1 Geneva Call has been engaging with over 150 ANSAs since its creation. For more information, see: www.genevacall.org (all internet references were accessed in December 2019).

2 For different explanations on how Geneva Call works, see Heffes, Ezequiel, “Non-State Actors Engaging Non-State Actors: The Experience of Geneva Call in NIACs”, in Heffes, Ezequiel, Kotlik, Marcos D. and Ventura, Manuel J. (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice, T. M. C. Asser Press and Springer, The Hague, forthcoming 2020CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bongard, Pascal and Somer, Jonathan, “Monitoring Armed Non-State Actor Compliance with Humanitarian Norms: A Look at International Mechanisms and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 883, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Fragmented ANSAs have been defined as those that “have weak coercive capacity for enforcing organizational decisions and little unity of purpose among leaders. They exist as loose collections of small factions and individuals but are unlikely to summon unity and institutionalized discipline for any substantial period of time.” Staniland, Paul, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2014, p. 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and Lee J. M. Seymour, “The Problem with Fragmented Insurgencies”, Washington Post, 13 May 2015, available at: https://tinyurl.com/yx42svc8.

5 When referring to “humanitarian actors”, this piece includes all those civilian organizations, whether national or international, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles (neutrality, impartiality and independence) and are engaged in humanitarian action, defined here as encompassing humanitarian assistance and protection.

6 ICRC, Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences, Geneva, August 2016, p. 5.

7 Chinkin, Christine and Kaldor, Mary, International Law and New Wars, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2017, pp. 5–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Weinstein has affirmed that “[m]echanisms of deterrence depend on the fact that individuals care about the future”. Weinstein, Jeremy, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 350CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In protracted conflicts with fragmented ANSAs, in which attribution for violations of basic norms is extremely difficult, Geneva Call's experience has shown that an approach based on punishment and sanctions is not always conducive, and direct engagement with leadership is preferred.

9 As the ICRC has explained, protracted conflicts demand that humanitarian organizations engage “more deeply with the social and economic needs of communities enduring the entrenched impoverishment and deprivation brought about by long conflict”. ICRC, above note 6, p. 12. The existence of these demands can be quite challenging when engaging ANSAs, as they will prefer to receive assistance for their members rather than talking about humanitarian norms.

10 See also P. Staniland, above note 3, p. 8.

11 The Deed of Commitment is an innovative tool developed by Geneva Call. It is a humanitarian agreement signed by the ANSA leadership that includes international humanitarian provisions to be respected by armed actors during armed conflict. As of today, four thematic Deeds exist covering themes of prohibition of anti-personnel mines, protection of children, prohibition of sexual violence and gender discrimination, and protection of health care.

12 Some studies indicate that “legitimacy-seeking” ANSAs tend to be more respectful than those that are “legitimacy-indifferent”. In this sense, see Jo, Hyeran, Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Schneckener, Ulrich and Hofmann, Claudia, “The Power of Persuasion: The Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations in Engaging Armed Groups”, in Krieger, Heike (ed.), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 102Google Scholar.

14 On the role of religious leaders in this context, see Ioana Cismas and Ezequiel Heffes, “Can Religious Leaders Play a Role in Enhancing Compliance with IHL?”, ICRC Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 20 December 2017, available at http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/12/20/can-religious-leaders-play-a-role-in-enhancing-compliance-with-ihl-2/. See also ICRC, The Roots of Restraint in War, Geneva, 2018Google Scholar, which acknowledges the role of religious leaders in influencing the behaviour of community-embedded armed groups and those with a decentralized nature.

15 Haspeslagh, Sophie and Yousuf, Zahbia (eds), Local Engagement with Armed Groups: In the Midst of Violence, Accord Insight No. 2, Conciliation Resources, London, May 2015, p. 5Google Scholar.

16 Bangerter has explained in this sense that persuading ANSAs to respect IHL can only take place in the frame of a dialogue, for which time spent is essential: “[P]ersuasion is a lengthy process as well as a labour-intensive one. Sowing doubt first is often a better tactic than aiming for a quick breakthrough. This allows members of the armed group to rethink their position by themselves. Asking questions is a powerful tool to help this process, apart from the fact that it shows genuine interest. And time allows enhancing one's credibility. Persistence and coherence between words and deeds can only be experienced over time, and they are in the eye of the beholder, that is, the armed group.” Olivier Bangerter, “Comment: Persuading Armed Groups to Better Respect International Humanitarian Law”, in H. Krieger (ed.), above note 13, p. 122.

17 This suggested time span is drawn from Geneva Call's experience dealing with behaviour changes in ANSAs.