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Compliance with International Humanitarian Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2010
Abstract
In 1974, the University of Leiden (Netherlands) established a Chair of International Humanitarian Law, whose first incumbent was Professor Frits Kalshoven, a familiar name to readers of the Review. Mr. George Aldrich, who led the United States delegation at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts from 1974 to 1977, and who since 1981 has been a Judge at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in The Hague, was recently appointed as his successor.
During an official ceremony held at the University of Leiden on 13 November 1990, the new holder of the “Red Cross Chair”, as it is sometimes called, made a pressing appeal in his inaugural lecture for compliance with international humanitarian law. In his talk Professor Aldrich described with a large measure of realism the obstacles to implementation of the law but showed cautious optimism in reviewing the means available to the international community to surmount those obstacles.
The Review is pleased to publish, with the author's agreement, the text of his lecture which brings to a close, on a note of appeal and hope, this series of articles devoted to implementation of international humanitarian law.
- Type
- Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (Part II)
- Information
- International Review of the Red Cross (1961 - 1997) , Volume 31 , Issue 282 , June 1991 , pp. 294 - 306
- Copyright
- Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 1991
References
1 Will, George F., “The Perils of Legality”, Newsweek, 10 09 1990.Google Scholar
2 Lauterpacht, H., “The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War”, 29 British Y.B. Int'l L., pp. 360, 382 (1952).Google Scholar
3 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, of 12 August 1949, 6 UST 3114, TIAS No. 3362, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, of 12 August 1949, 6 UST 3217, TIAS No. 3363, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949, 6 UST 3316, TIAS No. 3364, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, 6 UST 3516, TIAS No. 3365, 75 UNTS 287.
4 For the text of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, see Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Final Act (1977)Google Scholar, reprinted in 16 ILM, p. 1391 (1977); Schindler, D. and Toman, J., The Laws of Armed Conflict, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1988, (3rd edition), pp. 621–688 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roberts, A. & Guelff, R., Documents on the Laws of War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, 2nd ed., pp. 389–446.Google Scholar
5 Information concerning the numbers of States party is taken from publications by the ICRC.
6 For example, the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed Regulations, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and the 1981 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
7 Art. 1, para. 1.
8 Art. 83, para. 1.
9 Art. 83, para. 2.
10 Judge Stephen M. Schwebel stated concisely the effects of compliance and of noncompliance. “If experience demonstrates that states may safely violate international law, its credibility suffers. States will not except compliance by others and be the less conscientious about their own. Correspondingly, observance of the law, and enforcement of the law, will generate expectations of future compliance and will thus enhance the present effectiveness of international law.” Schwebel, , The Compliance Process and the Future of International Law, 1981 Proceedings, American Society of International Law, pp. 180–181.Google Scholar
11 Art. 1 common to all four Conventions and to Protocol I.
12 See, for example, Arts. 146 and 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians.
13 Stone, Julius, Legal Controls of International Conflict — A treatise on the dynamics of disputes and war law, Maitland Publications Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1954, pp. 318–323.Google Scholar
14 See, in particular, Kalshoven, Frits, Belligerent Reprisals, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1971.Google Scholar
15 For example, reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by Article 13 of the Third 1949 Geneva Convention, and reprisals against protected persons are prohibited by Article 33 of the Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention.
16 Sick, wounded, and shipwrecked persons, medical personnel, units, and transports (Art. 20), civilians and the civilian population (Art. 51), civilian objects (Art. 52), certain cultural objects and places of worship (Art. 53), objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (Art. 54), the natural environment (Art. 55), and dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations (Art. 56).
17 The only Party to Protocol I that has made such a reservation, albeit an ambiguous one, is Italy.
18 Art. 90.
19 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 19.
20 See, for example, the Third 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, Arts. 8, 10, 11 and 126.
21 See, for example, the Third 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, Art. 9.
22 The only significant exception occurred during hostilities between India and Pakistan.
23 Art. 5.
24 According to the ICRC, as at 31 March 1991 the following Parties have accepted the competence of the Commission: Sweden, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Belgium, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Malta, Spain, Liechtenstein, Algeria, USSR, Bylorussian SSR, Ukranian SSR, Uruguay, Canada and Federal Republic of Germany.
25 During the Diplomatic Conference that adopted the Protocols, the USSR was a leading opponent of the Fact-Finding Commission.