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Russian “Official Antisemitism” Reconsidered: Socio-Economic Aspects of Tsarist Jewish Policy, 1881–1905

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 February 2009

Daniel Gutwein
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The respective Jewish policies of Tsarist ministers Witte and Plehve are re-examined through the perspective of their opposing socio-economic policies. The two ministers' rivalry over Jewish policy is considered not to be a reflection of “antisemitic” or “pro-Jewish” sympathies, as that would leave major elements of these policies unexplained; rather, analysis shows it to be a means in their struggle to gain supremacy for their own respective policies regarding the nature and pace of Russia's industrialization. The Russian policy-makers perceived the Jews not only as a religious group; they saw them as a non-monolithic economic entity, and differentiated among the various strata of Jewish society in accordance with the respective influence of each stratum's economic activities on Russian society and economy. Accordingly, the two ministers formulated opposing differential Jewish policies to fit their respective all-Russian socio-economic policies.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of Social History , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , August 1994 , pp. 197 - 221
Copyright
Copyright © Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis 1994

References

1 See the considerable attention paid to this issue in Dubnow, S., History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, 3 vols (Philadelphia, 1920)Google Scholar; Greenberg, L., The Jews in Russia, 2 vols in one (New York, 1976)Google Scholar; Loewe, H. D., Antisemitismus und Reakionäre Utopie Russischer Konservatismus im Kampf gegen den Wandel von Staat und Gesellschaft, 1890–1917 (Hamburg, 1978)Google Scholar. Also: Etinger, S., “Ha'yesodot Veha'megamot Beitsuv Mediniyuto Shel Ha'shilton Ha'rusi Klapey Ha'yehudim im Khalukat Polin”, Ha'avar, 19 (1972), pp. 20–34Google Scholar; Etinger, , “Takanot 1804”, Ha'avar, 22 (1977), pp. 87–110Google Scholar. For the years 1881–1917, see Aronson, M., Troubled Waters: The Origin of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia (Pittsburgh, 1990), pp. 44–192Google Scholar; Goldenweiser, A., “Legal Status of Jews in Russia”, in Frumkin, J., Aronson, G. and Goldinweiser, A. (eds), Russian Jewry (1860–1917) (New York, 1966), pp. 85–109Google Scholar; Klier, J. D. and Lambroza, S., Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 3–289Google Scholar; Rogger, H., Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986), pp. 1–187CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 On the ideological interpretation and its limitations see Rogger, “The Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism: A Reappraisal”, in ibid., pp. 25–39 (will be referred to as Rogger, “Reappraisal”); Rogger, “Russian Ministers and the Jewish Question 1881–1917”, in ibid., pp. 56–112 (will be referred to as Rogger, “Ministers”).

3 See, for instance, Dubnow, History of the Jews, III, pp. 16–17, 67–97, 107–108, 125–127; Greenberg, The Jews in Russia, II, pp. 48–52, 103–107; Baron, S. W., The Russian Jew Under Tsars and Soviets (New York, 1976), pp. 56Google Scholar, 137–138, 369.

4 See Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 109–112; this is the perspective which informs Rogger, “Government, Jews, Peasant and Land After the Liberation of the Serfs”, in Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, pp. 113–175 (will be referred to as Rogger, “Peasants”).

5 Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 78; and cf. Rogger, H., Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution, 1881–1917 (London and New York, 1983), pp. 33–34Google Scholar (will be referred to as Rogger, Modernisation). Loewe is of the same opinion: “The Ministry of Finance pursued a course of rapid industrialization. At the same time it was consistently more favourable towards Jews than any other government agency, and it advocated a gradual relaxation of anti-Jewish regulations. The Ministry of Interior tried to block a development along capitalistic lines, or at least to slow down this process, and it was more often than not a proponent of anti-Jewish measures. The bitterness of the conflict between Witte and Plehve has to be seen in this light”, Loewe, Antisemitismus, p. 294. And Loewe sums up: “Pleves Antisemitismus muss daher als ein integraler Bestandteil seiner politischen Weltanschauung, seiner antikapitalistischen Grundeinstellurig gesehen werden. Seine Politik wurde durch eine halbfeudale, agrarische Art von Staatsräson bestimmt, wahrend Vitte eine moderne kapitalistiche Staatsräson vertrat, die in lezter konsequenzzu bügerlichen Regierungsformen hin tendierte”, ibid., p. 57.

6 Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 78.

7 See the 1903 confrontation between Witte and Plehve over a request by a Jewish mutual aid association to open a workhouse for indigent Jews in Vilna. Rogger emphasizes that “There were matters at issue here – the police-sponsored unions of Sergei Zubatov (including the Independent Jewish Workers' Party of Vilna), whether association of mutual aid should be allowed, which ministry should supervise them – that did not necessarily bear on the Jewish question, but it was against its background that both sides stated their positions in the debate.”, Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 78–79; see, also, Judge, E. H., Plehve (New York, 1983), pp. 131–149Google Scholar; von Laue, T. H., Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1969), pp. 251–252Google Scholar; Mishkinski, M., “Ha'sozialism Ha'mishtarti' Umegamot Bemediniyut Ha'shilton Ha'tsari Legabei Hayehudim (1900–1903)”, Zion, 25 (1960), pp. 238–249Google Scholar.

8 Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 78.

9 Rogger, “Reappraisal”, p. 25.

10 See Rogger, “Peasants”, and also, Aronson, I. M., Russian Bureaucratic Attitudes toward Jews, 1881–1894, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Northwestern University, 1973), pp. 141–273Google Scholar.

11 Loewe argues that “In der Welt Pleves war kein Plate für die Juden”, Loewe, Antbemitismus, p. 57.

12 See, for instance, Maor, Y., “Yehudey Rusia Betkufat Pleve”, Ha'avar, 1 (1958), pp. 38–40Google Scholar, 43, 47–48; Judge, Plehve, pp. 93–101, 104–109.

13 For Plehve's biography see Judge, Plehve, pp. 12–37.

14 The proof of Plehve's antisemitism during his “bureaucratic” period is of three types: 1) justifications for the restrictions imposed on the Jews as a result of their involvement in revolutionary politics; 2) Plehve's own involvement in the formulation of anti-Jewish legislation during the 1880s and his leadership in the early 1890s of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to make the May Laws more rigorous; 3) responsibility for the pogroms of the 1880s. Save for his uncontested expressions of support for anti-Jewish restrictions, the other evidences are problematic. The principal source for Plehve's reputed responsibility for the pogroms of the 1880s is Witte's memoirs, the credibility of which is clearly questionable particularly when they concern Plehve, Witte's main rival. On Plehve and the pogroms see: Maor, “Jews under Plehve”, pp. 38–39; Judge, Plehve, p. 94; on the way Plehve is handled in Witte's memoirs see: Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 78; Feldman, A., “Pleve Veha'pogrom Bekishinev be–1903”, Ha'avar, 17 (1970), pp. 140–145Google Scholar. The information regarding Plehve's efforts to extend anti-Jewish legislation in the 1890s is based on Plehve's own admission, on rumors that were spread, and on attempts by other ministers to obstruct such prospected legislation. No archival material exists, however, on this issue. See Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 69–70, 74–76; Rogger, “Peasants”, pp. 153–154; Judge, Plehve, pp. 23, 25, 94; Aronson, Russian Bureaucratic Attitudes toward Jews, p. 61.

15 Maor, “Jews under Plehve”, p. 43.

16 See, for instance, Greenberg, The Jews in Russia, II, pp. 50–52; Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, III, pp. 67–77; Maor, “Jews under Plehve”, pp. 43–51.

17 Feldman, “Plehve and the Kishinev Pogrom”, p. 137.

18 Rogger, “Reappraisal”, p. 31; Rogger, Modernisation, p. 205. Cf. “Die Behauptung Pleve habe ihn selbst organisiert, ist weder beweisbar noch wahrscheinlich. Warum solte Pleve sich die Finger schmutzig machen, wo es doch andere gab, die seine Wünsche als Befehle auffassten?”, Loewe, Antisemitismus, p. 65; see also pp. 57–68.

19 Judge, E. H., Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom (New York, 1992), pp. 125–133Google Scholar; Judge, Plehve, pp. 98–101; Lambroza, S., “Plehve, Kishinev and the Jewish Question: A Reappraisal”, Nationalities Papers, 23 (1981), pp. 117–127Google Scholar; cf. Klier and Lambroza, Pogroms, pp. 203–204.

20 For Plehve's interview with Herzl, see Th. Herzl, The Diary, III (Herzl's Collected Writings, IV) (Tel-Aviv, 1960), pp. 315–319; 323–328; for Plehve's interview with Lucien Wolf, see The Jewish Chronicle, London, 12 February 1904.

21 In describing the meeting between Plehve and Herzl, Rogger notes that Plehve remarked: “the ultimate goal for the Jews was assimilation”, Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 80. However, it should b e emphasized that Plehve's comments make it clear that his intention was t o a civil integration based o n political loyalty to the tsarist regime rather than cultural assimilation: see Herzl, The Diary, III, p. 324.

22 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 78–79.

23 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 79–80; Rogger, “Peasants”, pp. 158–159.

24 Judge, Plehve, p. 106.

25 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 79–82; Judge, Plehve, p. 109.

26 Compare to Szajkowski, Z., “Paul Nathan, Lucien Wolf, Jacob H. Schiff and the Jewish Revolutionary Movement in Eastern Europe”, Jewish Social Studies, XXIX (1967), pp. 3–26Google Scholar, 75–91.

27 Loewe considers this statement as “Handel mit Menschenrechten”, Loewe, Antisemitismus, p. 56.

28 Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 82; Rogger, “Peasants”, p. 159; Judge, Plehve, p. 109.

29 Mishkinski, “State Socialism”, pp. 246–247; Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 79.

30 For Witte's political biography, see Von Laue, Sergei Witte', Mehlinger, H. D. and Thompson, J. M., Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution (Bloomington, 1972)Google Scholar. In evaluating Witte's Jewish policy allowance should also be made for the traditional Jewish policy of the Finance Ministry: “In der Judenfrage hatte das Finanzministerium immer schon eine liberale Haltung eingenommen. Vittes unmittelbare VorgSnger Bunge und Vysnegradskij verhinderten durch Intervention beim Kaiser von Ignatev und Pleve geplante VerschSrfungen der restriktiven Judengesetzgebung”, Loewe, Antisemitismus, pp. 43–44.

31 Feldman, A., “Ha'minshar Miyom 17.10.1905, Ha'rosen Vite Vesheelat Ha'yehudim Berusia”, in Yavin, A. (ed.), Sefer Raphael Mahler (Merchavia, 1974), pp. 122–124Google Scholar, 137, 150; Greenberg, The Jews in Russia, II, pp. 105–108; Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 84–88.

32 Von Laue, Sergei Witte, pp. 187, 206; Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 86.

33 Feldman, “Witte and the Jewish Question”, p. 131; Greenberg, The Jews in Russia, II, p. 106.

34 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 78–79.

35 Rogger, “Peasants”, pp. 155–156.

36 Cf. Herzl, The Diary, 10 August 1903, III, p. 320.

37 Rogger, “Peasants”, p. 156.

38 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 78–79.

39 Witte himself presented this opposition in such terms. See Witte, S., The Memories of Count Witte (ed. Yarmolinsky, A.) (New York, 1921), pp. 191–192Google Scholar, 209, 237–249, 273. On the acceptability of this explanation for contemporary observers, see Dillon, E. J., The Eclipse of Russia (London, 1918), pp. 112Google Scholar, 118–119; Ular, A., Russia from Within (London, 1905), pp. 135–136Google Scholar. On the aceptability of this explanation for modern scholarship, see Von Laue, Sergei Witte, pp. 95, 252; Judge, Plehve, pp. 8–11, 38–92.

40 Von Laue, Sergei Witte, p. 146. See also the chapters “Sergej Vitte und das Finanzministerium (1892–1903): Eine Kapitalistische Gegenposition zum gouvernemcntalen Antisemitismus”, Loewe, Antisemitismus, pp. 40–48, and “Das innenministerium unter V. K. Pleve: Feudaler Antikapitalismus und repressive Judenpolitik”, ibid., pp. 49–51.

41 Von Laue, Sergei Witte, pp. 289–290.

42 Thalheim, K. C., “Russia's Economic Development”, in Katkov, K. G. (ed.), Russia Enters The Twentieth Century (London, 1971), pp. 85–110Google Scholar.

43 On the mercantilist school see Witte, S., “Save Russia by Rapid and Forceful Industrialization”, in Adams, A. E. (ed.), Imperial Russia after 1861 (Boston, 1968), pp. 49–59Google Scholar; Ular, Russia from Within, pp. 144–167; Gurko, V. I., Features and Figures of the Past (New York, 1967), pp. 57–61Google Scholar; McKay, J. P., Pioneers for Profit (Chicago, 1970), pp. 3–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 78–79; Crisp, O., Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914 (London, 1976), pp. 98–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 136, 176; Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte, pp. 20–24; Liashchenko, P., History of the National Economy of Russia (New York, 1949), pp. 534–538Google Scholar, 560–563; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, pp. 22–35, 76–77, 90, 101–114, 137–146, 179–187, 218, 270; Rogger, Modernisation, pp. 102–109.

44 This conception is the crux of Von Laue's work: Von Laue, Sergei Witte; see, also, Gatrell, P., The Tsarist Economy, 1850–1917 (New York, 1986), p. 236 n. 8Google Scholar.

45 Von Laue, Sergei Witte, p. 202; Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 107, 201, 219, 227–233; Judge, Plehve, pp. 29, 50–51, 80–81.

46 On the organic school, see Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 227–233; Ular, Russia from Within, pp. 141–152; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, pp. 62, 122, 135–159, 168–177, 201, 220–221, 276–290; Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy, pp. 98–99, 137-–142, 159–196; Judge, Plehve, pp. 38–92; Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy, pp. 12–20.

47 See, for instance, Judge, Plehve, pp. 122–174, 62–92; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, pp. 145–162, 239–248.

48 Robinson, G. T., Rural Russia under the Old Regime (Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 132–133Google Scholar; Judge, Plehve, pp. 8–9, 64.

49 Witte differentiated between the high and low aristocracy. While viewing the gentry as an enemy, he sought an alliance with the high aristocracy, both because h e needed their political support and because he viewed their wealth as an appropriate basis o n which to constitute a class o f industrialists. Accordingly, he pursued a policy that actively attempted to divide these tw o sections of the aristocracy, see Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 60–61; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, pp. 120–140.

50 Ibid., pp. 167–187.

51 Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 60–65, 201–203; Ular, Russia from Within, pp. 136–139, 163; Mchlinger and Thompson, Count Witte, pp. 54–55; on the high aristocracy see note 47.

52 See notes 44 and 45.

53 An unequivocal spokesman for this view was Pobedonostsev, see Byrnes, R. F., Pobedonostsev (Bloomington, 1968), pp. 282–357Google Scholar, 104–107, 130–131, 187–191, 202–209. See also the chapter “Im ideologischen Spiegel der alten Elite: Die Juden als Speerspitze des Kapitalismus”, in Loewe, Antisemitismus, pp. 23–29.

54 Gerschenkron, A., Economic Development in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 5–51Google Scholar. See also Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy, pp. xi–xiii, 8–9, 231–234, 235n. 1.

55 Kahan, A., “Government Policies and Industrialization in Russia”, Journal of Economic History, XXVII (1967), pp. 460–477CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kahan, A., “Capital Formation During the Period of Early Industrialization in Russia, 1890–1913”, in Mathias, P. and Postan, M. M. (eds), Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. 7, part 2 (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 265–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 There were additional differences between the two schools which belie ideological illusions. For instance, the organic school fought to restrict the power of the central bureaucracy and supported extending the authority of provincial government bodies, such as the Zemstvos, which served as “schools for democracy”. In contrast, Witte was committed to preserving autocratic power as a vehicle for instituting his desired changes. He warned that investing the Zemstvos with greater authority was alien to the Russian spirit, an idea imported from England and the West which would eventually bring with it constitutional government. See Walkin, J., The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia (London, 1963)Google Scholar; Von Laue, Sergei Wine, pp. 157–167; Judge, Plehve, pp. 38–92; Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 78–81, 122–128; Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte, pp. 24–25.

57 For a general survey on the Jewish economy in Russia, see Dijur, I. M., “Jews in the Russian Economy”, in Frumkin, J., Aronson, G. and Goldinweiser, A. (eds), Russian Jewry (1860–1917) (New York, 1966), pp. 120–143Google Scholar.

58 See Leshtzinski, Y., Der Idishar Arbeitar (in Rusland) (Vilna, 1960)Google Scholar; Leshtzinski, , Ha'tfuza H'yehudit (Jerusalem, 1960), pp. 93–96Google Scholar. Peled, Cf. Y. and Shafir, G., “Split Labor Market and the State: The Effect of Modernization on Jewish Industrial Workers in Tsarist Russia”, American Journal of Sociology, 92 (1986–1987), pp. 1435–1460CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 Kahan, A., Essays in Jewish Social and Economic History (Chicago, 1986), pp. 1–69Google Scholar (“The Impact of Industrialization in Tsarist Russia on the Socioeconomic Conditions of the Jewish Population”), 82–100 (“Notes on Jewish Enterpreneurship in Tsarist Russia”).

60 Rogger, “Ministers”, p. 86. A revealing example of Witte's connection with Jewish financiers in Russia and the West was his relationship with the Rothschilds. Witte was on friendly terms with Alphonse de Rothschild in Paris with whom he regularly sought counsel on political and economic issues. Witte provided tangible help to the Rothschilds in gaining control of Russian oil, which was important both to Russian industrialization and to the strategic business interests of the Rothschilds. The mediator between Witte and the Rothschilds was another Jew, Adolph Rotstein, who, in addition to managing a bank in St Petersburg which was associated with the Rothschilds, served as Witte's principal economic advisor and took an active part in executing the policy of the mercantilist school. The Rothschilds purposefully employed Jews in their dealings in Russia. See Graetz, M., “Yozma Yehudit Deyemey Ha'mahapekha Ha'taasiyatit Ha'sheniya: Kenisat Ha'rotshildim letaasiyat Ha'neft Ha'rusit”, Zion, 50 (1985), pp. 355–378Google Scholar; Fursenko, A. A., “Parishkie Rosthschildi i russkaia nepht”, Voprosi Istorü, 8 (1962), pp. 29–42Google Scholar. On the Jewish role in the Russian oil industry, sec also Landau, H., “Jews in the Russian Oil Industry”, YWO Bleter, 14 (1939), pp. 269–285Google Scholar.

61 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 74–75; see also, Aronsfeld, C. C., “Jewish Bankers and the Tsar”, Jewish Social Studies, XXXV (1973), pp. 87–103Google Scholar.

62 Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte, p. 24.

63 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 87–88.

64 Herzl, The Diary, III, p. 322.

65 Rogger, “Ministers”, pp. 109–112.

66 Cf. Kahan, “The Impact of Industrialization”, p. 25.