Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 June 2014
Many aid agencies and commentators suggest that humanitarian principles are of little value to the humanitarian crises of today. However, through profiling the experience of the Lebanese Red Cross, this article highlights the enduring value and impact of the application of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Fundamental Principles as effective operational tools for acceptance, access and safety. Having suffered a series of security incidents during the civil war and subsequent disturbances and tensions, this National Society deliberately sought to increase its acceptance amongst different groups. One of the approaches used was the systematic operational application of the Fundamental Principles. Today, the Lebanese Red Cross is the only public service and Lebanese humanitarian actor with access throughout the country. This article seeks to address the relative absence of attention to how humanitarian organisations apply humanitarian principles in practice – and their responsibility and accountability to do so – by describing the systematic approach of the Lebanese Red Cross.
1 Alfred B. Prados, ‘Lebanon’, CRS Report for Congress RL33509, Congressional Research Service, 2007, p. 4, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33509.pdf (All internet references were accessed in March 2014, unless otherwise stated).
2 Rebecca A. Hopkins, ‘Lebanon and the uprising in Syria: issue for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2012, pp. 7–11, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42339.pdf.
3 The Safer Access Framework is a tool and approach used by National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to increase their acceptance, security and access to vulnerable people and communities. See www.icrc.org/saferaccess.
4 This model has since been adapted slightly in the Safer Access guide. The modified diagram (‘the Safer Access Cycle’) and explanation can be found at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2013/safer-access-a-guide-for-all-national-societies.pdf, pp. 39–45.
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6 International Federation of the Red Cross, ‘The seven Fundamental Principles’, available at: www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-principles/.
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8 See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Signatories of the Code of Conduct, available at: https://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/code-of-conduct/Code%20of%20Conduct%20UPDATED_APRIL%202014.pdf (last visited April 2014).
9 ICRC, Safer Access: a Guide for All National Societies, Geneva, October 2013, pp. 54–61Google Scholar, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2013/safer-access-a-guide-for-all-national-societies.pdf.
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13 F. Terry, above note 10.
14 J. Pictet, above note 7, p. 14.
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20 Ian Smillie, ‘The emperor's old clothes: the self-created siege of humanitarian action’, in A. Donini (ed.), above note 16.
21 A. Donini, above note 16, p. 345.
22 Arts. 12 of Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (hereinafter GC I) and of Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (hereinafter GC II); Art. 13 of Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (hereinafter GC III) and Art. 27 of Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 (hereinafter GC IV); Common Art. 3 to the Geneva Conventions; Art. 75(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977 (hereinafter AP I); Art. 4(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 (hereinafter AP II). See also ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law,Vol. I: Rules, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (hereinafter ICRC Customary Law Study), Rule 87.
23 Art. 9 of GC I, GC II and GC III; Art. 10 of GC IV; Common Art. 3 to the Geneva Conventions.
24 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 22, Rules 55 and 56. These specific rules are applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.
25 The term ‘armed conflict’ indicates a situation in which recourse is made to armed force between two or more states or to protracted armed violence between government authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a state. Whether or not a situation is classified as an armed conflict is important because, if it is, IHL applies and provides the normative framework against which the behaviour of the parties to the conflict is assessed. The term ‘internal disturbances and tensions’ refers to serious situations that fall short of the classification of armed conflict and to which IHL does not therefore apply. These situations may be of political, religious, racial, social, economic or other origin and include serious acts of violence affecting a large number of people. The relevant normative framework applicable to them is comprised of domestic law and international human rights law.
26 Safer Access guide, above note 3.
27 International Crisis Group, ‘Lebanon's Palestinian dilemma: the struggle over Nahr al-Bared’, Middle East Report No. 117, 1 March 2012, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/lebanon/117-lebanons-palestinian-dilemma-the-struggle-over-nahr-al-bared.aspx.
28 Jan Egeland, Adele Harmer and Abby Stoddard, ‘To stay and deliver: good practice for humanitarians in complex security environments’, Policy and Studies Series, OCHA, Policy Development and Studies Branch, 2011, p. 3.
29 Quote from a senior official of the Lebanese Red Cross.
30 Acceptance, deterrence and protection approaches to security are said to form a ‘security triangle’. Often used in combination, they constitute a range of security options for agencies that extend from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’. Acceptance is an approach to security that attempts to negate a threat by building relationships with local communities and relevant stakeholders in the operational area and by obtaining their consent for the organisation's presence and its work. Protection is an approach to security that emphasises the use of protective procedures and devices to reduce vulnerability to existing threats. Deterrence is an approach that attempts to deter a threat by posing a counter-threat, in its most extreme form through the use of armed protection. See Humanitarian Policy Group (HPN), ‘Operational security management in violent environments’, Good Practice Review No. 8, HPN, Overseas Development Institute, London, December 2010.
31 See, for example, J. Egeland, A. Harmer and A. Stoddard, above note 28, p. 19.