1 Joseph M. Siracusa, Nuclear Weapons: A Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 23.

2 Masao Tomonaga, “The Lifelong Health Effects of Atomic Bombs by Immediate DNA Damage”, presentation to the Second Intergovernmental Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo, 4–5 March 2013, available at: www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/hum/hum_tomonaga.pdf (all internet references were accessed in October 2015).

3 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Disarmament Timeline”, 19 August 2011, available at: www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nuclear-disarmament-timeline/.

4 Extended nuclear deterrence is the establishment of a so-called “nuclear umbrella”, under which a group of States that do not possess nuclear weapons claim protection from the nuclear weapons of another State. See Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1961, pp. 276–277.

5 The most recent evidence presented at the Intergovernmental Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons, held in Vienna in December 2014, is available online and covers, inter alia, climatic effects, long-term health effects, the risk of a nuclear detonation, emergency response capabilities and the blast effects a detonation. All presentations are available at: www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons-and-nuclear-terrorism/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/presentations/.

6 For an overview, see John Borrie and Tim Caughley (eds), Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian Lens, United Nations Publishers, Geneva, 2013.

7 Nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction have been mentioned in several International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent resolutions, but in recent times the Movement's voice has been most prominently developed through its strong Council of Delegates 2011: Resolution 1, “Working Towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”, Geneva, 26 November 2011 (2011 Resolution), and the detailed follow-up “Working Towards the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: Four-Year Action Plan”, Sydney, 17–18 November 2013 (2013 Resolution).

8 Junod, Marcel, “The Hiroshima Disaster (I)”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 64, No. 230, 1982Google Scholar, available at: www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_Sep-Oct-1982.pdf; Junod, Marcel, “The Hiroshima Disaster (II)”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 64, No. 231, 1982Google Scholar, available at: www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_Nov-Dec-1982.pdf.

9 See, e.g., Reaching Critical Will, Unspeakable Suffering: The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 2013, available at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/7422-unspeakable-suffering-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons.

10 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) won the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize for their work to highlight the health effects of the use of nuclear weapons and educate the public about these effects. More information is available at: www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1985/physicians-history.html.

11 Toon, Owen, Robock, Alan and Turco, Richard, “The Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War”, Physics Today, Vol. 61, No. 12, 2008CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 For example, in the August 2014 issue of The Diplomat, Zachary Keck employs many of the best-known arguments in support of the premise that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings saved millions of lives and have since prevented further use of atomic warheads. Zachery Keck, “How Hiroshima and Nagasaki Saved Millions of Lives”, The Diplomat, 7 August 2014, available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/how-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-saved-millions-of-lives/.

13 Ken Berry, Patricia Lewis, Benoit Pelopidas, Nikolai Sokov and Ward Wilson, Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2010, Appendices 1 and 2, “A More Detailed Analysis of the Nuclear Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, pp. 60–71.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 See, e.g., Ivo H. Daalder, “Stepping Down the Nuclear Ladder: How Low Can We Go?”, in Ivo H. Daalder and Terry Terriff (eds), Rethinking the Unthinkable: New Directions for Nuclear Arms Control, Routledge, New York, 2013, p. 81.

17 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) declares that “deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of NATO, 2010, p.14.

18 The former USSR carried out its first nuclear test on 29 August 1949, and the United Kingdom tested its first nuclear device on 3 October 1952.

19 G. Snyder, above note 4.

20 For an analysis of deterrence theory and its viability, see Huth, Paul K., “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, KY, 1996, pp. 81–87.

21 For an exploration of the security and military arguments relating to nuclear deterrence, see Robert Green, Security without Nuclear Deterrence, Astron Media, Christchurch, 2010.

22 Between 2007 and 2013, under the aegis of the “Nuclear Security Project”, former US secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former US secretary of state George P. Shultz, former US secretary of defence William J. Perry and former US senator Sam Nunn co-authored a series of op-eds/statements in The Wall Street Journal rebuffing many of their earlier claims about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, especially in today's context. See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation Work Today Doesn't Match the Urgency of the Threat”, The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2013; “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation”, The Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2011; “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent”, The Wall Street Journal, 19 January 2010; “Toward a Nuclear-Free World”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008; and “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007, all available at: www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/publications/wall-street-journal-op-eds.

23 See Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 The Doomsday Clock is a clock face which represents how close humanity is to global catastrophe. Formerly, if the Clock reached midnight it meant that nuclear war had commenced, but now the Clock encompasses not only the threat of nuclear war but also issues such as climate change.

25 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Doomsday Clock Timeline, available at: http://thebulletin.org/timeline.

26 Nuclear sharing occurs when non-nuclear weapons States host nuclear weapons on their territories.

27 See, e.g., Robock, Alan, “Nuclear Winter Is a Real and Present Danger”, Nature, Vol. 473, 2011CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Robock, Alan, Oman, Luke, Stenchikov, Georgiy L., Toon, Owen B., Bardeen, Charles and Turco, Richard P., “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, 2007CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 UNGA Res. 1(1), “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy”, 24 January 1946.

29 International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA: A Chronology”, available at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/npt_chrono.html#1940.

30 Dag Hammarskjöld, transcript of press conference, New York, 19 May 1955, in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, Vol. 2, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, p. 487.

31 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 729 UNTS 161, 1 July 1968 (entered into force 5 March 1970).

32 K. Berry, P. Lewis, B. Pelopidas, N. Sokov and W. Wilson, above note 13.

33 The preamble reads: “Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples …”.

34 The Conference on Disarmament is the sole negotiating forum for disarmament issues, including nuclear weapons.

35 UNGA Res. 67/56, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations”, UN Doc A/RES/67/56, 3 December 2012.

36 Reaching Critical Will stated that it will no longer monitor the CD because “after 17 years of inaction” in advancing nuclear disarmament, the group of States appears to work “in a vacuum”. Reaching Critical Will, March 2015 E-News, available at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latest-news/9565-march-2015-e-news.

37 See Acheson, Ray, “Editorial: Uprising”, NPT News in Review, Vol. 13, No. 17, 25 May 2015Google Scholar, available at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/NIR2015/No17.pdf.

38 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 1342 UNTS 137, 10 April 1981 (entered into force 2 December 1983).

39 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 2056 UNTS 241, 18 September 1997 (entered into force 1 March 1999) (Ottawa Treaty).

40 For an explanation of the challenges of progressing nuclear disarmament at the United Nations see Randy Rydell, Explaining Hammarskjöld's “Hardy Perennial”: The Role of the United Nations in Nuclear Disarmament, United Nations Association – UK, 2013.

41 For an exploration of why the atomic bombings were not dealt with under international law immediately after WWII, see Yuki Tanaka, “The Atomic Bombing, the Tokyo Tribunal and the Shimoda Case: Lesson for Anti-Nuclear Legal Movements”, in Yuki Tanaka, Tim McCormack and Gerry Simpson (eds), Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011. See also Falk, Richard, “The Shimoda Case; A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 59, No. 4, 1965CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Huber, Max, “La fin des hostiltés et les tâches futures de la Croix-Rouge” (“The End of Hostilities and the Future Tasks of the Red Cross”), International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 27, No. 321, 1945Google Scholar, available at: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&pdftype=1&fid=6675344&jid=IRC&volumeId=27&issueId=321&aid=6675340.

43 For a comprehensive overview of the ICRC's position on nuclear weapons and the Movement's five decades of resolutions and statements calling for their prohibition, see Bugnion, Francois, “The International Committee of the Red Cross and Nuclear Weapons: From Hiroshima to the dawn of the 21st Century”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 859, 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 International Committee of the Red Cross Appeal to the High Contracting Parties Signatory to the Geneva

Conventions for the Protection of the Victims of War: Atomic Weapons and Non-Directed Missiles, Geneva, 5 April 1950.

45 See F. Bugnion, above note 43.

46 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Arts 51(1), 51(2).

47 AP I, Art. 51(4).

48 AP I, Art. 51(5).

49 AP I, Art. 35(2).

50 See Lou Maresca, “The Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: The Key Issues and Perspective of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, in J. Borrie and T. Caughley (eds), above note 6, p. 137.

51 For example, Russia threatened to aim its nuclear warheads at the Ukraine in 2008, well before the controversial referendum that led to Crimea's incorporation into Russia in 2014. See Luke Harding, “Putin Issues Nuclear Threat to Ukraine over Plan to Host US Shield”, The Guardian, 13 February 2008, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/13/russia.putin; and the United States, through its nuclear posture review, stated that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will maintain them as a credible deterrent and the measure of the consequences for an attack launched by an adversary. See United States Government, Nuclear Posture Review, 2010, available at: www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.

52 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996 (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), available at: www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&case=95&code=unan&p3=2.

53 For an exploration of the campaign to establish the World Court Project, the progression of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in court, and the outcomes, see Catherine Dewes, “The World Court Project: The Evolution and Impact of an Effective Citizens’ Movement”, PhD thesis, University of New England, 1998.

54 The public record of oral statements presented during proceedings of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 52.

55 For a synopsis of New Zealand's challenge to French nuclear testing at the ICJ, see Arthur Watts, “Nuclear Tests Cases”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online ed., 2015.

56 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 52.

57 For example, see support for nuclear deterrence after the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion from leading UK expert Michael Quinlan, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, 1997.

58 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 52.

59 Christopher Weeramantry, Towards One World: The Memoirs of Judge C. G. Weeramantry, Vol. 3, Stamford Lake Publishers, Pannipitiya, 2014, p. 204.

60 For a view of international legal considerations on nuclear weapons outside of humanitarian law, see Gro Nystuen, “Legal Aspects of Nuclear Weapons: A ‘Bird's Eye View’ of International Law and Nuclear Weapons”, ILPI Vienna Conference Series Paper No. 6, 2014, available at: http://d2dczhp6dhfxqb.cloudfront.net/sites/30/2014/12/No-6-nuking-the-law.pdf.

61 Letter dated 17 December 2007 from the Permanent Representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, 62nd session, UN Doc. A/62/650, 2008.

62 See Treasa Dunworth, “Effective Measures Relating to Nuclear Disarmament: Some International Legal Issues”, discussion paper commissioned by the government of New Zealand, 2014.

63 Robock, Alan, Oman, Luke and Stenchikov, Georgiy L., “Nuclear Winter Revisited with a Modern Climate Model and Current Nuclear Arsenals: Still Catastrophic Consequences”, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 112, No. D13, 2007CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64 Jacob Kellenberger, “Bringing the Era of Nuclear Weapons to an End”, Statement to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, 20 April 2010, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons-statement-200410.htm, also available in the “Reports and Documents” section of this issue of the Review.

65 See A. Robock, L. Oman and G. L. Stenchikov, above note 63.

66 Ibid., p. 1.

67 Wright, Tim, “Negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention: Distant Dream or Present Possibility?”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009, p. 8Google Scholar. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is a global network of civil society groups whose efforts resulted in States agreeing the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines.

68 For an overview of the activities of ICAN, see the organization's website at: www.icanw.org.

69 ICAN is currently working to secure declarations by States in support of the Austrian Pledge from the Vienna Intergovernmental Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. See ICAN, “Humanitarian Pledge: Stigmatize, Prohibit and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons”, available at: www.icanw.org/pledge.

70 J. Kellenberger, above note 64.

71 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, Vol. 1, UN Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50, 2010, p. 12.

72 At the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the States Party to the NPT, 2nd Session, South Africa delivered for the first time a statement on behalf of the “humanitarian initiative”, available at: http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/secretariat/unoda/npt/second-session-of-the-preparatory-committee-2013/statements/.

73 2011 Resolution, above note 7.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 IPPNW, 20th World Congress Statement, 25 August 2012, available at: www.sfbaypsr.org/pdfs/HiroshimaCongressStatement0812.pdf?d0054e.

77 2013 Resolution, above note 7.

78 Ibid.

79 Robert Tickner, CEO of Australian Red Cross, attended this conference, and these are personal reflections from that experience.

80 The Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons Agenda is available at: www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/hum/program0226.pdf.

81 Espen Barth Eide, Chair's Summary, Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo, 5 March 2013, available at: www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/nuclear_summary/id716343/.

82 See Patricia Lewis and Heather Williams, “The Meaning of the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons”, in J. Borrie and T. Caughley (eds), above note 6.

83 Reaching Critical Will, Conference Report: Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 4–5 March 2013, available at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-2013/HINW-report.pdf.

84 Juan M. Gomez Robledo, Chair's Summary, Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Nayarit, 13–14 February 2014.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 See the overview by the Austrian government on the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, available at: www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons-and-nuclear-terrorism/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/.

88 For example, the Australian statement at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons outlined Australia's desire to keep nuclear weapons negotiations within the existing framework: “Australia is pursuing a path that offers the most practical and realistic chance for disarmament. To be effective, disarmament must be based on high-level political will, supported by practical, sustained efforts, which we are pursuing, including through implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan and our membership of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative.” Australian Statement at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 8–9 December 2014, available at: www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Statements/HINW14_Statement_Australia.pdf.

89 For an overview, see Nick Ritchie, “The Story So Far: The Humanitarian Initiative on the Impacts of Nuclear Weapons”, ILPI-UNIDIR Vienna Conference Series, 2014, available at: www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-story-so-far-en-616.pdf.

90 Helen Durham, “The Use of Nuclear Weapons and International Humanitarian Law”, presentation, Third Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons, Vienna, December 2015.

91 See J. M. Gomez Robledo, above note 84.

92 Sebastian Kurz, Austrian Pledge from the Third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, delivered Vienna, 2014.

93 Ibid.

94 ICAN, “33 Latin American and Caribbean States Endorse Austrian Pledge and Call for Negotiations on a Ban Treaty”, press release, 30 January 2015, available at: www.icanw.org/campaign-news/33-latin-american-and-caribbean-states-endorse-austrian-pledge-and-call-for-negotiations-on-a-ban-treaty/.

95 For more info on the Humanitarian Pledge, see ICAN, above note 69.

96 See UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, First Committee Press Releases, Draft Resolutions, Statements, Secretary-General's Reports, and Side Events, available at: www.un.org/disarmament/meetings/firstcommittee-68/.

97 See above note 28.

98 Switzerland, “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament”, First NPT Preparatory Committee, 2 May 2012.

99 New Zealand, “Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’, UNGA, 21 October 2013.”

100 Peter Maurer, “Nuclear Weapons: Ending a Threat to Humanity”, speech to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, 18 February 2015, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/nuclear-weapons-ending-threat-humanity, also available in the “Reports and Documents” section of this issue of the Review.

101 Ibid.

102 See Robock, Alan and Toon, Owen, “Self-Assured Destruction: The Climate Impact of Nuclear War”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 68, No. 5, 2012CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

103 P. Maurer, above note 100.