1 “Wherever something stirs on this long trail of dust, made even more subtle after six months of drought, clouds are seen to rise, and when the slightest wind passes over the countryside, the heavy heads of the old trees seem to dissolve into smoke.” Eugene Fromentin, Une année dans le Sahel, Typographie Wittersheim, Paris, 1859, p. 43.

2 Climate migration refers to “[t]he movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, within a State or across an international border”: Warsaw International Mechanism, Executive Committee, “Action Area 6: Migration, Displacement and Human Mobility”, submission from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2016. The present article seeks to avoid labels such as “environmental refugee” or “climate refugee”, as they have no basis in international law: see Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 3, 6. These terms also generate considerable controversy as the word “refugee” has a technical legal meaning: see Rafiqul Islam, “Climate Refugees and International Refugee Law”, in Rafiqul Islam and Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan (eds), An Introduction to International Refugee Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden and Boston, MA, 2013, pp. 217–218. Many writers warn of misunderstandings as a result of the misuse of legal terms by lay persons: see, for example, the review of such criticisms in Camillo Boano, Roger Zetter and Tim Morris, Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding the Linkages between Environmental Change, Livelihoods and Forced Migration, Forced Migration Policy Briefing No. 1, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, November 2008, p. 10. See also Astri Suhrke, “Environmental Degradation and Population Flows”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1994, p. 482, who suggests that the definition of refugee in such contexts is a sociological one rather than a legal one. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recommends the term “persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change”, which is somewhat long-winded: see UNHCR, “Climate Change and Disaster Displacement”, available at: www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html (all internet references were accessed in January 2022). Others suggest “environmental refugees”: see Bates, Diane C., “Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change”, Population and Environment, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2002CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 As the United Nations (UN) has observed, “[d]isasters often generate the mass displacement of persons, either across borders (refugees) or within those of a disaster-affected State (internally displaced persons)”. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, UN Doc. A/CN.4/598, 15 May 2008, para. 27.

4 “The occurrence of a disaster is not envisaged as grounds for granting refugee status”: ibid., para. 28. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the harmful effects of climate change include an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events forcing people from their homes, possibly permanently; increased warming and drought affecting agriculture and access to clean water; sea-level rises making coastal areas uninhabitable; and increased potential for violence as a result of economic dislocation. Vicente R. Barros et al. (eds), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Fifth Assessment Report, Working Group II, IPCC, 2014, Part A, pp. 766–771, and Part B, p. 1175, available at: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/. While international law may draw distinctions between different categories of natural disasters, it has been observed that “disaster categorization” entails a “high degree of arbitrariness” since it is “not always possible to maintain a clear delineation between causes”. Report of the Special Rapporteur, above note 3, paras 48–49.

5 J. McAdam, above note 2, p. 1.

6 “Sahel”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at: www.britannica.com/place/Sahel. The Sahel may extend to parts of Nigeria, Eritrea, the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau (Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), The Slow Onset Effects of Climate Change and Human Rights Protection for Cross-Border Migrants, 2018, paras 92–93, available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/OHCHR_slow_onset_of_Climate_Change_EN.pdf), as well as other neighbouring countries (Africa Renewal, “The Sahel: Land of Opportunities”, available at: www.un.org/africarenewal/sahel).

7 Willem Van Cotthem, “Desertification in the Sahel”, 16 February 2015, available at: https://desertification.wordpress.com/2015/02/16/the-sahel-desertified/. See UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 107, 9 May 1992 (entered into force 21 March 1993) (UNFCCC), Art. 1(1).

8 See the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, 1954 UNTS 3, 17 June 1994 (entered into force 26 December 1996) (UNCCD), Annex I, available at: www.unccd.int/conventionregions/annex-i-africa. The UNCCD, inter alia, establishes a regional programme for Africa to fight land degradation. Land degradation affects much of Africa: see Pablo Muñoz et al., Land Degradation, Poverty and Inequality, UNCCD, Bonn, 2019, pp. 8–9, available at: https://tinyurl.com/yzvnj4h9.

9 UNFCCC, Art. 1(2); PDD and UN Human Rights, above note 6, paras 96–104; UN, “Africa is Particularly Vulnerable to the Expected Impacts of Global Warming”, fact sheet, available at: https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/factsheet_africa.pdf; ICRC, “Mali-Niger: Climate Change and Conflict Make an Explosive Mix in the Sahel”, news release, 22 January 2019, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/mali-niger-climate-change-and-conflict-make-explosive-mix-sahel. See also, generally, Oxfam International, Uprooted by Climate Change: Responding to the Growing Risk of Displacement, Oxford, November 2017; Isabelle Niang and Olivier C. Ruppel, “Africa”, in V. R. Barros et al. (eds), above note 4, Part B, p. 1199.

10 See, for example, HRC Res. 13/4, “The Right to Food”, 24 March 2010; ICRC, “A Conflict without Borders Continues to Play Out in the Sahel”, news release, 8 July 2020, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/conflict-without-borders-continues-play-out-sahel; Robert Muggah and José Luengo Cabrerea, “The Sahel is Engulfed by Violence. Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Extremists are Largely to Blame”, World Economic Forum, 23 January 2019, available at: www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/. Finally, see UN Security Council, Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2021/442, 10 May 2021, p. 2, para. 4: “The latest available data indicate that, in 2021, 6.8 million people were food-insecure in G5 Sahel countries. The threat of famine is now looming in Burkina Faso. Also, since 2018, in the Liptako-Gourma region, the number of internally displaced people has risen twentyfold. In G5 Sahel States, close to 2.2 million people were internally displaced and more than 880,000 people were refugees. Large-scale displacement continued to have an impact on State service provision and the availability of natural resources, further exacerbating tension and social conflicts.”

11 ICRC, above note 9; ICRC, above note 10. The role played by such groups appears to be a complex one: see Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni and Baba Dakono, “Are Terrorist Groups Stoking Local Conflicts in the Sahel?”, Institute for Security Studies, 14 October 2019, available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/are-terrorist-groups-stoking-local-conflicts-in-the-sahel.

12 Stefano M. Torelli, “Climate-Driven Migration in Africa”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 20 December 2017, available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_climate_driven_migration_in_africa/; Lisa Schlein, “Internal Displacement in the Sahel Tops 2 Million as Armed Conflict Intensifies”, VOA, 23 January 2021, available at: www.voanews.com/africa/internal-displacement-sahel-tops-2-million-armed-conflict-intensifies. See UNHCR, Update of UNHCR's Operations in Africa, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 69th Session, 1–5 October 2018; UNHCR, UNHCR Global Trends 2019, 18 June 2020, available at: www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, April 2020, available at: www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2020-IDMC-GRID.pdf; UNHCR, “Sahel Refugee Crisis”, available at: www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/sahel/; UNHCR, “Sahel Crisis Explained”, 29 October 2020, available at: www.unrefugees.org/news/sahel-crisis-explained/; Climate Refugees, “Climate, Conflict, Migration in the Sahel – Regional Expert Weighs In”, 5 October 2020, available at: www.climate-refugees.org/perspectives/2020/10/4/sahel. See also Epule, Terence, Pen, Changhui and Lepage, Laurent, “Environmental Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Perspectives on the Trends, Causes, Challenges and Way Forward”, GeoJournal, Vol. 80, No. 1, 2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II), 13 September 2018, para. 8, affirmed by UNGA Res. 73/151, 17 December 2018.

14 The G5 Sahel is an institutional framework for coordination of regional cooperation in development policies and security matters in West Africa. It was formed on 16 February 2014 in Mauritania at a summit of five Sahel countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – and is permanently seated in Mauritania. Later in 2014, it adopted a Convention of Establishment. See Dominic Chavez, “Sahel G5 Meeting Brings Together Governments and Donors to Accelerate Regional Development”, World Bank, 14 July 2014, available at: www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/14/sahel-g5-meeting-brings-together-governments-and-donors-to-accelerate-regional-development; Abdelhak Bassou, State, Borders and Territory in the Sahel: The Case of the G5 Sahel, Policy Brief PB-17/33, OCP Policy Center, October 2017, available at: https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/OCPPC-PB1733vEn.pdf; G5 Sahel, Convention portant creation du G5 Sahel, 14 December 2014.

15 UNHCR, “US$20 Million for Sahel Drive to Curb COVID-19”, 23 July 2020, available at: www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/7/5f1993eb4/us20-million-sahel-drive-curb-covid-19.html.

16 UNHCR, “UNHCR Warns of Mounting Needs in Sahel as Forced Displacement Intensifies”, 16 October 2020, available at: www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/10/5f894b234/unhcr-warns-mounting-needs-sahel-forced-displacement-intensifies.html.

17 Ibid.

18 UNCHR, “Sahel Crisis”, available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/sahelcrisis.

19 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137, 28 July 1951 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention), Art. 1(a)(2). The overwhelming majority of African States are parties to the Refugee Convention, including the five Sahel countries in question: see UNHCR, “States Parties, Including Reservations and Declarations, to the 1951 Refugee Convention”, available at: www.unhcr.org/5d9ed32b4.

20 The fear of persecution must be based on the five grounds listed in Article 1(a)(2) of the Refugee Convention, which is exhaustive. See Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, “Refugee Status Determination: Analysis and Application”, in R. Islam and J. Hossain Bhuiyan (eds), above note 2, pp. 54–60.

21 UNHCR, “What Is a Refugee?”, available at: www.unhcr.org/what-is-a-refugee.html. See, generally, James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014.

22 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002, available at: www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/legal/3d58ddef4/guidelines-international-protection-1-gender-related-persecution-context.html.

23 Ibid.; House of Lords, Fornah v. SSHD, [2007] 1 AC 412, 2007.

24 Supreme Court of Canada, Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 102 DLR (4th) 214, 1993.

25 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/12/09, 23 October 2012, available at: www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/legal/50ae466f9/guidelines-international-protection-9-claims-refugee-status-based-sexual.html; Court of Justice of the European Union, X, Y, Z v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, Case Nos C-199/12, C-200/12, C-201/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:720, 2013.

26 See House of Lords, Hoxha and Anor v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 19, 2005, paras 8–9, which cautioned against “reading into a treaty [the Refugee Convention] words that are not there”. It should be noted that the first principle of treaty interpretation is that of giving a term its ordinary meaning: see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 22 May 1969 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Art. 31(1).

27 Ionel Zamfir, “Refugee Status under International Law”, European Parliamentary Research Service, 27 October 2015, p. 24, available at: https://epthinktank.eu/2015/10/27/refugee-status-under-international-law/.

28 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, January 1992, para. 39, available at: www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf; UNHCR, Legal Considerations Regarding Claims for International Protection Made in the Context of the Adverse Effects of Climate Change and Disasters, 1 October 2020, paras 7–9, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html.

29 UNHCR, Legal Considerations, above note 28, para. 10. See also Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law, “International Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground”, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2002; R. Islam, above note 2, pp. 222–224.

30 See Sanjula Weerasinghe, In Harm's Way: International Protection in the Context of Nexus Dynamics between Conflict or Violence and Disaster or Climate Change, UNHCR, Division of International Protection, December 2018, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/5c1ba88d4.pdf.

31 See Jane McAdam, Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards, UNHCR, Geneva, May 2011, p. 14.

32 Report of the Special Rapporteur, above note 2, para. 26; New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (NZIPT), AC (Tuvalu), [2014] NZIPT 800517-520, 2014, para. 86. A much-cited example is that of the Marsh Arabs of Iraq, many of whom were forced to flee their traditional homeland as a result of the wetlands being drained by the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein in retribution for a failed uprising. See Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/56, 15 February 1995.

33 Cooper, Jessica B., “Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition”, New York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1998Google Scholar.

34 New Zealand Court of Appeal (NZCA), Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, [2014] NZCA 173, 2014, para. 21. See, further, J. McAdam, above note 31, p. 12; Baker-Jones, Mark and Baker-Jones, Melanie, “Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment – A Person Displaced”, QUT Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2015, pp. 114–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar. While national courts have assumed different stances on the definition of fear of persecution (see Rafiqul Islam, “The Origin and Evolution of International Refugee Law”, in R. Islam and J. Hossain Bhuiyan (eds), above note 2, pp. 26–27), the circumstances share the common feature of human agency, whether through human rights violations or armed conflict.

35 A. Suhrke, above note 2, p. 492.

36 See J. McAdam, above note 31, pp. 13–14; Law Library of Congress, “New Zealand: ‘Climate Change Refugee’ Case Overview”, Section IV, July 2015, available at: www.loc.gov/item/2016295703/.

37 NZCA, Teitiota, above note 34. For comment, see M. Baker-Jones and M. Baker-Jones, above note 34.

38 NZIPT, AF (Kiribati), [2013] NZIPT 800413, 2013. The New Zealand Immigration Act of 2009 incorporates the test for a refugee under the Refugee Convention and the test for protected person status in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR). See Supreme Court of New Zealand (NZSC), Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, [2015] NZSC 107, 2015, paras 5–6.

39 NZIPT, AF, above note 38, paras 49, 54.

40 Ibid., para. 65.

41 NZCA, Teitiota, above note 34, para. 11. This submission appears to have been based on a “sociological” definition of refugee status, which is broader than the legal definition: see NZIPT, AF, above note 38, para. 52.

42 NZCA, Teitiota, above note 34, para. 21. See also NZIPT, AC, above note 32; NZIPT, AF, above note 38.

43 M. Baker-Jones and M. Baker-Jones, above note 34, pp. 111–112 (footnotes omitted).

44 NZCA, Teitiota, above note 34, para. 25.

45 Ibid., para. 41.

46 NZSC, Teitiota, above note 38, para. 13. It should be noted that the UN Human Rights Committee did not find reasons to disagree with the conclusions of the New Zealand judiciary: see Human Rights Committee, Teitiota v. New Zealand, Communication No. 2728/2016, Views, 24 October 2019.

47 UNHCR, Legal Considerations, above note 28, paras. 5-6.

48 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45, 10 September 1969 (entered into force 20 January 1974) (OAU Convention). As of May 2019, the OAU Convention had been ratified by forty-six States. See, generally, Paul Weis, “The Convention of the Organization of African Unity Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems”, Revue de Droits de l'Homme, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1970; Rose M. D'Sa, “The African Refugee Problem: Relevant International Conventions and Recent Activities of the Organization of African Unity”, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1984; Rainer Hofman, “Refugee Law in an African Context”, Zeitschrift für auslandisches öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1992.

49 For a different narrative asserting that in fact, national security considerations were uppermost, see Okoth-Obbo, George, “Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2001, p. 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rankin, Micah Bond, “Extending the Limits or Narrowing The Scope? Deconstructing the OAU Refugee Definition Thirty Years On”, South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2005, p. 408Google Scholar.

50 OAU Convention, Art. 8(2). The preamble additionally acknowledges that the Refugee Convention constitutes the basic instrument relating to the status and treatment of refugees. See also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), Doebbler v. Sudan, Communication No. 235/2000, 11–25 November 2009, para. 125.

51 Latin American States expanded the definition of refugee through a non-binding declaration, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 22 November 1984, Art. 3(3), available at: www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html. The Cartagena Declaration makes specific reference to generalized violence, internal conflicts and massive violations of human rights but does not expressly mention natural disasters. European Union legislation is also of interest: Directive 2011/95/EU on Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted, OJ L 337/9, 13 December 2011, Art. 2(f), known as the Qualifications Directive, whilst accepting that the Refugee Convention constitutes the foundation of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees, introduces the legal concept of “subsidiary protection” for persons who do not qualify as refugees but would be at risk of “serious harm” if returned to their country of origin. “Serious harm” is defined as (a) the death penalty or execution; (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and (c) serious and individual threat to a person's life due to indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict (Art. 15). Persons displaced as a result of climate change or environmental disasters may therefore fall outside the scope of the definition.

52 R. Hofman, above note 48, p. 323. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque was of the view that the OAU Convention constituted an example of an instrument incorporating a broader human rights standard enlarging the concept of refugee to those in need of complementary international protection. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Appl. No. 27765/09, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 23 February 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, p. 62.

53 P. Weis, above note 48, p. 455; G. Okoth-Obbo, above note 49, pp. 111–112; Arboleda, Eduardo, “Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of Pragmatism”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1991, pp. 194 –196CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, this view has been challenged: see M. B. Rankin, above note 49, pp. 410–414; Sharpe, Marina, “The 1969 African Refugee Convention: Innovations, Misconceptions, and Omissions”, McGill Law Journal, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2012, pp. 113–120Google Scholar.

54 G. Okoth-Obbo, above note 49, p. 112.

55 See also Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, International Legal Materials, Vol. 32, No. 6, 1993, p. 1661, Part I, para. 23(5).

56 M. B. Rankin, above note 49, p. 410; M. Sharpe, above note 53, p. 111.

57 For the “inclusive” view, see, for example, Gino J. Naldi, The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of Its Role, 2nd ed., Mansell, London, 1999, p. 79; Ram C. Chhangani, African Refugee Law: Problems and Prospects, University of Maiduguri Press, Maiduguri, 1992, p. 9. In contrast, for the “exclusive” view, see Ruma Mandal, Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (“Complementary Protection”), Legal and Protection Policy Research Series No. 9, UNHCR, 2005, pp. 13–14, available at: www.unhcr.org/435df0aa2.pdf.

58 M. B. Rankin, above note 49, p. 415; Rwelamira, M. R., “Two Decades of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1989, p. 558CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches, UNHCR, Geneva, February 2012, pp. 33–34; David Keane, “The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of ‘Environmental Refugees’”, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2004, pp. 216–217.

59 Cristiano d'Orsi, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Is a New Special Regional Refugee Law Regime Emerging?”, Zeitschrift für Auslandisches Öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, Vol. 68, No. 6, 2008, p. 1061.

60 For a summary of these views, see Edwards, Alice, “Refugee Determination in Africa”, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2006, p. 226CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, the view has been expressed that the term “public order” in the Refugee Convention corresponds to the term “ordre public” in French law (see Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951, available at: www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf), and this may well be the case also with the OAU Convention.

61 M. R. Rwelamira, above note 58, p. 558; A. Edwards, above note 60, p. 227; R. Islam, above note 2, p. 229; W. Kälin and N. Schrepfer, above note 58, p. 34.

62 UNHCR, Legal Considerations, above note 28, para. 16.

63 A. Edwards, above note 60; W. Kälin and N. Schrepfer, above note 58.

64 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1 July 1990 (entered into force 29 November 1999), Art. 23(4).

65 S. Weerasinghe, above note 30, p. 114.

66 UNHCR, Legal Considerations, above note 28, para. 17.

67 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Older Persons in Africa, 31 January 2016, Art. 14.

68 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa, 29 January 2018, Art. 12(1).

69 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, 29 January 2018, Art. 24.

70 Marina Sharpe, “The Free Movement of Persons within the African Union and Refugee Protection”, 25 May 2020, available at: www.reflaw.org/the-free-movement-of-persons-within-the-african-union-and-refugee-protection/.

71 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, 1994 (not yet in force) (Arab Convention on Refugees). Mauritania and Sudan are the only Sahel States to be members of the League of Arab States.

72 Arab Convention on Refugees, Art. 1.

73 However, the UN has drafted a soft-law document, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, setting out the humanitarian and human rights standards applicable to IDPs: see Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998, Annex. The Principles apply to those affected by natural disasters (ibid., Introduction, para. 2). Furthermore, according to Principle 6(2)(d), the prohibition on arbitrary displacement includes displacement in cases of disaster, unless required by health and safety reasons. See, further, Deng, Francis M., “The International Protection of the Internally Displaced”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1995, p. 74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

74 UNHCR, Update of UNHCR's Operations in Africa, above note 12. For the situation in the Sahel, see IDMC and NRC, above note 12, pp. 23–24.

75 Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 222–225.

76 See above note 64.

77 Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 23 October 2009 (entered into force 6 December 2012), International Legal Materials, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2010 (Kampala Convention), p. 83. By June 2020, the Kampala Convention had been ratified by thirty-one States, including the five countries of the Central Sahel. See, generally, Mike Asplet and Megan Bradley, “Introductory Note to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)”, International Legal Materials, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2013; Adeola, Romola, “The Impact of the African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa”, African Journal of Human Rights Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Abebe, Allehone M., “The African Union Convention on Internally Displaced Persons: Its Codification Background, Scope, and Enforcement Challenges”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2010Google Scholar; Giustiniani, Flavia Zorzi, “New Hopes and Challenges for the Protection of IDPs in Africa: The Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2011Google Scholar; d'Orsi, Cristiano, “Strengths and Weaknesses in the Protection of the Internally Displaced in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2012Google Scholar.

78 Kampala Convention, Art. 4(4).

79 Ibid., Art. 5(1).

80 Ibid., Art. 5(4).

81 Ibid., Art. 1(k). It essentially repeats verbatim the description provided by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, above note 73, Introduction, para. 2.

82 Kampala Convention, Art. 1(l).

83 Ibid., Art. 4(4)(f). Accordingly, forced evacuations to protect a population at risk of drowning in floods, for instance, would not come within the scope of the definition.

84 Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, 30 November 2006 (entered into force 21 June 2008) (Great Lakes Protocol), available at: www.refworld.org/pdfid/52384fe44.pdf. The Great Lakes Protocol shares many similarities with the Kampala Convention and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: see International Refugee Rights Initiative, Comparison of the Kampala Convention and the IDP Protocol of the Great Lakes Pact, January 2014, available at: www.refugee-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Comparative-Note-on-the-Kampala-Convention-and-IDP-Protocol-FINAL-EN.pdf. The ICGLR is an intergovernmental organization of the States of the African Great Lakes region with a mandate to promote peace and development. Its members are Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. The relevance of the Great Lakes Protocol for the purposes of this article may be limited as only one State Party, Sudan, is considered to be part of the Sahel region.

85 International Refugee Rights Initiative, Comparison of the Kampala Convention and the IDP Protocol of the Great Lakes Pact, January 2014, p. 3, available at: www.refugee-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Comparative-Note-on-the-Kampala-Convention-and-IDP-Protocol-FINAL-EN.pdf; Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer, Internal Displacement and the Kampala Convention: An Opportunity for Development Actors, IDMC, Geneva, November 2012, pp. 18–19.

86 W. Kälin and N. Schrepfer, above note 85, p. 18.

87 Great Lakes Protocol, Art. 3(2).

88 See Annalisa Savaresi, “Plugging the Enforcement Gap: The Rise and Rise of Human Rights in Climate Change Litigation”, Questions of International Law, Vol. 77, 2021. See, generally, Jane McAdam and Marc Limon, Human Rights, Climate Change and Cross-Border Displacement: The Role of the International Human Rights Community in Contributing to Effective and Just Solutions, Universal Rights Group, Versoix, 2015. See also the Climate Change Litigation Databases, available at: http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case-category/human-rights/page/3/.

89 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1520 UNTS 217, 17 June 1981 (entered into force 21 October 1986) (African Charter). The African Charter has been ratified by all the Sahel States.

90 R. Islam, above note 2, pp. 231–234; Walter Kälin, “The Human Rights Dimension of Natural or Human-Made Disasters”, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 55, 2012. See, further, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, Series C, No. 196, Judgment, 3 April 2009, para. 148; ACHPR, Social and Economic Rights Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, Decision, 27 October 2001, para. 51; Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Neubauer v. Germany, BVerfG 1 BvR 2656/18, 1 BvR 78/20, 1 BvR 96/20, 1 BvR 288/20, 29 April 2021; Supreme Court of the Netherlands, State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Judgment, 20 December 2019, English translation available at: https://tinyurl.com/vc5vw9w4. In the Urgenda Foundation case, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the Netherlands was under a positive obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to take appropriate and independent measures to mitigate climate change even if it was a minor contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. For comment, see Maiko Meguro, “International Decisions”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 114, No. 4, 2020. See, further, Jacqueline Peel and Jolene Lin, “Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 113, No. 4, 2019; Charlotte Renglet and Stefaan Smis, “The Belgian Climate Case: A Step Forward in Invoking Human Rights Standards in Climate Litigation?”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 25, No. 21, 2021.

91 UNHCR, Legal Considerations, above note 28, para. 11.

92 Report of the Special Rapporteur, above note 2, para. 26; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, UN Doc. A/75/207, 21 July 2020; IACHR, State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Series A, No. 23, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, 15 November 2017, para. 66; J. McAdam, above note 31, pp. 16–36; James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

93 W. Kälin, above note 90, p. 127. See, for example, ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey, Appl. No. 48939/99, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 30 November 2004 (rights to life and property); ECtHR, Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Appl. Nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02, 15343/02, Judgment (Chamber), 20 March 2008 (right to life); ECtHR, Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, Appl. Nos 17423/05, 20534/05, 20678/05, 23263/05, 24283/05, 35673/05, Judgment (Chamber), 28 February 2012 (right to life and respect for private and family life).

94 See, for example, ECtHR, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Appl. No. 16798/90, Judgment, 9 December 1994 (respect for private and family life); ECtHR, Guerra v. Italy, Appl. No. 14967/89, Judgment, 19 February 1998 (respect for private and family life); ECtHR, Giacomelli v. Italy, Appl. No. 59909/00, Judgment (Chamber), 2 November 2006 (respect for private and family life); ECtHR, Tătar v. Romania, Appl. No. 67021/01, Judgment (Chamber), 27 January 2009 (respect for private and family life).

95 See, for example, ECtHR, Öneryildiz, above note 93; ECtHR, Budayeva, above note 93.

96 ECtHR, Budayeva, above note 93, paras 135, 137. As opposed to human-made hazards: ECtHR, Öneryildiz, above note 93. See also J. McAdam, above note 31, pp. 59–60. The obvious point could be made that it is now generally accepted that environmental change is also driven by human activity.

97 For comment, see Simon Behrman and Avidan Kent, “The Teitiota Case and the Limitations of the Human Rights Framework”, Questions of International Law, Vol.77, 2021. The ICCPR has been accepted by the five Sahel States in question.

98 Human Rights Committee, Teitiota, above note 46, para. 9.4.

99 Ibid., paras 9.11–9.12.

100 Ibid., para. 9.4.

101 African Charter, Art. 24; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 69, 16 November 1988 (entered into force 16 November 1999), Art. 11; Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 2004 (entered into force 15 March 2008), Art. 38. See further ACHPR, SERAC, above note 90.

102 IACHR, above note 92, para. 59.

103 Ibid., paras 54, 59.

104 Ibid., para. 66.

105 UN, Support Plan for the Sahel (Working Together for a Peaceful and Prosperous Sahel), May 2018, p. 8: “For years, the improvements and growth witnessed in the Sahel have been overshadowed by complex and multi-dimensional challenges. These are characterized by mutually reinforcing factors of vulnerability, instability and insecurity. These risks are intensified by political and governance crises, unequal distribution of wealth and lack of access to resources, opportunities and basic services. The demographic bulge, combined with climate change, could worsen a phenomenon of violence and conflict, and lead to displacement and migration”.

106 AfDB, “Sahel Region: The African Development Bank Pledges to Mobilise $6.5 Billion in Support of the Great Green Wall Initiative”, 11 January 2021, available at: www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/sahel-region-african-development-bank-pledges-mobilise-65-billion-support-great-green-wall-initiative-40203.

107 20 December 2021.

108 See the GGWI website, available at: www.greatgreenwall.org/results. See also Republic of Niger, Cadre de Gestion Environnementale et Sociale (CGES) du Projet de Relance et du Développement de la Région du Lac Tchad (PROLAC): Rapport final, January 2020, para. 2(5) (“Défis environnementaux et sociaux”); Republic of Niger, Plan d'Action 2016–2020 de l'initiative 3N “Les nigériens nourrissent les nigériens”, 2016; Soufiyane Amadou, Nicola Cantoreggi and Ronald Jaubert, “Les Nigériens nourrissent les Nigériens: Quelles perspectives pour les exploitations familiales?”, Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, Vol. 2018/2, No. 278, 2018, p. 337: “The 3N initiative, ‘Nigeriens feed Nigeriens’, supposes to break with the “addiction to aid”. The initiative affirms a willingness to address the dependence on aid and the practices of development and humanitarian aid programs through innovations such as the creation of an investment fund, the promotion of small scale irrigation and the supervision of humanitarian aid. The analysis of the achievements of the first phase of the Initiative (2011–2015), of programmatic documents and their evolution between 2012 and 2017 as well as the positioning of donors raises questions on the 3N initiative's capacity and willingness to promote a policy centered on family farms while it is an essential condition for Nigeriens to feed Nigeriens.” See, finally, Republic of Chad, Stratégie nationale et plan d'action pour la mise en oeuvre de l'initiative Grande Muraille Verte au Tchad, 2012, p. 34: “L'Initiative GMV vise le développement des communautés locales à travers la mise en place d'une approche novatrice et inclusive consistant à mettre en synergie les actions de lutte contre la désertification avec des activités de restauration des terres et de conservation de la biodiversité. Cette mise en synergie concerne également le développement des systèmes de productions (agricole, sylvicole et pastorale) et aussi le développement des infrastructures socioéconomiques de base et la création de richesses par le développement d'activités génératrices de revenus en vue de contribuer à une sécurité alimentaire stable et à la relance d'une croissance économique durable. L'objectif général visé est de contribuer à la lutte contre l'avancée du désert en mettant en valeur, de manière intégrée, des zones dégradées dans l'emprise de la GMV en vue de lutter contre la pauvreté tout en assurant une gestion durable des ressources naturelles.”

109 “Niger Floods Force 23,000 from their Homes”, Phys.Org, 20 October 2019, available at: https://phys.org/news/2019-10-niger-homes.html.

110 See the GGWI website, available at: www.greatgreenwall.org/results.

111 UNHCR, “UNHCR Warns of Mounting Needs in Sahel as Forced Displacement Intensifies”, 16 October 2020, available at: www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/10/5f894b234/unhcr-warns-mounting-needs-sahel-forced-displacement-intensifies.html.

112 See the ECW website, available at: www.educationcannotwait.org/about-ecw/. Concerning the action of the EU in the Sahel, see, for example, Louis Balmond, “Les organisations internationales régionales africaines face à l'impact du changement climatique sur les conflits et le cas particulier du Sahel”, Questions de Droit International, 30 September 2021, pp. 35-36, available at: www.qil-qdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/03_Climate-Security_BALMOND_FIN_b.pdf: “Depuis 2008, l'UE préconisait en effet une approche globale en matière de sécurité et de développement pour faire face à la complexité des problèmes auxquels est confrontée la zone. La dégradation de la situation sécuritaire l'a conduite à adopter une stratégie pour la sécurité et le développement au Sahel dont la formulation même est significative de l'ordre des priorités retenues: l'insistance sur la relation entre sécurité et développement traduit le caractère intégré de la stratégie mais la dimension sécuritaire demeure prioritaire.”

113 Ministerial Roundtable for the Central Sahel, “Financial Announcements”, 28 October 2020, available at: https://tinyurl.com/yckva5pe.

114 For the list of commitments, see, “Non-Financial Commitments”, 20 October 2020, available at: https://tinyurl.com/3nw4xjp4.

115 See Ministerial Roundtable for the Central Sahel, “Co-Chairs’ Summary”, 2020, available at: https://tinyurl.com/mr33eph7. For the GCR, see Report of the UNHCR, Part II: Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc. A/73/12, 2 August 2018; see also UN General Assembly, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Doc. A/RES/73/151, 17 December 2018.

116 UN, Global Compact on Refugees, 2018 (GCR), p. 4, para. C(7).

117 Marina Sharpe, “The Global Compact on Refugees and Conflict Prevention in Africa: ‘Root Causes’ and Yet Another Divide”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2018.

118 GCR, above note 116, para. 88.

119 UN General Assembly, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015. For a definition of the Agenda, see the preamble of the resolution: “This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to strengthen universal peace in larger freedom. We recognize that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. All countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan. We are resolved to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet. We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world on to a sustainable and resilient path. As we embark on this collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind.”

120 Fatima Khan and Cecile Sackeyfio, “What Promise Does the Global Compact on Refugees Hold for African Refugees?”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2018.

121 UN General Assembly, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN Doc. A/RES/73/195, 19 December 2018.

122 Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, 2 vols, December 2015.

123 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 47.

124 Republic of Niger, Statement at the Adoption of the GCM, 10 December 2018, p. 3, available at: www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/niger.pdf.

125 Republic of Niger, Stratégie et plan national d'adaptation face aux changements climatiques dans le secteur agricole SPN2A 2020-2035, 10 April 2020, p. 49 available at: https://reca-niger.org/IMG/pdf/adaptaction_niger_spn2a_document_cadre_10042020.pdf.

126 ECOSOC, Support to the Sahel Region, UN Doc. E/RES/2020/2, 10 December2019.

127 UN General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1, 19 September 2016.

128 In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/70/59, 21 April 2016, p. 6, para. 18. See also p. 8, para. 27: “Disasters have always led to displacement and are likely to do so even more in the future, given the rising concentration of populations in cities and the likelihood that hazards relating to climate change and environmental degradation will increase in frequency and intensity. … More droughts are likely to lead many rural inhabitants to move to cities, creating pressures on labour markets and housing. Evidence suggests that people displaced by environmental factors tend to move to areas at even greater environmental risk. Sea-level rise and extreme weather events may drive people away from coastal areas and low-lying small island States. While many victims of disasters are able to return to their homes in a relatively short time, in some cases they require permanent relocation.”

129 UNHCR, “UNHCR Welcomes the Accession of the Government of Chad to the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework”, 8 May 2018, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Press%20release_UNHCR_CRRF_English.pdf.

130 UNHCR, “Applying Comprehensive Responses (CRRF) in Africa”, June 2018, available at: www.unhcr.org/5b3346397.pdf.

131 UNHCR, “UNHCR Welcomes New Asylum Law in Chad”, 24 December 2020, available at: https://tinyurl.com/yckpbp9x.

132 Rapport sur le projet de loi portant asile en République du Tchad, No. 065/AN/TL/CPGILAAJ/2020, 18 December 2020; see also Loi No. 027/PR/2020 portant d'asile en République du Tchad, 31 December 2020 (both documents on file with author). Finally, see Décret No. 11-839/PR/PM/MAT/11 portant création, organisation et attributions de la Commission nationale d'accueil, de réinsertion des réfugiés et des rapatriés (CNARR), 2 August 2011.

133 For a doctrinaire debate on this issue, see G. J. Naldi, above note 57, p. 79; R. C. Chhangani, above note 57, p. 9; Aurelie Lopez, “The Protection of Environmentally-Displaced Persons in International Law”, Environmental Law, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2007, p. 389; M. R. Rwelamira, above note 58, p. 558; Tatenda N. Muzenda, “The Role of Social and Economic Factors and Natural Disasters in Forced Population Displacements in Africa”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7, Special Issue, 1995, p. 51; A. Edwards, above note 60, p. 227; Tal H. Schreier, “A Critical Examination of South Africa's Application of the Expanded OAU Refugee Definition: Is Adequate Protection Being Offered Within the Meaning of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention?”, LLM diss., University of Cape Town, Faculty of Law, 2008, p. 18 (on file with author).

134 Combined Periodic Report of the Republic of Chad (1998 to 2015) on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human And Peoples’ Rights, September 2016, p. 70, para. 323: “The Government and its technical and financial partners have developed a humanitarian action plan to ensure the safety of camps for displaced persons and the availability of food, healthcare and education. Displaced persons live in secure areas including Moundou, Goré, Sarh, Bagassola, GozBeida, etc.”

135 In this regard, see, for example, SB Morgen, The Search for a Caliphate: Expansionist Agenda of Radical Islam from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, May 2021, p. 16, available at: www.sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/202105_Caliphate_.pdf. Between 2017 and 2019, Burkina Faso suffered from 225 terrorist attacks, Chad fifty-eight, Mauritania nine and Niger 134. Burkina Faso is second only to Mali, which suffered from 579 terrorist attacks during the same period. Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, University of Maryland and US National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, November 2020, p. 36, Table 2.9.

136 See, for example, Daly Belgasmi, “The Issue of Food Security: The Case of Niger”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2007, p. 60: “The Niger crisis is a complex food crisis that was caused by a combination of structural causes, last year's drought and the devastation of crops and grazing lands by locusts, between August and October 2004. High rates of poverty (63%), one of the highest population growths, low access to health care, low agricultural productivity, desertification and structurally high rates of severe child malnutrition (60% of children under five are affected by stunting) all played a role in this crisis. Niger is prone to recurrent droughts, which regularly result in food shortages.” See also Filippo Grandi, “Opening Statement at the 70th Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2020, p. 520.

137 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Burkina Faso: Situation Report, 1 February 2021, p. 2, available at: https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/burkina-faso/.

138 Plan national multirisques de préparation et de réponse aux catastrophes, 2009, pp. 107–108.

139 Plan national multirisques de préparation et de réponse aux catastrophes, 2012, pp. 9–10.

140 Plan d'action national de renforcement des capacités pour la réduction des risques de catastrophes, la préparation et la réponse aux urgences 2015–2020, September 2015.

141 Plan national multirisques de préparation et de réponse aux catastrophes, 2011.

142 Plan d'action national de renforcement des capacités en réduction des risques de catastrophes et préparation et réponse aux urgences 2015–2018, 2014.

143 Plan d'action national de renforcement des capacités pour la réduction des risques de catastrophe, la préparation et la réponse aux urgences 2015–2018, March 2015.

144 Loi No. 012-2014/AN portant loi d'orientation relative à la prévention et à la gestion des risques, des crises humanitaires et des catastrophes, 22 April 2014.

145 Loi No. 042-2008/AN portant statut des refugies au Burkina Faso, 18 December 2008.

146 Periodic Report of Burkina Faso within the Framework of the Implementation of Article 62 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, January 2015, p. 58, para. 231.

147 UN, Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (Kobe, Hyogo 18–22 January 2005), UN Doc. A/CONF.206/6, 16 March 2005, p. 16, para 4(ii)(i). At p. 4, the delegates at the Conference note that they “are deeply concerned that communities continue to experience excessive losses of precious human lives and valuable property as well as serious injuries and major displacements due to various disasters worldwide”.

148 Sanjula Weerasinghe, Bridging the Divide in Approaches to Conflict and Disaster Displacement: Norms, Institutions and Coordination in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Niger, the Philippines and Somalia, UNHCR and IOM, 2021, p. 134.

149 Ibid., p. 139.

150 Republic of Chad, Stratégie nationale et plan d'actions pour la gestion des risques de catastrophes, December 2020, Chap. 3 (“Strategie nationale de reduction de risques des catastrophes”), pp. 39–43. On file with authors. For previous documents that also focus on natural disasters in Chad, Republic of Chad, Rapport d'évaluation des capacités nationales pour la reduction des risques, la preparation et la response aux urgences au Tchad, April 2014; Republic of Chad, Plan d'action national de renforcement des capacités pour la réduction des risques de catastrophes, la préparation et la réponse aux urgences (2015–2020), September 2015.

151 Republic of Chad, Stratégie nationale, above note 150, para. 2(3)(5) (“Mouvements de populations”). In more detail, see p. 37: “La présence des camps de réfugiés/déplacés/retournés continue à représenter une préoccupation majeure sur le plan humanitaire. De toute évidence, on devrait s'attendre à ce que la situation se maintienne longtemps encore, le retour de ces réfugiés dans leur pays d'origine restant très improbable. L'approche de réinsertion socio-économique des réfugiés dans les communautés d'accueil en apportant une assistance élargie réfugiés/populations hôtes, en application dans le sud du pays doit être suivi minutieusement. Ces communautés hôtes sont estimées à 734 000 personnes.”

152 On the Refugee Law in Chad, see above note 131.

153 Décret No. 2005-022 fixant les modalités d'application en République islamique de Mauritanie des conventions internationales relatives aux réfugiés, 3 March 2005.

154 Document de stratégie nationale pour une meilleure gestion de la migration, October 2010.

155 Loi No. 1998-40 du 1998 portant sur le statut des réfugiés, 18 May 1998.

156 Décret No. 98-354/P-RM portant création de la Commission Nationale chargées des Réfugiés (CNCR), 28 October 1998.

157 Décret No. 92-0731 P-CTSP portant promulgation de la Constitution, 25 February 1992. See also Mali Periodic Report to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights relating to the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2001–2011, December 2011, p. 72, para. 363: “The same Constitution stipulates a number of duties that fall on the citizen: the duty for all to protect and defend the environment and the quality of life, the duty for all citizens to provide support in the event of a natural disaster, work, defence of the fatherland, the duty to honour all civic obligations and particularly to pay one's taxes, the duty of respecting the Constitution (Articles 15 to 24).”

158 Loi No. 97-16 portant statut des réfugiés, 20 June 1997. See also Décret No. 98-382/PRN/MI/AT déterminant les modalités d'application de la Loi No. 97-016 portant statut des réfugiés, 24 December 1998; Arrêté No. 208/MI/AT/SP/CNE portant règlement intérieur de la Commission Nationale d’Éligibilité au Statut des Réfugiés, 14 July 2000.

159 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, A/P 1/5/79, 29 May 1979. More generally, for the action of ECOWAS in the Sahel, see L. Balmond, above note 112, p. 41: “Pour le Sahel plus particulièrement, elle [ECOWAS] s'est dotée d'une Stratégie pour le Sahel, adoptée en 2014 complétée par une stratégie contre-terroriste et son plan de mise en œuvre23 puis en 2015 d'une Initiative-base de données socio-économique pour le Sahel pour assurer les actions de suivi et évaluation de sa Stratégie. Toutefois, si l'action de la [ECOWAS] dans le maintien de la paix n'a pas été négligeable, elle n'a pas développé une véritable stratégie intégrée au profit du Sahel, se concentrant sur les questions de sécurité et sur la lutte contre le terrorisme.”

160 John Agyei and Ezekiel Clottey, Operationalizing ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People among the Member States: Issues of Convergence, Divergence and Prospects for Sub-Regional Integration, 2008, p. 10, available at: www.migrationinstitute.org/files/events/clottey.pdf.

161 ECOWAS, Supplementary Protocol on the Implementation of the Third Phase (Right of Establishment) of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment, A/SP 2/5/90, 29 May 1990.

162 Michael P. Okom and Rose Ohiama Ugbe, “The Right of Establishment under the ECOWAS Protocol”, International Journal of Law, Vol. 2, No. 5, 2016.

163 Aderanti Adepoju, Alistair Boulton and Mariah Levin, Promoting Integration through Mobility: Free Movement and the ECOWAS Protocol, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 150, December 2007, p. 6, available at: www.unhcr.org/476650ae2.pdf.

164 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel, 2011, p. 23, available at: https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sahel_EN.pdf.

165 UNHCR, Progress Report: UNHCR Sahel Crisis Response, October 2020, p. 3 available at: https://tinyurl.com/yjs8smdr.

166 Dialogue régional de protection et de solutions dans le cadre des déplacements forcés au Sahel/Déclaration ministérielle et conclusions de Bamako, 11–12 September 2019; Déclaration ministérielle réaffirmant les conclusions de Bamako, 9 October 2019.

167 Loi No. 2018-74 relative à la protection et à l'assistance aux personnes déplacées internes, 10 December 2018.

168 Arrêté No. 1 MAHCG/SG portant création, attributions et composition du comité directeur chargé de l’élaboration du projet de loi sur les personnes déplacées internes (PDIs) au Niger, 2 February 2018.

169 Note verbale No. 01/MJ/SG/DGDH/PJJ/AS en date du 27 aout 2019 adressée à la Commission de l'Union Africaine par le Ministère de la Justice de la République du Niger, 29 August 2019, p. 2.

170 Fifteenth Periodic Report of the Republic of Niger on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Covering the Period 2017–2019, Presented Pursuant to Article 62 of the Said Charter, November 2019, pp. 90–91, paras 444–445, further explains: “The law defines the roles and responsibilities in matters of protection against internal displacements and it makes reference to sustainable solutions, particularly the voluntary return to their places of origin, local integration into their location of displacement and establishment elsewhere in the country.”

171 Commission on Human Rights Res. 1998/50, “Internally Displaced Persons”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/50, 17 April 1998.

172 Loi No. 2018-22 déterminant les principes fondamentaux de la protection sociale, 27 April 2018.

173 Décret No. 2020-298/PRN/MAH/GC déterminant les modalités d'application de la Loi No. 2018-74 du décembre 2018 relative à la protection et à l'assistance aux personnes déplacées internes, 17 April 2020.

174 Décret No. 2020-297/PRN/MAH/GC déterminant l'organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement du comité de coordination nationale de protection et d'assistance aux personnes déplacées internes, 17 April 2020.

175 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on Her Mission to the Niger, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/39/Add.3, 9 May 2018, p. 6, para. 22. In full, para. 22 reads as follows: “The Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Disaster Management, established in 2016 on the basis of the former Humanitarian Coordination Unit, is one of the institutions entrusted with responding to the situation of internally displaced persons. With its regional counterparts, it is at the forefront of the Government's response to the humanitarian crisis. This Ministry's responsibilities include: coordinating responses at the national level with the other ministries and bodies involved in preparing contingency plans and action plans; ensuring cross-sectoral coordination with national institutions (ministries, regions and subregions) and agencies involved in humanitarian action and disaster management; conducting surveys and assessments to diagnose humanitarian emergencies and disasters, assess needs and provide preliminary responses; developing and implementing projects to support the reception and reintegration of returnees and repatriated persons, internally displaced persons and host populations; and, in conjunction with the relevant ministries, managing the camps for refugees and internally displaced persons in the Niger.”

176 Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Disaster Management, Avant-projet de politique nationale de l'action humanitaire et de la gestion des catastrophes, August 2018, p. 20, para. 4(1)(1)(3). At p. 41, this document provides several interesting definitions: “Catastrophe: Rupture grave du fonctionnement d'une communauté ou d'une société engendrant d'importants impacts et pertes humaines, matérielles, économiques ou environnementales que la communauté ou la société affectée ne peut surmonter avec ses seules ressources”; “Catastrophe naturelle: c'est un événement d'origine naturelle, subit et brutal, qui provoque des bouleversements importants pouvant engendrer de grands dégâts matériels et humains. Il s'agit des inondations, des sécheresses, des invasions acridiennes et d'autres calamités”; “Catastrophe anthropique: Est considérée comme une catastrophe anthropique, toute menace comportant un élément intentionnel, de négligence ou d'erreur humaine ou impliquant la défaillance d'un système conçu par l'homme.”

177 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. Addendum: Mission to the Republic of Chad, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/21/Add.5, 22 December 2009, p. 14, para. 49. In this regard, para. 50 of this document clarifies: “Pour prévenir de nouveaux déplacements, le Représentant estime que cette situation nécessite de la part du Gouvernement tchadien à la fois une action humanitaire et des projets de relèvement précoce en étroite coopération avec les acteurs de développement. Ces projets devraient viser la réhabilitation de l'environnement dans les zones de déplacement et la promotion des moyens de production respectueux de l'environnement et adaptés aux conditions climatiques extrêmes afin d'atteindre l'autosuffisance des communautés affectées par le déplacement.”

178 “Idriss Déby Obituary: End of Chad's ‘Great Survivor’”, BBC News, 21 April 2021, available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56816290.

179 IDMC, “Chad: Country Information”, available at: www.internal-displacement.org/countries/chad.

180 ACTED, OXFAM et al., Solutions durables pour les personnes déplacées: Les défis à l'est du Tchad, March 2012, pp. 19–21.

181 Protection Cluster Chad, Stratégie du cluster protection: Tchad, August 2016, p. 15.

182 Action contre le Faim, Réfugiés et déplacés autour du Lac Tchad, Quarterly Bulletin No. 123, September–November 2016, pp. 7–8. See also Oxfam International, above note 9, p. 24: “To date, 2.6 million people, including 1.5 million children, have been displaced by the humanitarian crisis in and around the Lake Chad Basin, putting them at risk of violence and malnutrition.”

183 Janani Vivekananda et al., Shoring Up Stability: Addressing Climate and Fragility Risks in the Lake Chad Region, Adelphi, Berlin, 2019, p. 51, available at: www.adelphi.de/en/publication/shoring-stability. See also Amali Tower, Shrinking Options: The Nexus between Climate Change, Displacement and Security in the Lake Chad Basin, Climate Refugees, 18 September 2017, p. 10, available at: https://indd.adobe.com/view/bf1670bb-4562-402e-a6c2-ebb3298cf8e5.

184 OCHA, Plan de reponse humanitaire: Tchad, February 2020, p. 59.

185 Ibid., p. 77.

186 AU, Atelier de l'Union Africaine sur la transposition en droit national et l'application de la Convention de Kampala sur les personnes déplacées internes: Résumé de discussions, conclusions et recommandations, 2–3 May 2013, pp. 5–6.

187 Alice S. Thiombiano, “Burkina Faso: 1 074 993 déplacés internes en 2020, selon le CONASUR”, Burkina 24, 9 January 2021, available at: www.burkina24.com/2021/01/09/burkina-faso-1-074-993-deplaces-internes-en-2020-selon-le-conasur/.

188 UNHCR, OCHA et al., Burkina Faso: Consultations avec les personnes déplacées internes et les communautés hôtes au nom du Panel de Haut Niveau sur le Déplacement Interne: Rapport Final, September 2020, pp. 28–29.

189 Ibid.

190 OCHA, Burkina Faso: Plan de réponse humanitaire révisé, July 2020, pp. 62–63. For a general reference on the humanitarian response to the influx of IDPs in Burkina Faso, see Haruna Kiemtore, “Analyse de la dimension genre dans la réponse humanitaire face à l'afflux de personnes déplacées internes au Burkina Faso”, master's thesis, Institut International d'Ingénierie, Ouagadougou, 2019, available at: http://documentation.2ie-edu.org/cdi2ie/opac_css/doc_num.php?explnum_id=3491.

191 OCHA, Mali: Rapport de situation, 3 February 2021, available at: https://reports.unocha.org/fr/country/mali/.

192 AfDB, “Mali: La Banque africaine de développement accorde une aide humanitaire d'urgence de 150 000 dollars pour la prise en charge des personnes déplacées internes à Bamako”, 11 March 2021, available at: https://tinyurl.com/4z4p2mu8.

193 Ibid.

194 Décret No. 2014-0280/P-RM fixant les attributions spécifiques des membres du gouvernement, 25 April 2014.

195 Stratégie nationale de gestion des personnes déplacées internes et des rapatries, May 2015, p. 2, para. 2(1): “L'objectif général est de contribuer à la stabilisation … par le biais de la réinsertion socioéconomique des populations affectées …, afin de créer un environnement favorable au développement durable du pays.”

196 Orientations et priorités du gouvernement (Malien) pour la période 2013–2018, 2012; see, particularly, pp. 10–12, para. 6 (“Mise en œuvre d'une politique active de développement sociale”). See also Plan d'action prioritaires d'urgence (PAPU) du gouvernement (2013–2014), March 2013, p. 1, where humanitarian aid to IDPs is set as a top priority for the government.

197 UNHCR, NRC and IDMC, Examen du cadre normatif et institutionnel malien relatif à la protection des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du Mali, March 2017, p. 11.

198 Décision No. 2016-0109/MSAHRN/SG portant création du Comité Technique de Domestication de la Convention de Kampala, 28 April 2016.

199 UNHCR, NRC and IDMC, above note 197, p. 13.

200 IDMC, “Mauritania: Country Information”, available at: www.internal-displacement.org/countries/mauritania.

201 See, for example, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Humanitarian Action and Relations with Civil Society, Recueil des textes juridiques de protection et de promotion des droits humains en Mauritanie, November 2019. This document, however, does not contain any provision regarding the protection of the IDPs in the country.

202 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Periodic Reports of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on the Implementation of the Provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, July 2016 (submitted 22 March 2017).

203 ACHPR, Concluding Observations – Mauritania: 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Periodic Report, 2006–2014, 13–22 February 2018.

204 Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Humanitarian Action and Relations with Civil Society, Rapport d'activités 2016: Des progrès importants accomplis, 2017. See also Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Humanitarian Action and Relations with Civil Society, Plan d'actions stratégique 2015–2017 et Perspectives 2018–2019, available at: www.cdhah.gov.mr/index.php/10-strategies/14-plan-d-action-triennal.

205 AU, The African Union Strategy for the Sahel Region, PSC/PR/3(CDXLIX), 11 August 2014, p. 9, para. 22(5).

206 Ibid., p. 17, para. 35.

207 Ibid., p. 16, para. 33(vi).

208 ACHPR, “General Comment No. 5 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence (Article 12(1))”,10 November 2019, p. 6, para. 18. For a general analysis of General Comment No. 5, see Romola Adeola, Frans Viljoen and Tresor Makunya Muhindo, “A Commentary on the African Commission's General Comment on the Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence under Article 12(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”, Journal of African Law, Vol. 65, No. S1, 2021, p. 150: “ It is important that the African Commission continually engages states on the provisions of General Comment No 5 and leverages on the state reporting process as a means to interact more visibly and vocally with states on the subject. Moreover, it is important that General Comment No 5 is utilized in regional human rights jurisprudence. Overall, there should be significant engagement with civil society, in its broadest understanding, and with states at various levels of governance, to ensure that the right to free movement of persons is ensured in practice.”

209 Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pecoud and Paul de Guchteneire, “Migration and Climate Change: An Overview”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2011, p. 23.

210 As a general reference, see, for example, M. Bond Rankin, above note 49; E. Arboleda, above note 53.

211 UNHCR, Legal Considerations, above note 28, para. 19.

212 Ibid., para. 7.

213 In this regard see also ECOSOC, Final report of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sérgio: Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17, 28 June 2005, Principle 5(4) (“The right to be protected from displacement”): “States shall take steps to ensure that no one is subjected to displacement by either State or non-State actors. States shall also ensure that individuals, corporations, and other entities within their legal jurisdiction or effective control refrain from carrying out or otherwise participating in displacement.” More generally, see also Principle 5(1):“Everyone has the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home, land or place of habitual residence.”

214 UNEP, above note 164, p. 76.

215 The Refugee Convention can be revised in accordance with its Article 45 (“Revision”). In full, Article 45 reads: “1) Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2) The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request”.

216 G5 Sahel Convention of Establishment, 19 December 2014, Art. 4. In this regard, see A. Bassou, above note 14, p. 2: “Article 4 of Title II (“Objectifs du G5 Sahel”) sets out the goals, which are essentially to ensure development and security to improve the population's quality of life. Special focus is placed on using democracy and good governance as means to that end, and international and regional cooperation as a framework for such efforts.”

217 G5 Sahel, “L'impact du changement climatique sur la sécurité et le développement au Sahel”, 20 November 2020, available at: www.g5sahel.org/limpact-du-changement-climatique-sur-la-securite-et-le-developpement-au-sahel/.

218 G5 Sahel, “Le président du Faso plaide la cause des réfugiés et migrants”, 21 September 2016, available at: www.g5sahel.org/le-president-du-faso-plaide-la-cause-des-refugies-et-migrants/ (authors’ translation).

219 Ibid.

220 Zachary Lomo, “The Struggle for Protection of the Rights of Refugees and IDPs in Africa: Making the Existing International Legal Regime Work”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2000, p. 269.