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Protecting the global information space in times of armed conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2021

Henning Lahmann
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Abstract

The legal implications of information activities in the context of armed conflict against the background of the digital transformation have so far received only scarce attention. This article aims to fill this gap by exposing some of the legal issues arising in relation to mis- and disinformation tactics during armed conflict in order to provide a starting point for further debate in this respect. Specifically, it explores the existence and content of existing limits imposed by international humanitarian law on (digital) information operations and inquires whether the current framework adequately captures the humanitarian protection needs that arise from such conduct.

Keywords

digital information operationsinformation activitiesmisinformation tacticsdisinformation tacticsinternational humanitarian law
Type
Selected articles
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 102 , Issue 915: Non-State armed groups , December 2020 , pp. 1227 - 1248
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.

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Footnotes

*

This is the revised and updated version of the Geneva Academy Working Paper by Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann, “Protecting the Global Information Space in Times of Armed Conflict” (February 2021). The author wishes to thank Dr Kubo Mačák for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article.

References

1 See Dapo Akande, Antonio Coco, Talita de Souza Dias et al., “Oxford Statement on International Law Protections in Cyberspace: The Regulation of Information Operations and Activities”, Just Security, 2 June 2021, available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/76742/oxford-statement-on-international-law-protections-in-cyberspace-the-regulation-of-information-operations-and-activities/ (all internet references were accessed in February 2021).

2 See Abdi Latif Dahir, “Somalia Severs Diplomatic Ties with Kenya”, The New York Times, 15 December 2020, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/world/africa/somalia-kenya.html.

3 Whereas misinformation signifies information that is factually wrong yet not intentionally so, disinformation is “deliberately false or misleading”; see Caroline Jack, “Lexicon of Lies: Terms for Problematic Information”, Data & Society Research Institute, 2017, available at: https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/DataAndSociety_LexiconofLies.pdf, pp. 2–3.

4 See Marko Milanovic and Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyber Attacks and Cyber (Mis)Information Operations During a Pandemic”, Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2020.

5 The Oxford Statement, above note 1, notes: “The conduct of information operations or activities in armed conflict is subject to the appliable rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These rules include, but are not limited to, the duty to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law, which entails a prohibition against encouraging violations of IHL; the duties to respect and to protect specific actors or objects, including medical personnel and facilities and humanitarian personnel and consignments; and other rules on the protection of persons who do not or no longer participate in hostilities, such as civilians and prisoners of war.”

6 See Laurent Gisel, Tilman Rodenhäuser and Knut Dörmann, “Twenty Years on: International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Cyber Operations During Armed Conflicts”, International Review of the Red Cross, September 2020, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/reviews-pdf/2020-10/Twenty-years-on-IHL-and-cyber-operations-final-version.pdf, pp. 11–16; Schmitt, Michael N. (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 373 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 See e.g. Sassòli, Marco and Issar, Yvette, “Challenges to International Humanitarian Law”, in von Arnaud, A., Matz-Lück, N. and Odendahl, K. (eds), 100 Years of Peace Through Law: Past and Future, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2015, pp. 219–220Google Scholar; M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, Commentary to rule 123, p. 495; Michael Schmitt, “France Speaks out on IHL and Cyber Operations: Part II”, EJIL Talk!, 1 October 2019, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/france-speaks-out-on-ihl-and-cyber-operations-part-ii/; German Ministry of Defence, Law of Armed Conflict: Manual, Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2, May 2013, available at: https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/93610/ae27428ce99dfa6bbd8897c269e7d214/b-02-02-10-download-manual-law-of-armed-conflict-data.pdf, para. 487.

8 A “distributed denial of service” (DDoS) attack utilizes a number of computers to overwhelm the target systems to render them unavailable for legitimate users.

9 Oxford Statement, above note 1.

10 See Pontus Winther, International Humanitarian Law and Influence Operations: The Protection of Civilians from Unlawful Communication Influence Activities during Armed Conflict, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, 2019, 147 ff.

11 Oxford Statement, above note 1.

12 See Michael N. Schmitt, “Wired Warfare 3.0: Protecting the Civilian Population During Cyber Operations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 101, 2019, p. 344: “International humanitarian law was crafted in the context of means and methods of warfare, the effects of which were to damage, destroy, injure or kill. While the civilian population might have suffered as a result of military operations that did not cause these consequences, the threat of harm was overwhelmingly from such effects. Thus, IHL rules are grounded in the need to shield civilians and civilian objects from them, at least to the extent possible without depriving States of their ability to conduct essential military operations.” The author speaks insofar of the “cognitive paradigm of physicality”, see ibid., note 69.

13 M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 139, para. 3; to clarify, this encompasses the information (as data) itself and not the physical infrastructure necessary to display the information; physically destroying the server that stores the journalistic website content, as a civilian object, would be subject to the principle of distinction just like a newspaper printing house; this is a function of the conceptual distinction between the physical and the non-physical, and IHL's principal focus on the former.

14 M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 93, para. 5.

15 See International Cyber Law: Interactive Toolkit, “Scenario 12: Cyber Operations against Computer Data”, 22 May 2020, available at: https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Scenario_12:_Cyber_operations_against_computer_data.

16 German Ministry of Defence, above note 7 (emphasis added).

17 M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 122, para. 5.

18 M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 123, para. 2.

19 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary to the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987 (ICRC Commentary on APs), paras 1520–1522.

20 Eric Talbot Jensen and Summer Crockett, “‘Deepfakes’ and the Law of Armed Conflict: Are They Legal?”, Articles of War, 19 August 2020, available at: https://lieber.westpoint.edu/deepfakes/.

21 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 19, para. 1521.

22 M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 139, para. 3.

23 ICRC Commentary on APs, above note 19, para. 1515 (emphasis added).

24 Ibid., para. 1516.

25 ICRC, Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 2020. Article 13: Humane Treatment of Prisoners, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=3DEA78B5A19414AFC1258585004344BD, para. 1624.

26 Ibid.

27 ICRC, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 1958. Article 27. Treatment: General Observations, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=25179A620578AD49C12563CD0042B949, p. 204.

28 Ibid.

29 ICRC, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 2016. Article 3: Conflicts not of an International Character, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC, para. 672.

30 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep 14, para. 220; Commentary of 2020 to GC III, above note 25, para. 191; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, rule 144.

31 ICRC, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 2016. Article 1: Respect for the Convention, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=72239588AFA66200C1257F7D00367DBD, para. 158.

32 See International Cyber Law: Interactive Toolkit, “Scenario 19: Hate Speech”, 1 October 2020, available at: https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Scenario_19:_Hate_speech, para. L16.

33 German Ministry of Defence, above note 7, para. 487.

34 See Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar's Military”, The New York Times, 15 October 2018, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.

35 See Oxford Statement, above note 1.

36 See e.g. Unnati Ghia, “International Humanitarian Law in a Post-Truth World”, Cambridge International Law Journal Online, 17 December 2018, available at: http://cilj.co.uk/2018/12/17/international-humanitarian-law-in-a-post-truth-world/; E. T. Jensen and S. Crockett, above note 20; P. Winther, above note 10, 147 ff; International Cyber Law: Interactive Toolkit, above note 32, para. L15.

37 See ICRC, “IHL Database: Customary IHL: Rule 2. Violence Aimed at Spreading Terror among the Civilian Population”, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule2.

38 See M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 98, para. 3.

39 P. Winther, above note 10, p. 148.

40 Ibid., p. 152; but see ICRC, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Commentary of 1987. Protection of the Civilian Population, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=5E5142B6BA102B45C12563CD00434741, para. 1940, which leaves open the possibility of a broader interpretation.

41 See also Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978), Art. 13(I); J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, above note 30, rule 15.

42 See International Law Association Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st Century, “The Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare”, International Law Studies, Vol. 93, 2017, p. 380Google Scholar.

43 See P. Winther, above note 10, p. 131.

44 Likewise, M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 92, para. 2.

45 See the “International Humanitarian Law” section.

46 E. T. Jensen and S. Crockett, above note 20.

47 Droege, Cordula, “Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of Civilians”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 886, 2012, p. 557CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 M. Milanovic and M. N. Schmitt, above note 4, p. 269.

49 M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 92.

50 Vishakha Choudhary, “The Truth under Siege: Does International Humanitarian Law Respond Adequately to Information Warfare?”, GroJIL Blog, 21 March 2019, available at: https://grojil.org/2019/03/21/the-truth-under-siege-does-international-humanitarian-law-respond-adequately-to-information-warfare/.

51 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Judgment, ICTY-IT-98-30/I-T, 2 November 2001, para. 252.

52 Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Judgment, ICTR-2001-71-I, 15 July 2004, para. 463; Prosecutor v. Kordić and Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, IT-95-14/II-A, 17 December 2004, para. 27; Prosecutor v. Orić, Judgment, IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006, para. 274; Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Judgment, ICTR-99-52-A, 28 November 2007, para. 501.

53 See V. Choudhary, above note 50.

54 See M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 92, para. 8.

55 M. N. Schmitt, above note 6, rule 113 para. 5.

56 See Antonio Coco, “Instigation”, in Jérôme de Hemptinne, Robert Roth, Elies van Sliedregt, Marjolein Cupido, Manuel J. Ventura and Lachezar Yanev (eds), Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019.

57 UN Human Rights Council, Report on the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, UN Doc A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018.

58 Ohlin, Jens David, “Incitement and Conspiracy to Commit Genocide”, in Gaeta, Paola (ed.), The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 212Google Scholar.

59 See M. Milanovic and M. N. Schmitt, above note 4, pp. 267–269.

60 See on this Jens David Ohlin, Election Interference: International Law and the Future of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020; Nicholas Tsagourias, “Electoral Cyber Interference, Self-Determination and the Principle of Non-Intervention in Cyberspace”, EJIL Talk!, 26 August 2019, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/electoral-cyber-interference-self-determination-and-the-principle-of-non-intervention-in-cyberspace/.

61 Also see Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended), Art. 1.

62 In the context of disinformation and cyber operations, see M. Milanovic and M. N. Schmitt, above note 4, pp. 261–266.

63 See ICRC, How Does Law Protect in War? – Online Casebook, Chapter IHL and Human Rights, available at: https://casebook.icrc.org/law/ihl-and-human-rights.

64 There are a few noteworthy exceptions: see Norwegian Military Manual, p. 200; French Military Manual, p. 68.

65 See Lahmann, Henning, “Information Operations and the Question of Illegitimate Interference Under International Law”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2020, pp. 209–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 See as an example the European External Action Service (EEAS) “EU vs. Disinfo” initiative, available at: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/.