Article contents
The protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping operations: reconciling protection concepts and practices
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 July 2014
Abstract
The ‘protection of civilians’ mandate in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations fulfils a critical role in realising broader protection objectives, which have in recent years become an important focus of international relations and international law. The concepts of the ‘protection of civilians’ constructed by the humanitarian, human rights and peacekeeping communities have evolved somewhat separately, resulting in disparate understandings of the associated normative bases, substance and responsibilities. If UN peacekeepers are to effectively provide physical protection to civilians under threat of violence, it is necessary to untangle this conceptual and normative confusion. The practical expectations of the use of force to protect civilians must be clear, and an overarching framework is needed to facilitate the spectrum of actors working in a complementary way towards the common objectives of the broader protection agenda.
Keywords
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 95 , Issue 891-892: Multinational operations and the law , December 2013 , pp. 517 - 538
- Copyright
- Copyright © icrc 2014
References
1 Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7019, 19 August 2013; Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6985, 25 June 2013; Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7098, 22 January 2014; Cross-Cutting Report 2013 No. 3: Protection of Civilians, Security Council Report, 20 December 2013, pp. 11–12, available at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/protection-of-civilians/. All internet references were last visited in February 2014.
2 For example, UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), 1956–1967; UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 1958; UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 1964–present; UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), 1974–1979; UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 1974–present; and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1978–present.
3 For example, UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), 1991–1995; UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 1991–present; UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 1991–1995; UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992–1993; UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992–1994; UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1993–1996.
4 The ‘CNN effect’ refers to the broadcasting of images of suffering populations, which caused democratic constituencies to put pressure on their governments to ‘do something’. See Robinson, Piers, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention, Routledge, London and New York, 2002Google Scholar.
5 Examples include UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Haiti (UNMIH).
6 See the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, para. 49; and Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, paras. 50–52.
7 The only UN peacekeeping operation deployed since 1999 without a protection of civilians mandate was the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), which was established to monitor a cessation of armed violence and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan to end the conflict in Syria: see SC Res. 2043, 14 April 2012, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/six_point_proposal.pdf.
8 Operations Directive No. 8 (untitled), February 1961, UN Archives DAG/13/1.6.5.0.0; Operations Directives August 1960–January 1964, Box 3, pp. 2–3; and Findlay, Trevor, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002Google Scholar, Appendix 2.
9 See Durch, William J. (ed.), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993, pp. 315–351Google Scholar; Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 86–87Google Scholar; and International Court of Justice (ICJ), Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151. On peacekeeping and war fighting, see Månsson, Katarina, ‘Use of force and civilian protection’, in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2005, pp. 503–504CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bowett, Derek, United Nations Forces, Stevens & Sons, London, 1964, pp. 196 and 683Google Scholar.
10 See Durch, William J. and Schear, James A., ‘Faultlines: UN operations in the former Yugoslavia’, in Durch, W. J., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, pp. 197–202Google Scholar; and T. Findlay, above note 8, pp. 219–272.
11 SC Res. 743, 21 February 1992; SC Res. 758, 8 June 1992; SC Res. 776, 14 September 1992; SC Res. 836, 4 June 1993; T. Findlay, above note 8, pp. 221–231.
12 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, para. 49; Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, paras. 50–52.
13 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999.
14 The agenda of the UN Security Council encompasses country and regional issues, as well as thematic and general issues. Thematic issues addressed by the Council include ‘Women, Peace and Security’, ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ and ‘Protection of Civilians’.
15 SC Res. 1270, 22 October 1999, operative para. 14.
16 MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) protection of civilians language was added to the mandate in SC Res. 1291, 24 February 2000, operative para. 8; UNMIL (Liberia): SC Res. 1509, 19 September 2003, operative para. 3(j); UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire): SC Res. 1528, 27 February 2004, operative para. 6(i); MINUSTAH (Haiti): SC Res. 1542, 30 April 2004, operative para. 7(I)(f); ONUB (Burundi): SC Res. 1545, 21 May 2004, operative para. 5; UNMIS (Sudan): SC Res. 1590, 24 March 2005, operative para. 16(i); UNIFIL (Lebanon) protection of civilians language was added to the mandate in SC Res. 1701, 11 August 2006, operative para. 12; UNAMID (Darfur) protection of civilians language was in the original mandate, SC Res. 1769, 31 July 2007, operative para. 15(a)(2); MINURCAT (Chad and Central African Republic) protection of civilians language was added to the mandate in SC Res. 1861, 14 January 2009, operative para. 7(a)(i); MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) protection of civilians language was in the original mandate, SC Res. 1925, 28 May 2010, operative paras. 11 and 12(a); UNISFA (Abyei), SC Res. 1990, 27 June 2011, operative para. 3(d); UNMISS (South Sudan): SC Res. 1996. 8 July 2011, operative para. 3(b); MINUMSA (Mali): SC Res. 2100, 25 April 2013, operative para. 16(c)(i). The exceptions are the UN missions in East Timor (UNTAET, UNMISET, UNMIT), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and Syria (UNSMIS).
17 Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.4054, 22 October 1999, p. 16.
18 Holt, Victoria and Taylor, Glyn, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges, independent study jointly commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations, 2009, pp. 8 and 160–172Google Scholar.
19 The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP or R2P) is a principle of international security and human rights to address the international community's failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, IDRC Books, Ottawa, 2001Google Scholar; 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, 24 October 2005; and Orford, Anne, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja: The UN's Inability to Protect Civilians, 12 December 2008, available at: www.hrw.org/reports/2008/12/12/killings-kiwanja; Human Rights Watch, Abandoning Abyei: Destruction and Displacement, 22 July 2008, available at: www.hrw.org/reports/2008/07/21/abandoning-abyei-0; Darfur Consortium, Putting People First: The Protection Challenge Facing UNAMID in Darfur, 28 July 2008, available at: www.darfurconsortium.org/darfur_consortium_actions/reports/2008/Putting_People_First_UNAMID_report.pdf.
21 SC Res. 1769, 31 July 2007, operative para. 15(a)(ii); SC Res. 2003, 29 July 2011, operative para. 3(a).
22 SC Res. 1856, 22 December 2008, operative paras. 3 and 6. See also Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6055, 22 December 2008, pp. 2–3.
23 SC Res. 1778, 25 September 2007.
24 SC Res. 2057, 5 July 2012.
25 SC Res. 2066, 17 September 2012.
26 SC Res. 1894, 11 November 2009.
27 Annual Reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/63/19 (2009), A/64/19 (2010), A/65/19 (2011) and A/66/19 (2012).
28 V. Holt and G. Taylor, above note 18.
29 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – Department of Field Support, Draft Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2010, available at: www.peacekeeping.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/100129-DPKO-DFS-POC-Operational-Concept.pdf.
30 SC Res. 1973, 17 March 2011, operative para. 4.
31 Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Regime Change, e-International Relations, 27 September 2011, available at: www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-problem-of-regime-change; Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul D., ‘The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect’, in International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Iyi, John-Mark, ‘The duty of an intervention force to protect civilians: a critical analysis of NATO's intervention in Libya’, in Conflict Trends, No. 2, ACCORD, 2012Google Scholar.
32 See in particular Security Council, Cross-Cutting Report 2012 No. 2: Protection of Civilians, 31 May 2012, pp. 14–22, available at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/protection-of-civilians/.
33 SC Res. 2098, 28 March 2013, operative para. 11(a)(i).
34 Ibid., operative para. 12(b).
35 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report), 2000, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, para. 62; United Nations Master List of Numbered ROE, Guidelines for the Development of ROE for UNPKO, Provisional Sample ROE, Attachment 1 to FGS/0220.001, United Nations, April 2002, Rule 1.8; see also SC Res. 918, 17 May 1994, which ‘[r]ecognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, UN and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief’ (emphasis added).
36 This approach is articulated in Sheeran, Scott, ‘The use of force in United Nations peacekeeping operations’, in Weller, Marc (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming, 2014Google Scholar; Brahimi Report, above note 35, para. 62. For a critical view on the expanded concept of self-defence, see White, Nigel, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993, p. 201Google Scholar; T. Findlay, above note 8, p. 356.
37 For example, see Haidi Willmot and Ralph Mamiya in M. Weller (ed.), above note 36; Gray, Christine, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford University Press, 2008, 3rd ed., pp. 313–314Google Scholar; Cox, Katherine, ‘Beyond self-defense: United Nations peacekeeping operations and the use of force’, in Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 27, 1999, pp. 239 and 258Google Scholar.
38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 2(1); UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, 26 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004) para. 21; Report of the Secretary-General on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, GA Res. 8052, 18 September 1970; European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Application No. 15318/89, Series A, No. 310, 1995, para. 62; Milanovic, Marko, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
39 See Best, Geoffrey, War and Law since 1945, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994Google Scholar; Fleck, Dieter (ed.), Handbook of Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008Google Scholar; Greenwood, Christopher, Essays on War in International Law, Cameron May, London, 2006Google Scholar; ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005Google Scholar [hereafter ‘ICRC Customary Law Study’], Rules 1–11; SC Res. 1894, 11 November 2009.
40 Sometimes referred to as the Hague law, these rules are mainly contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its five Protocols, the 1925 Gas Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1997 Antipersonnel Mine Convention. Bugnion, Francois, ‘Law of Geneva and Law of The Hague’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 83, No. 844, 2001, pp. 901–922Google Scholar.
41 Quéguiner, Jean-François, ‘Precautions under the law governing the conduct of hostilities’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 864, December 2006, pp. 793–821CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Report of the Secretary-General on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, above note 38.
42 Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions.
43 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 48; Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 13(1).
44 de Chazournes, Laurence Boisson and Condorelli, Luigi, ‘Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: protecting collective interests’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 82, No. 837, 2000, p. 67Google Scholar; Focarelli, Carlo, ‘Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: a soap bubble?’, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, p. 125CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
45 See ICRC Customary Law Study above note 39, and US criticisms in Bellinger, John B. III and Haynes, William J. II, ‘A US government response to the International Committee of the Red Cross study Customary International Humanitarian Law’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 866, June 2007, p. 444Google Scholar.
46 See UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law, 6 August 1999, ST/SGB/1999/13, section 1.1; Sheeran, Scott, ‘A constitutional moment? United Nations peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 8, 2011, pp. 55 and 113–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Christopher Greenwood, ‘Scope of application of humanitarian law’, in D. Fleck, above note 39, pp. 39 and 46; Zwanenburg, Martin, Accountability of Peace Support Operations, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005, pp. 171–174Google Scholar; ICRC, statement of the ICRC to the United Nations General Assembly 50th session, 16 November 1995, Fourth Committee, Agenda Item 86, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/57jmrn.htm.
47 UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, above note 46, section 1.1.
48 The ICRC is critical of this perspective, as are some others: see M. Zwanenburg, above note 46, pp. 171–174.
49 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arts. 3, 5, and 9; ICCPR, Arts. 6(1), 7, and 9(1).
50 See ICCPR, Art. 2(1); General Comment No. 31, above note 38, paras. 3 and 10; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Preliminary Objections), Serie C, No. 1, Judgement, 26 June 1989, para. 172 (referring to ‘the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention’); Human Rights Committee, Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, Communication No. 563/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (1995), paras. 8.2 and 10.
51 ICCPR, Art. 4(2); Svensson-McCarthy, Anna-Lena, The International Law of Human Rights and States of Exception, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 1998Google Scholar; Sheeran, Scott, ‘Reconceptualising states of emergency under international human rights law: theory, legal doctrine, and politics’, in Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2013, pp. 101–168Google Scholar.
52 See S. Sheeran, above note 46, pp. 112–119; Verdirame, Guglielmo, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012Google Scholar; Megret, Frederic and Hoffman, Florian, ‘The UN as a human rights violator? Some reflections on the UN's changing human rights responsibilities’, in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2003, pp. 314–334CrossRefGoogle Scholar; legal advice dated 1 April 2009 from UN Office of Legal Affairs to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available at: http://documents.nytimes.com/united-nations-correspondence-on-peacekeeping-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo#p=1; Geoffrey Gettleman, ‘U.N. army told not to join Congo army in operation’, in New York Times, 9 December 2009, available at: www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/world/africa/10congo.html.
54 Brahimi Report, above note 35, para. 62, quoting the report of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, S/1999/1257.
55 See the various references to this positive basis of obligation (‘due diligence’), below note 60.
56 Ibid.
58 de Wet, Erika, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, Hart, Oxford, 2004, pp. 201–202Google Scholar; Sheeran, Scott and Bevilacqua, Catherine, ‘The UN Security Council and international human rights obligations: towards a theory of constraints and derogation’, in Sheeran, Scott and Sir Rodley, Nigel (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on International Human Rights Law, Routledge, London, 2013Google Scholar; Michael Wood, ‘The UN Security Council and international law’, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, 8 November 2006, para. 29, available at: www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/lectures/2006_hersch_lecture_2.pdf.
61 Goodrich, Leland M. and Hambro, Edvard, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1946, pp. 21 and 59Google Scholar; Lowe, Vaughan, Roberts, Adam, Welsh, Jennifer and Zaum, Dominik, ‘Introduction’, in Lowe, et al. (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 11–17Google Scholar.
62 See Arts. 25, 39, 42 and 43 of the UN Charter.
63 See discussion in S. Sheeran, above note 46, p. 118.
64 See the section on interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 31–33.
65 Franck, Thomas, ‘Book review of Derek W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (Stevens, London, 1963)Google Scholar ’, in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 77, 1964, p. 1565; Alvarez, José, International Organizations as Law-Makers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 191Google Scholar.
66 Alvarez, José, ‘Constitutional interpretation in international organizations’, in Coicaud, Jean-Marc and Heiskanen, Veijo (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Organizations, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2001, p. 121Google Scholar; ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174; ICJ, above note 9.
68 Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6531, 10 May 2011, p. 11. See also Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6650 (9 November 2011), p. 19: France stated ‘The protection of civilians is at the heart of the mandate of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In that framework our Organisation, on a daily basis, must fulfil that mission.’
69 C. Gray, above note 37, p. 313.
70 See discussion in H. Willmot and R. Mamiya, above note 37; S. Sheeran, above note 36; K. Cox, above note 37, p. 258; Wills, Siobhan, Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shraga, Daphna and Zacklin, Ralph, ‘The applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peacekeeping operations: conceptual, legal and practical issues’, in Symposium on Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations, ICRC, Geneva, 1995, pp. 39 and 43Google Scholar.
71 See L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, above note 61, pp. 155–163.
73 Simma, Bruno (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 724–725Google Scholar.
74 United Nations Master List of Numbered ROE, above note 35 (and other references under that note). Also see discussion of the UN Master List in Holt, Victoria and Berkman, Tobias, Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington, DC, 2006, pp. 83–86Google Scholar; T. Findlay, above note 8, Appendix 3. A UN template for ROE, although without model rules, is provided in the UN Infantry Battalion Manual, 2012, Vol. II, Annex C, model ROE, p. 254, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/UNIBAM.Vol.II.pdf.
75 Ibid., Rule 1.8.
76 See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. UN/210/TC/GG95, October 1995, p. 20, available at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/tes_publications/books/peacekeeping_Training/genguide_en.pdf, which states that the use of force in defence of the mandate ‘might be interpreted as entitling United Nations personnel to open fire in a wide variety of situations’.
78 See T. Findlay, above note 8, pp. 6 and 14; Murphy, Ray, ‘United Nations peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia’, in Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 8, 2003, p. 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; D. Bowett, above note 9, p. 196; B. Simma, above note 73, p. 683.
79 N. White, above note 36, pp. 5 and 201. This is acknowledged also by the UN in the 1995 General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, which state that use of force in defence of the mandate ‘might be interpreted as entitling United Nations personnel to open fire in a wide variety of situations’. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, above note 76.
83 See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (hereinafter Capstone Doctrine), 2008, Chapter 5, available at: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf.
84 Both in conflict situations and in response to natural disasters. See, generally, O'Callaghan, Sorcha and Pantullano, Sara, Protective Action: Incorporating Civilian Protection into Humanitarian Response, Humanitarian Policy Group, London, 2007Google Scholar; Humanitarian Response Review, OCHA, 2005; ICRC, Enhancing Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 2nd ed., November 2012, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0956.pdf.
85 This definition was adopted by the ICRC and the IASC in 1999 following several workshops hosted by the ICRC and attended by representatives of both the human rights and humanitarian communities. See also ‘Protection of civilians in conflict – the ICRC perspective’, address by Angelo Gnaedinger, ICRC Director-General, Humanitarian and Resident Coordinators' Retreat, Geneva, 9 May 2007, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/children-statement-140507.htm.
86 The Sphere Project, Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, 2011 edition, p. 32, available at: www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95530/The-Sphere-Project-Handbook-20111.pdf
87 For the ICRC definition, see ICRC, above note 84; ICRC, ‘ICRC Protection Policy’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, September 2008Google Scholar. For Oxfam's definition, see ‘What is the “Protection of Civilians” principle?’, available at: www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/conflict/protection-of-civilians.
88 Marc DuBois, ‘Protection: the new humanitarian fig leaf’, Humanitarian Aid on the Move (Groupe URD Newsletter), April 2009, available at: www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Protection_Fig-Leaf_DuBois.pdf; DuBois, Marc, ‘Protection: fig-leaves and other delusions’, in Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, No. 46, March 2010Google Scholar, available at: www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-46/protection-fig-leaves-and-other-delusions.
89 Ibid.
90 See UN Human Rights Council, Protection of the Human Rights of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Res. 9/9, 2008; and see OHCHR focus on accountability in the statement of Ms. Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at the UN Security Council Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 25 June 2012, available at: www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12288&LangID=E.
91 OHCHR staff, ‘Protection in the field: human rights perspectives’, in Ramcharan, Bernard (ed.), Human Rights Protection in the Field, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 119 and 121Google Scholar.
93 See e.g. the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001, available at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. The ICISS report is punctuated with numerous references to ‘human protection’ and also prescribes these grounds for the Responsibility to Protect: see e.g. p. XII, (1)A and B.
94 Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Self-defence, protection and humanitarian values and the doctrine of impartiality and neutrality in enforcement mandates’, in M. Weller (ed.), above note 36.
95 See L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, above note 61, pp. 59–60; Kelsen, Hans, ‘Collective security and collective self-defense under the Charter of the United Nations’, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 14, October 1948, p. 783CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
96 See e.g. UNAMSIL, above note 15, which was mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ‘take the necessary action … to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of [the host country]’; see also the Security Council resolutions and mandates referred to in above note 16.
97 Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.4054, 22 October 1999.
98 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – Department of Field Support, above note 29.
99 Cited in V. Holt and G. Taylor, above note 18, p. 181.
100 The Secretary-General's report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. A/63/677, 2009, took a much broader perspective than the focus of the World Summit Outcome, above note 19, paras. 138–139.
101 SC Res. 2098, 28 March 2013; see e.g. Oswald, Bruce ‘Ossie’, ‘The Security Council and the Intervention Brigade: some legal issues’, in ASIL Insights, Vol. 17, No. 15, 6 June 2013, pp. 1–5Google Scholar, available at: www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/15/security-council-and-intervention-brigade-some-legal-issues; Carina Lamont and Emma Skeppström, The United Nations at War in the DRC? Legal Aspects of the Intervention Brigade, Swedish Ministry of Defence, Report No. FOI-R-3761-SE, December 2013.
102 OHCHR staff, above note 91, p. 121 (emphasis in original).
103 Urquhart, Brian, A Life in Peace and War, Harper and Row, New York, 1987, pp. 178–179Google Scholar.
104 Reliefweb, ‘UN's new solution for Congo not without risk’, 28 March 2013, available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/un%E2%80%99s-new-solution-congo-not-without-risk.
105 See for example What's in Blue, ‘Adoption of a resolution on the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 27 March 2013, available at: www.whatsinblue.org/2013/03/adoption-of-a-resolution-on-democratic-republic-of-congo.php; ‘U.N. approves new combat force to “neutralize” Congo rebels’, Reuters, 28 March 2013, available at: www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/us-congo-democratic-un-idUSBRE92R0X820130328; and FIDH, ‘DRC: an intervention brigade within MONUSCO would require further human rights protection mechanisms’, 27 March 2013, available at: www.fidh.org/DRC-An-intervention-brigade-within-MONUSCO-would-require-further-human-13106.
106 The traditional ‘guiding principles’ of UN peacekeeping are: Impartiality, Consent, and Non-Use of Force except in Self Defence and Defence of the Mandate. See Capstone Doctrine, above note 83.
107 ‘South Sudan expels a U.N. rights officer’, in New York Times, 5 November 2012, available at: www.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/world/africa/south-sudan-expels-un-rights-officer.html?_r=0.
108 See e.g. the statement of the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica during the 2008 MONUSCO mandate renewal, Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6055, 22 December 2008, p. 5; and the resulting SC Res. 1856, 22 December 2008, operative para. 3(a), and SC Res. 1925, 28 May 2010, operative para. 12(a).
109 Pierre Krähenbühl, The Militarization of Aid and its Perils, ICRC Resource Centre, 22 February 2011, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/editorial/humanitarians-danger-article-2011-02-01.htm.
- 14
- Cited by