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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
For many years, the United Nations Security Council expressed its concerns about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program, doing so in the context of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. With the intent to resolve its concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The Resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that had been concluded on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran (the E3/EU + 3). Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA are closely intertwined. Their implementation will result in strict limits on Iran’s ability to produce weapongrade nuclear material. On-site verification and monitoring of these limits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will provide assurance that Iran is observing them. Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA also provide for a step-by-step removal of sanctions imposed on Iran for its past failure to resolve concerns about its nuclear program. Past concerns about “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program, while neither misplaced nor necessarily fully assuaged, were put aside, being outweighed by the prospect that the JCPOA offers, “a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”
* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the United Nations website (visited January 15, 2016), http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow/RES2231E.pdf.
1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ Google Scholar [hereinafter JCPOA].
2 S.C. Res. 2231, Annex B (July 20, 2015).
3 International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Corrected), ¶¶ 1–2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 (June 1972) [hereinafter INFCIRC/153].
4 Id. ¶ 7.
5 Id. ¶¶ 42–48.
6 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, art. XII.C.
7 IAEA, Model Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540 (Sept. 1997).
8 Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh on New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program, Iran Watch (Aug. 14, 2002), http://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14-02.
9 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 6, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/53 (Aug. 31, 2006)Google Scholar.
10 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 45, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003)Google Scholar.
11 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 41, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67 (Sept. 2, 2005)Google Scholar.
12 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 4, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005)Google Scholar.
13 IAEA, Board of Governors Res. 14, ¶ 1, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006)Google Scholar.
14 Id. ¶ 7.
15 S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010).
16 JCPOA, supra note 1, at preface, pmbl.
17 Id. at pmbl.
18 Id. ¶ 26.
19 Id. at Annex I, ¶ 75.
20 Under NPT safeguards agreements, no fixed time is specified for resolving concerns. This has the advantage of providing the IAEA with flexibility, but it has the disadvantage of allowing States to delay, perhaps for a long time. In the case of Iran, the JCPOA was agreed more than thirteen years after the first discovery of Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities.
21 IAEA, Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, ¶ 85, IAEA Doc. GOV/2015/68 (Dec. 2, 2015)Google Scholar.
22 IAEA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Implementation and Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), ¶ 9, IAEA Doc. GOV/2015/72 (Dec. 15, 2015)Google Scholar.
23 S.C. Res. 2231 ¶ 8 (July 20, 2015.
1 The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.
2 ‘Government officials’ for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration.
1 Iran will permit the IAEA to share the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, as submitted as part of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants.
2 For the purpose of this Annex, non-gaseous centrifuge uranium isotope separation-related research and development or production will include laser isotope separation systems, electromagnetic isotope separation systems, chemical exchange systems, gaseous diffusion systems, vortex and aerodynamic systems, and other such processes that separate uranium isotopes.
1 For the purposes of EU legislation, “Iranian person, entity or body” means:
(i) the State of Iran or any public authority thereof;
(ii) any natural person in, or resident in, Iran;
(iii) any legal person, entity or body having its registered office in Iran;
(iv) any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside Iran, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by one or more of the above mentioned persons or bodies.
2 The headings and subheadings in this Annex are for descriptive purposes only.
3 For the purposes of this Annex, the term “associated services” means any service – including technical assistance, training, insurance, re-insurance, brokering, transportation or financial service – necessary and ordinarily incident to the underlying activity for which sanctions have been lifted pursuant to this JCPOA.
4 Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons still subject to restrictive measures and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those referred to in Section 1. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran’s position on EU sanctions.
5 For the purposes of U.S. legislation, “Iranian person” means (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; and (B) an entity organised under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.
6 The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed towards non-U.S. persons. For the purposes of Sections 4 and 6-7 of this JCPOA, the term “non-U.S. person” means any individual or entity, excluding (i) any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organised under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States, and (ii) any entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person. For the purposes of (ii) of the preceding sentence, an entity is “owned or controlled” by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 percent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity. U.S. persons and U.S.-owned or -controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authorised to do so by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
7 All citations to statutes and Executive orders included in this JCPOA refer to the statute or Executive order as amended as of the conclusion date of this JCPOA, including: the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), as amended by Section 102 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and Sections 201–207 and 311 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA); CISADA, as amended by Sections 214 –216, 222, 224, 311–312, 402– 403 and 605 of TRA and Section 1249 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), as amended by Sections 503-504 of TRA and Section 1250 of IFCA; Executive Order (E.O.) 13622, as amended by Section 15 of E.O. 13628 and Section 16 of E.O. 13645. The citations listed in Section 4 include authorities under which secondary sanctions will no longer apply as a result of actions described in Section 4.8.1.
8 Removal of NIOC from the SDN List, as provided for in Section 4.8.1, will include resolution of related designations and determinations.
9 See footnote 3 for the meaning of “associated services”.
10 This commitment in Section 4.4.1 is based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.
11 To give effect to the measures described in this Section 5.1, the United States will license activities that do not involve any person on the SDN List and are otherwise consistent with applicable U.S. laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Export Administration Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.
12 Licenses issued in furtherance of Section 5.1.1 will include appropriate conditions to ensure that licensed activities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re-sold or re-transferred to, any person on the SDN list. Should the United States determine that licensed aircraft, goods, or services have been used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation end-use, or have been re-sold or retransferred to persons on the SDN List, the United States would view this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under Section 5.1.1 in whole or in part.
13 For the purposes of Section 5.1.2 of this JCPOA, a non-U.S. entity is owned or controlled by a U.S. person if the U.S. person: (i) holds a 50 per cent or greater equity interest by vote or value in the entity; (ii) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity; or (iii) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.
14 Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not apply to transactions that involve persons on the SDN List and is without prejudice to sanctions that may apply under legal provisions other than those cited in Section 4. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran’s position on U.S. sanctions.
15 For the purposes of the cessation of application of the provisions set out in Sections 4.1.1-4.1.7, the effects described for non-U.S. financial institutions extend to the activities outside of U.S. jurisdiction of international financial institutions.
16 Non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran) not appearing on the SDN List will not be exposed to sanctions as a result of those Iranian financial institutions engaging in transactions or banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conduct or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships with the Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List.
17 The effects described in Section 7.5 with respect to the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas are based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the SDN List.
1 This Annex is only for the purpose of determining the sequence of implementation of the commitments described in this JCPOA and annexes thereto and does not restrict or expand the scope of these commitments.
2 The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply are those directed towards non-U.S. persons, as described in Section 4 of Annex II.
3 The provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.