1 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter: ICTY) was established through Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. Its Statute was originally published as an Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to para. 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993).

2 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, established through Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.

3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9 (1998), hereinafter: ICC Statute.

4 Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94–1-AR72, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995 (hereinafter: Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction). For a comment on this decision, see Sassòli, Marco, “La première décision de la chambre d'appel du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie: Tadic (compétence)”, Revue générale de droit international public, Vol. 100, 1996, pp. 101–134.Google Scholar

5 Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94–1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (hereinafter: Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment).

6 First Geneva Convention, Art. 50; Second Geneva Convention, Art. 51; Third Geneva Convention, Art. 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 147; and Protocol I, Arts 11(4), 85 and 86.

7 See Separate Opinion of Judge Georges Abi-Saab in the decision of the Appeals Chamber on Jurisdiction, Chapter IV, Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), and amicus curiae brief presented by the United States, 17 July 1995, pp. 35–36.

8 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), paras 79–83.

9 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 4.

10 Thus, “compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power” is a grave breach (Third Geneva Convention, Art. 130, and Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 147), while in a non-international armed conflict civilians, although protected by the applicable law, may be under a legal obligation to serve in the governmental armed forces, even if they consider them as hostile.

11 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 219; Dietrich Schindler, “The different types of armed conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols”, Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de droit international, Vol. 163/11,1979. p. 150.

12 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 76.

13 Loc. cit. (note 11), paras 110–115.

14 Pictet, Jean S. (ed.), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Commentary, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, p. 212.Google Scholar

15 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94–1-T, ICTY Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997, paras 578–607 (hereinafter: Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment).

16 See Fenrick, William, “The development of the law of armed conflict through the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”, in Schmitt, and Green, (eds), The Law of Armed Conflict: into the Next Millennium, International Law Studies, US Naval War College, Newport, 1998, pp. 85–92Google Scholar; Meron, Theodor, “Classification of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's fallout”, Am. J. Int'l L., Vol. 92, 1998, pp. 236–242Google Scholar; and The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al. (the Celebici case), Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-96–21-T, 16 November 1998, paras 230–231 (hereinafter: The Celebici Judgment).

17 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 103–105.

18 Loc. cit. (note 11), para. 219. One wonders why the ICTY could not use the same line of argument. It could thus have avoided many legal controversies.

19 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 115–145.

20 Earlier a Trial Chamber of the ICTY had already come to a similar conclusion in the Celebici case. Because of the continuing involvement of the FRY, it applied the law of international armed conflicts to the detention of Bosnian Serbs by Bosnian Muslims, considering that the Nicaragua test was not applicable to the question of individual responsibility. See The Celebici Judgment, loc. cit. (note 16), paras 233 and 234.

21 UN Charter, Art. 92.

22 See the decision of the European Court for Human Rights in the case Loizidou v. Turkey, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996, pp. 2, 216 ff., paras 56 and 57.

23 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 47.

24 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 146–162. Earlier, the Trial Chambers had come to similar conclusions: Review of Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94–2-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, 20 October 1995, para. 30.; trial of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the Celebici case, loc. cit. (note 16), paras 233 and 234; and concerning the involvement of Croatia in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, The Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, Case No. IT-95–12-R61, ICTY Trial Chamber, 13 September 1996, para. 25.

25 See Holbrooke, Richard, To End A War, Random House, New York, 1998, pp. 4, 5, 99, 105–107, 139, 140, 148–151, 197, 243, 255, 256, 310 and 341–343.Google Scholar

26 See The Celebici Judgment, loc. cit. (note 16), paras 250–266, and, in particular, para. 259. It did not explain why the will of persons in a disintegrating State should be decisive in determining their nationality, although the Bosnian Serbs were not allowed to choose the State in which they wanted to live.

27 Infra note 42.

28 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 76.

29 Infra note 33 and accompanying text.

30 Supra note 9 and accompanying text.

31 Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 584–608. The Trial Chamber did not make clear whether it considered all of them to be nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina or still citizens of the former Yugoslavia.

32 See Meron, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 238–242; Greenwood, Christopher, “International humanitarian law and the Tadic case”, Eur. J. Int'l L, Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 273–274CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fenrick, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 91 – 92; and The Celebici Judgment, loc. cit. (note 16), paras 245–266.

33 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 163–169.

34 See Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 4(2), 44 and 70(2).

35 Full protection as “protected persons” is afforded to enemy and certain third country nationals (Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 4), while a party's own nationals benefit from much more limited, fundamental guarantees (ibid., Arts 13–26, and Protocol I, Art. 75). Combatants may be interned without any further reason until the end of active hostilities, while civilians may only be interned in exceptional circumstances (Third Geneva Convention, Arts 21 and 118, and Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 41–43 and 78). Protected civilians benefit from much more extensive guarantees in occupied territories than on enemy national territory (compare Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 35–46 with Arts 47–78).

36 Third Geneva Convention, Arts 50 and 130, and Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 40, 51 and 147.

37 Supra note 35.

38 Art. 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, and Protocol II, Art. 4.

39 Protocol II, Arts 5 and 6 respectively.

40 Ibid., Art. 17.

41 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 49(1).

42 Article 35 of the Fourth Convention regulates only their right to leave the territory. The ICRC Commentary, loc. cit. (note 14), p. 235, considers that “the right of expulsion has been retained”.

43 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 178–184.

44 Ibid., para. 204.

45 Ibid., paras 196–201.

46 Ibid., paras 202 and 203.

47 Ibid., paras 204–226.

48 See the practice of the Swiss Supreme Court, last in Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, Recueil Officiel, Vol. 118, Part IV, pp. 227 ff., consideration 5d/cc, p. 232.

49 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 204.

50 Ibid., para. 219.

51 See Mantovani, Ferrando, Diritto penale, Parte generale, 3rd ed., Padova, CEDAM, 1992, pp. 320–323Google Scholar (containing a reference in note 21 to the German, Danish, Chilean and Argentinian law providing for the same distinction). See also infra note 53, for the German and Swiss law.

52 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 220.

53 For the difficult distinction between dolus eventualis and culpa in Germany, see Roxin, Claus, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. 1, 3rd ed., Beck, München, 1997, pp. 372–400Google Scholar, and, for Swiss law, Stratenwerth, G¨nter, Schweizerisches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil l: Die Straftat, 2nd ed., Staempfli, Bern, 1996, pp. 183–187.Google Scholar

54 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 228.

55 Ibid., para. 204.

56 Such law has been vaguely suggested by the UN Secretary-General as a subsidiary source for the ICTY, see Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. (note 1), para. 36.

57 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 225.

58 Ibid., para. 226.

59 Ibid., paras 224, notes 287–291, and Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991, pp. 428 f.

60 See the frequently criticized Art. 116(1) of the Codice penale (adopted in 1930, during the Fascist period, and still in force); Mantovani, op. cit. (note 51), pp. 538–541; Zuccalà, Giuseppe (ed.), Commentario breve al codice penale, Complemento giurisprudenziale, 3rd ed., Padova, CEDAM, 1994, pp. 339–344Google Scholar; Romano, Mario and Grasso, Giovanni, Commentario sistematico del codice penale, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Milano, Giuffrè, 1996, pp. 217–224.Google Scholar

61 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 208.

62 Ibid., paras 210–213.

63 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 15 December 1997, G.A. Res. 52/164.

64 See Sassòli, Marco, “Bedeutung von ‘Travaux préparatoires’ zu Kodifikations-verträgen für das allgemeine Völkerrecht”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 41, 1990, pp. 109–149.Google Scholar

65 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 220.

66 This fundamental distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is recognized in the preambular para. 5 of Protocol I. See Sassòli, Marco and Bouvier, Antoine, How Does Law Protect in War?, ICRC, Geneva, 1999, pp. 83–88Google Scholar and, in particular, pp. 681–682: the case of U.S. v. William List and Others.

67 On such disintegration of State structures, see the Preparatory Document drafted by the ICRC for the First Periodical Meeting on International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 19–23 January 1998, in Sassòli and Bouvier, op. cit. (note 66), pp. 482–492.

68 See Protocol I, Arts 43(2) and 44(2).

69 Under Art. 4(A)(2) of the Third Convention the only exception to this rule concerned armed forces which did not distinguish themselves sufficiently from the civilian population. All their members lost combatant status, including those who wore a distinctive sign. Art. 44(4) of Protocol I has individualized this rule. Every member who distinguishes himself sufficiently from the civilian population has combatant status, even if most of his comrades do not respect the rule.

70 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 239, citing Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), para. 633.

71 Ibid., citing Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), para. 634.

72 Ibid., and Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), paras 656–657.

73 Ibid., and Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), paras 658–659.

74 Ibid., para. 249.

75 Ibid., and Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 141 (discussing whether the Statute exceeds customary international law by requiring the existence of an armed conflict).

76 Ibid., para. 251.

77 Ibid., para. 248 (footnote omitted).

78 For the facts of this case, ibid., n. 318, referring to the decision of the Supreme Court for the British Zone (Criminal Chamber), 9 November 1948, S. StS 78/48, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, Vol. II, pp. 498–499.

79 Ibid., paras 257–266.

80 Ibid., para. 252; see also Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), para. 634.

81 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 245 (footnote omitted).

82 Ibid., paras 257–266.

83 See Bindschedler, R., “Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Deutschlands”, Annuaire suisse de droit international, Vol. 6, 1949, p. 59.Google Scholar

84 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 270.

85 Ibid., para. 268.

86 For example, Swiss Penal Code, Art. 115.

87 Compare, for example, the difference between the much lower penalty in Art. 151 of the Swiss Penal Code for maliciously causing harm to assets and that foreseen in Art. 146 of that Code for fraud: the only difference between the two crimes being the motive of enrichment. The American law covering fraud and swindles also has such a motive requirement: “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses…”, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1341 (1988) (emphasis added). Another example can be found in the definition of bribery under the U.S. Code: “Whoever… corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official… with intent to influence any official act…”, 18 U.S.C. sec. 201b(1) (1998) (emphasis added).

88 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 269.

89 Ibid., para. 260, describing the facts of the Seh. case.

90 For a description of the facts of this case, op. cit. (note 78).

91 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 254.

92 See, for example, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1111 (1998) (defining murder), and 18 U.S.C. sec. 1112 (1998) (defining manslaughter).

93 The Chamber did so because it felt it to be a matter of general significance for the Tribunal's jurisprudence. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 281.

94 ICTY Statute, Article 5: Crimes against humanity The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) murder;

(b) extermination;

(c) enslavement;

(d) deportation;

(e) imprisonment;

(f) torture;

(g) rape;

(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;

(i) other inhumane acts.

95 See, for example, the description and analysis of the varying interpretations, made by the Trial Chamber, of whether crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent. Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), para. 650, n. 154, and paras 651–652; compare this analysis with that made by the Appeals Chamber, Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 289–291.

96 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 285.

97 Those grounds mentioned are national, political, ethnic, racial or religious. Report of the Secretary-General, loc. cit. (note 1), para. 48. The statement by the U.S. as a member of the Security Council also included gender, see UN SCOR, p. 16, UN Doc. S/PV.3217; see also Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 300.

98 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 285.

99 See, e.g. Art. 5(c) of the Statute of the Military Tribunal for the Far East, and Art. II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10. See also supra note 95 (referring to the description and analysis made by the Trial Chamber and the the Appeals Chamber of the varying interpretations of the elements of crimes against humanity).

100 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 285.

101 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, May 6-July 26, 1996, UNGAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10).

102 Loc. cit. (note 5), para. 291, and paras 221 f. (providing the Appeals Chamber's first reference).

103 Supra note 3.

104 Ibid., Art. 7(1); see also supra note 95 (referring to the description and analysis by the Trial Chamber and the the Appeals Chamber of the varying interpretations of the elements of crimes against humanity).

105 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 285 and 293–304.

106 Ibid., para. 285.

107 Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. (note 1).

108 For statements by Security Council members, see UN Doc. S/PV.3217.

109 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 293.

110 Ibid., para. 295.

111 Ibid., para. 296.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., paras 282–286.

114 Ibid., para. 300.

115 Ibid., para. 304. See, e.g. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), paras 75, 88 and 143.

116 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 28.