Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T19:00:02.721Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The President and the Mahatma: America's Response to Gandhi's Fast, February-March 1943

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2013

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Early in February 1943 Mohandas Gandhi informed the Governor General of India, Lord Linlithgow, that he had decided to undertake a fast for a period of twenty-one days. Gandhi was at that time a prisoner at the Aga Khan palace in the city of Poona, near Bombay. He and his associates had been arrested on 9 August 1942 after the All India Congress Committee had adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of British rule over India. Violent protest demonstrations and attacks on government property by angry Indians following the arrest of the leaders was met by ruthless repressive measures. With thousands of nationalists thrown into prison and with the overwhelming coercive authority of the British Indian Government mobilized against them, the leaderless and unarmed Indian adherents and supporters of the Congress Party were beaten back and cowed down.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis 1968

References

page 142 note 1 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (A. A. Berle, Jr.), 5 May 1941; Note by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Paul H. Alling), n.d.; Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Wallace Murray), 7 November 1941; Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Sumner Welles) to the Secretary of State (Cordell Hull), 15 November 1941; Foreign Relations of the United States 1941 (Washington, 1959), III, pp. 171, 176, 184–7.

page 143 note 1 Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War (London, 1951), IV, p. 187.Google Scholar

page 143 note 2 This argument is developed in Venkataramani, M.S., Undercurrents in American Foreign Relations (New Delhi, 1965), pp. 45.Google Scholar For a detailed discussion of developments during this period, see Venkataramani, M. S. and Shrivastava, B. K., “The United States and the Cripps Mission”, in: India Quarterly (New Delhi), 19 (0712 1963).Google Scholar

page 144 note 1 Roosevelt, Franklin D. to Kai-shek, Chiang, 12 08 1942, Foreign Relations of the United States 1942 (Washington, 1959), I, pp. 715–7.Google Scholar

page 145 note 1 Quoted by Pyarelal, a close associate and secretary of Gandhi, Mahatma, “Gandhiji's Satyagraha: Its Technique and Application”, in: Gandhian Outlook and Techniques (New Delhi, 1953), p. 387.Google Scholar For a brief account of the concept and history of fasting see Hocart, A.M., “Fasting”, in: Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1931), VI, pp. 144–6.Google Scholar

page 145 note 2 Gandhi, M.K., “Fasting in Non-Violent Action”, in: Harijan (Ahmedabad), 26 07 1942, p. 248.Google Scholar The article as well as several others written by Gandhi on the theme of fasting are brought together in Gandhi, M. K., Fasting in Satyagraha (Ahmedabad, 1965).Google Scholar

page 146 note 1 Churchill's comment on Gandhi and the Congress is quoted in Nehru, Jawaharlal, Discovery of India (London, 1960), pp. 446–7.Google Scholar Text of the Mansion House speech in Charles Eade, comp., The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill (London, 1952), II, pp. 341–5.

page 148 note 1 M.K. Gandhi to Lord Linlithgow, 14 August 1942; Linlithgow to Gandhi, 22 August 1942; in: Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, August 1942 – April 1944 (New Delhi, 1944), pp. 1–3.

page 148 note 2 Gandhi to the Additional Secretary, Home Department, Government of India (Sir Richard Tottenham), 23 September 1942, ibid., pp. 3–4.

page 149 note 1 Gandhi to Linlithgow, 31 December 1942, ibid., p. 5; Linlithgow to Gandhi, 13 January 1943; Gandhi to Linlithgow, 19 January 1943, ibid., pp. 5–7.

page 149 note 2 Linlithgow to Gandhi, 25 January 1943; Gandhi to Linlithgow, 29 January 1943, ibid., pp. 7–8.

page 149 note 3 Gandhi to Tottenham, 8 February 1943; Tottenham, to Gandhi, , 9 02 1943, Gandhiji's Correspondence With the Government 1942–44 (Ahmedabad, 1945), pp. 4950.Google Scholar

page 149 note 4 Linlithgow, to Gandhi, , 5 02 1943, in: Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, pp. 4, 911.Google Scholar

page 150 note 1 The Personal Representative of the President in India (William Phillips) to the Secretary of State (Cordell Hull), 10 February 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States 1943 (Washington, 1964), IV, pp. 187–8.Google Scholar This source will hereafter be cited as FR 1943, IV. Text of the Government of India's communiqué in Gandhi, Devadas, comp., India Unreconciled (New Delhi, 1943), pp. 105–7.Google Scholar

page 151 note 1 Diary entries, 11, 12, 13 02 1943, Indian Diary II, Papers of William Phillips, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., USA.Google Scholar

page 152 note 1 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the President, 11 February 1943; to the Secretary of State, 12 February 1943; FR 1943, IV, pp. 188–91, 191–2.

page 152 note 2 Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, 15 02 1943, Official File (OF) 48-H, Roosevelt, Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, USA.Google Scholar Roosevelt to Phillips, 16 February 1943, OF 2314, ibid. On the same day, 16 February, Hull informed Phillips by telegram concerning the President's desire that he should return to the United States. It is from this telegram that a possible clue may be found to the puzzling action of Roosevelt. Hull indicated that the President's move had reference to the concluding paragraph of Phillips' letter to the President dated 12 February. The paragraph referred to comprised of a single sentence and it read: “Any guidance which you can give me will be appreciated.” The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India, 16 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, p. 194.

page 153 note 1 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 13 February 1943; 15 February 1943; FR 1943, IV, pp. 192–3. Emphasis added.

page 153 note 2 New York Times, 19 February 1943, p. 8. A. J. Muste, executive secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, to the President, 24 February 1943, 845.1907, Files of the State Department, National Archives, Washington, DC, USA.

page 154 note 1 Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 22 February 1943, p. 1; The Hindu (Madras), 25 February 1943, p. 4; New York Times, 25 February 1943. Among those who signed Pearl Buck's appeal to Roosevelt were Richard J. Walsh, Bruce Bliven, John L. Childes, George S. Counts, Reinhold Niebuhr, James Loeb Jr., William E. Bohn, Mark Starr, Thomasine Campbell, Dorothy Norman, Nathaniel Minkoff, Morris Shapiro, Alfred Baker Lewis, Edward Heiman, and Frank McCullogh. Buck's efforts are described in Richard J. Walsh to J. J. Singh, 20 February 1943, Papers of J. J. Singh, Indian School of International Studies Library, New Delhi, India. Also Singh to Roosevelt, Churchill, Halifax, and Chiang Kai-shek, n. d., February 1943, telegrams, ibid.

page 154 note 2 New York Times, 24 February 1943, p. 9; 5 March 1943, p. 21. Lea Springs and others of Corning, New York, to the Secretary of State, 24 February 1943, 845.00/1824, Files of the State Department.

page 154 note 3 Among the communications that the President received was one from V.K. Krishna Menon. He appealed to Roosevelt to use his “immense influence” to secure the release of Gandhi and thereby avert a calamity whose consequences would be incalculable. V.K. Krishna Menon to the President, 21 February 1943, 845.00/1831, Files of the State Department. Menon communicated to the President a resolution adopted at a meeting of the Indian community in London. In the files made available by the State Department to Venkataramani only one other communication from abroad relating to the fast was found. It was an appeal to the President to use his good offices to save the life of Gandhi and it was signed by Salvador Allende, Secretary of the Socialist Party of Chile, and representatives of several other Chilean organizations. Salvador Allende and others to the President, 23 February 1943, 845.00/1790, ibid.

page 155 note 1 Survey of press opinion, in Acting Secretary of State (Sumner Welles) to the United States Mission in New Delhi, 27 February 1943, 845.00/1790, ibid. The Chicago Sun urged that Gandhi should be released unconditionally. “The fact remains that if he died a martyred prisoner, the bad situation becomes incalcuably worse”, it declared. Excerpts in The Hindu, 24 February 1943, p. 4. Columnist Ludwell Denny wrote that the United States could not ignore the implications of Britain's handling of the situation posed by Gandhi's fast. The issue was not Gandhi, but the war effort, he declared. “Americans have a right to expect the British government to make every effort to change a sullen India into a fighting ally for our common freedom.” Denny, Ludwell, “Allies Need India”, in: New York World Telegram, 1 03 1943.Google Scholar Also Nation (New York), Vol. 156 (20 February 1943), p. 354.

page 155 note 2 Ed., Mr. Gandhi's Fast”, in: New York Herald Tribune, 14 february 1943Google Scholar; ed., “If Gandhi Dies”, ibid., 22 February 1943. The correspondent of the newspaper in India, Sonia Tamara, presented a more balanced picture in “Two Philosophies Clash in India”, ibid., 24 February 1943.

page 155 note 3 Ed., “Political Hunger”, in: Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 24 02 1943.Google Scholar

page 156 note 1 Chicago Daily News, 26 February 1943.

page 156 note 2 Survey of press opinion, loc. cit.; Daily Mail (London), 25 february 1943.

page 157 note 1 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the President, 11 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, pp. 188–91.

page 157 note 2 Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 12 February 1943, ibid., pp. 191–2. Diary entry, 12 February 1943, Indian Diary II, Phillips Papers.

page 158 note 1 Memorandum of Conversation with the British Ambassador (Lord Halifax), by the Secretary of State, 16 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, pp. 194–5.

page 158 note 2 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 16 February 1943, ibid., pp. 193–4. Emphasis added. Phillips received the information from Herbert Matthews of the New York Times. The correspondent told Phillips that it had been indicated to him that Sir Mohammed Usman, Law Member of the Viceroy's Council, was anxious that Phillips should convey a message from four Members of the Council to the Viceroy whom they could not reach. Phillips sent word to Usman through Matthews that he would call on Usman if invited to do so. When Matthews communicated this information to Usman, the latter, after conferring in private with some colleagues, told the former that he would write to Phillips “tomorrow”. Phillips had no intention of carrying out the assignment, but he thought it was best to show willingness to call on Usman if the latter invited him to do. Diary entry, 16 February 1943, Indian Diary II, Phillips Papers.

page 159 note 1 The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India, 17 February 1942, FR 1943, IV, p. 195.

page 159 note 2 Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 18 February 1943, ibid., pp. 195–6. With characteristic British thoroughness, the authorities stockpiled in Poona quantities of sandalwood and other materials for possible use to cremate Gandhi. The route for the funeral procession has also been decided. Officials all over the country had been directed to suppress any disturbances that might break out following Gandhi's death. On this point, see Slade, Madeleine (Mira Behn), The Spirit's Pilgrimage (New York, 1960), p. 252.Google Scholar Slade, a long-time follower of the Mahatma, was an inmate of the Aga Khan Palace.

page 160 note 1 Linlithgow was willing to permit Phillips to state that the Viceroy was keeping him “in the closest possible touch with the matter”. The envoy declined the offer because he thought that such a statement would give the impression that Phillips concurred with the Viceroy's policy. The Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1943, FR 1943, VI, pp. 200–1. Phillips to Welles, 17 February 1943, copy in India Diary II, Phillips Papers.

page 161 note 1 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 19 February 1943, ibid., pp. 196–7. Diary entries, 19 February 1943, Indian Diary II, Phillips Papers.

page 161 note 2 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 19 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, pp. 196–7.

page 161 note 3 The following is the text of the resolution: “This Conference representing different creeds, communities and interests in India, gives expression to the universal desire of the people of this country that, in the interest of the future of India and of international goodwill, Mahatma Gandhi should be released immediately and unconditionally. This Conference views with gravest concern the serious situation that will arise if the Government fail to take timely action and prevent a catastrophe.” Phillips cabled the text of the resolution to the State Department. Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 20 February 1943, ibid., p. 198. For the proceedings of the conference see Leaders' Conference: An Authentic Account of the Leaders' Conference held at New Delhi on 19th and 20th February 1943 in respect of Mahatma Gandhi's Fast (New Delhi, 1943). New York Times (21 February 1943) carried a brief report of the proceedings on p. 21. Interviews with Sapru and Ismail described in Diary entry, 20 February 1943, Indian Diary II, Phillips Papers.

page 162 note 1 Rajaji's comment cited in New York Times, 21 February 1943, p. 21. Despatch of Herbert Matthews, ibid., 20 February 1943, p. 5. Birla was quoted in a despatch from New Delhi by Steele, A.T., correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, 18 02 1943.Google Scholar

page 162 note 2 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the Secretary of State, 20 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, pp. 197–8.

page 163 note 1 Diary entry, 16 February 1943, Box 5, Diary 22, Papers of Breckinridge Long, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, USA. “This is the first time Phillips has been in contentious territory and under attack – and he does not like it”, Long added. There were no references to Gandhi's fast in the diaries of Admiral William Leahy (Library of Congress, Washington, DC), and of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (Manuscripts Division, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.).

page 163 note 2 Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), II, p. 1492.Google Scholar

page 164 note 1 Memorandum of Conversation with the British Ambassador, by the Secretary of State, 20 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, pp. 199–200.

page 164 note 2 The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India, 20 February 1943, ibid., p. 199.

page 164 note 3 Hindustan Times, 21 February 1943, p. 1; 22 February 1943, p. 1; 23 February 1943, p. 1; 24 February 1943, p. 1; 26 February 1943, p. 2. New York Times, 21 February 1943; 24 February 1943, p. 9. The Hindu, 24 February 1943, p. 4. The Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Gordon P. Merriam), to Singh, n. d., February 1943, Singh Papers. At about this time Reuter reported from Washington that Secretary Hull had stated at a press conference that he could not understand the significance of the statement that Phillips had made. The report came as a “bombshell” to Phillips and he was distressed to see headlines in some newspapers to the effect that he had been repudiated by Hull. Phillips sent a telegram to Hull seeking clarification and received a reply a couple of days later to the effect that the Secretary had been misquoted and that Reuter's was being asked to correct their report. Diary entry, 23 February 1943, Indian Diary II, Phillips Papers. Reuter's misreporting on certain important occasions calls for deeper study. Even Dawn, organ of the Muslim League, demanded that there should be more accuracy in news cabled from abroad. “We cannot at the present time afford to have jumbled version from abroad of what is happening in India, certainly no sly suggestion that because of dissensions in India the Muslims are indifferent to the fate of Mahatma Gandhi whom they could with all good will love to see breaking his fast as a free man…”, it wrote. Ed., “A Little More Truth”, in: Dawn, 25 February 1943.

page 165 note 1 Churchill, Winston S., The Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950), p. 736.Google Scholar According to his physician, Churchill took a “serious view of his illness” and “his mind was busy conjuring up possible complications.” Lord Moran, Churchill (London, 1966), p. 88.Google Scholar

page 166 note 1 Churchill's telegram is summarized in Hull, Memoirs II, p. 1493.

page 166 note 2 Sherwood, Robert, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London, 1949), II, pp. 700–1.Google Scholar Sherwood draws attention to the significant fact that Churchill was, at that time, conducting discussions on “Tube Alloys” with Hopkins rather than with Roosevelt. Churchill also chose to send Hopkins on 27 February a long cable that gave a “complete record of all Anglo-American dealings since the first exchanges in 1940”. The cable was to reinforce his demands in respect of a British role in “Tube Alloys”. By chance or by design, at critical points in Indian affairs Churchill managed to place in the hands of Roosevelt and Hopkins documents extolling the partnership of the two countries and the appropriateness of a spirit of accommodation on the part of the United States towards what they portrayed as Britain's very legitimate aspirations.

page 166 note 3 Text of Churchill's reply in Leaders' Conference (quoted above, pp. 161f., n. 3), p. 49. Sherwood, , op. cit., II, p. 700.Google Scholar

page 167 note 1 Hull, , Memoirs, II, p. 1493.Google Scholar

page 167 note 2 The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India, 25 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, pp. 203–4.

page 168 note 1 Congressional Record, 89 (1943), p. 1212.Google Scholar

page 168 note 2 Phillips, William, Ventures in Diplomacy (North Beverly, Mass., 1952), p. 360.Google Scholar Diary entry, 22 February 1943, India Diary II, Phillips Papers. The Viceroy and his close associate, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, remained firm and unruffled. Ian Stephens, editor of the Statesman who was a guest at a party in Sir Gilbert's home on the most critical day recalled that the latter seemed “entirely calm” and “enjoyed his party as always”. Stephens, Ian, Monsoon Morning (London, 1966), p. 96.Google Scholar

page 169 note 1 The Personal Representative of the President in India to the President, 23 February 1943, FR 1943, IV, pp. 201–3.

page 169 note 2 Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances (Delhi, 1942).Google Scholar

page 170 note 1 “Responsibilities in India”, in: New Statesman and Nation (London), Vol. 25 (27 03 1943), p. 200.Google Scholar A Conservative weekly on the other hand, described the white paper as “factual evidence” which proved that Gandhi's policy had “all along been playing into the hands of the enemy”. “What Gandhi Intended”, in: Spectator (London), No 5987 (26 03 1943), pp. 281–2.Google Scholar In a letter to the Government of India on 15 July 1943 Gandhi took note of the fact that the introduction to the white paper by Tottenham was dated 13 February 1943, three days after the commencement of the fast. “The date is ominous. Why was the period of my fast chosen for publishing a document in which I am the target?”, Gandhi asked. Was the white paper hurriedly released “in expectation of my death which medical opinion must have considered almost a certainty?” “It reads”, Gandhi added, “like the presentation of a case by a prosecutor. In the present case the prosecutor happens to be also the policeman and jailor. He first arrests and gags his victims, and then opens the case behind their backs.” Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, p. 34.

page 170 note 2 New York Times, 23 February 1943, p. 17.

page 170 note 3 Linlithgow to Gandhi, 5 February 1943; Gandhi to Linlithgow, 7 February 1943; Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, pp. 9–11, 11–12.

page 170 note 4 Churchill, , The Hinge of Fate, p. 737.Google Scholar

page 171 note 1 Despatch from Matthews, Herbert, New York Times, 3 03 1943, p. 10Google Scholar; ed., “Gandhi Ends His Fast”, ibid., 4 March 1943, p. 18. Nation, Vol. 156 (6 March 1943), p. 326. Current History (New York), Vol. 4 (04 1943), p. 123.Google Scholar Survey of press opinion, in Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission in New Delhi, 5 March 1943, 845.00/1799, Files of the State Department.

page 171 note 2 Ed., “A Decisive Battle”, in: New York Herald Tribune, 4 03 1943.Google Scholar The newspaper saw some good emerging out of Gandhi's “total failure”. Indians would be forced to face facts as they witnessed the collapse of the “meretricious mysticism of the last two or three decades”. The Tribune's correspondent in India, Sonia Tamara, reported that it was doubtful whether Gandhi would ever again stand at the head of the Congress, or even play any important part at all in Indian politics in the future. “India's Fire of Revolt Dies Down”, ibid., 3 March 1943; “India's Problems Baffling As Ever”, ibid., 12 May 1943.

page 172 note 1 Nursery Technic”, in: Chicago Daily News, 4 03 1943.Google Scholar With scant respect for accuracy Churchill wrote in his memoirs that Gandhi “abandoned” his fast when he became “quite convinced of our obduracy”. Churchill, , op. cit., p. 737.Google Scholar

page 172 note 2 Quoted in Hindustan Times, 1 April 1943, p. 1. A note in Current History stated that India did not hold the centre of the stage in respect of the war and Gandhi's bargaining power was weak. Gandhi's Moment of Trial”, in: Current History, Vol. 4 (03 1943), pp. 4041.Google Scholar

page 173 note 1 Time magazine reported that as the fast progressed, “Indian scorn included Americans as allies of the British, despite a faint hope that the U.S. might still intervene.” Time (Chicago), Vol. 41 (1 03 1943), p. 20.Google Scholar