1 Ignatieff, Michael, ‘Nation-building lite’, in New York Times, 28 July 2002.Google Scholar

2 Or perhaps even a ‘cannibalistic’ state? See Meredith, Kevin, Villarreal, Sergio, and Wilkinson, Mitchel, ‘Afghanistan: The de-evolution of insurgency’, in Small Wars Journal, October 2010, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/10/afghanistan-the-deevolution-of/ (last visited 8 December 2010).Google Scholar

3 Very little scholarly analysis of the role of NGOs in Afghanistan has been written either during or since the cold war period. An exception is Baitenmann, Helga, ‘NGOs and the Afghan war: the politicization of humanitarian aid’, in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 62–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Between 1990 and 2002, only two studies addressed the issue, albeit tangentially: Antonio Donini, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Providence, RI, Occasional Paper No. 22, 1996; and Nigel Nicholds with John Borton, The Changing Role of NGOs in the Provision of Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance: Case Study 1 – Afghanistan/Pakistan, Overseas Development Institute, London, Working Paper 74, 1994. Fiona Terry's Condemned to Repeat: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2002, contains a chapter on manipulations around the Afghan refugees issue and its implications for humanitarianism; it includes a brief analysis of the cross-border ‘solidarity’ days.

4 Even Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), today one of the paragons of principled humanitarianism, had no qualms about taking sides: see F. Terry, above note 3, p. 73.

5 A. Donini, above note 3, p. 35.

6 During the Najibullah period there were no international NGOs in government-held territory (except for the International Assistance Mission, a faith-based medical organization). Oxfam was the first international NGO to open shop in Kabul, in late 1991. The International Committee of the Red Cross had a presence throughout the war years, except for a hiatus at the beginning of the Soviet occupation.

7 See Antonio Donini, ‘Principles, politics, and pragmatism in the international response to the Afghan crisis’, in Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin Wermester (eds), Nation-building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CN, 2004, pp. 120–124.

8 For a detailed analysis of the Strategic Framework, see A. Donini, above note 7, pp. 126–130, and the bibliographical references provided therein. See also, Mark Duffield, Patricia Gossman, and Nicholas Leader, Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Islamabad, 2001, available at: http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?searchword=Strategic+Framework&option=com_search&Itemid=112 (last visited 24 November 2010). On negotiations with the Taliban, see Antonio Donini, ‘Negotiating with the Taliban’, in Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (eds), Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and their Craft, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2007.

9 In early 2002, an Afghan analyst remarked: ‘The Taliban are like broken glass. You don't see it, but when you walk on it, it hurts’ (personal communication).

10 A fact facilitated by the appointment of Lakhdar Brahimi, who had given his name to the ‘Brahimi Report’ – the UN's rulebook for integrated missions – as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Report A/55/305 – S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000.

11 See Norah Niland, ‘Justice postponed: the marginalization of human rights in Afghanistan’, in A. Donini et al., above note 7, pp. 61–83.

12 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Vintage, London, 2004.

13 The incorporation of relief and other forms of assistance into military operations is nothing new. US NGOs were willing participants in such approaches during the Vietnam War. Most US NGOs – and most of the NGOs involved in Vietnam were American – positioned themselves, by default if not by design, as virtual extensions of US policy in the region, working in close partnership with the US government. A review of the experience of four major NGOs – Vietnam Christian Service, CARE, International Voluntary Services, and Catholic Relief Services – is instructive regarding the infiltration of humanitarian activities by political agendas. See Herring, George C., ‘Introduction to special issue: non-governmental organizations and the Vietnam War’, in Peace & Change, Vol. 27, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 162–164CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 There is no single model for PRTs. Some are more civilianized or, like the Dutch PRT in Oruzgan, under civilian command. In theory this means that assistance activities maintain some separation from military objectives. Others are more militarized and more integrated. On balance there has been a progressive militarization of PRTs, with civilians increasingly excluded from decision-making. See Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Mirwais Wardak, Idrees Zaman, and Annabel Taylor, Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil–Military Relations, British Agencies Afghanistan Group and European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan, London, 2008. For a critique of the British approach, see Gordon, Stuart, ‘The United Kingdom's stabilisation model and Afghanistan: the impact on humanitarian actors’, in Disasters, Vol. 34, (Supplement S3), 2010, pp. S368–S387.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

15 ‘ARSIC-N and ANA travel outside boundaries to deliver aid’, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Press Release, 23 December 2007, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/PANA-7A7FC7?OpenDocument&RSS20=18-P (last visited 25 November 2010).

16 ‘New DoD policy outlines military health support in global stability missions’, Press Release, 24 May 2010, available at: http://www.health.mil/News_And_Multimedia/Releases/detail/10-05-24/New_DoD_Policy_Outlines_Military_Health_Support_in_Global_Stability_Missions.aspx (last visited 24 November 2010).

17 Anthony H. Cordesman, Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build: ‘The Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan & Iraq Wars’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, September 2009, available at: http://csis.org/publication/shape-clear-hold-and-build-uncertain-lessons-afghan-iraq-wars (last visited 24 November 2010).

18 This is the subject of an ongoing research project co-ordinated by Andrew Wilder at Feinstein International Center (FIC): see Andrew Wilder, ‘A “weapons system” based on wishful thinking’, Opinion editorial, in The Boston Globe, 16 September 2009, available at: http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/09/16/a_weapons_system_based_on_wishful_thinking/ (last visited 24 November 2010). See also ‘Conference report: winning “hearts and minds” in Afghanistan: assessing the effectiveness of development aid in COIN operations’, available at: https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34085650 (last visited 26 November 2010) for a description of the Tufts/FIC study on hearts and minds.

19 ‘Development Alternatives, Inc’ – now known simply as DAI – is a for-profit company that implements many USAID projects: see http://www.dai.com/about/index.php (last visited 24 November 2010). Because it works in ways similar to NGOs, but usually with armed escorts, this blurs the line between non-governmental and militarized assistance.

20 Personal observation.

21 To be fair, some preliminary contacts have been made but as yet with no visible results.

22 UN General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991, which established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) – now OCHA – specifically gives OCHA the responsibility of ‘[a]ctively facilitating, including through negotiation if needed, the access by the operational organizations to emergency areas for the rapid provision of emergency assistance by obtaining the consent of all parties concerned, through modalities such as the establishment of temporary relief corridors where needed, days and zones of tranquility and other forms’ (Annex, para. 35(d)).

23 For more detail on humanitarian leadership (or lack thereof), see Antonio Donini, NGOs and Humanitarian Reform: Mapping Study Afghanistan Report, NGO Humanitarian Reform Consortium, 2009, available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-7WC45P?OpenDocument (last visited 24 November 2010).

24 Michiel Hofman and Sophie Delaunay, Afghanistan: A Return to Humanitarian Action, MSF, Geneva, Switzerland, March 2010, available at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2010/MSF-Return-to-Humanitarian-Action_4311.pdf (last visited 24 November 2010).

25 See, e.g., UN Security Council resolution 1868 of 23 March 2009, S/RES/1868 (2009), para. 4(b), extending UNAMA; Resolution 1917 of 22 March 2010, S/RES/1917 (2010), para. 5(b), extending UNAMA; Resolution 1890 of 8 October 2009, S/RES/1890 (2009), para. 5, extending ISAF.

26 See, e.g., Xion Tong (ed.), ‘UN Afghanistan envoy backs call for more NATO troops’, in Xinhua, 23 October 2009, available at: news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/23/content_12309531.htm (last visited 24 November 2010).

27 ‘I express my admiration for all the dedication of the women and men of the United Nations, voluntary humanitarian workers, NGOs and other members of the international community, including ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) for their dedication and commitment’. Press conference, Kabul, 2 November 2009, available at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1761&ctl=Details&mid=1892&ItemID=6374 (last visited 24 November 2010).

28 Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 5 November 2009, available at: http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=11606 (last visited 25 November 2010). The statement goes on to lament that ‘We have not seen any resolution by the Security Council, which speaks of grace, tolerance and altruism’. Similar criticism of the UN's ‘partial standing’ was expressed on 22 March: see http://www.alqimmah.net/archive/index.php/t-15269.html (last visited 25 November 2010).

29 This was a recurring theme in interviews with Afghan analysts and NGO and UN staff in Kabul in January 2010.

30 Several factors conspire to create this information vacuum: the bunkerization of aid agencies, growing risk-averseness, lack of monitoring of projects in insecure areas, remote-control management, etc. Attacks against aid workers have had a chilling effect. These factors are compounded by the reluctance, with few exceptions, to engage in contact and relationship with the armed opposition(s). Recent information seems to show that the Taliban are not necessarily hostile to NGO activities, particularly in the health sector, though they may be hostile to the presence of foreigners; see Leonard S. Rubinstein, Humanitarian Space Shrinking for Health Program Delivery in Afghanistan and Pakistan, PeaceBrief No. 59, US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, October 2010, available at: http://www.usip.org/resources/humanitarian-space-shrinking-health-program-delivery-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan (last visited 24 November 2010).

31 This trend, which does not only apply to Afghanistan, is analysed by Mark Duffield, who describes the international ‘gated communities’ in urban areas, the fortified aid compounds, and the exclusive means of transport that mesh these secure sites into an ‘archipelago’ of international aid. Mark Duffield, ‘The fortified aid compound: architecture and security in post-interventionary society’, in Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding (forthcoming, 2010).

32 The Feinstein International Center's Humanitarian Agenda 2015 research on local perceptions of the work of aid agencies has documented ‘coherence’ issues in thirteen countries. All the studies are available at fic.tufts.edu. The final report, A. Donini et al., The State of the Humanitarian Enterprise, 2008, is available at: https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Humanitarian+Agenda+2015+--+The+State+of+the+Humanitarian+Enterprise (last visited 8 December 2010).