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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2010
Before addressing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) itself, we should point out that any view of the treaty from a Southern perspective can be only partial, that is, one perspective among many possible others. Developing and non-aligned countries may have different — and equally legitimate — interests and expectations regarding a particular international instrument. In fact, this diversity is itself one of the defining characteristics of the “South”, a term we use to categorize developing States whose main point in common is the absence of alignment with any great power and, indeed, with each other.
Achilles Zaluar, a career diplomat in the Brazilian Ministry for External Relations, was a member of Brazil's delegation to the 1994 Special Conference of the BWC and the first session of the Ad Hoc Group.
Roque Monteleone-Neto, an Associate Professor in the Genetics Department at the Federal University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, is currently working for the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in New York. He was previously a member of the Brazilian delegation to various conferences of the BWC.
1 The Group of 21 or G-21 (actually numbering 28) in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament; the caucus represented by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations; and the various groupings of non-aligned and other developing countries in connection with multilateral treaties such as the BWC and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2 Non-Aligned Movement, “Cartagena 95 — Basic Documents”, Colombia, 1995, pp. 61–69.
3 United Nations, “List of States Parties to the BWC as of 25 November 1996”, BWC/CONF.IV/INF.2, background document of the Fourth Review Conference, Geneva 1996.
4 United Nations, “Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC — Final Document”, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996, pp. 8–10.
5 Hunger, I., “Article V: Confidence Building Measures”, in Pearson, G. and Dando, M. (eds), Strengthening the BWC: Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 1996, pp. 78–79 Google Scholar. See also United Nations, “Background information on the participation of States Parties in the agreed confidence-building measures (1992–96)”, BWC/CONF.IV/ INF.2, background document of the Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 1996.
6 Duncan, A. and Matthews, R.J., “Development of a Verification Protocol for the BWC”, in Poole, J.B. and Guthrie, R. (eds), Verification 1996 — Arms Control, Peacekeeping and the Environment, Westview Press/VERTIC, Boulder, USA, 1996, p. 167.Google Scholar
7 United Nations, “Special Conference of the States Parties to the BWC — Final Report”, BWC/SPCONF/1, Geneva, 1994.
8 United Nations, “Second consolidated report of the Director of the IAEA under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996)”, S/1996/833, New York, 1996, p. 11.
9 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of Section C of SC resolution 687 (1991)”, S/1995/864, New York, 1995, p. 33.
10 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b)(i) of resolution 687 (1991)”, S/1996/848, New York, 1996, p. 23.Google Scholar
11 Duarte, C.S., “The Brazilian approach to strengthening the BWC: promoting cooperation and securing compliance”Google Scholar, non-published paper presented at the Arms Control Conference of the Southern Methodist University, Dallas, 1995, p. 5.
12 United Nations, “Background paper on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the BWC - Document by Sweden”, BWC/CONF.IV/4/Add.1, Geneva, 1996, pp. 2–6.Google Scholar
13 Cole, L.A., “The Specter of Biological Weapons”, Scientific American, 12 1995.Google Scholar
14 The hurdles are similar to those encountered by a nation or movement seeking to initiate a chemical attack. As one commentator recently put it, “even the Aum Shynrikyo in Japan, which had conscientiously recruited trained scientists, held perhaps US 1 billion in assets, and conducted clandestine field trials prior to the Tokyo subway attack, was incapable of carrying out a technically sophisticated strike. The cult was only able to produce a rudimentary chemical weapon with a primitive method of dispersion.” See Rodrigues, Leslie, “The emerging threat of chembio terrorism: is the U.S. prepared?”, The Arena, No 6, 11 1996, Washington, p. 2 Google Scholar. On the other hand, any doubts about the contemporary military value of chemical weapons were put to rest by the effective battlefield use of chemical attacks by Iraq against Iran during the 1980s.
15 As the Ambassador of Egypt said to the Conference on Disarmament, to explain why his country did not ratify the BWC or sign the 1993 Convention on Chemical Weapons, “security and peace cannot coexist with an imbalance of power and serious disparities among States belonging to the same region in regard to their rights and obligations under the various instruments of disarmament”. United Nations, “Note verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Secretariat of the Fourth Review Conference of the BWC”, BWC/CONF.IV/8, Geneva, 1996, p. 2.
16 Mention should be made to the hypothesis that the Black Plague, which killed one third of Europe's population in the 14th century, apparently originated when the disease was deliberately spread in a biological attack during the siege of Caffa, in the Crimea, launched by the Tartars against the Genoese. See SIPRI, The problem of chemical and biological warfare, Vol. I — The rise of CB weapons, SIPRI, Stockholm, 1971, p. 215 Google Scholar. The prospect of a global epidemic resulting from the spread of a genetically enhanced agent has been the theme of movie thrillers and cheap paperbacks, but is certainly not unfeasible.
17 World Health Organization, The World Health Report 1996, Geneva, 1996, pp. 110–111.Google Scholar
18 Monteleone-Neto, R. and Felicio, J.E.M., “Article X: international cooperation and development, exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information”Google Scholar, in G. Pearson and M. Dando (eds), op. cit. (note 5, above), pp. 116–117.
19 Estimates being discussed prior to the resumption of the First Session of the Preparatory Commission for the CBTB organization, in March 1997, put the budget for the first two years at between 70,000,000 and 90,000,000 US dollars per year. Compare that with the budget of the specialized agencies (United Nations, “Budgetary and financial situation of organizations of the United Nations system”, A/51/505/Corr.1, New York, 1996, p. 2).
20 Dando, M., “Article I: Scope”Google Scholar, in G. Pearson and M. Dando (eds), op. cit. (note 5 above).
21 See note 4, p. 43.
22 United Nations, “Background information document on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the BWC”, BWC/CONF.IV/3, Geneva, 1996, p. 31.
23 United Nations, “Background information document on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the BWC”, BWC/CONF.IV/3/Corr. 2, Geneva, 1996.
24 See note 4, p. 42.
25 See note 7.
26 See note 4, p. 16.
27 Bailey, K.C.A., The UN Inspections in Iraq — Lesson for on-site verification, Westview Press, Boulder, USA, 1995.Google Scholar