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Informal international law-making: A way around the deadlock of international humanitarian law?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 July 2022
Abstract
Over the last two decades, international humanitarian law (IHL) has seen a stalling with regard to States’ willingness to adopt treaties or to be formally involved in the development of IHL. This raises the question of whether holding on to the doctrine of sources as laid down in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is the only way to meaningfully further develop IHL. Indeed, in recent years IHL instruments have often dispensed with certain formalities that are traditionally linked to (the formal sources of) international law; this phenomenon is also called “informal international law-making” (IIL). The present contribution will analyze IIL as an alternative way forward in light of the current “deadlock” caused by States’ unwillingness to conclude new IHL treaties or to recognize customary IHL. In this article, we will investigate and assess the opportunities, shortcomings and pitfalls offered by informality by looking into examples of IIL within IHL. More concretely, we will look into State practice in relation to (1) the Safe Schools Declaration, (2) the Tallinn Manual and Tallinn Manual 2.0, and (3) the Montreux Document. Most importantly, our findings will assess whether IIL can overcome one of its alleged main disadvantages: its lack of effectiveness.
Keywords
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 104 , Issue 920-921: How International Humanitarian Law Develops , August 2022 , pp. 2111 - 2130
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.
References
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4 White House, “National Security Strategy”, 27 May 2010, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (all internet references were accessed in July 2022).
5 Ibid.
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11 See also Jan Wouters, “International Law, Informal Lawmaking and Global Governance in Times of Anti-Globalism and Populism”, in Heike Krieger, Georg Nolte and Andreas Zimmermann (eds), The International Rule of Law: Rise or Decline? Approaching Current Foundational Challenges, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, p. 242.
12 Joost Pauwelyn, “Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research Questions”, in J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds), above note 9, p. 22.
13 Ibid., pp. 15–17.
14 Ibid., pp. 17–19.
15 Ibid., pp. 19–20.
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22 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013 (Tallinn Manual), p. 19.
23 M. Sassòli, above note 2, p. 534; P. Tanodomdej, above note 20, p. 69.
24 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, p. 583.
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26 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, p. 588.
27 German Federal Government, On the Application of International Law in Cyberspace, Berlin, March 2021, pp. 2, 7–10.
28 US Department of Defence, Cybersecurity Reference and Resource Guide, Washington, DC, 20 February 2020, p. 10.
29 French Ministry of the Armed Forces, International Law applied to Operations in Cyberspace, Paris, October 2019, p. 5 (authors’ translation, emphasis added). Original text: “L’élaboration de cette synthèse tient également compte des réflexions actuellement conduits dans ce domaine par des universitaires et des experts indépendants. Parmi ces dernières, le Manuel de Tallinn 2.0 représente le travail le plus exhaustif mené dans ce domaine jusqu’à present”; and caveat: “Si son autorité demeure étroitement tributaire de celle reconnue aux experts à l'origine de sa publication, cette initiative est toutefois de nature à stimuler la réflexion internationale sur le droit international applicable aux cyber-opérations”. For a more substantive analysis of the similarities and divergences between the Manuals and France's statement, see Michael N. Schmitt, “France Speaks Out on IHL and Cyber Operations: Part I”, EJIL: Talk!, 30 September 2019, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/france-speaks-out-on-ihl-and-cyber-operations-part-i/; Michael N. Schmitt, “France Speaks Out on IHL and Cyber Operations: Part II”, EJIL: Talk!, 1 October 2019, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/france-speaks-out-on-ihl-and-cyber-operations-part-ii/.
30 Stef Blok, “Letter to the Parliament on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace”, 5 July 2019, available at: https://tinyurl.com/mu6ubvzp.
31 Ibid.
32 New Zealand Defence Force, Manual of Armed Forces Law, Vol. 4, 2008, Section 1 fn. 23, 31, 82, 86, Section 2 fn. 1, Section 4 fn. 122, Section 10 fn. 165, 166–178, 180–182.
33 Jeremy Wright, “Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century”, 23 May 2018, available at: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century
34 Harold Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Harold Koh to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference Ft. Meade, MD, Sept. 18, 2012”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, 2012
35 Schmitt, Michael, “International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, 2012Google Scholar.
36 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, pp. 584–585.
37 Brian Egan, “Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace”, Berkeley Law School, 10 November 2016, available at: https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/egan-talk-transcript-111016.pdf.
38 US Cyber Command, Twitter, 19 February 2020, available at: https://twitter.com/us_cybercom/status/1229926329254064134?s=21.
39 António Guterres, “Remarks to the General Assembly on the Secretary-General's Priorities for 2020”, New York, 22 January 2020, available at: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-01-22/remarks-general-assembly-priorities-for-2020.
40 French Ministry of the Armed Forces, above note 29, pp. 13–15.
41 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, p. 594.
42 Ibid., p. 604.
43 Nicholas Tsagourias, “Symposium on Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany, ‘A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice’: The Slow Process of Normativizing Cyberspace”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 113, 2019, p. 74.
44 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, pp. 620–622, 647.
45 Ibid., p. 624.
46 Samuele De Tomas Colatin, “Power Grid Cyberattack in Ukraine (2015)”, Cyber Law Toolkit, 4 June 2021, available at: https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Power_grid_cyberattack_in_Ukraine_(2015 ).
47 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, pp. 585, 647.
48 Michael N. Schmitt, “Estonia Speaks Out on Key Rules for Cyberspace”, Just Security, 10 June 2019, available at: www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/.
49 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, pp. 585, 647.
50 See, for example, UNGA Res. A/68/98, 24 June 2013; UNGA Res. A/RES/68/243, 9 January 2014; European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7 February 2013, p. 16; NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, Wales, 5 September 2014, para. 72.
51 Marie Lamensch, “Cyberspace Has Rules: It's Time to Enforce Them”, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 20 October 2021, available at: www.cigionline.org/articles/cyberspace-has-rules-its-time-to-enforce-them/.
52 White House, “Statement from the Press Secretary”, 15 February 2018, available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25/ .
53 Sarah Marsh, “US Joins UK in Blaming Russia for NotPetya Cyber-Attack”, The Guardian, 15 February 2018.
54 Michael N. Schmitt, “Norm-Skepticism in Cyberspace? Counter-Factual and Counterproductive”, Just Security, 28 February 2020, available at: www.justsecurity.org/68892/norm-skepticism-in-cyberspace-counter-factual-and-counterproductive/.
55 L. Boer, above note 25.
56 N. Tsagourias, above note 43, p. 74.
57 Ibid., p. 74. In 2018, for instance, the Dutch minister of foreign affairs Stef Blok called the Tallinn Manual a “roadmap” for State accountability. Government of the Netherlands, “Speech by Minister Blok on First Anniversary Tallinn Manual 2.0”, 20 June 2018, available at: https://perma.cc/XMB5-GTCC.
58 Kubo Mačák, “Symposium on Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany, ‘A Rule Book on The Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice’: On the Shelf, but Close at Hand: The Contribution of Non-State Initiatives to International Cyber Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 113, 2019, pp. 82–84.
59 Ibid.
60 M. N. Schmitt, above note 54.
61 D. Efrony and Y. Shany, above note 21, p. 650.
62 Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, “The Oxford Process on International Law Protections in Cyberspace”, available at: www.elac.ox.ac.uk/the-oxford-process-on-international-law-protections-in-cyberspace#/.
63 Ibid.
64 Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), “The Safe Schools Declaration: An Inter-Governmental Political Commitment to Protect Students, Teachers, Schools, and Universities from the Worst Effects of Armed Conflict”, 2021, available at: https://ssd.protectingeducation.org/; M. Zwanenburg, above note 7, pp. 256, 274–275.
65 The commentary to the Guidelines explicitly minimizes their role as being “intended to serve as a guidance” and states that “they are not legally binding in themselves and do not affect existing obligation under international law”: GCPEA, Commentary on the “Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict”, New York, 2019, pp. 4–5. See also GCPEA, above note 64.
66 P. V. Kessing, above note 1, p. 146.
67 The Guidelines, however, while not reflecting existing IHL, do rely on evidence of good practices which are already applied by some parties to an armed conflict: M. Zwanenburg, above note 7, pp. 256, 258–266.
68 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Oslo Conference on Safe Schools: Protecting Education from Attack, Oslo, 28–29 May 2015; GCPEA, Second International Conference on Safe Schools: Chair's Summary, Buenos Aires, 28–29 March 2017; Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, Third International Conference on Safe Schools, Palma de Mallorca, 27–29 May 2019; GCPEA, Fourth International Conference on the Safe Schools Declaration, Abuja, 25–27 October 2021.
69 With regard to the international organizations, the drafting process involved UNHCR, UNICEF and UNESCO, which are all part of the GCPEA steering committee: M. Zwanenburg, above note 7, pp. 255, 273–274, 276.
70 The commentary to the Guidelines includes an account of the drafting process: GCPEA, above note 65, pp. 6–8.
71 Argentina, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Finland, Germany, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Qatar, Senegal and Switzerland: see Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, above note 68, p. 20.
72 For the most up-to-date list of endorsing States, see: www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/development-cooperation/safeschools_declaration/id2460245/; GCPEA, above note 65.
73 Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2017/414, 10 May 2017, para. 14; Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/72/865, S/2018/465, 16 May 2018, para. 122; Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/74/845, S/2020/535, 9 June 2020, para. 232.
74 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. A/72/276, 2 August 2017, paras 13, 53.
75 UN Department of Peacekeeping, Operations Policy on Child Protection in United Nations Peace Operations, 2017, p. 23.
76 For a brief summary of the increasing attention being paid to this issue, particularly within the context of the UN, see M. Zwanenburg, above note 7, pp. 270–272.
77 GCPEA, above note 65.
78 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises, COM (2018) 304 final, 18 May 2018, p. 9.
79 GCPEA, Practical Impact of the Safe Schools Declaration, New York, October 2019, p. 1.
80 GCPEA, “Safe Schools Declaration Endorsements”, New York, 2022, available at: https://ssd.protectingeducation.org/endorsement/; GCPEA, above note 79.
81 Human Rights Watch, Protecting Schools from Military Use: Law, Policy and Military Doctrine, New York, 27 May 2019, available at: www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/27/protecting-schools-military-use/law-policy-and-military-doctrine.
82 Ibid.
83 GCPEA, above note 79, p. 2.
84 Article 36, The Safe Schools Declaration: Reflections on Effective Post-Agreement Work, London, July 2021, pp. 7–8.
85 MINUSCA Directive on the Protection of Schools and Universities against Military Use, UN Doc. MINUSCA/OSRSG/046/2015, 24 December 2015.
86 GCPEA, above note 79, p. 2.
87 Human Rights Watch, “These Killings Can Be Stopped”: Government and Separatist Groups Abuses in Cameroon's Anglophone Regions, New York, July 2018, p. 31; Human Rights Watch, above note 81.
88 GCPEA, above note 79, p. 2.
89 Ibid., p. 2.
90 P. V. Kessing, above note 1, p. 140.
91 ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, Montreux, August 2009, p. 41.
92 James Cockayne, “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2008, p. 421.
93 Ibid., p. 427.
94 See the Montreux Document Forum website, available at: www.montreuxdocument.org/about/the-forum.html.
95 ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above note 91, p. 5.
96 Ibid., p. 8; M. Sassòli, above note 2, pp. 544–546.
97 ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above note 91, pp. 5, 9.
98 Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Ukraine, and the United States. See P. V. Kessing, above note 1, p. 140; ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above note 91, p. 31.
99 J. Cockayne, above note 92, pp. 419–420.
100 Ibid., p. 403.
101 Ibid., p. 426
102 Ibid., p. 419.
103 For a complete list of the States and regional organizations supporting the Montreux Document and the date of their communication of support, see: www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-states.html.
104 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Private Military and Security Firms and Erosion of the State Monopoly on the Use of Force, Recommendation 1858, 2009, para. 15.
105 Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama have all joined the Montreux Document: János Kálmán, “The International Regulation of Private Security Providers – a Brief Analysis”, in János Kálmán (ed.), Legal Studies on Contemporary Hungarian Legal Systems, Universitas-Győr, Győr, 2014, p. 162.
106 American University Washington College of Law, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Initiative for Human Rights in Business and International Institute for Nonviolent Action, “Montreux Five Years On: An Analysis of State Efforts to Implement the Montreux Document Legal Obligations and Good Practices”, 2013, p. 157.
107 Ibid., p. 158.
108 Ibid., p. 157.
109 Anthony Aust, “The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1986, p. 787.
110 As referred to in J. Cockayne, above note 92, p. 428.
111 J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds), above note 9, pp. 30–31.
112 Ibid.
113 ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above note 91, p. 40.
114 See for example J. Kálmán, above note 105, p. 160.
115 ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above note 91, p. 40.
116 Ibid., p. 40.
117 J. Cockayne, above note 92, p. 423, referring to Amnesty International and International Commission of Jurists, Comments on the Swiss Initiative Draft Text Dated 13 August 2008, 29 August 2008.
118 M. Zwanenburg, above note 7, p. 256; J. Cockayne, above note 92, p. 428.
119 ICJ, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, paras 43, 46, 49.
120 Principle 1 states: “Declarations publicly made and manifesting the will to be bound may have the effect of creating legal obligations. When the conditions for this are met, the binding character of such declarations is based on good faith; States concerned may then take them into consideration and rely on them; such States are entitled to require that such obligations be respected.” International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part 2, 2006, p. 370.
121 P. V. Kessing, above note 1, p. 150.
122 Ferrelli, Ashley, “Military Use of Educational Facilities during Armed Conflict: An Evaluation of the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict as an Effective Solution”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2016, p. 363Google Scholar.