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International humanitarian law-making and new military technologies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2022

Yahli Shereshevsky
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Abstract

Military technology has developed rapidly in recent years, and this development challenges existing norms. It has produced countless debates about the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to areas of war and technology including cyber military operations, military artificial intelligence (including autonomous weapons), the use of drones, and military human enhancement. Despite these rapid progressions, the prospect of creating new treaties to specifically regulate their use by militaries and in armed conflicts is very low. This is largely due to the unequal allocation of military technology among States and the differing interests that result from this inequality. The absence of formal regulation means that State and non-State actors are increasingly embracing informal means of law-making. This is similar to other areas of IHL, such as the regulation of asymmetric conflicts, where norms are contested. In such cases, State and non-State actors employ various informal law-making techniques to advance their normative positions through treaty interpretation and the identification of customary international law.

However, the discussion on military technology differs from other contemporary IHL debates. First, due to the rapid development of such technology and uncertainty about how it will be employed in practice, the interests of the various actors are less clear. Second, there are significant challenges in obtaining accurate information about new military technologies. This makes even the informal law-making path in the context of new technologies more challenging.

This paper explores the dynamics of contemporary international law-making as it relates to the regulation of new military technologies. It identifies the main techniques that are used by the relevant actors and explores the common themes among the various debates over military technology, as well as the potential specific challenges in relation to certain technologies.

Keywords

law-makingmilitary technologyIHLcyberautonomous weapons
Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 104 , Issue 920-921: How International Humanitarian Law Develops , August 2022 , pp. 2131 - 2152
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC

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Footnotes

*

I would like to thank David Hughes and Arie Kacowicz for their valuable comments, and Danielle Regev for her excellent research assistance.

References

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4 Ibid, p. 568 (describing the failure of the attempts to ban the crossbow due to its effectiveness as a weapon).

5 See, e.g., Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, revised and expanded ed., Free Press, New York, 2010; Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today , Gotham Books, New York, 2006; William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1982.

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13 Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11.

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15 J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds), above note 14.

16 S. Ratner, above note 9, pp. 913–914.

17 The Copenhagen Process on the handling of Detainees in International Military Operation: Principles and Guidelines, 2012, available at: https://iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Copenhagen-Process-Principles-and-Guidelines.pdf.

18 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home; Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, ICRC, Geneva, 2005 (ICRC Interpretive Guidance), available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.

19 The Safe Schools Declaration is a non-binding declaration that was developed in a process led by Norway and Argentina. It is available at: www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/utvikling/safe_schools_declaration.pdf.

20 Government of Ireland, “Draft Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas”, 2 March 2022, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/draft-political-declaration-strengthening-protection-civilians-humanitarian.

21 Yoram Dinstein and Arne Willy Dahl, Oslo Manual on Select Topics of the Law of Armed Conflict, Springer, Cham, 2020.

22 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

23 Louise Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.

24 Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, 2016 (updated version), available at: https://tinyurl.com/ycytsefz.

25 Danish Ministry of Defence, Military Manual on International Law Relevant to Danish Armed Forces in International Operations, Defense Command Denmark, Copenhagen, 2020, available at: https://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/2014GazaConflictFullReport.pdf.

26 State of Israel, The 2014 Gaza Conflict Report: Factual and Legal Aspects, May 2015, available at: https://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/2014GazaConflictFullReport.pdf,

27 Emily Crawford, Non-Binding Norms in International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022; Heike Krieger and Jonas Püschmann (eds), Law-Making and Legitimacy in International Humanitarian Law, Edward Elgar, Northampton, 2021; Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11; Sivakumaran, Sandesh, “Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict”, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2018CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 K. Dörmann, above note 11, p. 714.

29 Protocol IV (Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons) to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 1380 UNTS 370, 13 October 1995.

30 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 2056 UNTS 211, 18 September 1997.

31 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2688 UNTS 39, 30 May 2008.

32 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, UN Doc A/CONF.229/2017/8, 7 July 2017, available at: www.icanw.org/tpnw_full_text.

33 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978), Art. 35.

34 See, e.g., the prohibitions on blinding laser weapons, anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions and nuclear weapons cited in above notes 29–32.

35 See, e.g., Ohm, Paul, “The Argument against Technology-Neutral Surveillance Laws,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 7, 2010Google Scholar; Lyria Bennett Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race to Keep Up with Technological Change,” University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy, Vol. 2007, No. 2, 2007.

36 L. Bennett Moses, above note 35, p. 270.

37 Rebecca Crootof, “Regulating New Weapons Technology”, in Ronald T. P. Alcala and Eric Talbot Jesnen (eds), The Impact of Emerging Technologies on the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, pp. 15–17; R. Liivoja, above note 7, pp. 1168–1171.

38 See, e.g., David Turns, “Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, pp. 211–212 (suggesting that there are very few examples in which the general principle had an impact on positions of States regarding the legality of weapons). For a general critical look on the historical regulation of weapons, see C. af Jochnick and R. Normand, above note 6 (suggesting that, in many cases, the banning of specific weapons is a direct result of the limited military effectiveness of those weapons).

39 S. Watts, above note 3.

40 Liivoja calls these types of weapons “newly controversial”: R. Liivoja, above note 7, p. 1175.

41 See, e.g., Petrova, Margarita H., “Naming and Praising in Humanitarian Norm Development”, World Politics, Vol. 71, No. 3, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cottrell, M. Patrick, “Legitimacy and Institutional Replacement: The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Emergence of the Mine Ban Treaty”, International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2009CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 See S. Watts, above note 3, pp. 584, 594.

43 See, e.g., Schneider, Jacquelyn, “The Capability/Vulnerability Paradox and Military Revolutions: Implications for Computing, Cyber, and the Onset of War”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Benjamin M. Jensen, Christopher Whyte and Scott Cuomo, “Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence”, International Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2019.

44 Kasmira Jefford, “What Next for Talks on Regulating ‘Killer Robots’?”, Geneva Solutions, 21 December 2021, available at: https://genevasolutions.news/global-news/what-next-for-talks-on-regulating-killer-robots.

45 Charli Carpenter, “A Better Path to a Treaty Banning ‘Killer Robots’ Has Just Been Cleared”, World Politics Review, 7 January 2022, available at: www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30232/a-better-path-to-a-treaty-banning-ai-weapons-killer-robots; Human Rights Watch, “Killer Robots: Military Powers Stymie Ban”, 19 December 2021, available at: www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/19/killer-robots-military-powers-stymie-ban.

46 Michael N. Schmitt and Sean Watts, “The Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2015, pp. 222.

47 Shereshevsky, Yahli, “Are All Soldiers Created Equal? On the Equal Application of the Law to Enhanced Soldiers”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2021, pp. 276–277Google Scholar.

48 Steven Ratner, “Persuasion About/Without International Law: The Case of Cybersecurity Norms”, in Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner (eds), Talking International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, pp. 109–110; R. Crootof, above note 37, p. 21.

49 R. Crootof, above note 37, p. 21.

50 See Arthur Holland Michel, “In the Debate over Autonomous Weapons, It's Time to Unlock the ‘Black Box’ of AI”, Bulletain of Atomic Scientists, 16 October 2020, available at: https://thebulletin.org/2020/10/ban-regulate-or-do-nothing-the-debate-over-ai-weapons-and-one-path-forward/.

51 S. Ratner, above note 48, p. 111; M. N. Schmitt and S. Watts, above note 46, pp. 210–211.

52 M. N. Schmitt and S. Watts, above note 46, p. 210.

53 S. Ratner, above note 48, pp. 109–111; Kubo Macák, “From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-Makers”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2017, pp. 881–882; M. N. Schmitt and S. Watts, above note 46, pp. 223–224.

54 R. Crootof, above note 37, pp. 21–22.

55 Ibid., pp. 22–25.

56 Rebecca Crootof, “Jurisprudential Space Junk: Treaties and New Technologies”, in Chiara Giorgetti and Natalie Klein (eds), Resolving Conflicts in the Law, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2019.

57 David Luban, “Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2013.

58 ICRC, ICRC Position on Autonomous Weapon Systems, Geneva, May 2021 (ICRC AWS Position), p. 7, available at: www.icrc.org/en/download/file/166330/icrc_position_on_aws_and_background_paper.pdf.

59 Vincent Boulanin, Moa Peldán Carlsson, Netta Goussac and Neil Davison, Limits on Autonomy in Weapon Systems: Identifying Practical Elements of Human Control, ICRC and SIPRI, June 2020, available at: www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/2006_limits_of_autonomy.pdf.

60 See, e.g., Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias, Autonomous Cyber Weapons and Command Responsibility, International Law Studies, Vol. 96, 2020; Rebecca Crootof, “War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 164, No. 6, 2016; Jack M. Beard, “Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities”, Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2014, p. 676.

61 Marco Sassóli, “Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified”, International Law Studies, Vol. 90, 2014, p. 317 (referring to the “Game Boy mentality” of the manufacturers).

62 See generally, Eric Talbot Jensen, “The (Erroneous) Requirement for Human Judgment (and Error) in the Law of Armed Conflict”, International Law Studies, Vol. 90, 2020.

63 While it is very challenging to demonstrate this argument through a comprehensive survey of the entire body of literature on new technologies in war, a useful example is States’ positions on the regulation of LAWS in which a majority of States emphasized the dangers of LAWS while only a minority discussed their potential positive effects. See Human Rights Watch, Stopping Killer Robots – Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and Retaining Human Control, 2020, available at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/04/arms0820_web_1.pdf.

64 See Steve Calandrillo and Nolan Kobuke Anderson, “Terrified by Technology: How Systemic Bias Distorts Legal and Regulatory Responses to Emerging Technology”, University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2022, No. 2, 2022; Dan M. Kahan, “Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 156, No, 3, 2008.

65 S. Calandrillo and N. Kobuke Anderson, above note 64.

66 Ibid., pp. 626–628.

67 See, e.g., Daniel Dinello, Technophobia! Science Fiction Visions of Posthuman Technology, University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 2005.

68 For a discussion of the fear of the other in relation to enhanced soldiers in the context of popular culture and its implications, see Y. Shereshevsky, above note 47, pp. 316–317.

69 See, e.g., R. Liivoja, above note 7, pp. 1160–1161; Ganesh Sitaraman, “Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 7, 2009; Sean D. Murphy, “Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the ‘War on Terrorism’: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed ‘Unprivileged Combatants’”, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 5–6, 2007; Roy S. Schöndorf, “Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2005.

70 See, e.g., Yuval Shany and Dafna Dror-Shpoliansky, “It's the End of the (Offline) World as We Know It: From Human Rights to Digital Human Rights – A Proposed Typology”, European Journal of International Law, 2022 (forthcoming).

71 See, e.g., R. Crootof, above note 37; Eichensehr, Kristen, “Cyberwar and International Law Step Zero”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2015Google Scholar.

72 R. Crootof, above note 37; K. Eichensehr, above note 71.

73 Michael N. Schmitt, “Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate”, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 30, 2012 (making a similar comparison, stating that “there are very few legal issues unique to [drones]”).

74 See, e.g., Schmitt, Michael N., “Rewired Warfare: Rethinking the Law of Cyber Attack”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 96, No. 893, 2014CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz and Haley Nix, “The Law of Cyber-Attack”, California Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 4, 2012.

75 K. Eichensehr, above note 71 (following Lois Henkin's famous statement regarding compliance, Eichensehr suggests that “most law-of-war rules apply most of the time to most new technologies”); Crootof, Rebecca, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Limits of Analogy”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2018Google Scholar (while accepting Eichensehr's position, Crootof suggests that autonomous weapons raise some aspects that require us to “explicitly revise rules or create entirely new ones”).

76 GGE on LAWS, Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: Final Report, UN Doc. CCW/MSP/2019/9, 13 December 2019, Annex III (GGE on LAWS Guiding Principles), available at: https://undocs.org/CCW/MSP/2019/9.

77 Rain Liivoja and Luke Chircop, “Are Enhanced Warfighters Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare?”, International Law Studies, Vol. 94, 2018.

78 Durkee, Melissa J., “Interpretive Entrepreneurs”, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, No. 3, 2021Google Scholar; Gleider Hernandez, “Interpretive Authority and the International Judiciary”, in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 16; Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11, pp. 11–12.

79 Fernando Luca Bordin, “Reflections of Customary International Law: The Authority of Codification Conventions and the ILC Draft Articles in International Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2014; Monica Hakimi, “Custom's Method and Process: Lessons from International Humanitarian Law”, in Curtis A. Bradley (ed.), Custom's Future: International Law in a Changing World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 163; Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11, pp. 12–13.

80 Y. Shany and D. Dror-Shpoliansky, above note 70.

81 R. Crootof, above note 37.

82 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017 (Tallinn Manual 2.0).

83 ICRC AWS position, above note 58.

84 See, e.g., Roy Schöndorf, “Israel's Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations”, International Law Studies, Vol. 97, 2021; Michael N. Schmitt, “France Speaks Out on IHL and Cyber Operations: Part I”, EJIL: Talk!, 30 September 2019, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/france-speaks-out-on-ihl-and-cyber-operations-part-i/; Jeffrey Biller and Michael N. Schmitt, “Un-caging the Bear? A Case Study in Cyber Opinio Juris and Unintended Consequences”, EJIL: Talk!, 24 October 2018, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/un-caging-the-bear-a-case-study-in-cyber-opinio-juris-and-unintended-consequences/.

85 On the role of academic scholarship in law-making processes, see, generally, Sivakumaran, Sandesh, “The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2017CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

86 See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, “Hard and Soft Law”, in Jeremy Dunoff and Mark Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer, “International Soft Law”, Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010; K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, above note 12.

87 S. Ratner, above note 48, p. 117.

88 Emily Crawford, Non-Binding Norms in International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022; Heike Krieger and Jonas Püschmann (eds), Law-Making and Legitimacy in International Humanitarian Law, Edward Elgar, Northampton, 2021; Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Making and Shaping the Law of Armed Conflict”, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2018.

89 S. Ratner, above note 48.

90 C. Carpenter, above note 45.

91 UN GGE, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/70/174, 22 July 2015, available at: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/174; GGE on LAWS Guiding Principles, above note 76.

92 See, for example, the various State commentaries on the GGE on LAWS Guiding Principles, available at: https://meetings.unoda.org/section/group-of-governmental-experts-gge-on-emerging-technologies-in-the-area-of-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-documents-4929-documents-4947/.

93 See, e.g., R. Schöndorf, above note 84; M. N. Schmitt, above note 84.

94 Tallin Manual 2.0, above note 82.

95 ICRC AWS position, above note 58.

96 Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11.

97 Ibid.

98 Tallinn Manual 2.0, above note 82, pp. 2–3.

99 Ibid, p. 2.

100 Australian Government, “Australia's Submission on International Law to Be Annexed to the Report of the 2021 Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber”, available at: https://tinyurl.com/58rhswsd.

101 M. J. Durkee, above note 78.

102 Ewan Lawson and Kubo Macák, Avoiding Civilian Harm from Military Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts: ICRC Expert Meeting, 21–22 January 2020, Geneva, 2021 (Civilian Harm Report), available at: https://shop.icrc.org/download/ebook?sku=4539/002-ebook.

103 ICRC AWS position, above note 58.

104 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 18; ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 18.

105 Tomer Broude and Yahli Shereshevsky, “Explaining the Practical Purchase of Soft Law”, in Harlan G. Cohen and Timothy Meyer (eds), International Law as Behavior, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021.

106 Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany, “A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 112, No. 4, 2018.

107 Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11, pp. 46–52.

108 Civilian Harm Report, above note 102.

109 “Executive Summary: Avoiding Civilian Harm from Military Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 104, No. 919, 2022.

110 Roy Schöndorf, “Israel's Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations”, EJIL: Talk!, 9 December 2020, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/israels-perspective-on-key-legal-and-practical-issues-concerning-the-application-of-international-law-to-cyber-operations/.

111 R. Schöndorf, above note 84.

112 Available at: https://twitter.com/RoySchondorf/status/1336263003734487042.

113 Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11, pp. 40–42.

114 Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism”, Review of International Organizations, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2014; Ingebritsen, Christine, “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2002CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998.

115 See, e.g., Rosert, Elvira, “Norm Emergence as Agenda Diffusion: Failure and Success in the Regulation of Cluster Munitions”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fen Osler Hampson and Holly Reid, “Coalition Diversity and Normative Legitimacy in Human Security Negotiations”, International Negotiation, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2003; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, above note 114.

116 Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11, pp. 52–57.

117 C. Carpenter, above note 45.

118 Y. Shereshevsky, above note 11 (focusing on the United States and Israel as the main actors in unilateral law-making initiatives in the context of extraterritorial armed conflicts against non-State armed groups).

119 Bode, Ingvild, “Norm-Making and the Global South: Attempts to Regulate Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”, Global Policy, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar.