1 UN Security Council Virtual Open Debate on International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism 20 Years After the Adoption of Resolution 1373, S/2021/48, 15 January 2021, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-2021-48.php (all internet references were accessed in June 2021).

2 UNSC Resolution 2462, 28 March 2019; UNSC Resolution 2482, 19 July 2019.

3 UN, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.

4 UNSC Resolution 1373, 28 September 2001.

5 UNSC Resolution 1267, 15 October 1999.

6 UNSC Resolution 1333, 19 December 2000.

7 UNSC Resolution 1390, 28 January 2002.

8 UNSC Resolution 2253, 17 December 2015.

9 UNSC Resolution 2368, 20 July 2017; UNSC Resolution 2255, 22 December 2015.

10 For explanation of terms at the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, see Assets Freeze: Explanation of Terms, 24 February 2015, available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/eot_assets_freeze_-_english.pdf.

11 UNSC Resolution 2368, above note 9, para. 64.

12 UNSC Resolution 2368, above note 9, para. 20 and UNSC Resolution 2462, above note 2, para. 3.

13 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197 (entered into force 10 April 2002) (ICSFT).

14 ICSFT, ibid., Art. 2.

15 UNSC Resolution 2462, para. 5.

16 On the rationale, see Financial Action Task Force, Guidance on Criminalizing Terrorist Financing, October 2016, Recommendation 5, paras 19–20, available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-Criminalising-Terrorist-Financing.pdf. See also, for example, UNSC Resolution 2253, 17 December 2015, para. 17; UNSC Resolution 2322, 12 December 2016, para. 6; UNSC Resolution 2368, above note 9, para. 18.

17 UNSC, Letter dated 3 June 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2020/493, 3 June 2020, available at: https://www.undocs.org/en/S/2020/493, p. 9.

18 Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action, July 2013, available at: https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/CounterTerrorism_Study_Full_Report.pdf, pp. 26–28.

19 Council of the EU, “Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism”, 2001/931/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 344/93, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001E0931&from=EN.

20 Ibid., Art. 3. This is implemented by Council of the EU, “Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities with a View to Combating Terrorism”, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 344/70, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R2580&from=GA, which, in turn, is implemented by Council of the EU, “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2021/138 of 5 February 2021 Implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities with a View to Combating Terrorism, and Repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1128”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 43/1, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32021R0138.

21 See Council of the EU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 of 20 September 2016 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and Persons, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them and Repealing Common Position 2002/402/CFSP, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016D1693-20201021; Council of the EU, Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Organisations, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02002R0881-20210414.

22 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693, ibid., Art. 3(3) and (4); Council of the EU, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 of 20 September 2016 Imposing Additional Restrictive Measures Directed Against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and Natural and Legal Persons, Entities or Bodies Associated with Them, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R1686-20200730.

23 Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, above note 20, Art. 10; Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, above note 21, Art. 11; Council Regulation (EU) No 2016/1686, ibid., Art. 18.

24 For some examples, see K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18.

25 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Executive Order 13224, 23 September 2001, section 2(a), available at: https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., section 3.

28 UNSC, Letter Dated 18 January 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2016/49, 20 January 2016, para. 415, available at: https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Global-Implementation-Survey-1373_EN.pdf.

29 Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 (Nigeria), available at: http://placng.org/lawsofnigeria/laws/terrorism_bill.pdf.

30 European Parliament and the Council of the EU, “Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 88/6, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0541, Art. 4(b).

31 K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18.

32 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Australia) (Australian Criminal Code), div. 102.6(2), available at: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00235. See K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18, p. 45.

33 Australian Criminal Code, ibid., div. 102.7.

34 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 United States Code (USC) § 1189.

35 United States Code 18 USC § 2339B.

36 United States Code 18 USC § 2339A.

37 18 USC § 2339B, above note 35.

38 UNSC Resolution 2178, 24 September 2014, para. 5.

39 Ibid., preamble.

40 Ibid., para. 6.

41 Australian Criminal Code, above note 32, divs 119.1, 117.1 and 100.1; Ball, Petra and Zegenhagen, Yvette, “Common Article 1 and Counter-Terrorism Legislation”, in Massingham, Eve and McConnachie, Annabel (eds), Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law, Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames, 2021, p. 189Google Scholar.

42 Jessica Burniske, Dustin Lewis and Naz Modirzadeh, Suppressing Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action: A Provisional Framework for Analyzing State Practice, 14 October 2015 (Suppressing FTFs), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673502, p. 23.

43 UN Doc. S/2016/49, above note 28, para. 438.

44 Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (United Kingdom), sections 58B and 58C, available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/3/contents/enacted/data.htm. See also Emanuela-Chiara Gillard and Nathalie Weizmann, “Humanitarian Relief in Situations of Armed Conflict”, in Robin Geiss and Nils Melzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the International Law of Global Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, p. 525.

45 UK Parliament, Commons Chamber, Consideration of Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, Debate, 11 September 2018, available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-09-11/debates/156B51AC-2504-442B-BEE4-02B6E2FBB5D5/Counter-TerrorismAndBorderSecurityBill#contribution-66ACFAF0-3DB0-4D06-8375-22B5CF7A689B. Note Mr Ben Wallace, Minister for Security and Economic Crime, column 658: “I fear that if we do not legislate, we will not be able to prosecute those people coming back.”

46 Australian Criminal Code, above note 32, div. 119.2; P. Ball and Y. Zegenhagen, above note 41, pp. 188–189.

47 Lov om ændring af straffeloven og om ophævelse af Lov, hvorved det forbydes fra dansk Territorium at understøtte krigsførende Magter [Act Amending the Penal Code and Repealing the Act Prohibiting Danish Territory from Supporting Warring Powers] (Denmark), Law No. 642 of 9 June 2016, available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2016/642.

48 Christophe Paulussen and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “Staying in an Area Controlled by a Terrorist Organisation: Crime or Operational Necessity?”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 11 January 2021, available at: https://icct.nl/publication/staying-in-an-area-controlled-by-a-terrorist-organisation-crime-or-operational-necessity/.

49 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, October 2015, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/applicability-ihl-terrorism-and-counterterrorism.

50 ICRC, Statement to the UNSC Debate: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts: International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism 20 Years After the Adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001), 12 January 2021, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/counter-terrorism-measures-must-not-restrict-impartial-humanitarian-organizations.

51 Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, Médecins Sans Frontières, Statement on IHL & Counter-Terrorism: Tensions and Challenges for Medical Humanitarian Organizations, 2 June 2016, available at: https://msf-analysis.org/ihl-counter-terrorism-tensions-challenges-medical-humanitarian-organizations/.

52 Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, An Analysis of Contemporary Anti-Diversion Policies and Practices of Humanitarian Organizations: Research and Policy Paper, May 2014, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/analysis-contemporary-anti-diversion-policies-and-practices-humanitarian-organizations.

53 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Humanitarian Action and Non-State Armed Groups: The International Legal Framework, Chatham House, London, February 2017, available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-02-02-humanitarian-action-non-state-armed-groups-gillard.pdf, p. 7.

54 Gillian McCarthy, Adding to the Evidence: The Impacts of Sanctions and Restrictive Measures on Humanitarian Action, VOICE, March 2021, available at: https://gisf.ngo/resource/adding-to-the-evidence-the-impact-of-sanctions-and-restrictive-measures-on-humanitarian-aid/, p. 7.

55 For listing criteria, see UNSC Resolution 2368, above note 9, paras 2–4; Alice Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter: Safeguarding Humanitarian Action, International Peace Institute, 19 December 2019 (A. Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter), available at: https://www.ipinst.org/2019/12/making-sanctions-smarter-safeguarding-humanitarian-action, p. 3; Dustin Lewis, Naz Modirzadeh and Gabriella Blum, Medical Care in Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law & State Responses to Terrorism, Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, September 2015 (Medical Care in Armed Conflict), available at: https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/medical-care-in-armed-conflict-international-humanitarian-law-and-state-responses-to-terrorism.

56 Supreme Court of the United States, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 22 (2010), available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf.

57 Marine Buissonniere, Sarah Woznik, Leonard Rubenstein and Julie Hannah, The Criminalization of Healthcare, Safeguarding Health in Conflict, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and University of Essex, June 2018, available at: https://www1.essex.ac.uk/hrc/documents/54198-criminalization-of-healthcare-web.pdf.

58 D. Lewis, N. Modirzadeh and G. Blum, Medical Care in Armed Conflict, above note 55, chapter 5; see also Alice Debarre, Safeguarding Medical Care and Humanitarian Action in the UN Counterterrorism Framework, International Peace Institute, 17 September 2018, available at: https://www.ipinst.org/2018/09/safeguarding-humanitarian-action-in-un-counterterrorism-framework.

59 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice: Accountability for ISIS Crimes in Iraq, 5 December 2017, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/05/flawed-justice/accountability-isis-crimes-iraq; Maya Alleruzzo and Salar Salim, “Iraq's IS Trials Bring Swift Verdicts, Almost All Guilty”, AP, 30 April 2018, available at: www.apnews.com/25a655d5b3cb47c5a0251f596855c98f/Iraq's-IS-trials-bring-swift-verdicts,-almost-all-guilty.

60 United States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), available at: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2579725/united-states-v-shah/.

61 Jessica Burniske, Naz Modirzadeh and Dustin Lewis, Counter-Terrorism Laws and Regulations: What Aid Agencies Need to Know, Humanitarian Practice Network, London, November 2014, available at: https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/NP_79_crc_string_FINAL.pdf, p. 10.

62 For examples of such donor conditions, see Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, An Analysis of Contemporary Counterterrorism-related Clauses in Humanitarian Grant and Partnership Agreement Contracts, May 2014, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CHE_Project_-_Counterterrorism-related_Humanitarian_Grant_Clauses_May_2014.pdf.

63 G. McCarthy, above note 54, p. 7. For illustrations of European donor clauses, see Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara, Goswami, Sangeeta and Deventer, Fulco van, “Screening of Final Beneficiaries – A Red Line in Humanitarian Operations. An Emerging Concern in Development Work”, International Review of the Red Cross, 2021CrossRefGoogle Scholar, in this edition.

64 USAID, Certifications, Assurances, Representations, and Other Statements of the Recipient, May 2020, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/303mav.pdf, p. 4. Some exceptions are also laid out.

65 USAID, Standard Provisions for U.S. Nongovernmental Organizations, May 2020, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/303maa.pdf, p. 12.

66 K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18, pp. 47–70.

67 Obi Anyadike, “Aid Workers Question USAID Counter-Terror Clause in Nigeria”, The New Humanitarian, 5 November 2019, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/11/05/USAID-counter-terror-Nigeria-Boko-Haram.

68 Under the principle of neutrality, humanitarian actors “must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature”. Independence is defined as autonomy “from the political, economic, military, or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented”. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Practitioner's Manual, Version 2, December 2014, p. 19.

69 Naz Modirzadeh, Comment on the Pilot Empirical Survey Study on the Impact of Counterterrorism Measures on Humanitarian Action, March 2017 (Comment on the Pilot Empirical Survey Study), available at: http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2017/03/Comment-on-the-Pilot-Empirical-Survey-Study-2017.pdf, p. 73; A. Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter, above note 55.

70 K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18; E.-C. Gillard and N. Weizmann, above note 44; Stuart Gordon and Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Counter-Terrorism, Bank De-Risking and Humanitarian Response: A Path Forward, Humanitarian Policy Group, August 2018, available at: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/12368.pdf.

71 Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Resolution 1526 (2004), UN Doc. S/2017/35, 13 January 2017, para. 71.

72 G. McCarthy, above note 54, p. 7.

73 A. Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter, above note 55, p. 10.

74 K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18.

75 UK HM Treasury and Home Office, National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2020 (Report, December 2020), available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/945411/NRA_2020_v1.2_FOR_PUBLICATION.pdf, p. 127.

76 J. Burniske, D. Lewis and N. Modirzadeh, Suppressing FTFs, above note 42.

77 See E.-C. Gillard and N. Weizmann, above note 44.

78 C. Paulussen and E.-C. Gillard, above note 48.

79 See N. Modirzadeh, Comment on the Pilot Empirical Survey Study, above note 69.

80 K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18, p. 84; A. Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter, above note 55, p. 3.

81 See Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict series of publications on counterterrorism measures and humanitarian action, available at: https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/publications#pilac-publications.

82 See, for example, K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 18; Norwegian Refugee Council, Principles under Pressure: The Impact of Counterterrorism Measures and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism on Principled Humanitarian Action, 12 June 2018, available at: https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/principles-under-pressure/; International Peace Institute, range of publications on sanctions, counterterrorism measures and humanitarian action, available at: https://www.ipinst.org/tag/humanitarian-affairs; Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay Between Sanctions, Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action, Chatham House, London, August 2017 (Recommendations for Reducing Tensions); Sara Pantuliano, Kate Mackintosh, Samir Elhawary and Victoria Metcalfe, Counter-Terrorism and Humanitarian Action: Tensions, Impact and Ways Forward, HPG Policy Brief 43, Humanitarian Policy Group, London, October 2011, available at: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/7347.pdf; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/75/337, 3 September 2020, available at: https://undocs.org/A/75/337.

83 See, for example, International Peace Institute, Safeguarding the Space for Principled Humanitarian Action in Counterterrorism Contexts, 23 May 2018, available at: https://www.ipinst.org/2018/05/poc-counterterrorism-contexts#3; Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations, Record of the Fourth Retreat on International Humanitarian Law: Safeguarding the Humanitarian Space in the Context of Sanctions Regimes and Counter-Terrorism Measures, UN Doc. A/74/857 S/2020/403, 2–3 March 2020, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3862098?ln=en.

84 See, for example, Peter Maurer, ICRC President, “Combatting Terrorism Should Not Come at the Expense of Humanitarian Action or Principles” (Speech, UN General Assembly High-Level Side Event on Counter-Terrorism Frameworks and Sanctions Regimes: Safeguarding Humanitarian Space, 26 September 2019), available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/combatting-terrorism-should-not-come-expense-humanitarian-action-or-principles; Briefing by ICRC President Peter Maurer and Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School Naz Modirzadeh, UN Doc. S/PV.8499, 1 April 2019. In 2021, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate will issue a new report on States’ counterterrorism legislation compliance with IHL and the impact of counterterrorism measures on humanitarian activities.

85 Security Council Report, Combatting Financing of Terrorism Open Debate, 27 March 2019, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2019/03/combatting-financing-of-terrorism-open-debate.php.

86 Security Council Report, International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime, 19 July 2019, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2019/07/international-terrorism-and-transnational-organised-crime.php.

87 The outcome has, however, been criticized as “fail[ing] to effectively mitigate against its potential impacts on humanitarian action and humanitarians’ longstanding concerns”, according to Scott Paul and Kathryn Achilles, “Correcting Course: Avoiding the Collision Between Humanitarian Action and Counterterrorism”, in Just Security, 23 May 2019, available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/64158/correcting-course-avoiding-the-collision-between-humanitarian-action-and-counterterrorism/.

88 UNSC Resolution 2178, above note 38, para. 5.

89 See AP I, Art. 70 and 81.

90 See Nathalie Weizmann, “Ensuring Respect for IHL as it Relates to Humanitarian Activities”, in Eve Massingham and Annabel McConnachie (eds), Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law, Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames, 2021, pp. 201–202.

91 See ICRC, Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention, 2017, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1A35EE65211A18AEC12581150044243A, Art. 2, para. 238.

92 Daniel H. Joyner, “What Were the Implications of the Actions of the UN Security Council?”, in Daniel H. Joyner (ed.), Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law: From Confrontation to Accord, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016, pp. 195–198. See also Security Council Report, The UN Security Council Handbook: A User's Guide to Practice and Procedure, New York, 2019, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/the-un-security-council-handbook-by-scr-1.pdf.

93 Zimmermann, Andreas, “Humanitarian Assistance and the Security Council”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2017, pp. 3–23 and p. 16CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Joyner, Daniel H., Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law: From Confrontation to Accord, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, p. 198CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On how the absence of the term “decides” should not prejudge the legally binding character of the Council's formulation, see Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet and Mathias Forteau (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. 1, Economica, Paris, 2005, p. 915. According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), “[i]n view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.” ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, paras 113–114.

94 Naz Modirzadeh and Dustin Lewis, Taking into Account the Potential Effects of Counterterrorism Measures on Humanitarian and Medical Activities, Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, May 2021 (Taking into Account), available at: http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2021/05/Taking-Into-Account.pdf, pp. 24–25.

95 For the types of counterterrorism measures that both paragraphs 5 and 6 cover, see Taking into Account, ibid., pp. 32–33.

96 Security Council Report, Special Research Report No. 1: Security Council Action Under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities, 23 June 2008, available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-c-glkwlemtisg-b-4202671.php, p. 10.

97 Comparison between relevant provisions of resolutions 2462 and 2482:

98 Leiæ, Johann Ruben and Paulus, Andreas, “Miscellaneous Provisions, Article 103”, in Simma, Bruno, Khan, Daniel-Erasmus, Nolte, Georg, Paulus, Andreas and Wessendorf, Nikolai, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, para. 38Google Scholar.

99 A peremptory norm of general international law is defined as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Art. 53. Peremptory norms protect the values and interests that are fundamentally important to the international community as a whole: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment (Trial Chamber), (10 December 1999), paras 153–156.

100 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 257; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and others, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 14 January 2000, para. 520; Marco Sassoli, “State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 84, No. 846, June 2002, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/401_434_sassoli.pdf, p. 414; Luigi Condorelli and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l'obligation des États de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire en toutes circonstances”, in Christophe Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1984, pp. 33–34; Alexander Orakhelashvili, “The Identification of Peremptory Norms”, in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed.), Peremptory Norms in International Law, Oxford University Press Online, January 2009, p. 61.

101 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC I), Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC II), Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC III), and Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV).

102 Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Provisional Measures) (Order of 8 April 1993), ICJ Rep 3 1993, para. 100. See also Concurring Opinion of Sir Nigel Rodley, Human Rights Committee, Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium (Communication No. 1472/2006), UN Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (22 October 2008); Anne Peters, “Ch.V The Security Council, Functions and Powers, Article 25”, in B. Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, para. 19; European Court of First Instance, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, T-315/01, Judgment, 21 September 2005, para. 230.

103 Orakhelashvili, Alexander, “The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2005, pp. 66–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

104 Gasser, Hans-Peter, “Collective Economic Sanctions and International Humanitarian Law – An Enforcement Measure Under the United Nations Charter and the Right of Civilians to Immunity: An Unavoidable Clash of Policy Goals?”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 56, 1996, pp. 871–904 and p. 881Google Scholar.

105 A. Peters, above note 102.

106 Johann Ruben Leiæ and Andreas Paulus, “Miscellaneous Provisions, Article 103”, in B. Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, para. 18. See also Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, “Is the UN Security Council Bound by Human Rights Law?”, ASIL Proceedings, Vol. 103, 2009, p. 202Google Scholar.

107 European Court of Human Rights, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Application No. 27021/08, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 7 July 2011, para. 102.

108 It is worth noting that Art. 21 of the ICSFT provides that “[n]othing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular… international humanitarian law…”.

109 Taking into Account, above note 94, p. 38.

110 This section focuses on IHL rules applicable in NIAC since this is generally the type of armed conflict to which designated armed groups are a party. However, there may be circumstances in which IHL rules applicable in international armed conflict will govern the actions of armed groups (see, for example, Dapo Akande, “Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts”, in Elizabeth Wilmshurt (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132573, pp. 64–65; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 25 July 1999, para. 137 on State “overall control” over the group; or Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Art. 1(4)). Importantly, many of the same rules of IHL are applicable in any type of armed conflict as a matter of customary IHL.

111 See ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016, Art. 3 (2016 Commentary on GC I), para. 736.

112 Common article 3 to the GC; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II), Art. 18.

113 2016 Commentary on GC I, common article 3, above note 111.

114 2016 Commentary on GC I, common article 3, above note 111, paras 792–793.

115 2016 Commentary on GC I, common article 3, above note 111. para. 796.

116 For NIAC, AP II, Art. 3(2) and Yves Sandoz et al. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, 1987, paras 4502–4503 (Commentary on AP I and Commentary on AP II). See also ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Rep 1986, p. 14, para. 242; UN General Assembly Resolution 2675(XXV), 9 December 1970.

117 2016 Commentary on GC I, above note 111, paras 804–805; ICRC, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, 1952, p. 58; Commentary on AP II, above note 116, para. 4892.

118 Common article 3 to the GC.

119 2016 Commentary on GC I, above note 111, para. 864.

120 2016 Commentary on GC I, above note 111, para. 867.

121 In 2014, the UNSC, for the first time, overrode the requirement of State consent in UNSC Resolution 2165 (2014), 14 July 2014 by authorizing UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners to use routes and border crossings to deliver humanitarian assistance throughout Syria.

122 Michael Bothe, “Relief Actions: The Position of the Recipient State”, in Frits Kalshoven (ed.), Assisting the Victims of Armed Conflict and Other Disasters: Papers Delivered at the International Conference on Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict, The Hague, 22–24 June 1988, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 95.

123 Verbatim Record of the 8423rd Meeting of the UNSC, UN Doc. S/PV.8423, 13 December 2018.

124 Commentary on AP I, above note 116, paras 2805 and 4885; Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldermar Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts – Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague/Boston, 2013, p. 485; Akande, Dapo and Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara, “Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict”, International Law Studies, Vol. 92, 2016, pp. 492–493Google Scholar; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary Or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc. A/73/314, 7 August 2018, para. 23.

125 Humanitarian relief operations distribute items essential for survival, depend on the local conditions, and typically include water, food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter, fuel for heating, and objects needed for religious worship.

126 GC IV, Art. 59; AP I, Arts 70 and 71; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1, pp. 193–203 (rules 55–56).

127 Commentary on AP I, above note 116, para. 2896. See 2016 Commentary on GC I, above note 111, paras 819–820, which distinguishes humanitarian relief from broader assistance activities.

128 M. Bothe, K. Partsch and W. Solf, above note 124, p. 487.

129 GC IV, Art. 59; AP I, Art. 70(3)(a).

130 AP I, Art. 70(3)(b).

131 Found in common article 3 to the GC and AP II, Art. 18. For relevant IHL rules applicable to third States in international armed conflict, see GC IV, Arts 23 and 59 and AP I, Arts 70 and 81. See also Weizmann, above note 90.

132 2016 Commentary on GC I, common Art. 3, above note 111, para. 840.

133 Common article 1 to the GC and 2016 Commentary on GC I, above note 111, paras 153–173.

134 See Dapo Akande and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict, 2016 (Oxford Guidance), para. 116; and, for example, United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), 12 May 1999, para. 36; CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003, paras 30–34; CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000, para. 39.

135 See Oxford Guidance, above note 134, para. 117; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10).

136 Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 600.

137 Common article 3 to the GC; AP II, Art. 7. See also 2016 Commentary on GC I, common article 3, above note 111, paras 731 and 749 and Commentary to AP II, paras 4633 and 4635. Art. 8 of AP I defines the wounded and sick as: “persons, whether military or civilian, who, because of trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or disability, are in need of medical assistance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility. These terms also cover maternity cases, new-born babies and other persons who may be in need of immediate medical assistance or care, such as the infirm or expectant mothers, and who refrain from any act of hostility.” The rule's application should not depend on the severity of the medical condition: 2016 Commentary on GC I, common article 3, above note 111, para. 741.

138 AP II, Arts 7 and 8; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 126, Rule 110.

139 2016 Commentary on GC I, common article 3, above note 111.

140 Common article 3 to the GC.

141 See AP II, Art. 9 and ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 126, Rule 26.

142 Punishment covers administrative and penal measures. Commentary on AP I, above note 116, Art. 10, para. 4691.

143 AP II, Art. 10(1) and ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 126, Rule 26.

144 AP II, Art. 10(2).

145 Commentary to AP II, Art. 10, para. 4686.

146 Commentary to AP II, Art. 10, para. 4687.

147 UNSC, Letter dated 3 June 2020, above note, 17 pp. 3 and 24.

148 Ibid., pp. 24–25.

149 Taking into Account, above note 94, p. 39.

150 Ibid., pp. 24–25.

151 See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (United States), General License No. 11 Regarding Certain Transactions in Support of Nongovernmental Organizations’ Activities in Yemen, 19 January 2021, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl11.pdf. Note the licence was revoked on 16 February 2021.

152 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (United States), Guidance Related to the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by Not-For-Profit Non-Governmental Organizations, 17 October 2014, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ngo_humanitarian.pdf.

153 Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on Humanitarian Assistance and International Humanitarian Law, 14487/19, Brussels, 25 November 2019, available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14487-2019-INIT/en/pdf.

154 Working Party on Public International Law, Third Report on the EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, June 2020, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/third-report-eu-guidelines-promoting-compliance-international-humanitarian-law, p. 20.

155 A. Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter, above note 55, p. 3.

156 ICRC, Call for Input – UN Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (CT) – Thematic Report to the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly, 2020, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Terrorism/SR/GA75/ICRC-GA75CT.docx.

157 E.-C. Gillard, Recommendations for Reducing Tensions, above note 82, p. 7.

158 Justine Walker, Risk Management Principles Guide for Sending Humanitarian Funds into Syria and Similar High-Risk Jurisdictions, May 2020, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/200526-risk-management-guide_en_0.pdf, p. 18.

159 European Parliament and the Council of the EU, “Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 88/6, 15 March 2017, Recital 38, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0541.

160 European Commission, Report to the European Parliament and the Council Based on Article 29(1) of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA (Report, 30 September 2020), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/report_on_transposition_of_directive_2017.541.on_combatting_terrorism.pdf, pp. 6–7.

161 Law No. 003/PR/2020 “Portant Répression des Actes de Terrorisme en République du Tchad”, 28 April 2020, available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica/Loi_terrorisme_du_Tchad_2020.pdf, Arts 2(8) and 10.

162 Republic of the Philippines, An Act to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Terrorism, thereby Repealing Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the “Human Security Act of 2007”, Republic Act No. 11479, available at: https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/06jun/20200703-RA-11479-RRD.pdf.

163 Ibid., sections 3(e), 12 and 13. See also Republic of the Philippines, Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Council, The 2020 Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 11479, otherwise known as The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, rule 4.14, available at: https://www.icnl.org/resources/library/implementing-rules-and-regulations-of-republic-act-no-11479-anti-terrorism-act. The Anti-Terrorism Council determines whether an organization is a State-recognized impartial humanitarian partner or organization in conformity with IHL; it may involve other parties to assist and make recommendations in this regard.

164 Federal Negarit Gazette of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1176/2020, 25 March 2020.

165 “Arrêté fédéral portant approbation et mise en œuvre de la Convention du Conseil de l'Europe pour la prévention du terrorisme et de son Protocole additionnel et concernant le renforcement des normes pénales contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé”, 5 October 2020, FF 2020 7651, Art. 260ter.

166 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (New Zealand), section 10(1), available at: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/latest/whole.html#DLM152716.

167 Ibid., section 10(3).

168 18 USC § 2339A, above note 36; 18 USC § 2339B, above note 35.

169 Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill as amended (United Kingdom), HL Bill (2018) 153, Chapter 1, available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017-2019/0153/18153.pdf.

170 Australian Criminal Code, above note 32, div. 119.2(3)(a).

171 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2021/423, 3 May 2021, p. 16.

172 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/40/52 (1 March 2019), para. 22, available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/40/52.

173 UN General Assembly Resolution 75/291, 2 July 2021, para. 109.

174 UN General Assembly Resolution 73/174, 17 January 2019.

175 Compendium of the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, UN Doc. A/69/941, 12 June 2015, p. 49.

176 Although this Somalia sanctions regime is not explicitly connected to counterterrorism, one of the bases for listing is an affiliation to groups designated under the 1267 regime. The UNSC sanctions regime for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) allows case-by-case humanitarian exemptions on request; the UNSC sanctions regime for Yemen allows case-by-case humanitarian exemptions from all its measures – arms embargo, travel ban and financial sanctions. At present the Yemen regime only lists individuals. On the DPRK, see UNSC Resolution 2397/2017, 22 December 2017; on Yemen, see UNSC Resolution 2564/2021, 25 February 2021. Exemption requests under UN sanctions have been described as time-consuming, complex, unpredictable, and limited in time and scope. See Rebecca Brubacker and Sophie Huvé, UN Sanctions and Humanitarian Action, United Nations University, January 2021, p. 7.

177 UNSC Resolution 2551(2020), 12 November 2020, para. 22.