On November 4, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) held in Tarakhel v. Switzerland, in a 14 to 3 decision, that Swiss authorities would violate Article 3 (prohibition of torture/inhuman and degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention) if the applicants were to be expelled to Italy, in application of the Dublin Regulation, without Switzerland having first obtained assurances from the Italian authorities that “the applicants would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together.”

In Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) panel unanimously dismissed an investment claim by an Israeli investor filed pursuant to the Israel-Uzbekistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) against Uzbekistan. The tribunal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute because the investment was not “implemented,” i.e., “established” in accordance with the laws and regulations of Uzbekistan as it was the result of corrupt practices by the investor. To reach this conclusion, the tribunal relied, inter alia, on the requirement of consent as set forth in Article 46 of the ICSID Convention. Ultimately, the tribunal decided that as a consequence of having no jurisdiction over the claims, it had no jurisdiction over Uzbekistan’s counterclaims.

The European Court of Human Rights (European Court), increasingly known as “the conscience of Europe,” together with the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, were the first intergovernmental organizations to reveal information about the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) “black sites.” These “black sites” were secret prisons established around the world, outside of U.S. territory, by the George W. Bush administration and run by the CIA to detain suspects termed “high value,” and their existence was repeatedly denied by the U.S. and Polish Governments. The Soros funded Open Society Justice Initiative, filed the application with the European Court on behalf of Abd al-Nashiri on May 6, 2011, arguing that Poland had been complicit in his rendition, detention, and torture at a CIA black-site prison within the state.

On June 16, 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or the Court) released its judgment in Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, finding that the rights of Azerbaijani refugees had been violated by their inability to return to property in an area under Armenia’s control. The judgment, which centers on a long-standing, “frozen” territorial armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, develops the Court’s jurisprudence on extraterritoriality. The intervention of Azerbaijan in the case makes it into a pseudo interstate dispute. Finally, although not the focus of this note, the application of the Pinheiro Principles to adjudicate mass population transfer is praiseworthy for its advancement of the contribution of human rights law to conflict resolution.

On March 31, 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its judgment in the case of Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (Whaling Decision). In what is perhaps its most important environmental decision to date, the ICJ ordered Japan to halt its whaling program in the Southern Ocean, finding the program lacked scientific merit and breached requirements of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).

On February 3, 2015, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered judgment in the case between Croatia and Serbia.1 Croatia had instituted proceedings on July 2, 1999 and claimed that during the armed conflict which erupted in 1991, Serbia had violated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). In its counter-claim, Serbia alleged that rather Croatia had violated the Convention, particularly during Operation Storm in 1995. This Serbian counter-claim was unanimously rejected. Croatia’s claim was also rejected, but with Judge Cançado Trindade and Judge ad hoc Vukas dissenting. The most vigorous disagreement between the judges did not concern the merits though, but rather focused on one remaining jurisdictional issue.

In 2013, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered judgment in a dispute between Cambodia and Thailand (the 2013 Judgment)1 over the interpretation of the ICJ’s previous decision in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (the 1962 Judgment).2 The parties’ dispute arises from longstanding uncertainty over the location of the territorial boundary between Cambodia and Thailand in the region of the Dangrek Mountains. Neither the original judgment nor its interpretation fully resolves this uncertainty, although together they confirm Cambodia’s sovereignty over the Temple of Preah Vihear and the high promontory on which it stands.

The English courts are alive with international cases. In recent years, matters ranging from the interpretation and effect of UN Security Council resolutions to the obligation of the British government to advance cases of diplomatic protection have been determined. These cases have been of fundamental importance from the perspective of both English law and public international law. Belhaj v. Straw is one notable example.

On December 18, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or the Court) issued its judgment of the case Fag og Arbejde (FOA) v. Kommunernes Landsforening (KL).1 The CJEU’s decision is notable for being the first in which the Court directly rules on the question of whether discrimination based on body weight is prohibited under European law. Finding that there is no general prohibition on obesity discrimination in the employment context, the Court of Justice of the European Union nevertheless considers that in some cases, obesity can be a cause of disability. As a result, unequal treatment of obese persons could be a violation of the protections of non-discrimination enjoyed by persons with disabilities.

In Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic, an arbitration proceeding under the 1976 United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, seated in Geneva, Switzerland, the Tribunal analyzed Achmea’s claims under the Netherlands-Slovak Republic Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the Slovak Republic’s objections that Achmea’s claim manifestly lacked legal merit due to the inexistence of a “dispute” within the scope of the BIT. The Tribunal found that while an arbitrable “dispute” did exist between the parties, the claimant had not established a prima facie violation of the BIT, leading the Tribunal to decline jurisdiction.

On April 2, 2015, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) rendered its first ever advisory opinion by the full Tribunal in response to a request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), a regional fisheries organization comprised of seven West-African States. The Tribunal was asked to address four substantive questions relating to the obligations of the flag and coastal states regarding fisheries management and the ensuing responsibility of both states and competent organizations for illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. In doing so, it also had occasion to clarify whether ITLOS indeed has plenary advisory jurisdiction.

On September 30, 2014, Afghanistan signed agreements with the United States and NATO providing for U.S. and NATO military presences in Afghanistan following termination in December 2014 of the post-9/11 U.S. “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military missions.

The United Nations (UN) Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178, and UN Human Rights Council Resolution S-22/1 (UN Documents) form a key part of the international community’s efforts to resolve, manage, and document the ongoing non-international armed conflict in Iraq.

On September 16, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) gave its judgment in the case of Hassan v. United Kingdom.This is the Court’s first explicit engagement with the co-applicability of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in relation to detention in international armed conflicts. The judgment is significant for its rejection of the government’s argument that international humanitarian law operates as lex specialis to displace international human rights law entirely during the “active hostilities phase of an international armed conflict.” It is also noteworthy for the majority’s ruling that provisions on detention of prisoners of war and the internment of protected persons in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 could be read into Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights (the European Convention), creating a new ground for detention under Article 5(1) in international armed conflicts and modifying the procedural guarantees in Article 5(4).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been charged with the task of supervising the application of international conventions for the protection of refugees. This particular task of UNHCR has never been elaborated, neither during the drafting of UNHCR’s Statute, nor at a later date. It is clear, however, that interpretation of the conventions UNHCR has to supervise is an accepted part of its task. Prompted by its Executive Committee in 1977, it first drafted a Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Handbook) under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its accompanying 1967 Protocol in 1979. The inclusion of procedures in the Handbook is particularly interesting since the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol for that matter, do not regulate the determination of refugee status: “It is therefore left to each Contracting State to establish the procedure that it considers most appropriate.” The Handbook nonetheless comprises procedures for the determination of refugee status based on and induced by the observation that state practice regarding status determination varies considerably; ranging from formal procedures to informal arrangements. It is acknowledged that realizing identical procedures would be unlikely and the Handbook therefore confines itself to laying down certain basic requirements.

On December 10, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, also known as the Mauritius Convention on Transparency, which was prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Mauritius Convention is intended to provide states with an efficient mechanism for applying the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Transparency Rules) in investor-state arbitrations arising under investment treaties concluded before the Transparency Rules’ effective date of April 1, 2014. The Mauritius Convention was opened for signature on March 17, 2015, in Port Louis, Mauritius.

In June 2015, President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir of Sudan attended a meeting of the African Union (AU) in Johannesburg, South Africa, despite the fact that a warrant had been issued for his arrest by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in the Darfur region. Although South Africa, a party to the ICC, was obliged to arrest Al Bashir and surrender him to the ICC under the terms of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the South African government made no attempt to apprehend him. On the application of a South African public interest law firm, the North Gauteng High Court ordered that the government was required by law to arrest and detain Al Bashir. Al Bashir was, however, allowed to leave South Africa.

On October 22, 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court rendered a decision on the constitutional legitimacy of certain domestic norms that required Italy’s compliance with the rule on state immunity sanctioned by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the Judgment Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening). The Constitutional Court declared that the international customary obligations on state immunity from jurisdiction can be applied automatically within the Italian legal order only as long as they are in conformity with the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), comprised of 324 parliamentarians elected by and from the parliaments of the Council’s 47 member states, first addressed the protection of whistle-blowers in 2010.1 The Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a report prepared by Pieter Omtzigt (the Netherlands/European People’s Party) on behalf of its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. This report broke new ground in that—unlike the situation in the United Kingdom and the United States—the very concept of public-interest whistleblowing was still widely unknown in continental Europe. Populations with histories of authoritarian or even totalitarian rule had little love for those who were widely considered to be “informers,” “snitches,” or the like.2 The PACE report recognized the importance of whistle-blowers, defining them as “concerned individuals who sound an alarm in order to stop wrongdoings that place fellow human beings at risk,” and whose actions “provide an opportunity to strengthen accountability and bolster the fight against corruption and mismanagement, both in the public and private sectors.”3 The PACE recommendation based on this report bore its first fruits in 2014, when the Committee of Ministers (CM), in Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7, invited member states to improve legal protections for whistle-blowers in line with certain guiding principles.4 This was the first legal instrument in Europe to place whistleblowing squarely within a human rights framework.

In December 2013, civil conflict erupted between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and opposition forces due to political infighting among the country’s political and military elites. On March 3, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2206 pursuant to its powers under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Resolution 2206 provides for targeted sanctions against specific individuals and entities deemed “responsible for or complicit in, or [as] having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan.” The stated purpose of the targeted sanctions, which consist of a travel ban and asset freeze for designated individuals and entities, is to “support the search for an inclusive and sustainable peace in South Sudan.”