1 Chadwyck-Healey Inc. & The National Security Archive (ed.), Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, Microfiche Collection, Chadwyck-Healey, Alexandria, 1990Google Scholar (hereinafter Cuban Missile Crisis). The most important documents from that collection have been published in a documents reader: Chang, Laurence and Kornbluh, Peter (eds), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, New Press, New York, 1992.Google Scholar

2 See Cuban Missile Crisis, ibid., 1992 Releases, Box, and ibid., Extras, Box. This material was researched by the author of this article during a stay in the United States in 1996.

3 Woodrow Wilson International Center for International Scholars (ed.), Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 1–9, Spring 1992-Winter 1996/1997 (hereinafter CWIHP Bulletin).Google Scholar

4 Archiv für Zeitgeschichte, ETH Zürich, Nachlass Paul Rüegger, Dossier No. 28.3.25.2 (hereinafter NL Rüegger).

5 The oral history conferences resulted in a series of books and articles by Blight, James G. and others: Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, “Essence of revision: Moscow, Havana and the Cuban missile crisis”, International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter 1989/1990, pp. 136–172Google Scholar; Blight, James G. and Welch, David A. (eds), On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, Noonday Press, New York, 1990Google Scholar; Allyn, Bruce J., Blight, James G., and Welch, David A. (eds), Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27–28, 1989, CSIA Occasional Papers, No. 9, University Press of America, Boston, 1992Google Scholar; Allyn, Bruce J., Blight, James G., and Welch, David A. (eds), Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse, Pantheon Books, New York, 1993.Google Scholar

6 Beschloss, Michael R., The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963, Harper Collins, New York, 1991.Google Scholar

7 Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997Google Scholar; Fursenko, Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, London, 1997Google Scholar; Zubok, Vladislav and Pleshakov, Constantine, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), London, 1996.Google Scholar

8 Thant, U, View from the UN, David & Charles, Newton Abbot, London, 1977Google Scholar; for the ICRC's role in the Cuban missile crisis, see pp. 177–194.

9 Borsinger, Melchior, “Paul Ruegger — Envoyé extraordinaire de l'humanite”, in Umbricht, Victor (ed.), À Paul Ruegger pour son 80^e anniversaire, 14 août 1977, Schudel, Riehen/Basel, 1977, pp. 155–162Google Scholar; René-Jean Dupuy, “Paul Ruegger et le droit international”, ibid., pp. 27–42; Probst, Raymond, ‘Good Offices’ in the Light of Swiss International Practice and Experience, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989.Google Scholar

10 “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Cuban missile crisis”, International Review of the Red Cross, December 1962, pp. 653–657Google Scholar; International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1962, pp. 31–35.

11 Bundy, McGeorge, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, Random House, New York, 1988, pp. 684 fGoogle Scholar. The story of the discovery of the missiles by the intelligence officers of the National Photographic Interpretation Center is described in detail by Brugioni, Dino A., Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis, edited by McCourt, Rober F., Random House, New York, 1991, pp. 56–217.Google Scholar

12 The minutes of the ExComm discussions during the Cuban missile crisis are to be found in May, Ernest R. and Zelikow, Philip D. (eds), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), London, 1997.Google Scholar

13 John F. Kennedy, Radio-TV Address of the President to the Nation, October 22,1962, in Chang/Kornbluh, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 150–154.

14 See Gribkov, Anatoli I. and Smith, William Y., Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis, Edition q, Chicago, 1994.Google Scholar

15 For an assessment of the moments during the crisis at which there was a real danger of war see Gaddis, op. cit. (note 7), pp. 269–278.

16 In particular the US Jupiter missiles that were installed in Turkey that very same year. Nash, Philip, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997.Google Scholar

17 For Khrushchev's explanation of his motives: Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Talbott, Strobe, Little, Brown, Boston, 1970, p. 493Google Scholar, and Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, translated and edited by Talbott, Strobe, Little, Brown, Boston, 1974, p. 511.Google Scholar

18 Allyn/Blight/Welch, op. cit. (note 5), p. 138–144; Zubok/Pleshakov, op. cit. (note 7), p. 259 f.

19 Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit. (note 17), p. 493; Gaddis, op. cit. (note 7), p. 264.

20 Castro was at first afraid that the missile deployment would in fact turn Cuba into a Soviet military base, but then reluctantly agreed for the sake of re-establishing the strategic balance between East and West. Whereas Khrushchev's main concern was to safeguard the Cuban Revolution, Castro's reasoning therefore inverted Khrushchev's. Gaddis, op. cit. (note 7), p. 265 f.

21 Fursenko/Naftali, op. cit. (note 7), p. 247.

22 U Thant, op. cit. (note 8), Appendix A, p. 460.

23 Although Khrushchev had ordered the vessels carrying missiles and nuclear warheads to turn back before they reached the quarantine line, the other ships sailing under the Soviet flag were still heading for Cuba. Beschloss, op. cit. (note 6), pp. 497 f.

24 Gaddis, op. cit. (note 7), p. 272.

25 Memorandum of telephone conversation between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball), October 24, 1962, 23:45, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963: Cuba, Vol. X, Patterson, David S. (ed.), United States Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1997, pp. 193–195.Google Scholar

26 U Thant, op. cit. (note 8), Appendix B, p. 461, and Appendix D, pp. 462 f.

27 Ibid., Appendix E, p. 463. The decisive passage in Khrushchev's message reads as follows: “We therefore accept your proposal, and have ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba but not yet within the area of the American warships' piratical activities to stay out of the interception area, as you recommend.”

28 Interoffice memorandum Hill to C.V. Narasimhan, 26 October 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Doc. 1392.

29 Borsinger, op. cit. (note 9), p. 158. — In 1965, the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross formally proclaimed the Fundamental Principles. See Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 13th ed., Geneva, 1994, p. 620.Google Scholar

30 Premier Khrushchev's telegram to President Kennedy, offering a settlement to the crisis, October 26, 1962, in Chang/Kornbluh, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 185–188. From an American perspective, it looked as though Khrushchev's letter was confirming a proposed deal along the same lines that had leaked out through KGB channels earlier that day. New information, however, has made it clear that this informal démarche was never authorized by the Fursenko, Kremlin. Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy, “Using KGB documents: The Scali-Feklisov channel in the Cuban missile crisis”, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 58–62.Google Scholar

31 Telegram Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, October 26,1962, CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 8–9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 289 f.

32 Nevertheless this version of how the ICRC came to be involved in the Cuban missile crisis can still be found in current literature. See e.g. Brugioni, op. cit. (note 11), p. 501.

33 So far no evidence has been found by the author that there were any formal or informal contacts during the missile crisis between representatives of the UN and the ICRC before 25 October 1962.

34 Premier Khrushchev's communiqué to President Kennedy, calling for a trade of Cuban missiles for Turkish missiles, October 27, 1962, Chang /Kornbluh, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 197–199.

35 Beschloss, op. cit. (note 6), p. 524.

36 Zubok/Pleshakov, op. cit. (note 7), p. 267.

37 DefCon2, the second-highest alert posture, means full readiness for an enemy attack. The highest alert posture, DefConi, is announced only when a full-scale war is already in progress. In times of peace the United States armed forces are usually on DefCon5.

38 Wenger, Andreas, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons, Rowman & Littelfields Publishers, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford, 1997, p. 276Google Scholar, and Zubok/Pleshakov, op. cit. (note 7), p. 267.

39 Beschloss, op. cit. (note 6), pp. 526–528.

40 Kennedy, Robert F., Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, W.W. Norton, New York, 1969, pp. 106–109Google Scholar, and Dobrynin, Anatoliy Fedorovich, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986), Times Books, Random House, New York, 1995, pp. 86–88Google Scholar. There has been a long-standing controversy between the two main protagonists as to whether the private offer to remove the US missiles in Turkey was an explicit part of the deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev. See Hershberg, Jim, “Anatomy of a controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin's meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962”, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 75–80.Google Scholar

41 Premier Khrushchev's communiqué to President Kennedy, accepting an end to the missile crisis, October 28, 1962, Chang/ Kornbluh, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 226–229.

42 Record from the diary of V.V. Kuznetsov of the conversation with Acting U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, October 29, 1962, CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 8–9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 295–299.

43 McCloy phone call from New York, October 29,1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Doc. 1645.

44 Spinelli to Narasimhan, October 30, 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Extras, Box R06M07S14T07, Cables - October 1962. See also U Thant, op. cit. (note 8), p. 180.

45 It is important to note that Castro's invitation to these talks dated from 27 October, a time when no agreement had as yet been reached between the superpowers. The Cuban leader therefore assumed he would be negotiating a solution to the crisis with U Thant, and not just the terms of the settlement based on the agreement reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev on 28 October. For Castro's invitation, see U Thant, op. cit. (note 8), Appendix G, p. 465.

46 Beschloss, op. cit. (note 6), p. 543.

47 Summary of my meeting with President Dorticos, Premier Castro and Foreign Minister Roa in Havana, October 30, 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1) Doc. 1963, and Summary of my meeting with President Dorticos, Premier Castro of Cuba and Foreign Minister Roa, October 31, 1962, ibid., Doc. 1747.

48 U Thant, op. cit. (note 8), p. 183.

49 See Summaries of meetings, op. cit. (note 47), and Notes on my second meeting with Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba in Havana, October 31,1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Doc. 1745.

50 U Thant, op. cit. (note 8), p. 186.

51 Ibid., p. 188.

52 The number of 30 inspectors is to be found in an aide mémoire prepared by the ICRC on 30 October 1962, published in NL Rüegger, op. cit. (note 4), Dossier 28.3.25.2.

53 Telegram Spinelli to Narasimhan, November 1, 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Extras, Box R06M07S14T07, Cables — November 1962. See also “The Inter national Committee of the Red Cross and the Cuban crisis”, International Review of the Red Cross, December 1962, pp. 653 f.Google Scholar

54 Telegram Spinelli to Narasimhan, November 3, 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Extras, Box R06M07S14T07, Cables - November 1962.

55 Récit Boissier, 5 November 1962, NL Rüegger, op. cit. (note 4), Dossier 28.3.25.2.

56 The Secretary-General's meeting with Mr. Paul Rüegger, representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, at 5 p.m., November 6, 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Doc. 2004.

57 Summary of meeting held on November 7,1962,10:00–11:00, ibid., Doc. 2050.

58 Summary of meeting held on November 7,1962,11:00–12:30, ibid., Doc. 2051.

59 Summary of meeting held on November 7,1962,15:00, ibid., Doc. 2052.

60 Telegram Rüegger to ICRC, 7 November 1962, NL Rüegger, op. cit. (note 4), Dossier 28.3.25.2.

61 Telegram Stevenson to Secretary of State, November 4,1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), 1992 Releases, Box 1.

62 Memorandum of the Third Castro-Mikoyan conversation, November 5, 1962, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995, p. 104.

63 For a short time, both sides considered the alternative of having the ICRC carry out the inspection of the Soviet vessels leaving Cuba in the same way as had been proposed for the inspection of vessels bound for Cuba, but the matter had never been discussed with either the UN Secretary-General or the ICRC. Department of State, Codification of instructions on Cuban negotiations, November 5, 1962, NSA, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), 1992 Releases, Box 2. Telegram from V.V. Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Ministry, November 6, 1962, CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 8–9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 326 f.

64 Telegram Kuznetsow to USSR Foreign Ministry, November 7, 1962, CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 8–9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 329 f.

65 For a detailed account of how the inspections were carried out, see Brugioni, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 520–523.

66 Telegram Rüegger to Boissier, 8 November, 1962, NL Rüegger, op. cit. (note 4), Dossier 28.3.25.2.

67 Telegram Stevenson to Secretary of State, November 9,1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), Doc. 2178.

68 These terms of references are to be found in a memorandum of the Legal Counselor to the UN Secretary-General, Constantin A. Stavropoulos: Memorandum for the record, November 9, 1962, NL Rüegger, op. cit. (note 4), Dossier 28.3.25.2

69 Rapport de l'Ambassadeur Paul Ruegger sur sa mission auprès du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies à New York du 6 au 11 novembre 1962 — établissement d'une procédure de vérification des cargaisons à destination de ce pays, 12 November 1962, NL Rüegger, op. cit. (note 4), Dossier 28.3.25.2. See also the account by Melchior Borsinger who accompanied Rüegger on his mission to New York, op. cit. (note 9), pp. 158–162.

70 This circular is reproduced in “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Cuban missile crisis”, International Review of the Red Cross, December 1962, pp. 655 f.Google Scholar

71 François-Poncet, André, “Le grain a levé”, Le Figaro, 6 November 1962, p. 1, 26.Google Scholar

72 Telegram McKinney to Secretary of State, November 1,1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, op. cit. (note 1), 1992 Releases, Box 1.

73 Bretscher, Willy, “Internationale Inspektion für Kuba: Soll das IKRK eingeschaltet werden?”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6 November 1962, evening issue, p. 1.Google Scholar

74 See also letter Bretscher to Schindler, 7 November 1962, NL Rüegger, Dossier 28.3.25.2

75 “À différentes reprises au sein du CICR, diverses tendances se sont manifestées, les unes pour une politique plus dynamique qui permettrait au CICR de mieux s'affirmer dans un monde qui évolue rapidement, les autres dans le sens qu'il doit s'en tenir plutôt à ses activités traditionelles.” Letter Petitpierre to Boissier, 31 October 1963, ibid.

76 Borsinger, op. cit. (note 9), p. 162.

77 Nevertheless that version of the story can still be found in current publications. See e.g. Brugioni, op. cit. (note 11), p. 501.