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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2009
Throughout the long debate on whether the workers' movement of Imperial Germany was predominantly radical or reformist in nature, little attention has been paid to attitudes at the grass-roots level. It is argued here that during the years of 1905–1906, when all Europe was witnessing turmoil and an intensification of social conflict, the German Social Democratic leadership deliberately put the radicalism of the masses to the test. The Dresden suffrage demonstrations of December 1905 were the first to end in violent clashes between participants and police. However, contrary to what has been written to date on this incident and those similar to it, the great majority of the demonstrators were not militant. But they did exhibit a remarkable readiness to engage in civil disobedience, which the Social Democrats could use to press the party's political aims.
2 A purely quantitative review of the period of the German Empire is found in Tilly, Richard, “Sozialer Protest als Gegenstand historischer Forschung”, Kapital, Staat und sozialer Protest in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1980), pp. 175–196CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For different approaches see Lindenberger, Thomas, Straβenpolitik: Zur Sozialgeschichte der dffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 1900–1914 (Berlin, 1995)Google Scholar.
3 Dörrer, Horst, Die Kämpfe der Dresdner Arbeiter unter dem Einfluβ der Ritssischen Revolution 1905 (Dresden, 1958), pp. 47–60Google Scholar.
4 Herrmann, Ursula, “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrccht in Sachsen in den Jahren 1905/06”, Zeitschrift fiir Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1955), pp. 856–883Google Scholar, quotes on pp. 870, 872.
5 Evans, Richard, “‘Red Wednesday’ in Hamburg: Social Democrats, Police and ‘Lumpen-proletariat’ in the Suffrage Disturbances of 17 January 1906”, Rethinking German History (London, 1987), pp. 248–290Google Scholar.
6 Ibid., p. 282.
7 See the most recent general surveys written on this: Kühne, Thomas, Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preuβen 1867–1914 (Düsseldorf, 1994), pp. 455–468Google Scholar; Nonn, Christoph, Verbraucherprotest und Parteiensystem im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Düsseldorf, 1996)Google Scholar, chs 3 and 4; on Saxony in particular, see Simone Lassig and Karl Heinrich Pohl (eds), Sachsen im Umbruch (forthcoming); Simone Lassig, Wahlrechtsreformen in Sachsen 1895–1909 (forthcoming)
8 On this, see Eichler, Joachim, Von Köln nach Mannheim: Die Debatten über Maifeier, Massenstreik und das Verhältnis der Freien Gewerkschaften zur deutschen Sozialdemokratie innerhalb der Arbeiterbewegung Deutschlands 1905/06 (Münster, 1992)Google Scholar. At a Social Democratic meeting in the Saxon city of Borna on 14 October 1905 it was said that the party and the trade unions needed to work together “in order to reach the ultimate goal of an overthrow, even if it meant risking life and limb”: Staatsarchiv Leipzig, Amtshauptmannschaft Borna, no. 3191, f. 109; see also ibid., ff. 100 (5 February 1905) and 102 (19 March 1905).
9 The best general surveys of the events in Austria are found in Knapp, Vincent J.Austrian Social Democracy 1889–1914 (Washington, 1980), pp. 129–139Google Scholar, and Jenks, W A., The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York, 1950), pp. 40–44Google Scholar. Eichler, Von Kdln nach Mannheim, pp. 42–58 and 77–92, has been right to reject the myth propagated by GDR historiography and often accepted in the West that the primary cause for the debate on political strikes was the first Russian revolution. Instead, he emphasizes the role of the syndicalist-localist movement led by Raphael Friedeberg. However, in doing so, Eichler fails to see the importance of the events in Austria for sparking interest in a discussion on new roads for Social Democratic tactics and strategy. The evidence of the impact of these events is clearly documented at least in the pages of the Stichsische Arbeiterzeitung.
10 See Kautsky, Karl Jr (ed.), August Bebels Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky (Assen, 1971)Google Scholar. Adler, Friedrich (ed.), Victor Adler: Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky (Vienna, 1954)Google Scholar; diary of Hermann Molkenbuhr in the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD) in Bonn.
11 Entry dated 17 August 1905, AdsD, Molkenbuhr papers IV. Eichler, Von Köln nach Mannheim, p. 152, falsely quotes here “Massenstreik” (mass strike).
12 Protokoll Uber die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 17–23 September 1905 in Jena (Berlin, 1905), pp. 142–143 (text of the resolution) and 285–343 (Bebel's speech, ensuing debate and vote); Bebel to Adler, 16 September 1905, Briefwechsel, p. 468 (on unanimous vote of executive committee).
13 Fricke, Dieter, “Auf dem Weg nach Mannheim: Zum Verhältnis der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und den Freien Gewerkschaften zu Beginn der Epoche des Imperialismus”, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, XXV (1977), p. 445Google Scholar; see also August Bebel: eine Biographie (Berlin, 1989), p. 630: the party congress revealed, as stated here, “that Bebel was completely under the spell of the momentum of the revolution in Russia”.
14 Bebel to Adler, 16 September 1905, Briefwechsel, p. 468.
15 This according to Eichler, Von Köln nach Mannheim, p. 148, and Mommsen, Hans, “The Free Trade Unions and Social Development in Imperial Germany”, in Mommsen, Wolfgang and Husung, Hans-Gerd (eds), The Development of Trade Unionism in Great Britain and Germany 1880–1914 (London, 1985), p. 379Google Scholar.
16 AdsD, Molkenbuhr papers IV, diary entry dated 2 August 1909.
17 “Mit solchen Hosenscheiβern […] kamen wir weit”: Bebel to Adler, 16 September 1905, Briefwechsel, p. 468; see also Heine, Wolfgang, “Politischer Massenstreik im gegenwärtigen Deutschland?”, Sozialistische Monatshefte, IX (1905), pp. 754–760Google Scholar.
18 Heine to Georg von Vollmar, 27 January 1906, AdsD, Vollmar papers, no. 875 (microfilm).
19 Die Neue Zeit, XXII (1903/1904), 1, p. 143.
20 See Dörrer, Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, pp. 34–35.
21 “Das Volk hat nun das Wort”: Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung (SAZ), 28 November 1905; see also the issues of 17 and 23 November and 2 December.
22 See the reports in SAZ, 20 November 1905; Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden (HStAD), Kreishauptmannschaft Leipzig, no. 253, ff. 7–8; HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 10993, f. 243; Leipziger Volkszeitung, 20 November.
23 As is argued in Herrmann, “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrecht in Sachsen”, p. 859, and Dörrer, Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, p. 47.
24 Die Neue Zeit, XXIV (1905/1906), 1, p. 364.
25 Report dated 3 December 1905, HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, f. 17.
26 This account is based on the extensive description of the meeting published in the SAZ on 2 December 1905, to which Police Chief Koettig also refers in his brief report, dated 3 December, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
27 Although Herrmann, who only quotes the last phrase of the statement, does argue this; “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrecht in Sachsen”, p. 862.
28 Protokoll über die Verhandlungen der Landesversammlung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Sachsens (Dresden, 1906), p. 58.
29 The following is the entire text as it appeared in the SAZ on 4 December 1905: “In the name of the entire people of Saxony, the meeting proclaims that the recent rejection of suffrage reform, which the public has so urgently demanded, by the Saxon government and the majority of the second chamber of parliament constitutes an incomprehensible disregard of the people's will; that the bitterness, especially of working class people, has reached its peak; and that the Saxon government and parliament are solely responsible for the consequences arising from this indignation. The people do not appear to be willing to let the matter rest with tedious protests, all of which have gone unheeded so far. The threat of police repression of suffrage demonstrations is not considered by the meeting to be an appropriate measure to placate the people. All that can help and reassure are immediate election reform and free suffrage as demanded by Social Democracy. This reform is being demanded again with utmost urgency and implacability.”
30 HStAD, Innenministcrium, no. 11042, f. 22. It is not true, as Herrmann argues, that other speakers did the same; “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrecht in Sachsen”, p. 862.
31 Report in the Dresdner Anzeiger (DA) from 4 December 1905; as well as the police report of 3 December 1905, HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 10443, ff. 2, 17.
32 Die Neue Zeit, XXIV (1905/1906), 1, pp. 363–364. Here Herrmann also quotes only one phrase from the statement taken out of context, which distorts the real message; “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Drciklasscnwahlrecht in Sachsen”, p. 862.
33 HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 10443, ff. 19–20.
34 Ibid., ff. 17, 19.
35 As reported in the SAZ.
36 As was stated in the text of the resolution, see note 29.
37 Fricke, Dieter, Handbuch der Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin, 1987), p. 729Google Scholar.
38 According to ibid., p. 314, the number of SPD members in the three Dresden Reichstag electoral districts in 1905 equaled 12,855.
39 The following is based primarily on the eyewitness accounts published in the SAZ and DA on 4 December 1905 and on the report of the police chief to the minister of internal affairs on 3 December, HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, ff. 17–20. All three sources concur basically, and sometimes they supplement each other; differences in these accounts will be indicated. The accounts appearing in other papers on 4 December only contained additional details on the climate. The content of later newspaper reports is mostly worthless for reconstructing the course of events since these reports are chiefly personal recollections exhibitizng obvious tendencies toward myth-building.
40 Just before these two groups met, there had been a confrontation at the Marien Bridge between the marchers from Pieschen and the gendarmerie. According to the account appearing in the SAZ, 400 demonstrators broke through the police barrier; however, the police report states that “their attempt to cross the Marien Bridge was thwarted, upon which they moved on toward the Augustus Bridge”. Both sources concurred that no blood was spilled at the confrontations here. It is possible that the police report failed to mention the breakthrough of the 400 demonstrators because the number involved seemed insignificant compared to the entire crowd of 4–5,000 – as estimated by the SAZ – and because this group was then stopped at Postplatz. It is also possible that the police wanted to prevent the crowd from proceeding along the north side of the river bank at all and that a small group of demonstrators did break through the barriers while the rest took a detour to the Augustus Bridge.
41 According to the police report, the “main contingent” was detained on the new town side of the bridge.
42 Sec DA, 4 December 1905.
43 This is repeated nearly word for word by Dörrer, Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, p. 52.
44 Dresdner Montagszeitung, 4 December 1905.
45 According to the police report this happened “among general howling and yelling”, “among the singing of social democratic freedom songs as well as cries of ‘revolution’ and ‘Down with the police’”; DA and SAZ only report cheers for equal suffrage.
46 This is the estimate given by the DA.
41 This was reported by the SAZ.
48 According to the police report, the demonstrators acted “with sticks raised high into the air”, whereas the DA only said they acted “while loudly singing the workers' Marseillaise”.
49 See Dresdner Zeitung, Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten and Leipziger Tageblatt; SAZ, 15 December 1905.
50 Ibid., 8 December 1905.
51 Ibid., 15 December 1905.
52 See the accounts published in the SAZ and the DA on 18 December 1905. Fischer was considered a right-winger in the party. However, in a letter to Wolfgang Heine, dated 17 January 1909 (Bundcsarchiv Potsdam, Heine papers, no. 1, ff. 37–41), he stressed always to have been in favor of demonstrations. Just how little revisionist and reformist attitudes excluded support for “radical” tactics has already been exemplified by the cases of Bernstein, Eduard and Frank, Ludwig in Tegel, Susan, “Reformist Social Democrats, the Mass Strike and the Prussian Suffrage 1913”, European History Quarterly XVII. (1987), pp. 307–344Google Scholar.
53 The following is also based on the articles appearing in the SAZ and the DA on 18 December, as well as on the police report of 21 December 1905 (HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, ff. 72–74).
54 I am not familiar with any source material supporting Herrmann's contention that “following the meetings in the new town, there were protest marches that were halted by police on the bridges crossing the Elbe”; “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrecht in Sachsen”, p. 873.
55 DA, 18 December 1905.
56 There is no evidence that this group marched “singing the Socialist March with fists held high”, as Dörrer describes: Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, p. 59.
57 The crowd was calling out names like “bloodhounds” and “Cossacks”, SAZ, 18 December 1905. It reflects the manner in which Dörrer handles his sources when he describes the events by stating that “the workers did not think about giving up one inch to the police” and had gathered “again and again” on the corners of the square to hold “rallies”: Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, pp. 59–60.
58 And not “several functionaries ordered to do so”, as Ddrrer maintains: Der Katnpf der Dresdner Arbeiter, p. 60.
59 This depiction is based primarily on the police report. For one, it coincides with the account published in the DA, whose reporter was standing behind the police cordon. For another, the account appearing in the SAZ contains clearly falsified claims. For example, the list of wounded (HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, ff. 82–83) contradicts the claim that all of the victims were wounded in the back. Instead, there were just as many wounds on hands, faces and heads. However, the SAZ gives a vivid picture of the atmosphere during the mass panic. It is quoted extensively by Dörrer, whose account in every other respect is full of omissions and mistakes as usual: Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, pp. 60–61.
60 DA, 18 December 1905.
61 HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, f. 20.
62 Indices, ibid., ff. 78–81.
63 Report, ibid., f. 74.
64 Ibid., ff. 82–83.
65 The SAZ assertion, propagated by Dörrer, that many of the wounded were women therefore appears unlikely: Der Kampf der Dresdner Arbeiter, p. 60.
66 Police report, HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, f. 74.
67 Ibid.
68 Detained for disturbing the peace were 5 metalworkers, a stove fitter, a typesetter, a blacksmith and a worker (the last two were tried and sentenced); arrested were 5 workers, 3 metalworkers, 3 salespeople, a blacksmith, a plumber, a mechanic, a mason, a coachman, a typesetter, a cigar worker, a messenger, a cabinet maker (acquitted), a tailor and a head office clerk (both not sentenced); injured were 3 workers, 3 metalworkers, 3 construction workers, 3 cabinet makers, 2 gentleman's servants, a garden assistant, a shoemaker, a furniture polisher, and a glassmaker.
69 HStAD, Innenministerium, no. 11043, f. 74.
70 Ibid., f. 73.
71 According to the SAZ roughly half of the audience marched; according to the DA, “the greater half”.
72 See also Lässig, Wahtrcchtsreformen in Sachsen.
73 See the memorandum from the Berlin police headquarters dated 13 December 1905, and cited by Stem, Leo, Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution von 1905–1907 auf Deutschland (Berlin, 1956), vol. 2, p. 148.Google Scholar Reflections on the motive for this decision can be found in a letter by August Bebel, dated 16 March 1906 (to Max Quarck, AdsD, NL Quarck, no. 5) in which he states that Austria is no model for the suffrage struggle in Germany since the Austrian state is much weaker, and in a diary entry by Molkenbuhr, dated 10 March 1906, on the same topic (AdsD, Molkenbuhr papers IV), the “masses” had shown “that actually they do not want any violence”. Also of interest is the police protocol of a discussion in the local SPD organization in Zwickau from 6 December 1905 (HStAD, PolizeiprSsidium Zwickau, no. 1305), in which the local party elite discussed the Dresden “suffrage battle” in connection with the issue of a mass strike and concluded that a great deal of preparation would still be necessary for such a strike to be successful.
74 This is the central thesis of Herrmann, “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie gegen das Dreiklassenwahlrecht in Sachsen”; quote in ibid., p. 876.
75 See Lange, Georg, “Das Ende der Dresdner Interne,” Sdcltsische Zeitung, 22 05 1954Google Scholar.
76 Evans, “‘Red Wednesday’ in Hamburg”, pp. 257–259, at least does not cite a single case in which a speaker went beyond making alibi calls for “peaceful” and “calm” behavior to advise explicitly against street demonstrations. It is also very improbable that the activists from each part of the city planned and organized such demonstrations without the knowledge and approval of the top party leadership in Hamburg.
77 Evans, “‘Red Wednesday’ in Hamburg”, pp. 257, 260–264, especially 278.
78 Luxemburg to Zetkin, Clara after 16 December 1906, Rosa Luxemburg: Gesammelte Briefe (Berlin, 1983), vol. 2, p. 277Google Scholar. Characteristically enough, she was not so sure about “the vast masses” just a few months before (Luxemburg to Stadthagen, 26 August 1906, ibid., p. 269).
79 As Dieter Groh is suggesting with the term “negative integration”.
80 Evans, “‘Red Wednesday’ in Hamburg”, pp. 279–281.