¹ The literature dealing with contemporary unemployment insurance and the role of this programme in the welfare state is extensive. See, for example, Blaustein, S.J. and Craig, I., An International Review of Unemployment Insurance Schemes (Kalamazoo, 1977)Google Scholar; Calceon, F., Eeckhoudt, L. and Greiner, D., “Unemployment Insurance, Social Protection and Employment Policy: An International Comparison”, International Social Security Review, 15 (1988), pp. 119–134CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ILO, Social Security for the Unemployed (Geneva, 1976)Google Scholar; Schmid, G., Reissert, B. and Bruche, G., Unemployment Insurance and Active Labour Market Policy (Detroit, 1992)Google Scholar.

² Alber, J., “Government Responses to the Challenge of Unemployment: The Development of Unemployment Insurance in Western Europe”, in Flora, P. and Heidenheimer, A. (eds), The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, 1981), pp. 151–183Google Scholar. For other studies that describe the role of labour movements in policy debates over unemployment insurance, see Heclo, H., Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New Haven, 1974)Google Scholar; Pal, L.A., State, Class, and Bureaucracy (Kingston, 1987)Google Scholar; Nelson, D., Unemployment Insurance: The American Experience 1915–1935 (Madison, 1989)Google Scholar; Weisbrod, B., “The Crisis of German Unemployment Insurance in 1928/1929 and its Political Repercussions”, in Mommsen, W.J. and Mock, W. (eds), The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany (London, 1981), pp. 188–204Google Scholar; Therborn, G., The Working Class and the Welfare State, paper presented to the 5th Nordic Congress of Research in the History of the Labour Movement, Murikka, 1983Google Scholar; Vanthemsche, G., “Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium”, International Review of Social History, 35 (1990), pp. 349–376CrossRefGoogle Scholar. These findings dovetail nicely with a fundamental claim of one of the dominant approaches to analysis of the welfare state, the “social-democratic” or “power-resources” approach, which posits that labour movements were early and forceful advocates of state involvement in social protection and that universalistic, decommodifying welfare states catering to a wide variety of social needs emerged in societies in which the working class was large, well organized and united in trade unions and social-democratic political parties. For good critical overviews of this approach, see Esping-Anderscn, G. and van Kersbergen, K., “Contemporary Research on Social Democracy”, Annual Review of Sociology, 18 (1992), pp. 187–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pierson, C., Beyond the Welfare State (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 24–39Google Scholar; Shalev, M., “The Social Democratic Model and Beyond”, Comparative Social Research, 6 (1983), pp. 315–351Google Scholar. For a more biting critique of this approach to historical analysis, see Baldwin, P., “The Scandinavian Origins of the Social Interpretation of the Welfare State”, Comparative Studies of History and Society, 31 (1989), pp. 3–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ For an examination of assistance to the unemployed in the pre-state period, see Schindler, R., “Unemployment Assistance During the Period of the Yishuv: Philanthropy, Productivity and Mutual Aid”, Journal of Jewish Community Service, 52 (1977), pp. 356–361Google Scholar. An unpublished thesis on the Histadrut's efforts to deal with unemployment during this period was written by Rosenthal, E., “Hoser Avodah-Hitgabshut Emdot, Midinyut U'naase Betnuat Haavodah” (unpublished thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1976)Google Scholar. On the development of UI after the establishment of Israel, see Doron, A. and Kramer, R., The Welfare State in Israel (Boulder, 1991)Google Scholar; Gal, J., “The Development of Unemployment Insurance in Israel”, Social Security, 3 (1994), pp. 117–136Google Scholar; and Shalev, M., Labour and the Political Economy in Israel (Oxford, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ See Pierson, P., “When Effect Becomes Cause”, World Politics, 45 (07 1993), pp. 595–628CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Skocpol, T. and Amenta, E., “States and Social Policies”, Annual Review of Sociology, 12 (1986), pp. 131–157CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This notion has also formed a part of the historical institutionalist approach in comparative politics as defined in Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. (eds), Structuring Politics (Cambridge, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ The notions of sequential approaches to policies and to developments within societies was formulated explicitly by Verba, S., “Sequences and Development”, in Binder, L. et al. (eds), Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, 1971), pp. 283–316Google Scholar. For examples of the use of this explanation, see S. Kuhnle, “The Growth of Social Insurance Programs in Scandinavia: Outside Influences and Internal Forces”, in Flora and Heidenheimer, Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, pp. 125–150; Skocpol, T., Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge, MA, 1992)Google Scholar and idem, “The Limits of the New Deal System and the Roots of Contemporary Welfare Dilemmas”, in Weir, M., Orloff, A.S. and Skocpol, T. (eds), The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, 1988), pp. 293–317Google Scholar.

⁶ See Kiehel, C., Unemployment Insurance in Belgium (New York, 1932)Google Scholar.

⁷ For an analysis of the tramping system, see Hobsbawm, E., Labouring Men (London 1964), pp.34–63Google Scholar and for graphic descriptions of the workings of this system based on personal diaries, See. Burnett, JIdle Hands (London, 1994), pp.111–115Google Scholar.

⁸ The Journeymen Steam-Engine Makers ' Society in Britain was the first union to do so. It was organized in 1824 and from then on provided its members with a travelling allowance, a funeral benefit and compensation in case of accidental disablement in addition to out-of-work pay. In 1850 it joined other organizations to form the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Machinists, Smiths, Millwrights and Patternmakers, which paid out-of-work pay to unemployed members for a period of six months during a labour dispute in 1852. An additional pioneering step in this regard was taken by the foundrymen's union, which introduced a fund for unemployed members in 1831. For more on these and other early union unemployment funds, see Gilson, M.B., Unemployment Insurance in Great Britain (New York, 1931)Google Scholar; Harris, J., Unemployment and Politics (Oxford, 1972), pp. 295–298Google Scholar and Alber, “Government Responses”, p. 152. In the United States, an early attempt to establish an unemployment fund was made by a New York printers' local in 1831 but the idea did not gain much support within the American labour movement.

⁹ See Clasen, J., Paying the Jobless (Aldershot, 1994), p. 52Google Scholar.

¹⁰ For a survey of the development of early UI programmes, see ILO, Unemployment Insurance Schemes (Geneva, 1955)Google Scholar. For an overview of the differences between the policies of the labour movements in different national settings during this period, see Ashford, D.E., The Emergence of the Welfare State (Oxford, 1986), pp. 187–239Google Scholar.

¹¹ Rubinow, While I.M., in his early study of trade union UI, Social Insurance (New York, 1965; 1st pub. 1913)Google Scholar, regarded the funds as merely “a natural function of labour organizations” (p. 457), other observers have emphasized its appeal to new members. For example, in his study of the development of UI in inter-war Belgium, Vanthemsche (“Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium”, p. 361) notes that “the number of union members in Belgium increased markedly from around 610,000 to 907,000 in the short period between 1929 and 1938. There can be no doubt that this increase is explained by the flight of working people to the unemployment funds”. The notion that UI could assist unions in dealing with the wage depressing effect of unemployed workers was expressed openly by the leadership of the German unions. In 1896, the German Trade Union Congress supported the extension of trade union unemployment funds because, among other reasons, it was assumed that they would improve the bargaining positions of the unions by reducing the wage depressing effect of a “reserve army” of workless people: see Clasen, Paying the Jobless, p. 52 and Alber, “Government Responses”, p. 152. In Britain, too, prevention of wage depression was seen as a primary motivation for the introduction of out-of-work benefits by unions. This view was expressed forcefully in , S. and Webb, B., Industrial Democracy (London, 1919), pp. 161–165Google Scholar.

¹² For a discussion of the idea of labour movements establishing a substitute society for their members, see Kasselow, E.M., Trade Unions and Industrial Relations (New York, 1969), pp. 5–28Google Scholar. For an elaboration of the idea of the “ghetto approach” to socialism among European socialists, see Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 24–25Google Scholar.

¹³ In Britain, according to Heclo's figures (Modern Social Politics, p. 68), 13 per cent of the labour force was covered by union unemployment funds during this period. Kiehel (Unemployment Insurance in Belgium, p. 86) notes that no more than 10 per cent of the industrial workers in Belgium were covered by union UI at this time. In most other countries, the coverage was even more limited. In Sweden, for example, only 4 per cent of the labour force was covered (Heclo, Modern Social Politics).

¹⁴ A detailed description of the Swiss efforts to establish municipal programmes and indeed a very early attempt at this in Basle (in 1789) can be found in Spates, T.G. and Rabinovitch, G.S., Unemployment Insurance in Switzerland (New York, 1931), pp. 31–40Google Scholar. References to the St Gallen experiment can also be found in Gilbert, B.B., The Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain (London, 1966), pp. 265–266Google Scholar. The St Gallen programme was compulsory. Two years prior to its adoption, the city of Berne established a voluntary unemployment fund. In later years, similar programmes were set up in Cologne (1896), Leipzig (1906) and in a number of Swiss and French cities. However, due to the voluntary nature of most of these municipal programmes, they generally attracted unskilled workers, who were often unemployed. Moreover, the insured workers were generally the sole source of income for the funds. As a result, the funds rapidly accumulated deficits and were abandoned after a short period.

¹⁵ For detailed descriptions of the workings of the Ghent model, seeGibbon, I.G., Unemployment Insurance (London, 1911), pp.82–107Google Scholar; Kiehel, Unemployment Insurance in Belgium, pp. 88–92 and Vanthemsche, “Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium”, PP. 351–353.

¹⁶ See ILO, Unemployment Insurance Schemes, p. 15.

¹⁷ See Kiehel, Unemployment Insurance in Belgium, pp. 95–97.

¹⁸ In Ghent itself, the affiliated communes were required to provide additional subsidies to the unemployment fund during the 1908–1909 depression and during the years immediately prior to World War I. During this period various changes were incorporated in the programme, most of which increased communal control over the unions or tightened eligibility conditions, such as introducing a mandatory waiting period(ibid., pp. 90–92).

¹⁹ See Alber, “Government Responses”, p. 153; ILO, Unemployment Insurance Schemes, pp. 15–26.

²⁰ The German social-democratic unions began calling for subsidies in the mid-1890s (see Rimlinger, G.V., Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York, 1971), p. 128)Google Scholar. This approach also received the seal of approval of the Second International. At its 1904 congress in Amsterdam, a report by the German expert on social security, Molkenbuhr, urging that insurance against unemployment and other risks be instituted, be paid for out of taxes, and be administered by labour organizations, was approved by a majority of delegates: Cole, G.D.H., Socialist Thought (London, 1956), p. 57Google Scholar. The issue was also a major subject of debate at the 1910 Copenhagen congress. The final resolution included a call Jor “general obligatory insurance”, but, until the adoption of this demand, the congress called for state subsidies for trade union unemployment funds that would “leave the trade union organizations in full autonomy“ (quoted in Therborn, The Working Class and the Welfare State, p. 5). For a detailed study of the Swedish social-democrats in the parliamentary struggle to institute Ghent-style subsidies for trade union unemployment funds, see Heclo, Modern Social Politics, pp. 70–78, 92–105.

²¹ See Ashford, The Emergence of the Welfare State, p. 218; Alber, “Government Responses”, p. 153; and Gilson, Unemployment Insurance, pp. 165–166, 192–193.

²² In contrast to this trend, in a number of countries (among them Finland, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden) laws supporting state subsidies for union funds were adopted in the inter-war period (ILO, Unemployment Insurance Schemes).

²³ Italy (1919), Austria (1920), Soviet Union (1922), Poland (1924), Bulgaria (1925), Germany (1927), Yugoslavia (1927), United States (1935), South Africa (1937), Canada (1940): ibid.

²⁴ For a discussion focused on the reaction of governments and the labour movement to the mass unemployment of the depression years, see Garraty, J.A., “Unemployment During the Great Depression”, Labor History, 17 (1976), pp. 133–159CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ An extreme example of this was the American case, in which Samuel Gompers and the AFL leadership vehemently opposed state-run UI until the beginning of the 1930s, regarding it as a “Utopian dream” and as an attempt by the government to control workers. Though Gompers himself was actively involved in a struggle for out-of-work funds while serving as a young labour activist in the Cigar Makers' Union during the early 1870s, by the second decade of the twentieth century, the American Federation of Labor, under his leadership, had adopted a strongly anti-state unemployment insurance policy. Despite pressure for a change in this policy both by political and social forces outside the AFL and within, the federation maintained its opposition to UI until the early 1930s. Only intense pressure by many of the major affiliated unions at the federation conventions in the first years of the 1930s convinced the AFL executive to change its position in 1932. For more on this process, see Lorwin, L.L., The American Federation of Labor (washington, 1933), pp. 281–297Google Scholar and Nelson, Unemployment Insurance. In Britain, too, the adoption of the 1911 law was supported by a majority of the parliamentary Labour party but rejected by large majorities in subsequent party conferences, see Marwick, “The Labour Party and the Welfare State”, pp. 380–403. Also see Brown, K.D., Labour and Unemployment 1900–1914 (Newton Abbot, 1971), pp. 164–174Google Scholar and Thane, P., “The Working Class and State ‘Welfare’ in Britain, 1880–1914”, The Historical Journal, 27:4 (1984), pp. 87–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In Belgium, also, similar struggles took place within the trade union movement, see Vanthemsche, “Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium”, p. 368–371.

²⁶ See Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, for a discussion and quantitative examination of this claim.

²⁷ In the years of the Weimar Republic in Germany, these issues were the subject of major concern for the unions and their representatives in the SDP (Clasen, Paying the Jobless). These issues were also raised by the trade union federations in the United States and Canada during the debates that immediately preceded the adoption of state UI programmes (Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization, p. 219 and Pal, State, Class, and Bureaucracy, pp. 62–65).

²⁸ For a comparison of the different schemes and a discussion of the adoption of the Ghent system in Sweden, see B. Rothstein, “Labor-Market Institutions and Working-Class Strength”, in Steinmo et al.. Structuring Politics, pp. 33–56.

²⁹ Though it should be noted that this process had in fact begun in the decades prior to World War I due to growing trade links to, and immigration from, Europe: see Gilbar, G.G., “The Growing Economic Involvement of Palestine with the West, 1865–1914”, in Kushner, D. (ed.), Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 188–210Google Scholar.

³⁰ By 1945, the size of the urban and the rural populations was nearly equal (872,090 inhabitants in villages and 825,880 in towns and cities) as compared to an urban population of 264,317 and a rural population of 492,865 in 1922. The number of industrial establishments grew from 1,236 in 1927 to 3,470 in 1942. Imports grew 533 per cent and exports 956 per cent in the period between 1922 and 1944; see Himadeh, S.A., Economic Organization of Palestine (Beirut, 1938), p. 221Google Scholar; Statistical Handbook of Middle Eastern Countries (Jerusalem, 1945), p. 3; Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1944–45 (Jerusalem, 1946), pp. 21 and 63.

³¹ It is worth noting, however, that prior to the mid-1930s and, to a certain degree, during World War II and immediately afterwards, there were fields in which economic links and even trade union cooperation existed. For example, during the mid-1930s, 35 per cent of the employees in Jewish agriculture were Arabs as were 12 per cent of the workforce in construction and 25 per cent in transportation and ports (Kimmerling, B., Zionism and Economy (Cambridge, MA, 1982), p. 50Google Scholar). In addition, in a number of workplaces in which both Jews and Arabs were employed there were cases of joint worker committees and labour struggles: see Lockman, Z., Comrades and Enemies (Berkeley, 1996)Google Scholar.

³² For more on the nature of the Arab economy in Palestine, see Himadeh, Economic Organization of Palestine, pp. 213–300; Horowitz, D. and Hinden, R., Economic Survey of Palestine (Tel Aviv, 1938), pp. 203–214Google Scholar; and Owen, R., “Economic Development in Mandatory Palestine: 1918–1948”, in Abed, G.T. (ed.), The Palestinian Economy (London, 1988), pp. 13–35Google Scholar. On the emerging Arab industrial labour force, see Taqqu, R., “Peasants into Workmen: Internal Labour Migration and the Arab Village Community under the Mandate”, in Migdal, J.S. (ed.), Palestinian Society and Politics (Princeton, 1980), pp. 261–286Google Scholar. On the problematic issue of Arab unemployment see Colonial Office, Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1938 (London, 1939), p. 132Google Scholar and the comment in Bulletin of the Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, II, 3/4 (1938) pp. 42–43. Membership in Arab trade unions at the end of the Mandate was still small. The largest Palestinian Arab Workers' Society claimed 15,000 members and the smaller Federation of Arab Trade Unions claimed 1,500 members, the same as in the Histadrut-organized Palestine Labour League: see Statistical Abstract, p. 132 for statistics and Tamari, S., “Factionalism and Class Formation in Recent Palestinian History” in Owen, R. (ed.), Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Basingstoke, 1986), pp. 177–202Google Scholar.

³³ On Jewish population and occupational distribution, see Statistical Handbook, pp. 3 and 5. For data on the economic structure of the Jewish community in Palestine, see Szereszewski, R., Essays on the Structure of the Jewish Economy in Palestine and Israel (Jerusalem, 1968)Google Scholar.

³⁴ For introductions to the history of Zionism and the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine, see Horowitz, D. and Lissak, M., Origins of the Israeli Polity(Chicago, 1977)Google Scholar and Laqueur, W.Z., A History of Zionism (London, 1972)Google Scholar.

³³ For data on Histadrut membership, see Gertz, A. (ed.) Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine (Jerusalem, 1947), p. 290Google Scholar. For English language studies of the development of the Histadrut and the Jewish labour movement, see Avrech, I. and Giladi, D. (eds), Labour and Society in Israel (Tel Aviv, 1973)Google Scholar; Glatt, J., The Historical Development of Histadrut (Ann Arbor, 1976)Google Scholar; Kurland, J., Cooperative Palestine (New York, 1947)Google Scholar; Muenzner, G., Jewish Labor Economy in Palestine (Jerusalem, 1943)Google Scholar; Preuss, W., The Labour Movement in Israel (Jerusalem, 1965)Google Scholar. For more critical studies of the Histadrut, see Grinberg, L.L., Split Corporatism in Israel (New York, 1991)Google Scholar and Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy in Israel.

³⁶ For studies focused on Mapai, see Medding, P., Mapai in Israel (Cambridge, 1972)Google Scholar and Shapiro, Y., The Formative Years of the Israeli Labour Party (London, 1976)Google Scholar.

³⁷ This issue of Jewish labour in the Jewish economy is dealt with at length in Shapira, A., Hamavak Hanihzav: Avoda Ivrit, 1929–1939 (Tel Aviv, 1977)Google Scholar and in Kimmerling Zionism and Economy.

³⁸ See Halevi, N., Hahitpathut Hakalkalit shel Hayeshuv Hayehudi Beeretz Yisrael 1917–1948 (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 16–18Google Scholar.

³⁹ See Yafo, Moetzet Poalei, Din Veheshbon shel Moetzet Poalei Yafo (Jaffa, 1924), pp. 38–40Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See comments of labour leader David Remez at a meeting with the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem, 17 April 1923, p. 1, Central Zionist Archives.

⁴¹ On the activities of the Histadrut during this period, see Kantor, L., Hazroa Hamiktzoit (Tel Aviv, 1966), pp. 151–152Google Scholar. On the activities of the Jaffa workers' council, see Milshtein, A., Keren Hoser Avoda 1933–1941 (Tel Aviv, 1985), pp. 7–12Google Scholar.

⁴² For more details on the economic aspects of the crisis, see Giladi, D., Hayeshuv Betkufat Haaliya Harevüt (Jerusalem, 1968), pp. 180–197Google Scholar. Details of unemployment in Haifa during this period can be found in De Vries, D., Tnuat Hapoalim Behaifa (Tel Aviv, 1991), p. 333Google Scholar.

⁴³ For more on the privation of unemployed Jewish workers in Tel Aviv and in Haifa, see Yafo, Moetzet Poalei, Din Veheshbon Mipeilut Moetzet Poalei Yafo (Jaffa, 1927), pp. 125–142Google Scholar, and De Vries, Tnuat Hapoalim Behaifa, pp. 336–341. These descriptions were also confirmed by the Mandatory authorities who noted in December 1927 that “many of the people in Tel Aviv are very near starvation” and that “many of the Tel Aviv men are becoming physically unemployable” (quoted from letter from H.C. Plumer to Colonial Office, Public Records Office, CO 733 140/2).

⁴⁴ For details on the levels of emigration, see Braslavski, M., Tnuat Hapolaim Haeretz Yisraelit, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1956), p. 34Google Scholar. A resolution expressing the labour movement's view regarding the possible implications of the crisis was approved by the Histadrut general council in 1927. The council warned that the situation was liable to lead to the “collapse of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine” and to “the intervention of the government and a decision to force the Jews to leave the country”, quoted in Kantoor, Hazroa Hamiktzoit, p. 160. Justification for these fears can be found in a confidential dispatch sent by Lord Plumer to the Colonial Office in London in December 1927 in which Plumer wrote that in order to deal with unemployment, alongside the dole and relief work, “there is only one practical remedy and that is to further by every possible means emigration from Palestine o f the surplus Jewish population and for this the Palestine Government and the Zionist Executive must work in co-operation” (Public Records Office CO, 733/14, p. 4).

⁴⁵ The Jaffa workers' council reported that it managed to create 44,400 workdays during 1925 through these efforts (Moetzet Poalei Yafo, Din Veheshbon, p. 132). With regard to the bakers' union, the system of job substitution was apparently common among bakers in Poland, from which the founders of the Palestine union came. Despite the immense difficulties involved in maintaining this system over time, the local bakers' unions in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem and other cities managed to implement job substitution among members until the end of the 1930s. For details of this system, see “Ezra Lemehousarei Haavoda bein Poalei Haafia”, Davar, 5 April 1931, p. 3; Yerushalaim, Moetzet Poalei, Din Veheshbon 1929–1932 (Jerusalem, 1932), pp. 54–56Google Scholar; Haifa, Moetzet Poalei, Hahistadrut Behaifa (Haifa, 1939), pp. 147–150Google Scholar; Aviv-Yafo, Agudat Poalei Haafia Tel, Skira Mipeulot Vaad Haguda Mertz 1943- August 1944 (Tel Aviv, 1944), pp. 3–4Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ See Moetzet Poalei Yafo, Din Veheshbon, p. 132; Kantoor, Hazroa Hamiktzoit, p. 162; De Vries, Tnuat Hapoalim, p. 353.

⁴⁷ See minutes of the WZO executive in Palestine, 2 0 October 1926, pp. 1–4, Central Zionist Archives.

⁴⁸ See Schindler, “Unemployment Assistance”, pp. 356–361. For data on the number of assistance recipients, see Mispar Mekablei Siua Behodashim Yuly, August–September 1927, Central Zionist Archives, S9 1871b.

⁴⁹ See, for example, a letter sent by the Jaffa workers' council to the WZO executive in March 1927 which demanded a raise in the assistance level: “Hureds and thousands of our members are degenerating. Over time everyone needs to fix his clothes or buy new shoes, and to pay the rent, even it is only a few prutot. The existing assistance level, which is not sufficient for even limited needs, obviously does not allow our members to take care of these additional elementary needs”: Central Zionist Archives, S9 1789b/2. See also De Vries, Tnuat Hapoalim, pp. 353–361. For the view of the Zionist Executive leadership of these efforts see Kisch, F.H., Palestine Diary (London, 1938), pp. 229–230Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ A.D. Gordon, one of the ideologues of the labour movement, wrote: “[…] from now on our primary ideal should be work […] Labour should take its place as the focus of our aspirations, it should serve as the foundation of our building. If only we can discover the idea of labour, we can be healed from our affliction, and bridge the gap that has separated us from nature”: see Gordon, A.D., The Nation and Labour (Jerusalem, 1952), p. 137Google Scholar. See Shapiro, B.Z., Social Welfare Policy in Israel: An Ideological Analysis (Jerusalem, 1972)Google Scholar for a discussion of this ideological approach to work. This period has been termed “one of the darkest and depressing periods in the history of the labour movement in Palestine”: see Even-Shoshan, D., Toldot Tnuat Hapoalim Beeretz Yisrael (Tel Aviv, 1966), p. 131Google Scholar.

⁵¹ See Gurion, D. Ben, “Lemilhama Behoser Avodah”, Kontras (1927), pp. 7–14Google Scholar.

⁵² On efforts by the WZ O to gain government support for relief work rather than its assistance programme, see Memorandum submitted to His Excellency the High Commissioner by the Palestine Zionist Executive (22 February 1927): Public Records Office, CO 733 / 140/2. For details of the activities of the WZ O in the employment sphere, see Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization (submitted to the 16th Zionist Congress, 28 July 7 August 1929), pp. 193–200.

⁵³ See Giladi, Hayeshuv Betkufat, p. 197.

⁵⁴ See Milshtein, Keren Hoser Avoda, pp. 7–8.

⁵⁵ See minutes of the executive bureau (va'ad hapoel) of the Histadrut, 4 October 1923 and 15 October 1923, pp. 218–219 and 228–229. A similar proposal was also raised during a Histadrut council in July 1926 but it had no impact.

⁵⁶ See minutes of the Histadrut council, 7–10 January 1929, pp. 33 and 70.

³⁷ See minutes o f the committee for proposals for an unemployment insurance fund, 21 January 1929 and n. d, Labour Archives, IV–231–1.

⁵⁸ See Kanevsky, Y., Habituah Hosoziali Deretz Yisrael (Tel Aviv, 1942), p. 76Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ See a report in the Haaretz newspaper, 1 September 1930 and the minutes of a meeting between the Gan Haim owner's representative and the pickers, 2 2 August 1932, Labour Archives, IV–235–3–43. On the second grove, see a letter sent by the pickers to the Histadrut's agricultural department, 2 2 July 1931, asking for advice on whether to demand the establishment of a UI fund, Labour Archives, IV–235–3–14 7 and a report in the Davar newspaper (2 February 1932) reporting on the existence of the fund. The funds were based on joint worker and employer contributions (4 per cent of wages by both sides). The funds existed for a number of years, but most of the money accumulated was not required. As a result, they were eventually converted to loan funds that enabled the pickers to establish agricultural settlements and buy land in the vicinity of the groves.

⁶⁰ See minutes of the unemployment insurance committee, Labour Archives, IV–208–333a.

⁶¹ The data on the distribution of Histadrut membership is based on the Histadrut statistical publication, Sikumim, 3 (1931), p. 3. Ben Gurion was particularly apprehensive regarding the implications of the fund upon membership. Upon hearing of the committee's proposals, he suggested that membership be both local and voluntary: see Ben Gurion's personal diary, 25 03 1932, p. 78, The Ben Gurion Archives.

⁶² See the speech by M. Namirovsky (Namir) and the debate that followed at the Histadrut council, 04 1926, pp. 1–59. For an analysis of this debate see Rosenthal, “Hoser Avodah”, pp. 57–63.

⁶³ For more details see Kanevski, Habituah Hasoziali, pp. 76–77. The value of a Palestine pound was equivalent to that of British pound.

⁶⁴ For details of the activities of the unemployment fund during this period, see Kanevsky, Y., Kerern HoserAvoda (Tel Aviv, 1933)Google Scholar and Sikum Peulot Keren Hoser Avoda, 15 July 1936, Labour Archives, IV–231–10. See also letters sent from the fund administrator, Yitzhak Finkelstein, to the Histadrut executive bureau dated 16 March 1933 (Labour Archives, IV–208–1–637) and a letter sent to the agricultural settlements by Finkelstein dated 28 August 1933 (Labour Archives, IV–231–3). For a personal account of the activities during this period see the autobiography by Eylam, Y. (Finkelstein), Benetivei Maase (Tel Aviv, 1974), pp. 12–17Google Scholar. See also the account o f this period in the biography of David Remez, the second secretary-general of the Histadrut (1935–1945), in Erez, S., Tkufa Ahat (Tel Aviv, 1967), pp. 176–186Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ See Halevi, Hahitpathut Hakalkalit, pp. 34–36 and Gross, N.T. and Metzer, J., “Palestine in World War II: Some Economic Aspects”, in Mills, G. T. and Rockoff, H. (eds), The Sinews of War (Ames, 1993), pp. 59–82Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Taqqu, R. L., “Arab Labor in Mandatory Palestine 1920–1948” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1977), p. 162Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ For a discussion of unemployment during this period, see Grinberg, Split Corporatism, p. 44. For details o f unemployment among Histadrut members, see Preuss, W., “Tnuat Haavtala Beshnot 1936–1940”, in Netel Mirazon (Tel Aviv, 1941), pp. 39–49Google Scholar. For personal accounts of the hardship faced by working-class families in Tel Aviv, see letters sent to the workers' council seeking work and assistance, such as the following sent by Meir Epshtein in December 1937: “[…] We are penniless. We are being evicted from our room and have nowhere to go. I haven't paid rent for five months. The shopkeepers come daily and demand our debts that are now 16 pounds. What must I do ? My son is hungry and we have no bread at home. He will stop going to school because his shoes are torn and I cannot buy him new ones. He suffers from a heart ailment and he requires medication frequently. Since August 19361 have worked less than four months. My situation is desperate and I ask you: visit us and see how bad our situation is. Save a family from starvation” (Labour Archives, IV–250–72–1–358).

⁶⁸ For a detailed review of the activities of the unemployment fund during this period, see Kanev, Habituah Hasoziali, pp. 83–92.

⁶⁹ Information on these activities can be found in a report in the fund's files in the Labour Archives, IV–208–1–2057, and in Kanev, Habituah Hasoziali, pp. 93–103.

⁷⁰ The figures on the distribution of the unemployment fund's resources are taken from ibid., p. 107. With regard to the return of loans, see Jerusalem, Mishan, Din Veheshbon MipeulotHaaguda MeApril 1936 – August 1937 (Jerusalem, 1937)Google Scholar. Kanev reports that the percentages varied from a high of nearly 30 per cent in Jerusalem and rural towns to a low of 8 per cent in Tel Aviv and 6.6 per cent in Haifa (p. 95). A report sent to the Jewish Agency in 1942 found that 13 per cent of the money distributed as loans to individuals during the 1935–1941 period was actually paid back: see Central Zionist Archives, S9 1077. This report followed an agreement signed by representatives of the unemployment fund and the Jewish Agency in July 1941 to make a joint concentrated effort to recoup the loans and divide the sum recovered between them (Central Zionist Archives, S9 1069).

⁷¹ For information on Mishan, see Aviv, Moetzet Paolei Tel, Mishan (Tel Aviv, 1937)Google Scholar. For descriptions of the eligibility conditions for loan applicants, see a report on the activities of Mishan in Tel Aviv between 1 October 1939 and 1 April 1940 (Labour Archives, IV 251–3), reports on the activities of Mishan in Jerusalem (Labour Archives, IV–208–2158) and Rehovot submitted to the Jewish Agency (Central Zionist Archives, S9 1077), and a letter sent to the Jewish Agency (dated 24 April 1938) from the secretary of the workers' council in Tel Aviv (Central Zionist Archives, S9 1078a).

⁷² The monthly benefits granted to a family o f four were 1.600 PP (report on Mishan activities in Tel Aviv, 1 October 1939–1 April 1940, Labour Archives, IV–251–3). The average monthly expenditure of a family of four in 1939 was 10.653 PP and the daily wage of an unskilled labourer in the construction trade was 0.315 PP (Gertz, Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, pp. 298 and 318).

⁷³ See report by social workers to the Mishan offices in Tel Aviv dated 12 January 1941 (Labour Archives, IV–251–9).

⁷⁴ On the modest beginnings of the Jewish Agency's subsidies, see letter to E. Kaplan from Y. Rabinovitz, 24 July 1936 (Central Zionist Archives, S9 1078). On the total public subsidies to the fund, see Kanev, Habituah Hasoziali, pp. 104–108.

⁷³ See Reports of the Executives of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (submitted to the 22nd Zionist Congress, December 1946), Table 38.

⁷⁶ See minutes of the WZO executive, 6 November 1938, Central Zionist Archives.

⁷⁷ See minutes of the unemployment fund board of directors, 30 May 1938,24 September 1939,4 December 1939 (Labour Archives, IV–208–1) and letter sent by the Mishan board of directors to the Histadrut threatening to resign if funds were not transferred, 14 March 1940 (Labour Archives, IV–208–1–2187).

⁷⁸ For evidence of the unrest among the unemployed, see a report on a public meeting of unemployed in the Davar newspaper, 27 March 1941, the views expressed in the opposition journal Bamifneh, 19 November 37 and an essay by Petrozeili, Y. in Bamishan (Tel Aviv, 1937)Google Scholar. For details on the formation of the left-wing opposition within Mapai, see Ishai, Y., Siatiyut Betnuat Haavoda (Tel Aviv, 1978), pp. 126–156Google Scholar; Merhav, P., The Israeli Left (San Diego, 1980), pp. 102–111Google Scholar; Shapira, A., Bed (Tel Aviv, 1980), pp. 496–503Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Evidence of the reluctance of the higher-income members to participate in the funding of the unemployment activities can be found in the drop in donations to the fund-raising campaigns, as shown in Kanev, Habituah Hasoziali, p. 106 and reflected in speeches by Golda Meir, who headed the fourth fund-raising campaign, see Meir, G., Bedegcl Haavodah (Tel Aviv, 1972), pp. 51–59Google Scholar. Also see Sternhell, Z., Binyan Uma o Tikun Hevrati (Tel Aviv, 1995), pp. 386–399Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ See Meir, Bedegel Haavodah, p. 52.

⁸¹ See Department of Labour, Annual Report for 1945 (Jerusalem, 1946), p. 20Google Scholar and minutes of meeting of the mutual aid department of the Histadrut, 13 June 1943, Labour Archives, IV–407–1–443.

⁸¹ The Histadrut proposal was included in a document entitled “Memorandum submitted to the director of department of labour of the Palestine government”, 31 December 1945, quoted in Doron and Kramer, The Welfare State, p. 146. For the proposal for the social insurance system in Israel, see Kanevsky, Y., “Tochnit Lebituach Soziali Bemedinat Yisrael”, Hikrei Avodah, 1–2 (1948)Google Scholar. For an earlier proposal that included the Ghent-style system of UI, see Kanevsky, Y., “Tochniteinu Bebituah Soziali”, Ahdut Haavodah, vol. 4 (Tel Aviv, 1946)Google Scholar.

⁸³ See minutes of the committee on social welfare, 24 November 1943 and 13 December 1943 (Labour Archives, IV–104–226–7 and IV–407–1–443) and letter from Dr A. Shmork to E. Kaplan, 28 December 1942 and report on the UI proposal, 3 March 1943 (Central Zionist Archives, S9 1037).

⁸⁴ On the guidelines of the first elected government, see the Prime Minister's statement in the parliament in Divrei Haknesset, vol. 1, 8 March 1949, p. 56. On the goals of the Kanev committee and its recommendations, see Tochnit Lebituach Soziali Beyisrael (Tel Aviv, 1950). After the first stage of the National Insurance Law was passed, the Histadrut general-secretary Mordechai Namir stated that the Histadrut sought to ensure that in the future the law be widened to include among other things, insurance against unemployment (minutes of the executive bureau, 26 November 1953).

⁸³ See report on activities of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, April– June 1949, State Archives, 5444/1639. For more details on unemployment during this period and the problematic nature of the data, see Hovne, A., The Labor Force in Israel (Jerusalem, 1961)Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ Among the supporters of UI were Walter Preuss, who headed the Histadrut's statistical department (Preuss, W., “Bitachon Soziali VeBituach Avtalah Bcmedinat Yisrael”, Hikrci Avodah, 1–2 (1948), pp. 108–115Google Scholar), Giora Lotan, who served as the director-general of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and later was the first head of the National Insurance Institute (Lotan, G., “Bituah Avtalah”, Yarhon Haavoda, 1 (1951), pp. 1–3Google Scholar) and a number of members of parliament from the communist party and the left-wing Mapam.

⁸⁷ See minutes of the Kanev committee, 14 August 1949, National Insurance Institute Archive, 14–2, 1–2. Ronen's reservations were published in Tochnit Lebituach, pp. 40–41. See also Kanev's report to the government in the minutes of the government meeting, 17 May 1950, pp. 20–41, State Archives.

⁸⁸ Kaplan had been actively involved in previous discussions regarding UI. Like Namir, he was a member of the committee established to examine the various UI proposals in 1931. He was an active participant in the executive bureau debate on the viability of the idea and he was, of course, very much involved in decisions regarding subsidies for the unemployment fund as Jewish Agency Treasurer. In most of these discussions, Kaplan had expressed serious reservations regarding the expense entailed in the project and in late 1938 had sought to end Jewish Agency support for Mishan.

⁸⁹ Not surprisingly perhaps, Namir was appointed Minister of Labour a few years later.

⁹⁰ See Tochnit Lebituach, p. 81.

⁹¹ In 1954, of the new immigrants from Arab countries, 27.4 per cent were employed in agriculture and an additional 23 per cent were unskilled workers in industry (Lissak, M., Social Mobility in Israel Society (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 18Google Scholar). For data on unemployment among the immigrants, see Patinkin, D., “The Israel Economy: The First Decade”, in the Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, Fourth Report 1957 and 1958 (Jerusalem, 1959), p. 36Google Scholar.

⁹² For a study of the dominant perception of the new immigrants by the Mapai leadership, see Segev, T., 1949, Hyisraelim Hrishonim (Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 105–187Google Scholar. For a more theoretical discussion of this issue, see Bernstein, D., “Immigrants and Society – a Critical View of the Dominant School of Israeli Sociology”, British Journal of Sociology, 31:2, (1980), pp. 246–264CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹³ For an explanation of the educational goals of the workfare programme, see an editorial dealing with the government employment policy in Yarhon Haavodah Vebituah Leumi, 4, 31 (1952), pp. 1–3.

⁹⁴ See Patinkin, “The Israel Economy”, pp. 30–31.

⁹⁵ One well publicized case occurred in the city of Petah Tikva in mid-May 1950 when workers' council and labour exchange activists prevented new immigrants in a nearby camp from leaving for work because they were willing to work for very low wages, while hundreds of veteran workers were unable to find employment: see reports in the Al Hamishmar, Davar, Maariv and Jerusalem Post newspapers, 17 May 1950.

⁹⁶ During the 1949–1950 period, the issue of new immigrant unemployment was not discussed at all in the meeting of the Histadrut secretariat (vaada merakezet), the central decision-making body, and only once in the executive bureau. In that discussion, the option of UI was not raised, but the possibility of renewed assistance was described as a threat to be avoided at any cost: see minutes of the executive bureau, 16 March 1949, pp. 1–18.

⁹⁷ For an examination of the political role of the labour exchanges and of Kupat Holim, see Medding, P. Y., The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948–1967 (New York, 1990), pp. 152–156, 166–171Google Scholar. For more on the role of the labour exchanges, see Rosenhak, Z., “Mekoroteiha Vehitpathuta Shel Medinat Revahah Dualit” (Ph.D. dissertation, Jerusalem University, 1995), pp. 73–82Google Scholar. For more on the Histadrut and Kupat Holim, see Yanay, U., “Service Delivery by a Trade Union: Does it Pay?”, Journal of Social Policy, 19, 2 (1990) pp. 221–234CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The figures on Histadrut membership are from Y. Slutzki, “The Histadrut -Its History, Structure and Principles”, in Avreh and Giladi, Labor and Society, p. 14.

⁹⁸ Data on the workfare programme are based upon figures published in the Ministry of Labour journal, Avoda Vebituah Leumi, 8,154 (1962) and upon figures provided to a public committee on unemployment insurance which convened in Jerusalem in May 1970.

⁹⁹ For a detailed discussion of developments surrounding the adoption of the law and subsequent changes made in it, see Gal, “The Development of Unemployment Insurance”.

¹⁰⁰ This a central claim in Rothstein's analysis of the development of the Swedish unemployment insurance system (“Labor-market institutions”).

¹⁰¹ See King, D., Actively Seeking Work? (Chicago, 1995)Google Scholar; Rothstein, B., “Labor-market institutions”; and Weir, M., Politics and Jobs (Princeton, 1992)Google Scholar.

¹⁰² See Heclo, Modern Social Politics, and Pierson, P., Dismantling the Welfare State? (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 41–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For further discussion of this point, see Hall, P.A., “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State”, Comparative Politics, 25, 3 (1993), pp. 275–296CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰³ Interestingly enough, claims to this effect have been made by individuals closely involved in the implementation of unemployment policies in Israel during this period but they have not received sufficient scholarly attention. Thus, in his autobiography, Yitshak Eylam termed the unemployment fund a “laboratory” upon which the policies of the Ministry of Labour were later to be based: see Eylam, Benitivei Maase, p. 16. Giora Lotan, the director-general of the National Insurance Institute and, during the Mandatory period, the person responsible for the distribution of subsidies to Mishan and the unemployment fund, also linked the opposition of the Mapai leadership to UI to the traumas of the unemployment fund period: see Lotan, G., Income Maintenance Activities of the Histadrut: Their Delimitation with Government Programs (Jerusalem, 1970), p. 189Google Scholar.