1 Miroiu, Andrei, Political Theory of Armed Groups: Social Order and Armed Groups, Springer, Cham, 2020, p. 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 International Bar Association, Nepal in Crisis: Justice Caught in the Crossfire, London, September 2002, p. 5.

3 CPN-M, “Building Red Power in Nepal”, A World to Win, Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, Vol. 30, 2004, p. 17.

4 OHCHR, Nepal Conflict Report, Geneva, 2012, p. 157; International Bar Association, above note 2, p. 24.

5 A. Miroiu, above note 1, p. 49.

6 CPN-M Provisions related to Procedural Law, 2006 (author's translation) (on file with the author).

7 Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions; the term “civilized nations” is currently read as “generally recognized as indispensable under international law”. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention: Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 2nd ed., 2020 (ICRC Commentary on GC III), para. 719, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCIII-commentary (all internet references were accessed in November 2021).

8 Ibid., para. 725.

9 The scope of application has been clarified in this manner. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, p. 1397.

10 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014, para. 15.

11 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 1 June 2001, paras. 47–50; Gary Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010, p. 158; Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 14–15; Marcos Kotlik, “Towards Equality of Belligerents: Why Are Armed Groups Bound by IHL?”, SSRN, 1 February 2012, p. 16, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2621783; Cedric Ryngaert, “Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian Law”, in Jean d'Aspremont (ed.), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-state Actors in International Law, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011, pp. 1003–5.

12 Bond, James E., “Application of the Law of War to Internal Conflicts”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1973, p. 372Google Scholar; Sivakumaran, Sandesh, “Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trials or Summary Justice?”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2009, p. 499CrossRefGoogle Scholar; L. Zegveld, above note 11, pp. 69–70. Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2016, p. 211.

13 The ICRC cites opinions of scholars and an opinion of the European Court of Human Rights. ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 7, para. 728.

14 The 2020 Commentary on GC III explains in detail the interpretation of the terms independence and impartiality and provides an illustrative list of judicial guarantees. Ibid., paras. 714–24. An explanation of judicial guarantees is also found in the ICRC Customary Law Study; see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, rule 100; the Commentary on Additional Protocol II asserts that Article 6 of Additional Protocol II “supplements and develops article 3(1)(d)”. Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann, above note 9, p. 1397; the Elements of Crimes of Article 8 (2)(c)(iv) of the International Criminal Court Rome Statute considers this position as the standard to find war crime of sentencing or execution without due process. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, p. 34, available at: https://rb.gy/lbsk2o; However, Jonathan Somer reasons that Additional Protocol II has not modified common Article 3 as the latter has a broader scope of application than the former. Somer, Jonathan, “Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 867, September 2007, p. 670CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 7, para. 730.

16 Ibid., para. 731.

17 For elaborate discussions on the matter, see L. Zegveld, above note 11; S. Sivakumaran, above note 12; J. Somer, above note 14; ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 7; Jan Willms, Justice Through Armed Groups’ Governance – An Oxymoron?, Governance Working Paper No. 40, Collaborative Research Center, October 2012; Manuel J. Ventura, “Automatic Criminal Liability for Unlawful Confinement (Imprisonment) as a War Crime? A Potential Consequence of Denying Non-State Armed Groups the Power to Detain in NIACs”, in Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos D. Kotlik and Manuel J. Ventura (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice, Springer, Berlin, 2020; David Tuck, “Detention by Armed Groups: Overcoming Challenges to Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 883, 2011; Laurence Hill-Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Marco Sassoli and Yuval Shany, “Should the Obligations of States and Armed Groups Under International Humanitarian Law Really be Equal?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 882, 2011.

18 D. Tuck, above note 17, p. 764; L. Hill-Cawthorne, ibid., p. 69; Marco Sassoli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, MA, 2019, paras. 10.02 and 10.14; G. Solis, above note 11, p. 159; J. Somer, above note 14, pp. 689–90.

19 Robert Kolb, Advanced Introduction to International Humanitarian Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, MA, 2014, pp. 29–36.

20 E. Heffes, M. D. Kotlik and M. J. Ventura, above note 17, p. 20.

21 Bangerter, Olivier, “Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 882, 2011, pp. 365–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; The Roots of Behaviour in War, and its update, The Roots of Restraint in War also explore the formal and informal sources that influence the behaviour of armed forces during armed conflicts, including those of non-State armed forces. See Daniel Muñoz-Rojas and Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations, ICRC, Geneva, 2004, pp. 1–16; ICRC, The Roots of Restraint in War, 2018, pp. 6–71.

22 Gurung, M. D., “Communist Movement in Nepal”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 44, 1977, p. 1849Google Scholar; S. D. Crane, Maoist Insurgency in Nepal 1996–2001, USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, pp. 2–3.

23 A form of local governance based on a council of village elders called the Panchas.

24 S. D. Crane, above note 22, p. 4.

25 Arjun Karki and David Seddon, “The People's War in Historical Context”, in Arjun Karki and David Seddon (eds), The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspective, Adroit Publishers, Delhi, 2003, p. 10.

26 George Katsiaficas, Asia's Unknown Uprisings, Vol. 2, PM Press, Oakland, CA, 2013, p. 219.

27 The expressions are used in the Maoists’ party documents. For example, “Revolution in Nepal, A Better World's in Birth”, A World to Win, Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, Vol. 29, 2002, p. 7. I do not necessarily agree with this political expression.

28 Mahendra Lowati, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal”, in Mahendra Lowati and Anup K. Pahari, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, Routledge, New York, 2010, pp. 8–10.

29 International Crisis Group, Nepal's Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, Asia Report No. 132, 18 May 2007, p. 6.

30 Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, pp. 151–2, available at: http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PW38.html#s1; A. Miroiu, above note 1, p. 44.

31 “Plan for the Historical Initiation of the People's War”, September 1995; A. Karki and D. Seddon, above note 25, p. 18, available at: https://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org/html/documents/1995-09-00_document_cpn-m_eng.html.

32 I have described in another publication how the indicators of intensity and organization have been met based on the facts on the grounds. See Sangroula, Yugichha, “Lest We Forget the Realm of Armed Conflicts: A Guided Discussion on the Law of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law”, Kathmandu School of Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2019, pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

33 CPN(M) and CPI-ML(PW), Joint Press Statement, 14 July 2000, cited in International Crisis Group, above note 29, footnote 10. Adversely, a political commentator has described the situation as a power trip, rather than a people's war. Om Asta Rai, “What Was it All For: Revisiting the 40-Point Demand of the Maoists 20 Years Later”, Nepali Times, 5 February 2016.

34 Michael Miklaucic, “Contending with Illicit Power Structures: A Typology”, in Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin, Till Förster and Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, Non-State Actors as Standard Setters, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 206; Olivier Bangerter, Internal Control: Code of Conducts within Insurgent Armed Groups, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 31, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, November 2012, p. 47.

35 The CPN-M explicitly and consistently demanded for these reforms throughout the Jana Yuddha.

36 Prachanda, “Two Momentous Years of Revolutionary Transformation”, in A. Karki and D. Seddon, above note 25, p. 212.

37 Marks, Thomas A. and Rich, Paul B., “Back to the Future – People's War in the 21st Century”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2017, p. 411CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 Common Minimum Policy & Programme of United Revolutionary People's Council, adopted by the First National Convention of the Revolutionary United Front of CPN-M, September 2001 (on file with the author). Policies (c) and (d) are particularly remarkable since the 1990 Constitution presented Nepal as a Hindu nation and did not recognize key socio-economic rights as fundamental rights. For example, food and heath were not recognized as fundamental rights and rather as directive principles and state policies within Article 24(1) of the 1990 Constitution. For a detailed analysis, see Geeta Pathak Sangroula, “Breaking the Generation Theory of Human Rights: Mapping the Scope of Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with Special Reference to the Constitutional Guarantees in Nepal”, Kathmandu School of Law Review, Vol. 3, Human Rights and Democratization Special Issue, 2013, p. 36.

39 “Revolution in Nepal”, above note 27, p. 80.

40 A. Karki and D. Seddon, above note 25, p. 31.

41 M. Lowati and A. K. Pahari, above note 28, p. 22.

42 Li Onesto, Dispatches from the People's War in Nepal, Insight Press, Chicago, IL, 2005, p. 222; Prachanda, above note 36.

43 Bishnu Raj Upreti, Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal, Adroit Publishers, New Delhi, 2006, p. 107.

44 CPN-M, above note 3, p. 11.

45 B. R. Upreti, above note 43, p. 107.

46 “Revolution in Nepal”, above note 27, p. 3.

47 L. Onesto, above note 42, p. 128.

48 CPN-M, above note 3, p. 117.

49 Epilogue, CPN-M Public Legal Code, 2003/4 (author's translation) (on file with the author).

50 “Revolution in Nepal”, above note 27, p. 3.

51 International Bar Association, above note 2, p. 29.

52 S. D. Crane, above note 22, p. 13.

53 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Nepal: Justice in Transition, February 2008, p. 3, available at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Nepal-Justice-in-Transition-Thematic-reports-2008.pdf.

54 Ashok Mehta and Mahendra Lowati, “Military Dimensions of the ‘People's War’: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Nepal”, in M. Lowati and A. K. Pahari, above note 28, p. 176.

55 B. R. Upreti, above note 43, p. 107.

56 CPN-M Common Minimum Policy, above note 38, policy 18.

57 B. R. Upreti, above note 43, p. 107.

58 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 187.

59 S. Sivakumaran, above note 12, p. 493.

60 B. R. Upreti, above note 43, p. 107.

61 L. Onesto, above note 42, pp. 94–5.

62 Specific statistical data is unavailable. Ibid., pp. 130–1.

63 Ibid., pp. 128–9.

64 Ibid., pp. 126–7.

65 Ibid., p. 174.

66 B. R. Upreti, above note 43, p. 107.

67 Ibid.

68 CPN-M Common Minimum Policy, above note 38, policy 19.

69 Ibid., policy 19.

70 CPN-M Public Legal Code, above note 49, section 20.

71 This is reflected in the preamble of the CPN-M Public Legal Code. Ibid.

72 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 91. However, the 2020 Commentary on GC III has suggested that courts can be composed from members of OAGs “as long as procedures are in place to ensure they perform their judicial functions independently and impartially”. ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 7, para. 716.

73 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 187.

74 ICJ, above note 53, p. 8.

75 “Revolution in Nepal”, above note 27, p. 80.

76 Government of Nepal, Crimes against State and Punishment Act, Nepal, 1989, section 3.2.

77 Government of Nepal, Some Public (Crime and Punishment Act), Nepal, 1970, section 2.

78 Government of Nepal, General Code (Muluki Ain), Nepal, 1963.

79 Constitution of Nepal, 1990, Arts 12(a) and 12(d).

80 Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 56–7.

81 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 7, para. 731; see the earlier section “Lawfulness of the courts established by organized armed groups”.

82 CPA held between Government of Nepal and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), November 2006, clauses 5.1.6, 5.2.11.

83 ICJ, above note 53.

84 Wenoj Adhikari v. HMG, DN 6487 (author's translation).

85 ICJ, above note 53, p. 13.

86 CPN-M, 40 Point Demand to the Government, 1996, available at: https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/40points.htm.

87 B. R. Upreti, above note 43, p. 108.

88 CPN-M, “Excerpts from the Second National Conference”, A World to Win, Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, Vol. 27, 2001, pp. 50 and 53.

89 CPN-M, above note 3, p. 17.

90 Prachanda, above note 36.

91 Arjun Karki, “A Radical Reform Agenda for Conflict Resolution in Nepal”, in A. Karki and D. Seddon, above note 25, p. 446.

92 ICJ, above note 53, p. 7.

93 L. Onesto, above note 42, p. 86.

94 Hutt, Michael, “Reading Maoist Memoirs”, Studies in Nepali History and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, p. 127Google Scholar.

95 Yurendra Basnett, From Politicization of Grievances to Political Violence: An Analysis of the Maoist Movement in Nepal, Development Destin Studies Series No. 07-78, London School of Economics, 2009, p. 20. But see Dhakal, Suresh, “Democracy, Democracies and Democracy Discourses in Nepal: An Anthropologist's Engagement”, Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 7, 2013, p. 151Google Scholar.

96 CPN-M Public Legal Code, above note 49, section 2.1.

97 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 86.

98 Reliefweb, “Nepal, Rebels Accused of Running Parallel Government”, 14 September 2006, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-rebels-accused-running-parallel-government.

99 ICJ, above note 53, p. 19.

100 B. R. Upreti, above note 43, p. 107.

101 M. Hutt, above note 94, p. 125.

102 Ibid., p. 126; Ina Zerkevich, Maoist People's War and the Revolution of Everyday Life in Nepal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 44; A. Karki and D. Seddon, above note 25, pp. 21 and 30.

103 Saferworld, “Justice Mechanisms and Conflict Dynamics in Nepal Local Perceptions and Impacts”, May 2016, available at: https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1069-justice-mechanisms-and-conflict-dynamics-in-nepal-local-perceptions-and-impacts.

104 Ibid., p. 2.

105 M. Lowati and A. K. Pahari, above note 28, p. 117; ICJ, Human Rights Report, Nepal, June 2020, p. 29; ICJ, above note 53, p. 21.

106 International Bar Association, above note 2, p. 31.

107 Ibid., p. 29.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 ICJ, above note 53, p. 19.

111 Ibid.

112 Mao, above note 30, pp. 343–4.

113 ICJ, above note 53, p. 11.

114 CPN-M, Declaration of the Beginning of the Jana Yuddha (on file with the author). L. Onesto, above note 42, pp. 75–6.

115 I. Zerkevich, above note 102, p. 232.

116 CPN-M Common Minimum Policy, above note 38, policy 19.

117 Ibid., policy 21.

118 CPN-M Public Legal Code, above note 49, part 3.

119 Ibid., part 2.

120 Ibid., part 3.

121 Ibid., part 11.

122 ICJ, above note 53, p. 11.

123 CPN-M Provisions related to Procedural Law, above note 6.

124 Ibid., chapter on criminal procedure.

125 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 126; L. Onesto, above note 42, pp. 74–5.

126 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 125.

127 M. Hutt, above note 94.

128 ICJ, above note 53, p. 13.

129 OHCHR, Human Rights Abuses by the CPN-M: Summary of Concerns, September 2006, p. 5; ICJ, above note 53, p. 10; International Bar Association, above note 2, p. 29.

130 OHCHR, ibid., p. 5.

131 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 90.

132 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 7, para. 722.

133 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 199.

134 ICJ, Attacks on Justice – Nepal, 2008, p. 9, available at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Nepal-Attacks-on-Justice-2005-Publications-2008.pdf.

135 OHCHR, above note 129, p. 5.

136 OHCHR, above note 4, p. 87.

137 OHCHR, above note 129, p. 8.

138 CPN-M, Document Adopted by the Third Expanded Meeting CC of the CPN (Maoist), March 1995, p. 13 (on file with the author).

139 M. Miklaucic, above note 34, p. 205.

140 Ibid., p. 10.

141 S. Sivakumaran, above note 12, p. 493.

142 S. D. Crane, above note 22, p. 15.

143 International Bar Association, above note 2, pp. 31 and 32; ICJ, above note 134, p. 4.

144 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 7, para. 716.

145 “Interview with Prachanda”, Kantipur Online, 8 February 2006 (on file with the author).

146 M. Lowati and A. K. Pahari, above note 28, pp. 44–5.

147 Geneva Call, Administration of Justice by Armed Non-State Actors, Report from the 2017 Garance Talks, Issue 2, p. 9, available at: https://genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/09/GaranceTalks_Issue02_Report_2018_web.pdf.

148 J. Somer, above note 14, p. 676.

149 S. Sivakumaran, above note 12, p. 504.

150 Ibid.