^{page 188 note 1} For an account of Münzenberg's death, see Kersten, Kurt, “Das Ende Willi Münzenbergs: ein Opfer Stalins und Ulbrichts”, in: Deutsche Rundschau, LXXXIII (1957), pp. 495–99.Google Scholar

^{page 188 note 2} For details of Münzenberg's youth, see his fragmentary autobiography Die dritte Front (Berlin, 1930)Google Scholar. For his activities after 1921, see Solidarität, : Zehn Jahre Arbeiterhilfe (Berlin, 1931)Google Scholar and the interesting secondary account by his sister-in-law Buber-Neumann, Margarete, Von Potsdam nach Moskau (Stuttgart, 1957).Google Scholar

^{page 189 note 1} In close association with his brother-in-law Heinz Neumann's opposition group within the leadership he attempted to prevent the toppling of the Braun-Severing government in Prussia although he had joined in official attacks on the German Social Democratic party (SPD). Gross, Babette L., “Die Volksfrontpolitik in den dreissiger Jahren: Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der kommunistischen Taktik”, in: Das Parlament, B 43/62 (Oct. 24, 1962), p. 524Google Scholar; Kersten, , pp. 487–88.Google Scholar

^{page 190 note 1} At the same time he issued personal appeals for an international protest against the maltreatment of the thousands in concentration camps. “30 bis 35 Konzentrationslager in Deutschland mit über 30,000 Gefangenen”, in: Unsere Zeit, VI (Apr. 15, 1933), p. 59.Google Scholar

^{page 190 note 2} The Neuer Deutscher Verlag was the parent body of Münzenberg's propaganda empire before 1933 published books ranging from politics to literature, sponsored the book club Universum-Bücherei, and controlled influential newspapers and periodicals.

^{page 190 note 3} Among the books published were: Bert Brecht and Hanns Eisler, Lieder und Balladen; E.E.Kisch, Eintritt Verboten; Gustav Regler, Der Kampf um die Saar; F. C. Weiskopf, Der Marsch auf Berlin; Henri Barbusse, Stalin; Arthur Koestler, Menschenopfer unerhört; and Nazi-Führer sehen dich an. Carrefour also sponsored the Free German Library direct ed by a committee consisting of Heinrich Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger, Leopold Schwarzschild, E. J. Gumbel, Rudolf Breitscheid, Rudolf Olden, Emil Ludwig, and Ernst Toller. See Freiheitsbibliothek, Deutsche, Eine Aufgabe (Basel, 1936).Google Scholar

^{page 190 note 4} The AIZ had been Münzenberg's most successful publishing venture before 1933 with a circulation of nearly half a million. In 1936 the AIZ changed its name to Die Volks-Illustrierte.

^{page 191 note 1} Contributors to Der Gegen-Angriff included: Toller, Johannes R. Becher, Kisch, Weiskopf, Oskar Maria Graf, Rudolf Leonhard, Michael Gold, Karl Franz, and Heinrich Kurella. Contributors to Weltfront included: Agnes Smedley, Martin Andersen-Nexö, Heinrich Mann, and Willi Bredel. Contributors to Einheit included: Henri Barbusse, Tom Mooney, Toller, Kisch, and Weinert. Münzenberg was concerned particularly about the fate of German youth. In a letter to his old friend Fritz Brupbacher he wrote: “The youth is the most important part of the segments which have to be rescued from Hitler and fascism. Hitler's influence on the masses must be reversed. The periodical Freie Jugend can and must help to fulfill this burning task.” Münzenberg to Brupbacher, Sept. 26, 1934, Brupbacher archive, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam. I am indebted to this Institute for permission to consult materials from its Brupbacher and Paul Hertz archives.

^{page 191 note 2} By 1935, 600,000 copies of the Braunbuch had been published in twenty-three languages. Of these 15,000 had been smuggled into Germany under the innocuous covers of the Redam edition of German classics. AIZ, XIV (Feb. 28, 1935), p. 139Google Scholar. Koestler, Arthur exaggerates in claiming that “within a few weeks, the Brown Book was translated into seventeen languages and circulated in millions of copies”, Invisible Writing (New York, 1954). p. 199Google Scholar. Nollau, Günther repeats this error verbatim in International Communism and World Revolution (New York, 1961), p. 120.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 1} The social democratic Neuer Vorwärts published an extremely favorable review of the Braunbuch praising its factual content and agreeing with its conclusions, “Göring ein Brandstifter und Morphinist”, No. 10 (Aug. 20, 1933), p. 1Google Scholar. At Goebbels' direction a Baltic Nazi hack writer, Adolf Ehrt, wrote a refutation of the Braunbuch titled Bewaffneter Aufstand of which 50,000 copies quickly were put into circulation. See Pol, Heinz, “Das Antibraunbuch”, in: Die neue Weltbühne, II (09 28, 1933), p. 1208.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 2} The committee issued a multi-lingual bulletin, Der Reichstagbrand, of its investigation. For details of the countertrial, see von London, Der spruch (Prague, 1933), passim.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 3} For details of the counter-trial, see Tobias, Fritz, Der Reichstagbrand: Legende und Wirklichkeit (Rastatt, 1962), pp. 212–30Google Scholar. The press coverage of the counter-trial was so favorable that the German government made an unsuccessful attempt to induce the English government to halt the proceedings. Braunbuch, II, p. 39.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 4} von London, spruch, p. 29.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 5} A pamphlet, Anklage gegen die Ankläger (Paris, 1933)Google Scholar was published by Carrefour and smuggled into Germany, in which leading French jurists refuted the secret indictment which the Nazi government had prepared for the trial. For details of the Leipzig trial, see Hays, Arthur Garfield, City Lawyer (New York, 1942), pp. 337–88.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 6} Der Kampf um ein Buch (Paris, 1934), pp. 4–7.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 7} The four were arrested again and detained in prison without charge. The three Bulgarians, who were Soviet citizens, were freed after intercession of their government, but Torgler was sent to a concentration camp.

^{page 193 note 1} Thirty thousand copies of Braunbuch II were smuggled into Germany under innocuous titles. The Weissbuch was published in 1934 and the Braune Netz in 1935. These publications received highly favorable reviews in the German émigré press. See, for instance, “Standartenführer Fiedler als Weissbuch-Dementi”, in: Das neue Tage-Buch, III (Jan. 5, 1935), Pp. 1255–56.Google Scholar

^{page 193 note 2} See, for instance, “Wir müssen die Jugend gewinnen!”, in: Unsere Zeit, VII (Oct., 1934)Google Scholar; “Hilfe im Kampf gegen Hitler”, in: AIZ, XIV (Dec. 5, 1935)Google Scholar; “Helden des Frieden”, Ibid., XV (April 12, 1936).

^{page 193 note 3} For a personal report on some of these committees, see Rolland, Romain, I Will Not Rest, trans. Shelvankar, K. S. (New York, 1934), pp. 58–59, 291–317.Google Scholar

^{page 193 note 4} The former had been founded by Münzenberg in 1927 and included Albert Einstein, Madame Sun Yat Sen, George Lansbury, Edo Fimmen, Nehru, and Roger Baldwin in its executive. The latter, with an equally impressive list of sponsors, had been launched by a congress in Amsterdam in 1932.

^{page 194 note 1} The topics included: out cultural inheritance; humanism; the individual; the role of the writer in society; the nation and culture; and creativity and the value of intellect. See “Internationaler Schriftsteller-Kongress”, in: Das neue Tage-Buch, III (June 22, 1935), p. 600.Google Scholar

^{page 194 note 2} Rühle, Jürgen, Literatur und Revolution (Cologne, 1960), pp. 507–08Google Scholar. Gustav Regler recounts that at the congress there was a spontaneous feeling of solidarity and commitment among those present, which disturbed the managers of the affair who were concerned with establishing its political neutrality. Das Ohr des Malchus (Cologne, 1958), pp. 314–16.Google Scholar

^{page 194 note 3} Münzenberg, , “Für Ernst Thälmann, das heisst: Gegen Faschismus, gegen imperialistischen Krieg, für den Frieden!”, in: AIZ, XIII (07 26, 1934), p. 466.Google Scholar

^{page 194 note 4} “Make the Ernst Thälmann Trial Another Defeat for Hitler!”, in: Daily Worker, XI (Mar. 17, 1934), p. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 194 note 5} “Only Mass Protest Will Save Thälmann, Says Marley”, Ibid., XI (Feb. 8, 1934), pp. 1, 3.

^{page 195 note 1} The tour lasted from July 19th to the 27th. The three spoke in Detroit, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Chicago, and Bevan and Rosenfeld continued on to the West coast. Foot, Michael, Bevan, Aneurin (London, 1962), p. 172Google Scholar and “Noted Men to Tour Country for Thälmann”, in: Daily Worker, XI (July 13, 1934), p. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 195 note 2} “Münzenberg, Appealing for Thälmann, Says Hitler Plans Mass Murder of Anti-Fascists”, Ibid., XI (July 19, 1934), p. 3.

^{page 195 note 3} “10,000 Workers Vow Fight to Free Thälmann at Farewell Banquet to Willi Münzenberg”, Ibid., XI (July 30, 1934), p. 2.

^{page 195 note 4} An international committee under the leadership of Malraux, Gide, and Professor Paul Langevin organized this affair which was attended by delegates of national committees, scientists, doctors, lawyers, and artists. “Anti-Terrorkonferenz in Strassburg”, in: Einheit, I (June, 1935), p. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 195 note 5} The Comintern's official united front from below which ushered in the “third period” in 1928 was predicated on wooing “misled” workers from their previous affiliations and established leaders. By 1934 the danger of fascism had become apparent to the men in the Kremlin and the Soviet Union concluded alliances with France and Czechoslovakia and joined the League of Nations. From the spring of that year the policy of the Comintern changed course radically in seeking united fronts from above and below which culminated in the popular front collaboration with socialist and middle-class parties. The popular front tactic came to an abrupt end with the Hitler-Stalin pact on August 23, 1939.

^{page 196 note 1} In 1925–1926 Münzenberg organized the Kuczinski-Ausschuss which arranged for co-operation between leaders of the KPD, SPD, and the trade unions in calling for a national referendum to deny former German princes compensation for their lost property. Although the left failed to carry the referendum in June 1926, it polled four million more than the combined KPD-SPD strength in the previous national election. Similarly, in February 1933 Münzenberg organized Das freie Wort, an anti-Nazi united front which included segments of the SPD and two of its leaders, Friedrich Stampfer and Toni Sender. Gross, , pp. 523, 525.Google Scholar

^{page 196 note 2} Münzenberg, , “Herr Wels verbrennt die Fahnen der II. Internationale”, in: Unsere Zeit, VI (Apr. 15, 1933), p. 36.Google Scholar

^{page 196 note 3} “Eine Frage an sozialdemokratische Freunde”, in: AIZ, XV (June 3, 1936), pp. 354–55Google Scholar, and “1936 – Jahr der deutschen Volksfront”, Ibid., XV (Jan. 30, 1936), p. 70. See also Mann's, Heinrich reminiscences about the Volksfront committee of which he was the chairman. Ein Zeitalter wird Besichtigt (Stockholm, 1948), pp. 418–28.Google Scholar

^{page 197 note 1} “1936 – das Jahr der Schaffung der deutschen Volksftont”, in: Eine Aufgabe, pp. 34, 36–37.Google Scholar

^{page 197 note 2} Signatories of the appeal included: Rudolf Breitscheid, Albert Grzesinski, Professor Siegfried Marck, Alfred Braunthal, and Dr. Otto Friedländer of the SPD; Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Franz Dahlem, Paul Merker, and Willi Münzenberg of the KPD; Willi Brandt, H. Diesel, and K. Franz of the SAP; and Arnold Zweig, Heinrich Mann, Professor Georg Bernhard, Rudolf Olden, Ernst Bloch, Klaus Mann, and Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt of the unaffiliated left. “Für Frieden, Freiheit und Brot”, in: Rundschau über Politik, Wirtschaft und Arbeiterbewegung, VI (Jan. 14, 1937), pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

^{page 197 note 3} Kersten, , pp. 490–91.Google Scholar

^{page 197 note 4} Aufgaben einer deutschen Volksftont (Paris, 1937), p. 18.Google Scholar

^{page 198 note 1} Alfred Kantorowicz recounts how Ulbricht destroyed the German popular front organizations in 1937 and thereafter undermined all attempts at co-operation which were not under his direction and control. Tagebuch, Deutsche (Munich, 1959), Vol. II, pp. 48, 62Google Scholar. For the KPD's attempts to take over the German Volksfront in 1937 and the efforts of Heinrich Mann and others to prevent it, see Der Briefwechsel der nicht kommunistischen Parteien und Gruppen der deutschen Volksfront mit dem ZK der KPD, Oct., 1937, Hertz archive, IISG, Amsterdam.

^{page 198 note 2} According to Kersten (loc. cit.), Ulbricht and Pieck were intent on assuming uncontested control of the KPD. As a leading German communist, with a large international following and important connections among communists and non-communists, Münzenberg was an obstacle in their quest for hegemony over the party. They attempted to undermine Münzenberg's popular front activities by taking an uncompromising line on co-operation with non-communists, and by complaining to the Comintern about his unwillingness to subordinate himself to them.

^{page 198 note 3} Buber-Neumann, , p. 452.Google Scholar

^{page 198 note 4} Babette Gross, Münzenberg's wife, reports that in the summer of 1936 almost everyone in Paris was indifferent to the events in spain, and she recounts her and Münzenberg's attempts to organize spanish relief. Letter to Paulette Brupbacher, July 23, 1936, Brupbacher archive, IISG, Amsterdam.

^{page 199 note 1} Buber-Neumann, , p. 453.Google Scholar

^{page 199 note 2} “The atmosphere in the Münzenberg Trust”, Koestler, recalls (p. 212)Google Scholar, “was more liberal and easygoing than in an orthodox party office, and one need not be afraid that an uncautious remark would be held against one on the day of reckoning.” See also, Regler, , p. 215.Google Scholar

^{page 199 note 3} These charges were later repeated in Münzenberg, 's expulsion hearings before the ICC “Der Beschluss der IKK im Fall Münzenberg”, in: Rundschau, VIII (Apr. 13, 1939), p. 639.Google Scholar

^{page 199 note 4} Nollau, , pp. 199, 210Google Scholar. The International Relations Section (OMS) of the Comintern, to which Münzenberg was responsible, was subordinate to the ECCI's Org-Bureau. It seems that the OMS was dissolved at this time and that its functions were taken over by the territorial sections of the ECCI.

^{page 200 note 1} Only through the intercession of Palmiro Togliatti was Münzenberg able to receive his passport and exit permit. Kersten, , p. 490Google Scholar and Buber-Neumann, , pp. 454–55.Google Scholar

^{page 200 note 2} Immediately upon his return Münzenberg spent some time at a sanitarium in a suburb of Paris. Ibid., p. 455.

^{page 200 note 3} Interview with Louis Fischer, Princeton, New Jersey, December 19, 1963.

^{page 201 note 1} Kersten, , p. 492Google Scholar. See, for instance, a left-handed attack on Münzenberg's, publishing activities in the official KPD press: “Propaganda als Waffe zum Selbstmord”, in: Deutsche Volkszeitung, II (Dec. 12, 1937), p. 3.Google Scholar

^{page 201 note 2} In 1937 it was understood among German exiles that Münzenberg had not been removed from power “because he did not abide by the popular front line decisively enough” as the KPD's whisper campaign would have it. It was apparent that he had been a major obstacle in Ulbricht's quest for power. “Das Gesetz der Selbstentmannung: Wie die KPD sich selbst liquidiert”, in: Freies Deutschland, I (Aug. 5, 1937), p. 5Google Scholar. Babette Gross recalls that the so-called Brussels Conference of the KPD in Moscow in October 1935 was preceded by a week's infighting over Thälmann's successor. Ulbricht and Pieck emerged victorious and immediately were supported by Dahlem, Ackermann, Merker, Funk, Mewis, Dengel, and others. Münzenberg, whose responsibility was to Moscow, remained an important exception to Ulbricht's and Pieck's absolute control of party affairs.

^{page 202 note 1} The letters are reprinted in Nollau, pp. 345–46, but the source is not indicated. Nollau informs me that copies of these letters are in an official archive in France closed to the public and, by prior agreement, kept secret by its users. Even if the letters are authentic their servile tone (and here Nollau agrees) does not represent Münzenberg's true feelings toward the Comintern. Letter to me from Günther Nollau, Apr. 23, 1964.

^{page 202 note 2} The Swedish banker Olof Aschberg, for instance, who was a stanch supporter of the Soviet Union, did not abandon Münzenberg during this critical period. Buber-Neumann, , p. 456.Google Scholar

^{page 203 note 1} “Propaganda als Waffe”, in: Die neue Weltbühne, XXXIII (May 13, 1937), pp. 623–26Google Scholar and Propaganda als Waffe (Paris, 1937).

^{page 203 note 2} The Deutsche Freiheitspartei was founded in the beginning of 1937 by Otto Klepper, last Finance Minister of Prussia. It sought to aid the forces offering resistance to Nazism in Germany and published the Freiheitsbriefe addressed to the “democratic forces of Germany” and smuggled into the country by the hundred thousands. Gross, , p. 539Google Scholar. By the fall of 1937, the organization held a meeting in Dijon at which Heinrich Mann was one of the main speakers. Kersten, , pp. 491–92.Google Scholar

^{page 204 note 1} This committee aided, among others, German refugees interned in France after the outbreak of war. It distributed food and clothing parcels to the German inmates of the camps including the communists who had reviled and blacklisted Münzenberg.

^{page 204 note 2} Comment empêcher l'agression hitlérienne? Memoire des amis Allemands de la Paix sur la Politique de Guerre de Hitler et la Volonté de Paix du Peuple Allemand (Paris, 1938).

^{page 205 note 1} The purpose of the organization, which was announced in a special edition of Die Zukunft, II (Apr. 28, 1938), p. 1Google Scholar, was to further the maintenance of peace and to promote harmonious relations between France and a reconstructed Germany of the future.

^{page 205 note 2} “Eine englisch-deutsche Union”, Ibid., II (July 28, 1939). From time to time the Zukunft appeared in special English editions.

^{page 205 note 3} “Zur Bündnispolitik der Arbeiterklasse”, Ibid., I (Oct. 12, 1938), pp. 6–7.

^{page 205 note 4} According to Kersten, (pp. 493–94)Google Scholar Münzenberg's material and ideological aid to the spanish loyalists, who streamed into the internment camp at Gurs completely disillusioned by the communist terror in Barcelona and Albacete, was a threat to communism's international image. Until August 1939 Münzenberg defended himself before the German émigré left against the KPD charges that he had allied himself with “Gestapo agents, confidence men, thieves, and German Poumists” at the camp in Gurs. Circular letter by Münzenberg: An die kommunistischen Genossen und spanienkämpfer im Lager Gurs, Aug. 9, 1939, Hertz archive, IISG, Amsterdam.

^{page 205 note 5} “Der Fall Münzenberg”, in: Rundschau, VIII (Mar. 23, 1939), pp. 449–50.Google Scholar

^{page 206 note 1} “Der Beschluss der IKK im Fall Münzenberg” and “Ausschluss Münzenbergs aus der KPD”, Ibid., VIII (Apr. 13, 1939), pp. 639–40. The character assassination of Münzenberg was answered in a statement by the former KPD Reichstag deputies Peter Maslowski, Walter Oettinghaus, and Grete Hahne, signed by seventy-four KPD members many of whom were spanish Civil War veterans. After recounting Münzenberg's career as founder and champion of communism, it accused the KPD of historical falsification and of speaking about decency, human rights, and democracy while denying the same to its own members. Circular letter: Wer die Wahrheit kennt und sie nicht spricht, der ist fürwahr ein feiger Wicht, Aug. 20, 1939, Hertz archive, IISG, Amsterdam.

^{page 206 note 2} “Klare Fronten”, in: Zukunft, II (Aug. 28, 1939), p. 3.Google Scholar

^{page 206 note 3} “Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt und die Westmächte”, Ibid., II (Aug. 28, 1939), p. 3.

^{page 207 note 1} “In der Freiheitsfront für die Einheitspartei”, Ibid., II (Aug. 28, 1939), pp. 6–7. Shortly after the outbreak of the war Münzenberg branded the KPD as the party which had betrayed the German people in their most difficult hour and demanded that it be destroyed along with Hitler. In a liberated Germany, he prophesied, there would be no room for dictators regardless of their persuasion. “Das muss verhindert werden”, Ibid., II (Sept. 6, 1939), p. 4. In a similar vein, see the two editorials “Die deutsche Freiheit im Kampf gegen Hitler und Stalin“ and ”Her zu uns! Offener Brief an Freunde in Deutschland und im Ausland!”, Ibid., II (Sept. 22, 1939), p. 1.

^{page 207 note 2} “Der russische Dolchstoss”, Ibid., II (Sept. 22, 1939), p. 1.

^{page 207 note 3} “Die deutschen Kommunisten in Moskau verboten”, Ibid., III (Oct. 27, 1939), p. 3. See also “Eine Front: die deutschen Kommunisten verstärken ihre Hitlerpropaganda”, Ibid., III (Jan. 26, 1940), p. 1. In 1937 the leading German communists Heinz Neumann, Hermann Remmele, and Leo Flieg disappeared mysteriously in Moscow.

^{page 207 note 4} “Hilferding über den ‘Sinn des Krieges’”, in: Die Welt: Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Arbeiterbewegung, No. 6 (Feb. 9, 1940), pp. 135–37.Google Scholar

^{page 208 note 1} For the mutual recriminations and petty squabbling to which the émigré left had descended by 1940, see Copy of letter by Jacob [Walcher] to Münzenberg, Apr. 13, 1940; Letter by Münzenberg to Jacob [Walcher], Apr. 16, 1940; and Copy of letter by Münzenberg and Oettinghaus to Paul Bernard, Apr. 19, 1940, Hertz archive, IISG, Amsterdam.

^{page 208 note 2} “Ein Jahr vergeblichen Kampfes”, in: Zukunft, II (Oct. 13, 1939), p. 5Google Scholar, and “Frieden, Freiheit, Sozialismus”, Ibid., Ill (Dec. 15, 1939), p. 1.

^{page 208 note 3} Kersten, (pp. 495–99)Google Scholar investigated the death and found that the few existing records had been destroyed by the French authorities in 1950. Kersten, quite rightly, discounts the possibility of suicide. This leaves two likely alternative explanations: murder by the Gestapo or by the NKVD. A recent journalistic account based in part on first-hand investigation underlines the mystery surrounding Münzenberg's death. See Schleimann, Jorgen, “The Life and Work of Willy Münzenberg”, in: Survey, No. 55 (04, 1965), pp. 86–90.Google Scholar

^{page 209 note 1} During his activity in Germany Münzenberg at times acted contrary to the official KPD or Comintern line which, at the same time, he supported publicly. Thus, for instance, he sided with Heinz Neumann in the leadership struggle which ensued after the breakup of the Thälmann-Neumann-Remmele triumvirate in 1931 and attempted to help divert the energies of the party from a sterile attack on the SPD to a full-scale campaign against the Nazis. Matthias, Erich and Morsey, Rudolf (eds.), Das Ende der Parteien 1933 (Düsseldorf, 1960), p. 677Google Scholar. This tendency periodically to observe orthodoxy in the breach was not a sign of disloyalty. Münzenberg disagreed with certain tactics of the KPD and the Comintern but never so seriously as to go into opposition. The nature of his work as propagandist made it possible for him to stretch orthodoxy but there is no evidence that before 1933 he was inclined to disavow it.