1 The authentic French text of Article 43 is identical in both the 1899 and the 1907 Hague Regulations. It reads that: ‘L'autorité du pouvoir légal ayant passé de fait entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays’. However, there is a slight difference in the English texts. While Article 43 of the 1899 Hague Regulations provides that: ‘The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’, the same article of the 1907 Hague Regulations stipulates that: ‘The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’.

2 On the epistemological level, the dualism based on this distinction is considered to derive from the Western philosophical tradition that has been premised upon the binary scheme (mind/body, objective/subjective, empirical/metaphysical, reality/appearance, and us/they). See Constable, Marianne, ‘Genealogy and jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law’, in Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994, pp. 555–556CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Fox, Gregory H., ‘The Occupation of Iraq’, in Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2005, p. 195Google Scholar.

4 See, for instance, Glahn, Gerhard von, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1957, pp. 27–37Google Scholar; and G. H. Fox, above note 3, p. 199.

5 The rule embodied in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations is a general rule in relation to the more detailed ones enumerated in the ensuing provisions of Section III of the Regulations. Even so, judicial practice and scholarly writings have occasionally invoked this general rule to deal with a particular issue that is governed by the specific provision. For instance, in the Value Added Tax case judgment, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that, even if the general ban on introducing new taxes may be inferred from Articles 48 and 49 of the Hague Regulations, exceptions can be made by applying the ‘necessity’ ground of maintaining ‘orderly government’ under Article 43, and this without needing to classify such taxes under the rubric of ‘other money contributions’ under Article 49: HCJ 69 + 493/81, Abu Aita [or Abu Ita] et al. v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region et al., 37(2) Piskei Din 197 (1983); English excerpt in Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, Vol. 13, 1983, p. 348 (hereafter Abu Aita case); and in Palestinian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 4, 1987–1988, pp. 186–209. See also Dinstein, Yoram, ‘Taxation under Belligerent Occupation’, in Jekewitz, Jürgen, Klein, Karl H., Kühne, Jörg D., Petersmann, Hans, and Wolfrum, Rüdiger (eds), Des Menschen Recht zwischen Freiheit und Verantwortung: Festschrift für Karl Josef Partsch zum 75. Geburtstag, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1989, pp. 122–123Google Scholar; Dinstein, Yoram, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 128CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Emmerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, J. P. Aillaud, Paris, 1835, pp. 178–179 and 230, paras. 150 (humane treatment of prisoners of war) and 200 (noting that, despite the right of the conqueror to seize the public property, the individuals retain their property). However, the law of occupation, as distinguished from the right of conquest, was yet to evolve. Nowhere in this treatise can we find any reference to the legal terminology of occupation. See also Benvenisti, Eyal, ‘The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation’, in Law and History Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2008, pp. 622, 624–625CrossRefGoogle Scholar (discussing Vattel's absence of distinction between an occupier and a conqueror).

7 While not providing a distinct legal regime of occupation as such, Rousseau considered war as a phenomenon that could only exist between governments, and stressed the immunity of the lives and property of private persons. He argued that: ‘War is therefore in no way a relation between a man and another man, but a relation between a state and another state, in which the individual persons are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers … Even in full-blown war, a just prince surely seizes, in an enemy state, all that appertains to public life, but he respects the person and property of the individuals’. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Contrat social ou principes du droit politique, 2nd edition, Bureaux de la Publication, Paris, 1865Google Scholar, Livre 1, IV (‘De l'esclavage’), p. 24 (translation from French by the present author). The original French text reads: ‘La guerre n'est donc point une relation d'homme à homme, mais une relation d'Etat à Etat, dans laquelle les particuliers ne sont ennemis qu'accidentellement, non point comme hommes, ni même comme citoyens, mais comme soldats … Même en pleine guerre, un prince juste s'empare bien, en pays ennemi, de tout ce qui appartient au public, mais il respecte la personne et les biens des particuliers’.

8 Georg F. von Martens, Precis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe, J. C. Dieterich, Göttingen, 1789, Vol. II, Livre VIII, in particular Chapter III, para. 234, pp. 343–344 (prohibition of attacks against women, children, and the aged), and para. 235, pp. 345–346 (protection of rights as prisoners of war for the vanquished soldiers, except by way of retaliation against ‘barbaric peoples’).

9 See, however, Karma Nabulsi's critique of the prevailing understanding that Rousseau was the founder of this key principle of the modern laws of war (distinction between combatants and non-combatants): Nabulsi, Karma, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 184–203CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing that Rousseau considered patriotism essential in his advocacy of the civil participation in just wars of self-defence).

10 This doctrine is named after J.-J. Rousseau and the French jurist Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis. It was also advocated by the French diplomat Talleyrand: E. Benvenisti, above note 6, p. 626. For Rousseau's argument, see J.-J. Rousseau, above note 7, Livre 1, IV, p. 24.

11 Schroeder, Paul W., The Transformation of European Politics: 1763–1848, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 72Google Scholar; Bhuta, Nehal, ‘The antinomies of transformative occupation’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2005, pp. 721, 730CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 See Martens, Fyodor F., La paix et la guerre: la Conférence de Bruxelles 1874; Droit et devoirs des belligérants (leur application pendant la guerre d'Orient 1874–1878); La Conférence de La Haye 1899, translated from Russian into French by Le Comte N. de Sancé, Arthur Rousseau, Paris, 1901, pp. 274–275Google Scholar.

13 N. Bhuta, above note 11; Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘Occupied zone: “a zone of reasonableness”?’, in Israel Law Review, Vol. 41, 2008, pp. 13, 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 The French Constitution of 3 September 1791, Title VI, first paragraph, available in English at: http://www.duke.edu/web/secmod/primarytexts/FrenchConstitution1791.pdf (last visited 13 April 2012).

15 M. Koskenniemi, above note 13, p. 30. However, this received understanding may be qualified by some unsavoury stories buried in archives. See Blanning, Timothy C. W., The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland 1792–1802, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983, p. 148 (discussing pillage, vandalism, and rape as booty of war in occupied Rhineland and Spain)Google Scholar; Blancpain, Marc, La vie quotidienne dans la France du Nord sous les occupations (1814–1944), Hachette, Paris, 1983, p. 21Google Scholar (describing crimes of rape, pillage, and vandalism that were returned in kind by the Cossacks and the Asian cavalry of the occupying Russian army in northern France), as cited in K. Nabulsi, above note 9, p. 24.

16 In the post-Napoleonic period, for some German states that had formed part of the Holy Roman Empire – such as Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, and Oldenburg – the new era provided the much-needed opportunity to restore political sovereignty and territories lost during the Rheinbund years. For other states, the era gave occasion to proceed with the integration of German-speaking states through the German Confederation. The Confederation model was favoured by states such as Saxony, particularly because it guaranteed the independence and sovereignty of its members: see Flockerzie, Lawrence J., ‘State-building and nation-building in the “Third Germany”: Saxony after the Congress of Vienna’, in Central European History, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1991, pp. 268, 276CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 See E. de Vattel, above note 6, Livre 2, para. 49.

18 E. Benvenisti, above note 6, pp. 623, 628. However, Croxton argues that the concept of sovereignty remained ambiguous for centuries after that point: Croxton, Derek, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the origins of sovereignty’, in International History Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1999, pp. 569–591CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 It ought to be added that, in view of the element of effective control, the legal regime of occupation was considered analogous to the much older legal regime of blockade: Spaight, James M., War Rights on Land, Macmillan, London, 1911, p. 328Google Scholar.

20 For the term ‘conservationist’ principle, see G. H. Fox, above note 3, pp. 199, 234–240.

21 Oppenheim, Lassa, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 2: War, Peace and Neutrality, ed. Lauterpacht, Hersch, 5th edition, Longmans, London, 1935, p. 344Google Scholar.

22 E. Benvenisti, above note 6, p. 630.

23 Heffter observed that: ‘Only if complete defeat of a state authority (debellatio) has been reached and rendered this state authority unable to make any further resistance, can the victorious side also take over the state authority, and begin its own, albeit usurpatory, state relationship with the defeated people. … Until that time, there can be only a factual confiscation of the rights and property of the previous state authority, which is suspended in the meantime’. Wilhelm Heffter, D. August, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, E. H. Schroeder, Berlin, 1844, pp. 220–221Google Scholar (translation from German by the present author). The original text reads: ‘Erst wenn eine vollständige Besiegung der bekriegten Staatsgewalt (debellatio) eingetreten und dieselbe zu fernerem Widerstande unfähig gemacht ist, kann sich der siegreiche Theil auch der Staatsgewalt bemächtigen, und nun ein eigenes, wiewohl usurpatorisches, Staatsverhältniß mit dem besiegten Volke beginnen. … Bis dahin findet lediglich eine thatsächliche Beschlagnahme der Rechte und des Vermögens der inzwischen suspendirten bisherigen Staatsgewalt Statt’ (all spellings as in the original).

24 G. F. von Martens, above note 8.

25 N. Bhuta, above note 11, pp. 726–727, n. 30.

26 See G. F. von Martens, above note 8, Livre VIII, Chapters III (‘De la manière de faire la guerre’) and IV (‘Des conventions qui se font avec l'ennemi dans le cours de la guerre’), pp. 339–369.

27 Ibid., Livre VIII, Chapter III, para. 238, pp. 348–349 (translated into English by the present author). The original French text reads: ‘Le motif pour lequel on a occupé une province ennemie décide surtout, si l'on se permet d'altérer plus ou moins le forme du gouvernement. L'ennemi n'est pas obligé de conserver la constitution du pays conquis, ni de lui laisser les droits & les privilèges que son Souverain lui a accordés …’. See also the extensive rights to take the property of the occupied or conquered territories: ibid., para. 239, p. 349, arguing that ‘the enemy is equally authorized to seize the property of their enemy … either the immovable property (Conquéte, Eroberung) or the movable property (Butin, Beute), not only 1) to obtain what is owed to it or an equivalent, but also 2) to compensate for the cost of the war, and 3) to oblige the enemy to consent to an equitable peace, and finally 4) to deprive the enemy of the desire or the forces to renew the insults that gave rise to the war’ (translated into English by the present author); the original reads: ‘L'ennemi est également autorisé à s'emparer des biens de l'ennemi … soit des biens immeubles (Conquéte, Eroberung), soit des biens meubles (Butin, Beute), tant 1) pour obtenir ce qui lui est dû ou un équivalent, que 2) pour se dédommager des frais de la guerre & 3) pour obliger l'ennemie à donner les mains à une paix équitable, enfin 4) pour ôter à l'ennemi l'envie ou les forces de renouveller les injures qui ont donné lieu à la guerre’.

28 N. Bhuta, above note 11, pp. 726–727, n. 30.

29 Challine, Paul, Le droit international public dans la jurisprudence française de 1789 à 1848, Domat-Montchrestien, Paris, 1934, pp. 122–124Google Scholar (referring to the Cour de cassation's ruling in 1841, according to which occupation could not abrogate the laws in force in the occupied territory), as cited in E. Benvenisti, above note 6, p. 628.

30 E. Benvenisti, above note 6, p. 634.

31 By the mid-nineteenth century, this ideology had become prevalent in most western European countries, with an emphasis on unencumbered rights of private property and free market: see Gray, Marion W., ‘“Modifying the traditional for the good of the whole”: commentary on state-building and bureaucracy in Nassau, Baden, and Saxony in the early nineteenth century’, in Central European History, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1991, pp. 293, 301CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 See, for instance, Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (respect for private property and the prohibition on confiscating private property).

33 K. Nabulsi, above note 9, pp. 158–174.

34 See Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles de 1874 sur le projet d'une convention internationale concernant la guerre, protocoles des séances plénières, protocoles de la Commission déléguée par la conférence, annexes (1874). As is well known, this humanitarian initiative made by Czar Alexander II of Russia was not ratified in the end.

35 K. Nabulsi, above note 9, p. 172. When employing the term ‘Grotian tradition of war’, she focuses her analysis on the making of laws of war from 1874 to 1949. Hence, she does not suggest that the seed for the conservationist principle of the law of occupation had already been sown in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia (1648).

36 Instructions for the Government Armies in the Field, issued as General Orders No. 100 of 24 April 1863 (Lieber Code), Article 3, (emphasis added).

37 See Röben, Betsy Baker, ‘The method behind Bluntschli's “modern” international law’, in Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002, pp. 249, 250–256CrossRefGoogle Scholar (exploring Lieber's influence on Bluntschli in devoting research to laws of war, and even to international law as a whole).

38 This analysis focuses on the negotiations that led to the adoption of the 1899 Hague Regulations, because Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations is identical to Article 43 of the 1899 Regulations in the authentic French text, though there are minor differences in the two English versions. See above note 1.

39 Authentic French text: ‘L'autorité du pouvoir légal étant suspendue et ayant passé de fait entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publique’.

40 The authentic French reads: ‘A cet effet, il maintiendra les lois qui étaient en vigueur dans le pays en temps de paix, et ne les modifiera, ne les suspendra ou ni les remplacera que s'il y a nécessité’.

41 As an aside, the textual interpretation of Article 43 of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations can lead to the view that constraints on the legislative power might apply only to such legislative measures to restore public order and civil life, but not to other measures. However, most writers agree that the limitations on the occupier's prescriptive powers under Article 43 relate to the entire gamut of legislation. See Schwenk, Edmund H., ‘Legislative power of the military occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations’, in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 54, 1945, p. 395CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Article 43 of The Oxford Manual of Land War (1880) provides that: ‘L'occupant doit prendre toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui pour rétablir et assurer l'ordre et la vie publique’ (‘[t]he occupant should take all due and needful measures to restore and ensure public order and public safety’). Article 44 of the Manual stipulates that: ‘L'occupant doit maintenir les lois qui étaient en vigueur dans le pays en temps de paix, et ne les modifier, ne les suspendre ou ne les remplacer que s'il y a nécessité’ (‘[t]he occupant should maintain the laws which were in force in the country in time of peace, and should not modify, suspend, or replace them, unless necessary’; available at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s database: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/140?OpenDocument (last visited 13 April 2012).

43 See the statement of the Baron de Bildt (Sweden and Norway), who referred to de Marten's view that it was important ‘to make sure that the obligations of the conqueror were limited and circumscribed’ (‘de trouver les obligations du vainqueur limitées et circonscrites’): Conférence Internationale de la Paix – La Haye 18 mai–29 juillet 1899 (1899), Sommaire général, troisième partie [Deuxième Comission], p. 120.

44 Ibid., pp. 120–121.

45 At the 8th session, held on 10 June 1899, unanimity was achieved with respect to the compromise clause proposed by Mr. Bihourd; ibid., pp. 126–127.

46 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the 1899 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899; and Article 43 of the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907.

47 See, inter alia, Christian Meurer, Die Völkerrechtliche Stellung der vom Feind Besetzten Gebiete, Mohr, Tübingen, 1915; and E. H. Schwenk, above note 41, p. 393.

48 E. H. Schwenk, above note 41, p. 393. For state practice, see the German occupation measures in Belgium during World War I, which were justified by interpreting the ‘concept of necessity’ exception very broadly. In a more recent example, this necessity ground was invoked by the Supreme Court of Israel to justify the introduction of VAT as a new tax in the occupied Palestinian territories, overriding the implications of Articles 48 and 49 of the Hague Regulations: Abu Aita case, above note 5, pp. 274 ff.

49 The ‘Iraq Occupied Territories Code’ (1915) that the British commander-in-chief promulgated was based on the civil and criminal codes of India. This initiated profound changes in the local laws and judiciary, which Rousseau described as ‘errements’ (‘errors’): Rousseau, Charles, Le droit des conflits armés, Pédone, Paris, 1983, p. 153Google Scholar, para. 99.

50 Ibid., p. 1258, para. 101C. See also Stibbe, Matthew, ‘The internment of civilians by belligerent states during the First World War and the responses of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2006, pp. 5–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 The ICRC's Draft International Convention on the Condition and Protection of Civilians of Enemy Nationality Who are on Territory Belonging to or Occupied by a Belligerent, which was submitted to the XVth International Red Cross Conference, Tokyo, in 1934: see Pictet, Jean S. (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, (IV) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, pp. 4–5Google Scholar. The Tokyo Draft Convention was adopted unanimously in Resolution XXXIX, entitled Projet de convention concernant la condition et la protection des civils de nationalité ennemie qui se trouvent sur le territoire d'un belligérant ou sur un territoire occupé par lui: see La Quinzième Conférence Internationale de la Croix-Rouge, tenue à Tokio, du 20 au 29 octobre 1934, Compte Rendu, pp. 262, 203–209 (for the full text of this draft Convention).

52 See Benvenisti, Eyal, The International Law of Occupation, 2nd edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004, pp. 32–44Google Scholar; Annette Becker, ‘The dilemmas of protecting civilians in occupied territory: the precursory example of World War I’, forthcoming issue.

53 C. Rousseau, above note 49, p. 140, para. 93; Ottolenghi, Michael, ‘The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: the implications for the international law of belligerent occupation’, in Fordham Law Review, Vol. 72, 2003–2004, pp. 2177 and 2188Google Scholar.

54 According to Charles Rousseau, the German occupying power issued the decree (arrêté) on 27 March 1917, which introduced the separation of administration between Flanders and Wallonia and created the Council of Flanders. He also refers to another anomalous practice of the Central Powers in Russia during World War I: the creation of the Council of Regency, which exercised the supreme power and which consisted of the Archbishop of Warsaw and two secular citizens; and the proclamation of independence of Ukraine by the pro-German Rada of Kiev: C. Rousseau, above note 49, p. 140, para. 93.

55 Visscher, Charles de, ‘L'occupation de guerre d'après la jurisprudence de la Cour de cassation de Belgique’, in Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 34, 1918, pp. 72–81Google Scholar, observing that ‘abuse [committed by the Occupying Power] does not exist only when, enacting the measures that exceeds its competence, the Occupying Power oversteps the objective limits of its provisional attributions: it also arises when the Occupying Power uses its powers for a purpose extraneous to the true objective of its mission in an occupied country’ (translated into English by the present author; the French text reads: ‘L'abus [commis par l'occupant] n'existe pas seulement quand, édictant des mesures qui excèdent sa compétence, l'occupant dépasse les limites objectives de ses attributions provisoires: il se présente également lorsque l'occupant use de ses pouvoirs dans un but et pour des motifs étrangers à l'objet véritable de sa mission en pays occupé’).

56 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 44–46.

57 See, for instance, Court of Appeal of Brussels, De Brabant and Gosselin v. T.& A. Florent, 22 July 1920, (1919–1922) 1 AD 463, No. 328; Court of Appeal of Liège, Mathot v. Longué, 19 February 1921, 1 AD 463, No. 329. Compare these with Court of Appeal of Liège, Bochart v. Committee of Supplies of Corneux, 28 February 1920, 1 AD 462, No. 327.

58 Mathot v. Longué case, above note 57.

59 See, for instance, the Bochart case, above note 57 (upholding the Occupying Power's legislative measure, the German Order of 8 August 1918, which was, even if taken pursuant to a personal profit of its own nationals, designed to regulate the high price of vegetables); and City of Malines v. Société Centrale pour l'Exploitation du Gaz, Belgian Court of Appeal, Brussels, 25 July 1925, reported in McNair, Arnold D. and Lauterpacht, H. (eds), Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases: 1925–1926, No. 362, (1929), p. 475Google Scholar (recognizing the legal authority of the Occupying Power to issue administrative decrees, which were partly responsible for increase in gas supply, as measures justified by the necessity for providing for the needs of the civilian population).

60 Mathot v. Longué case, above note 57, p. 464.

61 Ibid. The Court added that: ‘… it is unacceptable to say that by virtue of the [Hague] Convention the Occupying Power has been given any portion whatever of the legislative power … it appears from the text of the Convention itself and from the preliminary work that all that was intended … was to restrict the abuse of force by the Occupying Power and not to give him or recognize him as possessing any authority in the sphere of law … The law remains the apanage of the national authority exclusively, the Occupying Power possessing de facto power and nothing more’. See also De Brabant and Gosselin v. T. and A. Florent case, above note 57.

62 C. de Visscher, above note 55, pp. 72–81; E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 44–47, 194.

63 C. Rousseau, above note 49, pp. 139 and 153, paras. 92 and 99, and the cases cited therein.

64 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, p. 46.

65 Ibid., pp. 194–195.

66 See, for instance, Belgian Court of Cassation, In re Anthoine, 24 October 1940, [1919–1922] AD Case No. 151.

67 Article 428 of the Treaty of Versailles (1919). See Y. Dinstein, International Law of Belligerent Occupation, above note 5, p. 36 (contending that even the first phase of this occupation, which was predicated on the Armistice agreement, could be categorized as a ‘pacific (non-belligerent) occupation’). See also ibid., p. 270 (discussing the French and Belgian claim that their joint re-occupation of the Ruhr Valley in 1923 was based on Article 430 of the Treaty of Versailles).

68 Feilchenfeld, Ernst H., The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1942, p. 23Google Scholar, para. 93. According to Bhuta, ‘Feilchenfeld commented that the “old rules” [on occupation in the Hague Law] were essentially defunct by 1914, and that the only reason they were not denounced between 1918 and 1935 was that “they were not tested again through major occupations resulting from major wars”’: N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 733. However, the present author argues that this is an inaccurate understanding of Feilchenfeld's work: Feilchenfeld did not go so far as to contend that the Hague Law on occupation was obsolete by the start of World War I. What he emphasized was the absence in practice of the application of this normative framework in the interwar period.

69 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 60–72.

70 Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and its Interaction with International Human Rights Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, pp. 328–329CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Julius Stone contends that the Hague law of occupation survived the two world wars mainly because of ‘two contending imperatives: Allies' concern in both world wars to fix Germany with guilty violations of the rules, and Germany's desire … to exploit the great leeway for occupation machtpolitik [sic] left by the rules’: Stone, Julius, Legal Controls of International Conflict, Rinehard, New York, 1954, p. 727Google Scholar.

71 IMT, The Trial against Goering, et al., Judgment of 1 October 1946, International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, The Trial of the Major War Criminals, (1947), Vol. 1, at 64–65; reprinted in ‘Judicial decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), judgment and sentences’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 41, 1947, pp. 172, 248–249.

72 Ibid., (emphasis added).

73 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, p. 8; and G. von Glahn, above note 4, pp. 10–12.

74 E. Benvenisti, above note 6, p. 642.

75 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, preamble, third paragraph (emphasis added).

76 Stalin was said to have asserted candidly that ‘whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach’: Chesterman, Simon, ‘Occupation as liberation: international humanitarian law and regime change’, in Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2004, p. 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 734.

78 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 84–91.

79 See Ando, Niisuke, Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property in International Law: An Evaluation of US Practice in Japan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 87Google Scholar; E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 92–93; Cryer, Robert, ‘Of custom, treaties, scholars, and the gavel: the influence of the international criminal tribunals on the ICRC customary law study’, in Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, p. 241CrossRefGoogle Scholar, n. 14.

80 M. Koskenniemi, above note 13, p. 34.

81 McDougal, Myres S. and Feliciano, Florentino P., Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1961, p. 770Google Scholar. See also the previous UK Military Manual: United Kingdom War Office, The Law of War on Land, Being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, HMSO, London, 1958, p. 143, n. 1.

82 The juridical state of occupation was considered to have ended in 1952, when the legal character of the foreign (US)-stationed armed forces changed: after the status of forces agreement reached between West Germany and US, the continued stationing of the latter's army can be considered to have been based on the consent of the territorial government: S. Chesterman, above note 76, p. 55.

83 G. von Glahn, above note 4, pp. 276–285. Compare, however, Oppenheim, Lassa, International Law: A Treatise, 7th edition by Lauterpacht, H., Longmans, London, 1952, p. 553Google Scholar, para. 237a; Guggenheim, Paul, Traité de droit international public, Vol. II, Librairie de l'Université, Geneva, 1954, pp. 468–469Google Scholar; Y. Dinstein, International Law of Belligerent Occupation, above note 5, pp. 32–33.

84 Kelsen argued that: ‘By abolishing the last Government of Germany the victorious powers have destroyed the existence of Germany as a sovereign state. Since her unconditional surrender, at least since the abolishment of the Doenitz Government, Germany has ceased to exist as a state in the sense of international law. … the status of war has been terminated, because such a status can exist only between belligerent states’. Kelsen, Hans, ‘The legal status of Germany according to the Declaration of Berlin’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 39, No. 3, 1945, p. 519CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In another article, Kelsen reinforced his view: ‘… the four occupant Powers have assumed sovereignty over the former German territory and its population, though the term “sovereignty” was not used in the text of the Declaration [of Berlin, June 5, 1945]. … All this is in complete conformity with general international law, which authorizes a victorious state, after so-called debellatio of its opponent, to establish its own sovereignty over the territory and population of the subjugated state. Debellatio implies automatic termination of the state of war. Hence, a peace treaty with Germany is legally not possible. For a peace treaty presupposes the continued existence of the opponent belligerents as subjects of international law and a legal state of war in their mutual relations.’ Kelsen, Hans, ‘Is a peace treaty with Germany legally possible and politically desirable?’, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1947, p. 1188Google Scholar.

85 For a similar argument, see S. Chesterman, above note 76, p. 54; G. von Glahn, above note 4, pp. 275–286.

86 The Allies' confidence in the total defeat of Nazi Germany upon crossing the German border was partly accountable for their decision not to treat the law of occupation as the authority for occupation: E. Benvenisti, above note 52, p. 91.

87 In contrast, Hersch Lauterpacht attached importance to this unconditional surrender: L. Oppenheim, above note 83, p. 553, para. 237a.

88 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 94–95.

89 UN Charter, Articles 1(2) and 55.

90 Roberts, Adam, ‘What is a military occupation?’, in British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 55, 1985, pp. 249, 270–271CrossRefGoogle Scholar; E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 95–96.

91 For a detailed analysis of Article 47 of Fourth Geneva Convention, see Kolb, Robert, ‘Étude sur l'occupation et sur l'article 47 de la IVème Convention de Genève du 12 août 1949 relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre: le degré d'intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé’, in African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 10, 2002, p. 267CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kolb, Robert and Vité, Sylvain, Le droit de l'occupation militaire: perspectives historiques et enjeux juridiques actuels, Bruylant, Brussels, 2009Google Scholar.

92 Gutteridge, Joyce A. C., ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949’, in British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 26, 1949, p. 324Google Scholar.

93 Schwarzenberger, Georg, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 2: The Law of Armed Conflict, Stevens & Sons, London, 1968, p. 194Google Scholar.

94 This can be demonstrated by the enumeration of the grounds of security of the Occupying Power, of giving effect to the obligations of the Geneva Conventions (and to those of other rules of international humanitarian law), and of addressing the humanitarian needs of the civilian population under occupation: Y. Dinstein, International Law of Belligerent Occupation, above note 5, pp. 112–116. See also Yoram Dinstein, ‘Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: belligerent occupation and peacebuilding’, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, Occasional Paper Series, Fall 2004, No. 1; and Sassòli, Marco, ‘Legislation and maintenance of public order and civil life by Occupying Powers’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2005, p. 661CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

95 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, p. 105.

96 Ibid.

97 For analysis of ‘prolonged occupation’ in respect of the Palestinian occupied territories, see Roberts, Adam, ‘Prolonged military occupation: the Israeli-occupied territories since 1967’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84, No. 1, 1990, pp. 44–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98 Dinstein, Y., International Law of Belligerent Occupation, above note 5, pp. 116–120Google Scholar.

99 E. Benvenisti, above note 52, p. 31.

100 See the case law of the Israeli Supreme Court (sitting as a High Court of Justice): HCJ 390/79, Mustafa Dweikat et al. v. Government of Israel et al. (Elon Moreh case), 34(1) Piskei Din 1, excerpted in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 9, 1979, p. 345; HCJ 393/82, A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and Samaria Region v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al. (Teachers’ Housing Cooperative Society case), 37(4) Piskei Din 785, English excerpt in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 14, 1984, pp. 301, 302; and HCJ 61/80, Haetzni v. Minister of Defence et al., 34(3) Piskei Din 595, English excerpt in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 11, 1981, pp. 358, 359 (per Landau JP).

101 N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 734.

102 A. Roberts, above note 90, pp. 299–301.

103 See Y. Dinstein, International Law of Belligerent Occupation, above note 5, pp. 2–3. Compare, however, Ben-Naftali, Orna, Gross, Aeyal M., and Michaeli, Keren, ‘Illegal occupation: framing the occupied Palestinian territories’, in Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, 2005, pp. 551, 609–612Google Scholar; Orna Ben-Naftali, ‘PathoLAWgical occupation: normalizing the exceptional case of the occupied Palestinian territory and other legal pathologies’, in Ben-Naftali, Orna (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law – Pas de Deux, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 129, 161–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

104 Assessment of the implication of the principle of self-determination of peoples and its peremptory status on the legality of prolonged occupation is beyond the ambit of this article. On this matter, see Ronen, Yaël, ‘Illegal occupation and its consequences’, in Israel Law Review, Vol. 41, 2008, p. 201CrossRefGoogle Scholar; O. Ben-Naftali, above note 103, pp. 129–200.

105 M. Koskenniemi, above note 13, p. 16.

106 For assessment, see, inter alia, S. Chesterman, above note 76, p. 61; Zwanenburg, Marten, ‘Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the law of occupation’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 856, 2004, p. 745CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kaikobad, Kaiyan Homi, ‘Problems of belligerent occupation: the scope of powers exercised by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003–June 2004’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2005, p. 253CrossRefGoogle Scholar; M. Sassòli, above note 94. It is widely recognized that Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004), adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, formally ended the status of occupation by the coalition forces at the end of June 2004, even though there was hardly any change on the ground: K. H. Kaikobad, this note, p. 273; M. Sassòli, above note 94, p. 684. See, however, Roberts, Adam, ‘The end of occupation: Iraq 2004’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2005, pp. 27, 37–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

107 For detailed assessment of the legal status of many other troop-contributing states, see Wills, Siobhán, ‘Occupation law and multi-national operations: problems and perspectives’, in British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 77, No. 1, 2006, p. 256CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

108 Compare UN Security Council Resolution 674 of 29 October 1990, which condemned acts of the Iraqi occupying forces in Kuwait that violated Fourth Geneva Convention: UNSC Res. 674, 29 October 1990 (adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter), operative paras. 1 and 3, and preamble, para. 3.

109 UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, preamble, para. 13.

110 UN Security Council Resolution 1511, 6 October 2003, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

111 David Scheffer comments that blending the law of occupation with the Council's Chapter VII powers was ‘both unique and exceptionally risky’: Scheffer, David J., ‘Beyond occupation law’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 4, 2003, pp. 842, 846CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

112 S. Chesterman, above note 76, p. 52.

113 K. H. Kaikobad, above note 106, p. 264.

114 M. Sassòli, above note 94, pp. 681–682; UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, para. 8(e).

115 This issue is beyond the scope of the present article. See the article by Gregory H. Fox in this issue.

116 The measures that can be considered to go beyond the grounds of necessity included the simplification of the procedure of concluding public contracts, the amendment of Iraqi company law, the liberalization of trade and foreign investment, and allowing foreign investors to own Iraqi companies with no duty to return profits to Iraq. See also M. Zwanenburg, above note 106, pp. 757–759; M. Sassòli, above note 94, p. 679; Paust, Jordan J., ‘The United States as Occupying Power over portions of Iraq and special responsibilities under the laws of war’, in Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol. 27, 2003, pp. 12–13Google Scholar (criticizing privatization’ of the Iraqi oil production and distribution industry).

117 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136.

118 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 178. See also ibid., paras. 216–217 (application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the occupied territory in question).

119 See, for instance, Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Central Front – Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 28 (between The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia), 28 April 2004, para. 57. Further, the Russian skirmishes with Georgia and the former's intervention in South Ossetia in 2008 may be described as occupation, although disputes remain because of the degree of control exerted by Russian forces: see Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, appointed by the Council of the EU on 2 December 2008, Report, Vol. II, September 2009, p. 311. The Report notes that the law of occupation ‘applies to all the areas where Russian military actions had an impact on protected persons and goods’. However, it quickly adds that ‘the extent of the control and authority exercised by Russian forces may differ from one geographical area to another’, referring to the South Ossetian and Abkhazian territories that are administered by the de facto authorities and are much ‘freer’ than other areas. For support of this view, see Boon, Kristen E., ‘The future of the law of occupation’, in Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 46, 2009, pp. 107, 109CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

120 M. Koskenniemi, above note 13, p. 16 (referring to the anxiety of international lawyers over the ‘breakdown’ of the law of occupation in view of the paucity of acknowledged occupation since 1945, except in the case of the Israeli occupation and the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq in 2003).

121 See, in particular, Israeli Supreme Court of Israel, HCJ 337/71, Christian Association for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defence et al., 26(1) Piskei Din 574, pp. 581–582, excerpted in English in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 2, 1972, p. 354 (invoking the necessity ground of securing wellbeing of the local population to justify the legislative measure on a labour dispute). Admittedly, the Court referred only to the necessity ground under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, as it recognized the applicability of the customary law equivalent rules of Fourth Geneva Convention but not the applicability of the Convention as such: ibid., p. 580, English excerpt in: Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 2, 1972, pp. 354, 356 (per Sussman J.). However, it can be inferred that as Article 64 of Fourth Geneva Convention embodies the necessity grounds geared more strongly towards the wellbeing of the civilian population, the rationale of this decision would be more cogently applicable with respect to this provision.

122 Y. Dinstein, International Law of Belligerent Occupation, above note 5, pp. 110–116.

123 E. Benvenisti, above note 6, p. 648.

124 See ibid., p. 647. For the full exploration, see N. Bhuta, above note 11.

125 For the scholarly recognition of this term, see, inter alia, M. Koskenniemi, above note 13, p. 34; Watts, Sean, ‘Combatant status and computer network attack’, in Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2010, pp. 436Google Scholar; Fishman, Joseph P., ‘Locating the international interest in international cultural property’, in Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2010, p. 400Google Scholar; and Williams, Susan H., ‘Democracy, gender equality, and customary law: constitutionalizing internal cultural disruption’, in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, p. 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

126 Bentham argued that the characters of law can be divided into the role of the ‘Expositor’ and that of the ‘Censor’. He explained that: ‘To the province of the Expositor it belongs to explain to us what, as he supposes, the Law is: to that of the Censor, to observe to us what he thinks it [the Law] ought to be. The former, therefore, is principally occupied in stating, or in enquiring after facts: the latter, in discussing reasons.’ Bentham, Jeremy, A Fragment on Government, ed. Montague, F. C., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1891, pp. 98–99Google Scholar, emphasis in original, footnote omitted. With respect to the Expositor, Bentham added that he is assigned two tasks: the ‘business of history’, namely, demonstrating the history of law (‘to represent the Law in the state it has been’; and the ‘business of simple demonstration’ (‘to represent the Law in the state it is in for the time being’), which is based on ‘arrangement, narration and conjecture’: ibid., pp. 116–117, emphasis in original.

127 Roberts furnishes a tripartite analysis of the law as it has been (‘descriptive’); the law as it is (‘normative’); and the law as it ought to be (‘prescriptive’): Roberts, Anthea Elizabeth, ‘Traditional and modern approaches to customary international law: a reconciliation’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 4, 2001, p. 761CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

128 It is appropriate to recall that one of Koskenniemi's two principles for construing international law is precisely related to the question of what the law ought to be. He proposes that the principle of the reflection of subjective values, such as what is just, reasonable, and in good faith, should be employed in tandem with the principle of concordance with states’ will: Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘The politics of international law’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1990, pp. 4, 21, 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See, however, ibid., p. 24, where he argues that the normative content of what is just is far from determinable. See also Ralph Wilde, ‘Are human rights norms part of the jus post bellum, and should they be?’, in Stahn, Carsten and Kleffner, Jann K. (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2008, p. 164CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

129 This is linked to the argument that law as a social construct can be described as ‘a form of congealed politics’: Asmal, Kader, ‘Truth, reconciliation and justice: the South African perspective’, in Modern Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 1, 2000, p. 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar, n. 72. Compare Hersch Lauterpacht's famous statement that ‘if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law’: Lauterpacht, Hersch, ‘The problem of the revision of the law of war’, in British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 29, 1952, p. 382Google Scholar.

130 Carty, Anthony, ‘Critical international law: recent trends in the theory of international law’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1991, pp. 1, 66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

131 Ibid., pp. 67–68, 71. This is no doubt influenced by the CLS movement inaugurated earlier in US legal culture, which highlighted a ‘diversity of cultural responses’: Gordon, Robert W., ‘Critical legal histories’, in Stanford Law Review, Vol. 36, 1984, pp. 57, 70–71, 112CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This line of critique resonates further in theories of the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL): see Anghie, Antony, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004Google Scholar; Chimni, Bhupinder S., ‘The past, present and future of international law: a critical Third World approach’, in Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2007, p. 499Google Scholar. See also the methodological affinity of feminism in international law: Charlesworth, Hilary, Chinkin, Christine, and Wright, Shelley, ‘Feminist approaches to international law’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991, p. 613CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

132 R. W. Gordon, above note 131, p. 109.

133 Bowden, Brett, ‘The colonial origins of international law, European expansion and the classical standard of civilization’, in Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2005, p. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who argues that: ‘On practically every front, European expansion was largely an aggressive act involving what was usually the violent conquest and suppression of indigenous peoples’. That said, he is not blind to the fact that non-Europeans were engaged in similarly violent confrontations among themselves in the same period: ibid.

134 Wilde, Ralph, ‘From trusteeship to self-determination and back again: the role of the Hague Regulations in the evolution of international trusteeship, and the framework of rights and duties of occupying powers’, in Loyola Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 31, 2009, p. 103Google Scholar.

135 The Conference also endorsed the Free State of the Congo as essentially the private colony of King Leopold II of Belgium. Controversially, the Conference praised Leopold II for his trustee role in ‘civilizing’ natives in Congo.

136 A. Anghie, above note 131, p. 233.

137 B. Bowden, above note 133, p. 1. See also A. Anghie, above note 131, pp. 73–74, discussing the example of the treaty of cession concluded between the Wyanasa Chiefs of Nyasaland (current Malawi) and the British Empire in the 1890s and at the beginning of the twentieth century. For discussions of the issue of ‘unequal treaties’ that were imposed on Ottoman Turkey, Siam, China, and Japan, see ibid., pp. 72–73; and Gong, Gerrit W., The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 64–65Google Scholar.

138 See Gewald, Jan-Bart, ‘Imperial Germany and the Herero of southern Africa: genocide and the quest for recompense’, in Jones, Adam, Genocide, War Crimes and the West: History and Complicity, Zed Books, London, 2004, ch. 3, p. 59Google Scholar; Rajagopal, Balakrishnan, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hochschild, Adam, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa, Macmillan, New York, 1998Google Scholar (discussing King Leopold's Congo); May, Larry, Genocide: A Normative Account, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 254, 262CrossRefGoogle Scholar (examining the implications of the extermination of indigenous Tasmanians and Torres Strait Islanders in British Australia). See also Gellately, Robert and Kiernan, Ben (eds), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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140 Anthony Anghie and Bhupinder Chimni, S., ‘Third World approaches to international law and individual responsibility in internal conflicts’, in Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2003, p. 77Google Scholar.

141 For examinations of the legal implications of the debellatio doctrine, see D. A. W. Heffter, above note 23, p. 220; J. M. Spaight, above note 19, pp. 330–332 (criticizing the British annexation of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal by way of a proclamation of 1 June 1900, despite the absence of debellatio at this time); E. H. Feilchenfeld, above note 68, p. 7, para. 25 (arguing that ‘If one belligerent conquers the whole territory of an enemy … the enemy state ceases to exist, rules on state succession concerning complete annexation apply, and there is no longer any room for the rules governing mere occupation’); E. Benvenisti, above note 52, pp. 29, 92–93.

142 N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 729. See also Koskenniemi, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

143 N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 729, referring to P. W. Schroeder, above note 11, p. 9; Anghie, Antony, ‘Finding the peripheries: sovereignty and colonialism in nineteenth-century international law’, in Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1999, p. 1Google Scholar.

144 For detailed analysis, see A. Anghie, above note 131, pp. 32–114.

145 See Simpson, Gerry, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Bhuta refers to the example of the Russian Empire expressly declaring non-applicability of the law of occupation to its seizure of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire: N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 729. See also Graber, Dorris P., The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863–1914, Columbia University Press, New York, 1949, p. 133Google Scholar.

146 N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 729; Korman, Sharon, The Right to Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 56, 61Google Scholar.

147 Such sovereign rights were understood as encompassing the right to demand allegiance. Note that the Occupying Power, according to Article 45 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, is forbidden to demand the oath of allegiance from a population of foreign nationality under its occupation. See also N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 729.

148 E. Benvenisti, above note 6, p. 647. See also Shaw, Malcolm N., ‘Territory in international law’, in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 13, 1982, pp. 61, 79 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

149 M. N. Shaw, above note 148.

150 Among numerous examples that occurred after 1874, note, for instance, the Russian occupation of Bulgaria (1877–1878) and the ‘transformative policy’ based on ‘un nouvel ordre de choses’ implemented there; the British policy of asserting sovereignty over Egypt and Cyprus by means of occupation in 1914 without being bound by the constraints of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations; and the US occupations and subsequent annexation of Hawaii (1898), The Philippines (1898), and Puerto Rico (1898). See E. Benvenisti, above note 6, pp. 636, 641, 645. Furthermore, even Feilchenfeld, a prominent jurist on the law of occupation, was sceptical of the applicability of the law of occupation to the Japanese occupation of China after 1937 (failing to mention the Japanese occupation and colonization of Manchuria in 1931). With respect to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, he considered that this was ‘a clear occupation’, but withheld examination of the applicability of the law of occupation: E. H. Feilchenfeld, above note 68, p. 23, para. 94.

151 N. Bhuta, above note 11, p. 729.

152 J. M. Spaight, above note 19, pp. 323–330. However, there were a few cases of the suspension of the French laws: see F. F. Martens, above note 12, pp. 275–276. Furthermore, many of the Prussian measures, such as the requirement to pay extensive reparations under Article 11 of the General Armistice of 28 January 1871, were harsh, as noted by the Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, Vol. 3, 1871, pp. 377–379 (this was, however, replaced by a more moderate provision of Article 3 of the treaty concluded on 26 February 1871, purported to prolong the armistice: ibid., p. 379). See J. M. Spaight, above note 19, p. 324.

153 J. M. Spaight, above note 19, p. 364. At Santiago de Cuba, General Shafter initially kept the municipal authorities intact. However, President McKinley later decided to replace the Spanish civilian authorities with a military administration: ibid.

154 Apart from the annexation of the territories, he referred to the harsh nature of its martial law regulations issued in May 1901, including punishment of women, the ‘policy’ of burning houses to intimidate the population, and the setting up of ‘concentration camps’: ibid., pp. 332, 340–341, 343, 350–353.

155 F. F. Martens, above note 12, p. 279. This view was endorsed by Spaight: J. M. Spaight, above note 19, pp. 329, 357.

156 A. Anghie and B. S. Chimni, above note 140.

157 M. Koskenniemi, above note 13, p. 34; M. Koskenniemi, above note 142, pp. 112–178.

158 K. Nabulsi, above note 9, pp. 120, 141. See also Vincent, John, ‘Racial equality’, in Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam (eds), The Expansion of International Society, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 239–254Google Scholar.

159 For a detailed account of how the Russian jurist took credit for the draft of a preamble that had originally been prepared by the Belgian diplomat Baron Lambermont (the Belgian representative of the Brussels Conference in 1874, who sent the draft to the Belgian representative at the Hague Conference, M. de Beernaet), see K. Nabulsi, above note 9, p. 161.

160 Ibid., p. 164. He even justified Russia's ‘transformative’ occupation (‘un nouvel ordre de choses’) of Bulgaria between 1877 and 1878: F. F. Martens, above note 12, pp. 267–296, esp. pp. 271–272, 278–280, 287, 289, 294.

161 F. F. Martens, above note 12, pp. 46–47 (English translation by the present author).

162 K. Nabulsi, above note 9, pp. 164–165.

163 Lieber, Francis, ‘Twenty-seven definitions and elementary positions concerning the laws and usages of war’, in Miscellaneous Writings, J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1881, Vol. II, pp. 223 and 125Google Scholar, as cited in K. Nabulsi, above note 9, pp. 159, 164–165.

164 Schwarzenberger, Georg, ‘The Standard of Civilisation in International Law’, in Keeton, George W. and Schwarzenberger, Georg (eds), Current Legal Problems, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1955, p. 220Google Scholar (arguing that ‘The test whether a State was civilised and, thus, entitled to full recognition as an international personality was, as a rule, merely whether its government was sufficiently stable to undertake binding commitments under international law and whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty and property of foreigners’); G. W. Gong, above note 137. See also B. Bowden, above note 133.

165 B. Bowden, above note 133, p. 1.

166 G. W. Gong, above note 137, pp. 3–5.

167 Anghie, Antony, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the colonial origins of international law’, in Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, pp. 322, 332CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also A. Anghie, above note 143.

168 Lorimer, James, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1884, Vol. I, pp. 101–102Google Scholar, where he notes that ‘As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, divides itself into three concentric zones or spheres – that of civilised humanity, that of barbarous humanity, and that of savage humanity’.

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170 A. Anghie, above note 131, p. 233.

171 If they were not fully colonized, they were subordinated to the half-colonial system of capitulation treaties, as in the case of Persia, Siam (Thailand), China, and Japan. See ibid., pp. 84–86; and G. W. Gong, above note 137, p. 211.

172 See, for instance, the British East India Company, which ran India after the Battle of Plassey (1757) until 1857 (the Indian Revolt or the Sepoy Mutiny), and the Belgian King Leopold's holding company for his private colony in Congo, which formed the basis of the later Congo Free State.

173 A. Anghie, above note 131, p. 233.

174 Ibid., p. 212.

175 M. Koskenniemi, above note 13, p. 35.

176 K. Asmal, above note 129, p. 15, n. 72.

177 Descriptive sociologists hold that descriptions of social knowledge, including law, are ‘contingent’ and ‘the problematic outcome of intersubjective dialogue, translation, and projection’: see Harrington, Christine B. and Yngvesson, Barbara, ‘Interpretive sociolegal research’, in Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, pp. 135, 144CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

178 Compare Peller, Gary, ‘The metaphysics of American law’, in California Law Review, Vol. 73, 1985, pp. 1151, 1168, 1170CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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180 See also the line of reasoning followed in US domestic laws: C. B. Harrington and B. Yngvesson, above note 177, pp. 147, 144; Sarat, Austin ‘Leading law into the abyss: what (if anything) has sociology done to law?’, in Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994, pp. 609, 620Google Scholar.