1 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 31 October 2015, p. 27, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts (all internet references were accessed in March 2022).

2 According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, there were sixteen armed groups in Mali in 2019. See Andrew Lebovich, “Mapping Armed Groups in the Sahel and Mali”, European Council on Foreign Relations, available at: https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping#introduction. Some of these groups had the capacity to operate on the territory of several States at once, particularly in the tri-border region between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. A similar situation exists in the Lake Chad Basin region, where some armed groups have the capacity to conduct military operations on the territories of several States in the region, including Chad, Niger and Nigeria, plus Cameroon.

3 The “Sahel”, in the geographical sense, includes all the territory of the States that are crossed by the Sahel-Saharan strip, from Senegal to Eritrea. This article only examines humanitarian access in the Central Sahel zone, which covers parts of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, plus the Lake Chad Basin region, Chad and Nigeria.

4 Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. This force was created by the member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Benin is also contributing troops. The mandate of this force is authorized and renewed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. That mandate was renewed until 31 January 2022 by a communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union dated 18 January 2021 (Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CMLXXIII)).

5 The G5 member States are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. The G5 Sahel was established by the Convention Establishing the G5 Sahel, signed in Nouakchott on 19 December 2014. The G5 Sahel Joint Force was established in 2017.

6 Operation Barkhane was launched on 1 August 2014. It covers all the member States of the G5 Sahel, but France has announced that it will withdraw progressively from the territory of Mali in 2022. See Ministère des Armées, “Opération Barkhane”, available at: www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane.

7 État-Major des Armées, “Barkhane: Le Mécanisme de Commandement Conjoint, pierre angulaire de la coordination entre la force conjointe du G5 Sahel et la force Barkhane”, 4 June 2020, available at: https://archives.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane/breves/barkhane-le-mecanisme-de-commandement-conjoint-pierre-angulaire-de-la-coordination-entre-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-et-la-force-barkhane.

8 Government of Sweden et al., “Task Force Takuba: Political Statement by the Governments of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Mali, Niger, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom”, available at: www.government.se/495ef1/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/2020/political-statement-task-force-takuba.pdf.

9 Pau Summit, “Déclaration conjointe des Chefs d’État”, 13 January 2020, available at: www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/01/13/sommet-de-pau-declaration-conjointe-des-chefs-detat. The Pau Summit was followed by the Nouakchott Summit of 30 June 2020, at which the six heads of State met to take stock of the roadmap agreed upon at the Pau Summit. Nouakchott Summit, “Communiqué final du sommet de Nouakchott pour le suivi de la feuille de route du sommet de Pau”, 30 June 2020, available at: www.g5sahel.org/communique-final-du-sommet-de-nouakchott-pour-le-suivi-de-la-feuille-de-route-du-sommet-de-pau/.

10 The Sahel Coalition aims to combat armed terrorist groups, strengthen the capacity of the armed forces of the States in the region, support the return of the State and administrations to the territory, and assist in development. See European Council, “Joint Declaration of the Members of the European Council with the Member States of the G5 Sahel”, 28 April 2020, available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/28/joint-declaration-of-the-members-of-the-european-council-with-the-member-states-of-the-g5-sahel/.

11 European Council, “Sahel Partnership Action Plan”, 2019, available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/media/40533/sahel-partnership-action-plan.pdf.

12 UNSC Res. 2100, 25 April 2013, available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2100.

13 Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2020/1074, 2 November 2020, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/286/22/pdf/N2028622.pdf.

14 According to the Belgian Ministry of Defence, there was a contingent of about 100 Belgian soldiers in Niger in 2020, whose mission was to train the defence and security forces of Niger. See Belgian Ministry of Defence, “Notre mission: Niger”, available at: www.mil.be/fr/nos-missions/niger/. Italy has also set up a military mission to support the armed and security forces in Niger (MISIN), and Germany was present in several Sahelian countries. See Bernardo Venturi and Nana Alassane Toure, Out of the Security Deadlock: Challenges and Choices in the Sahel, 8 June 2020, pp. 24–25, available at: www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/out-security-deadlock-challenges-and-choices-sahel. The United States completed construction of an air base in Agadez, Niger, in 2020.

15 The European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) is a training mission for the Malian armed forces, established in 2013 as part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. See EUTM, “Factsheet”, available at: https://eutmmali.eu/factsheet/. The European Union Capacity Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali is a civilian mission of the EU that was launched in 2015 to support the Malian security forces (police, gendarmerie and national guard). See EUCAP Sahel Mali, “About EUCAP Sahel Mali”, available at: www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410662_fr?s=331#10107. EUCAP Sahel Niger is an EU civilian mission created in 2012 to support Niger in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. See EUCAP Sahel Niger, “Partnership for Security in the Sahel”, fact sheet, available at: https://eucap-sahel.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/EUCAP-Sahel-Niger-Factsheet-EN-low-resolution.pdf.

16 International Crisis Group, Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, Africa Report No. 258, 12 December 2017, available at: www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/258-force-du-g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-securitaire.

17 SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 2020.

18 ECOWAS, “Communiqué final de la session extraordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement sur le Terrorisme”, Ouagadougou, 14 September 2019, available at: https://ecowas.int/communique-final-de-la-session-extraordinaire-de-la-conference-des-chefs-detat-et-de-gouvernement-de-la-communaute-economique-des-etats-de-lafrique-de-louest-cedeao-sur-le/?lang=fr.

19 On the historical evolution of the various rebellions in Mali and Niger and the peace initiatives that are under way, see Yvan Guichaoua and Matthieu Pellerin, Making Peace, Building the State: Relations between Central Government and the Sahelian Peripheries in Niger and Mali, Études de l'IRSEM No. 51, March 2018, available at: www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/document/file/2442/Etude_IRSEM_n51_2018.pdf.

20 On the various alliances between these groups and their affiliation with Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State group, see Matthieu Pellerin, Armed Violence in the Sahara: Are We Moving From Jihadism to Insurgency?, Études de l'IFRI, November 2019, available at: www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/armed-violence-sahara-are-we-moving-jihadism-insurgency.

21 On the emergence of these groups in Mali and the expansion of their actions to the Liptako Gourma region, see International Crisis Group, The Niger-Mali Border: Subordinating Military Action to a Political Strategy, Africa Report No. 261, 12 June 2018, available at: www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/261-frontiere-niger-mali-mettre-loutil-militaire-au-service-dune-approche-politique.

22 This is a translation of the Arabic name of the group Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah'awati Wal Jihad, also commonly known as Boko Haram – a name rejected by the group itself. On the emergence of this group, see Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, L'Afrique: Nouvelle frontière du djihad?, La Découverte, Paris, 2018.

23 The existence of armed conflict in the Sahel has been affirmed in several recent UN reports: Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/74/845–S/2020/525, 9 June 2020, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/117/04/pdf/N2011704.pdf; Children and Armed Conflict in Mali: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2020/1105, 11 November 2020, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/307/85/pdf/N2030785.pdf. The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights has set up a portal to provide an independent and impartial classification of armed conflicts in the world. See its evaluation of the situations of violence in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger, available at: www.rulac.org.

24 The UN Secretary-General noted in his report on children in armed conflict in Nigeria that “[r]egions in countries bordering north-east Nigeria, namely the Far North Region of Cameroon, the Diffa Region of the Niger and the Lac Province of Chad, were also affected by persistent armed assaults by the armed group” see Children and Armed Conflict in Nigeria: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2020/652, 6 July 2020, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/172/67/pdf/N2017267.pdf.

25 According to a recent interpretation, military action by multiple armed groups fighting together against a common adversary can be aggregated and thus reach the threshold of intensity required to classify a situation of violence as a non-international armed conflict. See Jelena Nikolic, Thomas de Saint Maurice and Tristan Ferraro, “Aggregated Intensity: Classifying Coalitions of Non-State Armed Groups”, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 7 October 2020, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2020/10/07/aggregated-intensity-classifying-coalitions-non-state-armed-groups/.

26 The ICRC defines non-international armed conflict as follows: “Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. This armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation ”. See ICRC, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, Geneva, 17 March 2008, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.htm (emphasis in original).

27 Vité, Sylvain, “Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 876, 2009CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/typology-armed-conflicts-international-humanitarian-law-legal-concepts-and-actual. See also ICRC, “Internal Conflicts or Other Situations of Violence – What is the Difference for Victims?”, 10 December 2012, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-international-armed-conflict.htm.

28 For a recent example, see ICRC, “Colombia: Five Armed Conflicts – What's Happening?”, 30 January 2019, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/colombia-five-armed-conflicts-whats-happening.

29 The three countries concerned are Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Virtual Ministerial Roundtable on the Humanitarian Crisis in the Central Sahel: Co-Chairs’ Summary”, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Central%20Sahel%20Ministerial%20Round%20Table%20-%20Co-chairs%20summary_Final.pdf.

30 OCHA, “Central Sahel Crisis: Key Figures as of 15 October 2020”, 15 October 2015, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Central%20Sahel%20facts_figures_20201015.pdf.

31 See the document prepared by OCHA for the ministerial round table on the Central Sahel: OCHA, Central Sahel: Revised Needs and Requirement Overview, October 2020, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/RNRO%20CentralSahel%20Oct%202020_EN%20Web.pdf.

32 Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2020/585, 24 June 2020, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/151/70/pdf/N2015170.pdf?OpenElement.

33 The UN Secretary-General noted in a report to the Security Council that armed groups had attacked the armed and security forces in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger. See Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2020/373, 8 May 2020, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/107/01/pdf/N2010701.pdf.

34 “‘Unprecedented Terrorist Violence’ in West Africa, Sahel Region”, UN News, 8 January 2020, available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981.

35 ICRC, “Central Sahel: Spike in Violence Leads to Higher Deaths, More than 1 Million Fleeing Homes”, 14 September 2020, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/central-sahel-spike-violence-leads-higher-deaths-more-1-million-fleeing-homes.

36 UNICEF, The Crisis in Central Sahel: Advocacy Brief, October 2020, available at: www.unicef.org/wca/reports/central-sahel-crisis.

37 Children and Armed Conflict in Mali, above note 23. Another report by the Secretary-General mentions recruitment of children by armed groups in Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger. See Children and Armed Conflict in Nigeria, above note 24.

38 ICRC, “Mali-Niger: Climate Change and Conflict Make an Explosive Mix in the Sahel”, 22 January 2019, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/mali-niger-climate-change-and-conflict-make-explosive-mix-sahel.

39 ICRC, When Rain Turns to Dust: Understanding and Responding to the Combined Impact of Armed Conflicts and the Climate and Environment Crisis on People's Lives, Geneva, 2020, p. 8, available at: https://shop.icrc.org/when-rain-turns-to-dust-pdf-en.html.

40 As early as 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development predicted that the Sahel would experience a very significant rise in temperature of between 3 and 4 degrees depending on the region: “the greatest warming (~4 degrees) occurs over land and in particular in the western side of the Sahel”. Heinrigs, Philipp, Security Implications of Climate Change in the Sahel Region: Policy Considerations, Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat, 2010, p. 13Google Scholar, available at: www.oecd.org/swac/publications/swacpublicationsanddocumentsbytopic.htm.

41 International Crisis Group, The Central Sahel: Scene of New Climate Wars?, Africa Briefing No. 154, 24 April 2020, available at: www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/b154-le-sahel-central-theatre-des-nouvelles-guerres-climatiques.

42 ICRC, “Niger: Vivre entre insécurité, changement climatique et Covid-19”, 10 September 2020, available at: www.icrc.org/fr/document/niger-vivre-entre-insecurite-changement-climatique-et-covid-19.

43 Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar (ICRC Customary Law Study), available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul. For a detailed description of the regime applicable to humanitarian assistance and humanitarian access, see Schwendimann, Felix, “The Legal Framework of Humanitarian Access in Armed Conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 884, 2011Google Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/legal-framework-humanitarian-access-armed-conflict.

44 Ferraro, Tristan, Relief Schemes and the Delivery of Humanitarian Activities in Situations of AC: The ICRC's Perspective, San Remo Round Table, 2017, p. 2Google Scholar, available at: www.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/RT-2017-FERRARO.pdf.

45 ICRC, above note 1, p. 27.

46 See Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV), Art. 23 on the sending of food and medicine, Art. 55 on the provision of food and medical supplies to the population, and Art. 81 on the maintenance of civilian internees. Regarding the evacuation of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked and dead, see Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 15(1); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 18(1); and GC IV, Art. 16(2). Regarding detained persons, see Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Arts 25–32, 125. Rule 118 of the ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 43, on the provision of basic necessities to persons deprived of their liberty, states that “[p]ersons deprived of their liberty must be provided with adequate food, water, clothing, shelter and medical attention”. Rule 131 on the treatment of displaced persons states that “[i]n case of displacement, all possible measures must be taken in order that the civilians concerned are received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition and that members of the same family are not separated”.

47 The ICRC has produced a Q&A and glossary summarizing the rules that apply to humanitarian access in all armed conflicts, whether international or non-international. It identifies the following six main rules: “1. Each party to an armed conflict bears the primary obligation to meet the needs of the population under its control. 2. Impartial humanitarian organizations have a right to offer their services in order to carry out humanitarian activities, in particular when the needs of the population affected by the armed conflict are not fulfilled. 3. Impartial humanitarian activities undertaken in situations of armed conflict are subject to the consent of the parties to the conflict concerned. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must consent to such activities when the needs of the population under their control are not met. 4. Once impartial humanitarian relief operations have been agreed to, the parties to the armed conflict as well as States which are not a party to the armed conflict must allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of these relief schemes, subject to their right of control. 5. The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only in cases of imperative military necessity may their movements be temporarily restricted. 6. Humanitarian relief personnel, and objects used for humanitarian relief operations, must be respected and protected.” ICRC, “ICRC Q&A and Lexicon on Humanitarian Access”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, No. 893, 2015, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/icrc-qa-and-lexicon-humanitarian-access.

48 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016 (ICRC Commentary on GC I), para. 794, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary.

49 Ibid., para. 812.

50 The ICRC defines its mission as follows: “The International Committee of the Red Cross … is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.” ICRC, The ICRC: Its Mission and Work, Geneva, March 2009, p. 4, available at: https://shop.icrc.org/the-icrc-its-mission-and-work-pdf-en.html.

51 The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, adopted in 1986 at the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Geneva, set out in their preamble the seven Fundamental Principles of the Movement, namely humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality.

52 ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 48, para. 834.

53 Cameron, Lindsey, Haye, Eve La, Niebergall-Lackner, Heike, Demeyere, Bruno and Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, “The Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention – a New Tool for Generating Respect for International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 900, 2016, p. 1219Google Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/updated-commentary-first-geneva-convention-new-tool-generating-respect-international.

54 For a more in-depth study of the rules on humanitarian access and assistance, see Stoffels, Ruth Abril, “Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and Gaps”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, 2004Google Scholar; available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_855_stoffels.pdf; Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara, “The Law Regulating Cross-Border Relief Operations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, No. 890, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/law-regulating-cross-border-relief-operations; Bouchet-Saulnier, Françoise, “Consent to Humanitarian Access: An Obligation Triggered by Territorial Control, not States’ Rights”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, No. 893, 2015Google Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/consent-humanitarian-access-obligation-triggered-territorial-control-not-states-rights; Dapo Akande and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict, OCHA and Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflicts, 26 October 2016, available at: www.unocha.org/publication/oxford-guidance-law-relating-humanitarian-relief-operations-situations-armed-conflict.

55 See the exception included in Rule 56 of the ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 43, relating to freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel. The concept of imperative military necessity was introduced in Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978), in connection with the tasks performed by civilian civil defence organizations (Art. 62) and personnel participating in relief actions (Art. 71). In both cases, duties, activities and travel may be restricted only for reasons of imperative military necessity. According to Article 71, such restrictions may only be temporary.

56 Ibid.

57 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, “Article 6: Right to Life”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 3 September 2019, para. 2, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/261/15/pdf/G1926115.pdf.

58 Ibid., para. 3.

59 Ibid., para. 25.

60 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12, “The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11)”, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/420/12/pdf/G9942012.pdf.

61 Ibid., para. 19.

62 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation: Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/55, 3 August 2018, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/239/64/pdf/G1823964.pdf.

63 Breitegger, Alexander, “The Legal Framework Applicable to Insecurity and Violence Affecting the Delivery of Health Care in Armed Conflicts and Other Emergencies”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol, 95, No. 889, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/legal-framework-applicable-insecurity-and-violence-affecting-delivery-health-care-armed.

64 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), 23 October 2009 (entered into force 6 December 2012), available at: https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa.

65 Ibid., Art. 9(2)(b).

66 Ibid., Art. 9(2)(c).

67 Ibid., Art. 9(2)(d).

68 Model Law for the Implementation of the African Union Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 2018, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=5aeb398e4.

69 The Sahel countries occupied the following places in the Human Development Index (covering 189 countries and published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)) as of 2020: Burkina Faso: 182; Chad: 187; Mali: 184; Niger: 189. See UNDP, Human Development Report 2020: The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene, New York, 2020, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf.

70 Rule 31 of the ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 43, on the safety of medical relief personnel, states that “humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected”. This protection also covers relief goods. Rule 32, on humanitarian relief objects, states that “objects used for humanitarian relief operations must be respected and protected”.

71 Rule 55 of the ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 43, on access to humanitarian relief for civilians in need, states: “The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control.” Rule 56, on freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel, states: “The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only in case of imperative military necessity may their movements be temporarily restricted.”

72 MINUSMA, Note on Trends of Human Rights Violations and Abuses in Mali, 1 April–30 June 2020, 30 August 2020, p. 4, para. 8, available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ML/quaterly_note_on_human_rights_trends_april-june_2020_EN.pdf.

73 “Cinq humanitaires enlevés et assassinés par des djihadistes au Nigeria”, Le Temps, 23 July 2020, available at: www.letemps.ch/monde/cinq-humanitaires-enleves-assassines-djihadistes-nigeria; ICRC, “Nigeria: ICRC Condemns Midwife's Murder, Appeals to Abductors to Spare 2 Other Health Care Workers”, 17 September 2018, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/nigeria-icrc-condemns-midwifes-murder-appeals-abductors-spare-two-other-healthcare-workers.

74 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), “MSF Teams Forced to Leave Maïné Soroa after Two Years”, 9 August 2019, available at: www.msf.org/msf-teams-forced-leave-maïné-soroa-after-two-years-niger.

75 Government of Niger, “Communiqué du Ministère de l'Intérieur relatif à l'attaque de la prison de haute sécurité de Koutoukalé”, 15 May 2019, available at: www.gouv.ne/index.php/1154-communique-du-ministere-de-l-interieur-relatif-a-l-attaque-de-la-prison-de-haute-securite-de-koutoukale.

76 On 14 May 2019, the Burkina Faso National Assembly adopted Law No. 023-2019/AN Regulating the State of Siege and the State of Emergency in Burkina Faso. That law makes it possible to “prohibit the movement of persons or vehicles throughout [Burkina Faso's] territorial jurisdiction or in specific places and at times set by order” (Art. 13, author's translation). In Niger, the state of emergency has regularly been extended since 2015 on the basis of Law No. 98-24 of 11 August 1998, which stipulates the state of emergency's conditions. A state of emergency was first declared in the Diffa region by Decree No. 2015 073/PRN/PN/MDN/MISPD/ACR/MJ of 10 February 2015, and was later extended to the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions. The state of emergency also makes it possible to prohibit travel in any vehicle. In Mali, the state of emergency has regularly been extended under Law No. 2017-055 on the State of Siege and the State of Emergency, 6 November 2017.

77 This is particularly the case in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and on the border between Nigeria and Niger. Fishing on Lake Chad was banned because armed groups were taking part of the proceeds from the sale of fish.

78 Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of the Niger, UN Doc. CAT/C/NER/CO/1, 20 December 2019, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/350/39/pdf/G1935039.pdf; Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Niger, UN Doc. CCPR/C/NER/CO/2, 16 May 2019, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/139/70/pdf/G1913970.pdf.

79 For Burkina Faso, see Decree No. 2020-0271/PM/MDNAC/MATDC/MSECU/MS/MTMUSR concerning the Temporary Restriction of Freedom under the Special Measures to Reduce the Spread of COVID-19, 15 April 2020. The decree closed airports but allowed flights “for humanitarian purposes”. Similarly, in Niger, despite the border closure, measures were taken to allow for “humanitarian flights”. See Republic of Niger and UN Niger, Procédures opérationnelles standards pour la gestion des voyageurs des vols régionaux débarquant à Niamey en République du Niger dans le contexte de la pandémie Covid-19, June 2020.

80 See ICRC, Les règles du DIH sur l'accès humanitaire et le Covid-19, Geneva, 8 April 2020; ICRC, “COVID-19 and International Humanitarian Law”, available at: www.icrc.org/ru/download/file/116784/covid-19_and_ihl.pdf.

81 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, “States of Emergency (Article 4)”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, para. 2, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G01/444/70/pdf/G0144470.pdf.

82 Ibid., para. 9.

83 Ibid., paras 3, 11.

84 Droege, Cordula, “Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, 2008CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/elective-affinities-human-rights-and-humanitarian-law.

85 Nils Melzer, International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction, ICRC, Geneva, November 2019, p. 28, available at: https://shop.icrc.org/international-humanitarian-law-a-comprehensive-introduction-pdf-en.html.

86 In Niger, the use of armed escorts is governed by several regulatory texts, such as Decree No. 2019-115/MFP/RA/MF Establishing Travel Allowances for Contractual and Auxiliary Civil Servants of the State's Administrations and Public Establishments, 1 March 2019; Letter 008535/MAE/C/IA/NE/SG, 2 September 2020, stipulating that “movements outside built-up areas are only permitted with an authorized escort” (author's translation); and Joint Order 2019/042/MDN/MI/SP/D/AR, 19 April 2013, which sets the allowances applicable to the escorts of humanitarian organizations, UN agencies, NGOs, State bodies, embassies, private companies, enterprises and banks.

87 IASC, IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 27 February 2013, p. 3, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Armed%20Escort%20Guidelines%20-%20Final.pdf.

88 The components of the Movement are the ICRC, the IFRC and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of States Parties to the Geneva Conventions. See ICRC and IFRC, Report on the Use of Armed Protection for Humanitarian Assistance, 2 December 1995, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/57jneg.htm.

89 “Resolutions of the Council of Delegates”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 36, No. 310, 1996, Resolution 9, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/resolutions-council-delegates-4.

90 Council of Delegates, Guidance Document on Relations between the Components of the Movement and Military Bodies, Seoul, 2005, Resolution 7, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/resolution/council-of-delegates-resolutions-181105.htm. See in particular the Annex to this resolution, “Relations between the Movement's Components and Military Bodies on the Latter's National Territory”, point 7, “Use of Escorts and Armed Protection”: “The components of the Movement may not resort to armed protection.” The only possible exceptions are defined in Resolution 9 of the 1995 Council of Delegates: see ICRC and IFRC, Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 14th ed., 2008, available at: https://shop.icrc.org/handbook-of-the-international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement-pdf-en.html.

91 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, above note 51, preamble.

92 Krähenbühl, Pierre, “The ICRC's Approach to Contemporary Security Challenges: A Future for Independent and Neutral Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, 2004, p. 511Google Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/fr/articles/icrcs-approach-contemporary-security-challenges-future-independent-and-neutral.

93 See Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, above note 51, preamble.

94 P. Krähenbühl, above note 92, p. 511.

95 ICRC, “Sahel: Respecter et faire respecter l'espace humanitaire”, 20 November 2019, available at: www.icrc.org/fr/document/sahel-respecter-et-faire-respecter-lespace-humanitaire.

96 Ibid. (author's translation).

97 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 43, Rule 31 on the protection of humanitarian relief personnel and Rule 32 on the protection of relief objects.

98 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, paras 2887–2888, available at: https://tinyurl.com/44x5zcem.

99 MSF observes in a report that “humanitarians may be attacked if they are identified as part of the enemy to fight. The use of armed escorts by humanitarians and the use of vehicles not clearly identified as military, both observed in Mali, can increase the likelihood of such attacks.” Alejandro Pozo Marín, Perilous Terrain: Humanitarian Action at Risk in Mali, MSF, May 2017, p. 4, available at: https://arhp.msf.es/sites/default/files/Case-Study-03-Mali-EN.pdf.

100 OCHA, Responding to Humanitarian Challenges in a Long-Term Perspective in the Central Sahel: Track 3: Humanitarian Principles, HumanitarianSpace and Civil-Military Coordination, 2020, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Track%203%20Humanitarian%20Principles%20EN_0.pdf.

101 For example, in Niger in 2020 there were forty organizations participating in the humanitarian response plan in Tillabéry, thirty-one in Diffa and twenty-six in Tahoua. See OCHA, Lancement conjoint du Plan de Soutien et du Plan de Réponse Humanitaire du Niger (PS/PRH 2020), 24 February 2020, p. 13, available at: www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ner_fh_presentation_ps_prh_2020_27_02_2020.pdf.

102 In preparation for the Ministerial Roundtable on the Central Sahel, documents on civil–military coordination were produced for each of the countries concerned. For Burkina Faso, see OCHA, Principes humanitaires, accès et coordination civilo-militaire: Analyse de la crise et recommandations des organisations humanitaires et de développement au Burkina Faso, September 2020, pp. 5, 6, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Acces_notes%20uniformisées_vf-20201013_Disclaimer.pdf. For Mali, see OCHA, Les principes humanitaires et la relation civilo-militaire: Diagnostique et recommandations des organisations humanitaires et de développement au Mali, August 2020, pp. 5–7, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Principes%20Humanitaires%20et%20Relation%20Civillo-Militaire_Legal%20Notice.pdf. For Niger, see OCHA, Humanitarian Access and Civil-Military Coordination: Reaffirming Respect for Humanitarian Principles and Humanitarian Space and Strengthening Civil-Military Coordination, 11 October 2020, pp. 6, 7, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/201019%20Niger%20T3%20final%20English%20Version.pdf.

103 See ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 43, Rule 55 on access to humanitarian relief for civilians in need and Rule 56 on freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel.

104 The main donor States and the EU are taking part in this dialogue. The ICRC participates as an observer: see OCHA, Humanitarian Access and Civil-Military Coordination, above note 102.

105 Government of Niger, “Le Premier ministre en visite à Kouré: SE. Brigi Rafini rend hommage aux 8 victimes de l'attaque terroriste du 9 août et préside un dialogue de haut niveau sur l'accès humanitaire au Niger”, 24 August 2020, available at: www.lesahel.org/le-premier-ministre-en-visite-a-koure-se-brigi-rafini-rend-hommage-aux-8-victimes-de-lattaque-terroriste-du-9-aout-et-preside-un-dialogue-de-haut-niveau-sur-lacces-humanitaire-au-nig/.

106 See Ministère des Armées, “Barkhane: Destins croisés des adjudants Mathieu et Nicolas, des actions civilo-militaires”, 30 December 2020, available at: https://archives.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane/breves/barkhane-destins-croises-des-adjudants-mathieu-et-nicolas-des-actions-civilo-militaires; Ministère des Armées, “Barkhane: Jumelée à Gao (Mali), la ville de Thionville achemine ses dons grâce aux soldats de Barkhane”, 7 October 2020, available at: https://archives.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane/breves/barkhane-jumelee-a-gao-mali-la-ville-de-thionville-achemine-ses-dons-grace-aux-soldats-de-barkhane; Ministère des Armées, “Barkhane: Nouvelles infrastructures inaugurées au centre de santé communautaire du quartier de Djidara (Gao)”, 18 August 2020, available at: https://archives.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane/breves/barkhane-nouvelles-infrastructures-inaugurees-au-centre-de-sante-communautaire-du-quartier-de-djidara-gao.

107 See MINUSMA, QIPs Overview: Mali, September 2020, available at: https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2013-2020_qips_overview_en_0.pdf.

108 See the preparatory document concerning Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger presented at the Ministerial Roundtable on the Central Sahel: OCHA, above note 100.

109 Williamson, Jamie A., “Using Humanitarian Aid to ‘Win Hearts and Minds’: A Costly Failure?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/using-humanitarian-aid-win-hearts-and-minds-costly-failure.

110 Article 3(1)(j) of the Kampala Convention states that “States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for this Convention, and in particular to … [e]nsure assistance to internally displaced persons by meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and facilitating rapid and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations and personnel”.

111 Kampala Convention, Art. 5(7).

112 Ibid., Arts 7(5)(b), 7(5)(g).

113 Ibid., Arts 3(2)(a), 14(4).

114 Law No. 2018-74 on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, 10 December 2018, Art. 33, states: “Whoever attacks humanitarian personnel in the exercise or during the exercise of their aid, protection and assistance activities, [or] harms or perpetrates any form of violence against humanitarian personnel …, shall be punished by imprisonment of six months to five years and a fine of 500,000 to 5 million francs” (author's translation). Article 35 of the law states: “Anyone who: (1) hinders the rights of internally displaced persons to live in satisfactory conditions of dignity, security, sanitation, food, water, health and shelter, in particular; (2) separates family members for reasons other than protection and assistance as defined in this Act; (3) prevents the free passage of humanitarian aid and its rapid and free distribution to internally displaced persons; (4) attacks or carries out other acts of violence against persons in charge of humanitarian aid, their means of transport or stocks for the assistance of IDPs; (5) violates the civilian or humanitarian character of sites hosting internally displaced persons; (6) misuses, confiscates or diverts humanitarian aid intended for internally displaced persons shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five years to less than ten years and a fine of 2 million francs” (author's translation).

115 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, November 2019, p. 60, available at: www.icrc.org/en/publication/4427-international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts.

116 OCHA, Humanitarian Access and Civil-Military Coordination, above note 102, pp. 11, 12.

117 ICRC, above note 115, p. 60.

118 Law No. 003/PR/2020 on the Repression of Acts of Terrorism in the Republic of Chad, adopted by the National Assembly on 28 April 2020 and promulgated by the President of the Republic on 20 May 2020, Art. 1(3–4) (author's translation).