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Normative architecture and applied international humanitarian law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2022

Michael N. Schmitt
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Abstract

Military strategists have begun pivoting from a focus on counterterrorism, counter-insurgency and stability operations to potential peer and near-peer conflict. This shift has profound operational and tactical implications for how future wars will be fought, but equally, it will have a significant impact on how international humanitarian law (IHL) is understood and applied. This article considers the process by which the normative evolution of IHL will occur in response to a battlespace that looks different than it has for decades. To do so, the article introduces two concepts: “normative architecture” and “applied IHL”. It argues that only by understanding the difference between these two concepts, and their relationship to each other, can States and others concerned with how IHL is developing in the face of future conflict positively affect that process.

Keywords

international humanitarian lawcustomary lawdevelopmentState practice
Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 104 , Issue 920-921: How International Humanitarian Law Develops , August 2022 , pp. 2097 - 2110
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.

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