* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (visited March 24, 2016), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/251005.pdf.

1 See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 36 (per Lord Bingham).

2 E.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 8, 9 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(4), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. For a fuller account of these sources see Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/47 (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter A/HRC/27/47].

3 G.A. Res. 43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988). See further sources listed in A/HRC/27/47, supra note 2, ¶ 8.

4 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 8 on Article 9 (June 30, 1982) and Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35 on Article 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter General Comment No. 35]. See other bodies listed in A/HRC/27/47, supra note 2, ¶ 9.

5 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012).

6 Commission on Human Rights, Question of Arbitrary Detention, E/CN.4/RES/1991/42 (Mar. 5, 1991).

7 Its duty is described as “investigating cases of detention imposed arbitrarily or otherwise inconsistently with the relevant international standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or in the relevant international legal instruments accepted by the States concerned.” Id.

8 See Human Rights Council Res. 30/69, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/69, ¶ 1 (Aug. 4, 2015), which sets out the “terms of reference of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention under Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1991/42, 1992/28, 1993/36, 1994/32, 1995/59, 1996/28, 1997/50, 1998/41, 1999/37, 2000/36, 2001/40, 2002/42, 2003/31 and 2004/39, as well as Human Rights Council resolutions 6/4, 10/9, 15/18 and 24/7.”

9 See Commission on Human Rights Res. 1997/50, ¶ 15 (Apr. 15, 1997).

10 A/HRC/27/47, supra note 2, ¶ 1.

11 See International Commission of Jurists, Legal Commentary on the Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention in Armed Conflict 1 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter ICJ Commentary].

12 Human Rights Council Res 20/16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/16 (June 29, 2012). Here the Human Rights Council reaffirmed the importance of the work of the WGAD, and encouraged states to give “due consideration” to their recommendation, take “appropriate measures” to ensure “conformity with relevant international standards and the applicable international legal instruments,” and to “respect and promote” the range of rights available to any persons deprived of their liberty (whether in arrest, detention on a criminal charge, pre-trial detention, or administrative detention).

13 Id. ¶ 10.

14 Id. ¶ 11.

15 A/HRC/27/47, supra note 2.

16 Importantly, these included the judgements, general comments and guidance of the Human Rights Committee, as well as other Treaty based bodies within whose remit arbitrary detention lies.

17 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 47; U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/44 (Dec. 24, 2012) [hereinafter A/HRC/22/44].

18 A/HRC/27/47, supra note 2, ¶ 65

19 Id. The WGAD concluded that this report had not been concerned with factual compliance with these norms, and that its “basic principles and guidelines” would be presented “as an instrument for securing and improving such compliance.”

20 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right of Anyone Deprived of their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, U.N. Doc. WGAD/CRP.1/2015 (May 4, 2015) [hereinafter BPGs].

21 The Human Rights Committee is restricted to interpretation of the ICCPR. Its General Comment, which was adopted four months before the BPGs, is based almost exclusively on its own extensive jurisprudence on Article 9 ICCPR, as well as other General Comments it has issued on related rights and some other UN Guidelines on arbitrary detention for particular classes of detainees. See General Comment No. 35, supra note 4.

22 A/HRC/22/44, supra note 17, ¶ 47; see also A/HRC/27/47, supra note 2, ¶ 21.

23 BPGs, supra note 20, ¶¶ 22–25, 68.

24 General Comment No. 35, supra note 4, ¶¶ 65–67. Clearly, the BPGs approach also goes beyond the protections under the European Convention of Human Rights, which permits derogation under Article 15 from Article 5 under similarly restricted circumstances.

25 BPGs, supra note 20, ¶¶ 21, 65.

26 Id. ¶¶ 27, 69–73.

27 Id. ¶¶ 28, 74–78.

28 Id. ¶ 29.

29 Id. ¶¶ 80–85.

30 Id. ¶¶ 30–33, 86–90.

31 Id. ¶¶ 34, 35 91–93.

32 Id. ¶ 36.

33 Id. ¶¶ 37, 38, 95–101.

34 Id. ¶¶ 39, 102, 103.

35 Id. ¶¶ 40–42, 104, 105.

36 Id. ¶ 79.

37 Id. ¶¶ 43, 44, 106–11.

38 Id. ¶ 51. See further BPGs on: children - principle 18 (¶¶ 52–54) and guideline 18 (¶¶ 116–119); women and girls -principle 19 (¶ 55) and guideline 19 (¶¶ 120–121); persons with disabilities - principle 20 (¶¶ 56–59) and guideline 20 (¶¶ 122–26); and non-nationals, asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons - principle 21 (¶¶ 60–64) and guideline 21 (¶¶ 127–135).

39 Id. ¶¶ 136–141.

40 Id. ¶¶ 45–50, 112–15.

41 Id. ¶ 45.

42 Id. ¶ 47.

43 ICJ Commentary, supra note 11.

44 Id. at 3.

45 Id. at 5.

1 It is an essential component of due process rights necessary to protect the right to liberty and security of the person in all situations of deprivation of liberty and to prevent arbitrary arrest, detention, including secret detention, exile, forced disappearance or risk of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Articles 8, 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); Article 9(4), International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 37(b, d) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); Article 16 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW); Article 17(2)(f) of the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICPPED) which as the other duties in this convention is confirmed as customary international law; Articles 16, 32(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; Principles 4, 11, 32 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Body of Principles); Rules 7.1, 10.2, 13 of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juvenile Deprived of Their Liberty; Guideline 7 of the UNHCR Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (UNCHR Guidelines); Article 7(1)(a) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (African Charter); Article 5(h) of the Guidelines on Conditions of Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa (2014); Sections M, S of the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003); Article XXV of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) (American Declaration); Article 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention); Principles V, VII of the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (2008); Article 14(6, 7) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (Arab Charter); and, Article 5(4, 9) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See further to the Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD): A compilation of national, regional and international law, regulations and practice on the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before court (A/HRC/27/47), on state practice in particular, the ICRCs Customary IHL database on detention and enforced disappearances, i.a., “Relating to Rule 98. Enforced Disappearance Section A. General” https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule98_ sectiona (accessed 26 April 2015). Also the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States lists detention among categories of acts that violate customary international law. Section 702 (Customary International Law of Human Rights) provides that a state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . “(c) [the murder or] causing the disappearance of individuals”, “(e) prolonged arbitrary detention” or “(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”. ‘Without delay’ applies both to the right to get the matter before a court, and to the duty of the court to determine whether the detention is arbitrary or unlawful. The more precise requirements of ‘without delay’ are clarified later in the report, see, i.a., Guideline 7 and Guideline 10(a) where is stated that the right is a right to appear “promptly”.

2 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD): A compilation of national, regional and international law, regulations and practice on the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before court (A/HRC/27/47).

3 Report of the WGAD (A/HRC/19/57, para. 61).

4 Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before court is characterized as a “fundamental safeguard against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, requiring the senior authorities in the institutions responsible for implementing habeas corpus to take the requisite steps to ensure the effectiveness of that right (CAT/OP/HND/1, para. 137). Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, A/RES/47/133, 18 December 1992, Article 13: an investigation should be conducted for as long as the fate of the victim of enforced disappearance remains unknown; The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has reinforced the importance of guaranteeing the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before court to clarify past cases of enforced disappearances (A/HRC/4/ 41/Add.1, paras. 61–63): “habeas corpus procedures that have been suspended in contradiction to the Declaration should be reopened and investigations should be effortlessly continued in order to endeavour to clarify past cases of enforced disappearances” (para. 108).

5 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, OC-8/87 (1987), para. 42.

6 See Principle 4: Non-derogability of the right to bring proceedings before court without delay and to receive appropriate remedy.

7 WGAD: Persons deprived of their liberty are frequently unable to benefit from legal resources and guarantees that they are entitled to for the conduct of their defence as required by law in any judicial system and by applicable international human rights instruments (A/HRC/10/21, paras. 45-47; A/HRC/19/57, para. 63). The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention is frequently denied in circumstances where a detainee has never been formally charged or brought before a judge, has been held incommunicado or in solitary confinement, or has been denied an effective possibility or remedy to challenge his or her detention (Opinion nos. 33/2012, 38/2012, 19/2012, 22/2012, 08/2011, 14/2011).

8 Human Rights Council res. 20/16 (A/HRC/RES/20/16) para. 10. The Working Group appointed one of its members and subsequent Chair-Rapporteur, Mads Andenas, as reporter for the present Basic Principles and Guidelines. The present document is designated as a ‘conference room paper’, with a document number as CRP.1 from the Working Group. It is available on the UNFCCC web site and is the authentic version of the Basic Principles and Guidelines as finally adopted by the Working Group in 2015. (An edited version without footnotes is published in all the official languages of the UN with the document number A/HRC/30/37.) The Working Group had presented at the previous session of the Human Rights Council its 2011 Annual Report, (A/HRC/19/57), including a section on habeas corpus under ‘III. Thematic considerations’ as sub-section (B), clarifying international law and restating its jurisprudence. The Working Group was of the view that “States should ensure that the remedy of habeas corpus meets the following minimum requirements in order to comply with international human rights law”, and then listed in (a) to (h) these minimum requirements including:

9 In compliance with Human Rights Council res. 20/16 (A/HRC/RES/20/16) (2010).

10 The Working Group has continued the consultations with states directly and through the Regional Groups of Member States and other groups of states, and also with other stakeholders, submitting different drafts to general consultation over the dedicated web page and in communications directly with states, the Regional Groups of Member States and other groups of states.

11 The observations on State practice are based on the responses provided by the 44 States to the Working Group’s questionnaire, representing all global regions and diverse legal traditions, and other stakeholder submissions. The latter source not only demonstrates general practice accepted as law but also assists in identifying protection gaps and in proposing good practices to ensure effective coverage for persons deprived of their liberty to effectively exercise this procedural safeguard.

12 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report of Ukraine, CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7 (HRC, 2013): 8. [. . .] the Committee is concerned that sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly included in the non-exhaustive list of grounds of protection in the anti-discrimination law, and that the law provides for insufficient remedies (only compensation for material and moral damage) to victims of discrimination (arts. 2 and 26). The State party should further improve its antidiscrimination legislation to ensure adequate protection against discrimination in line with the Covenant and other international human rights standards. The State party should explicitly list sexual orientation and gender identity among the prohibited grounds for discrimination and provide victims of discrimination with effective and appropriate remedies, taking due account of the Committee’s general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant. It should also ensure that those responsible for discrimination bear administrative, civil and criminal responsibility in appropriate cases. 10. The Committee is [. . .] further concerned at reports that according to Ministry of Health order No. 60 of 3 February 2011 “On the improvement of medical care to persons requiring a change (correction) of sex”, transgender persons are required to undergo compulsory confinement in a psychiatric institution for a period up to 45 days and mandatory corrective surgery in the manner prescribed by the responsible Commission as a prerequisite for legal recognition of their gender. [. . .] While acknowledging the diversity of morality and cultures internationally, the Committee recalls that all States parties are always subject to the principles of universality of human rights and non- discrimination. The State party should therefore state clearly and officially that it does not tolerate any form of social stigmatization of homosexuality, bisexuality or transsexuality, or hate speech, discrimination or violence against persons because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. The State party should provide effective protection to LGBT persons and ensure the investigation, prosecution and punishment of any act of violence motivated by the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity. [. . .] The State party should also amend order No. 60 and other laws and regulations with a view to ensuring that: (1) the compulsory confinement of persons requiring a change (correction) of sex in a psychiatric institution for up to 45 days is replaced by a less invasive measure; [. . .] See also Concluding Observations on country reports: CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2 para. 30; CCPR/C/PHL/CO/4 (HRC, 2012), para. 10; CCPR/C/BLZ/CO/1 (HRC, 2013), para. 13; CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3 (HRC, 2013), para. 23; CCPR/C/LTU/CO/3 (HRC, 2012), para. 8; CCPR/ C/ARM/CO/2 (HRC, 2012), para. 10; CCPR/C/GTM/CO/3 (HRC, 2012), para. 11; CCPR/C/BOL/CO/3 (HRC, 2013), para. 7; CCPR/C/JAM/CO/3 (HRC, 2011), para. 8; CCPR/C/FIN/CO/6 (HRC, 2013), para. 8; CCPR/C/DOM/CO/5 (HRC, 2012), para. 16; CCPR/C/PER/CO/5 (HRC, 2013), para. 8; CCPR/C/URY/ CO/5 (HRC, 2013), para. 12; CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1 (HRC, 2012), para. 10.

13 See Principle 16 (Exercise of the right to court review in situations of armed conflict, public danger or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State).

14 Articles 26 and 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 15 Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment no. 35, paras. 3, 18 and 46; and, Communications: 265/1987, Vuolanne v. Finland, para. 9.3 (military); 1069/2002, Bakhtiyari v. Australia, para. 9.5 (children); 1090/2002, Rameka v. New Zealand, paras. 7.2-7.3 (parole); see Concluding observations Ukraine 2013, para. 10 (LGBTI); Switzerland 2001, para. 15 (non-citizens). 16 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992, Article 1.

17 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 6.

18 See: Principle 8: Timeframe for exercise of the right to bring proceedings before the court; WGAD Deliberation no. 9 concerning the definition and scope of arbitrary deprivation of liberty under customary international law, para. 57 (A/HRC/22/44), citing E/CN.4/1997/4, para. 66; HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 13.

19 WGAD Deliberation no. 9, paras. 58-59; HRC General Comment no. 35, paras. 5 and 6.

20 WGAD Revised methods of work, para. 8 (A/HRC/16/47, Annex); HRC General Comment no. 35, paras. 11, 12, 14- 21.

21 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/22/44.

22 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (A/HRC/27/48), para. 83. Also see the principle established at the Eight United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders: “Pretrial detention may be ordered only if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the persons concerned have been involved in the commission of the alleged offences and there is a danger of their absconding or committing further serious offences, or a danger that the course of justice will be seriously interfered with if they are let free.”

23 Deliberation No. 9 has been cited as one source on the approach to identification of customary international law by the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the identification of customary international law, Sir Michael Wood, in his first and second reports on formation and evidence of customary international law submitted to the International Law Commission, see First report on formation and evidence of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission (A/CN.4/663), para. 53 and Annex of the Second report on identification of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission (A/CN.4/672), paras 41.8 and 76.6.

24 HRC General Comment no. 35, paras. 11, 22-23.

25 The Working Group has in its jurisprudence applied the criteria in conformity with the conclusions on the identification of customary international law by the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the identification of customary international law, Sir Michael Wood, in his first and second reports on formation and evidence of customary international law submitted to the International Law Commission, see First report on formation and evidence of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission (A/CN.4/663), and Second report on identification of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission (A/CN.4/672). The basic approach is two constituent elements, a general practice which is accepted as law. In the international law on human rights, it is accepted that general principles of international law have an important role, and interacts with these two constituent elements in the formation of customary law.

26 The Working Group regards the work of the Red Cross as complementary in securing the rights of the arbitrarily detained and as highly authoritative on IHL, and appreciate that the two historically distinct systems of Human Rights Law and IHL increasingly work in tandem to create the most protective system. The Working Group has applied the authoritative ICRC customary international study, see Jan- Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 volumes, Volume I. Rules, Volume II. Practice (2 Parts), Cambridge University Press, 2005, and likewise the ICRC Customary IHL database.

27 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 43, and, Communication No. 1090/2002, Rameka v. New Zealand, paras. 7.3 and 7.4.

28 United Nations Charter, 1 UNTS XVI (26 June 1945), Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Preamble.

29 United Nations Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 1(1).

30 United Nations Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(5).

31 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2170 (2014) (15 August 2014),’Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’; Also see S/RES/1674 (2006) (28 April 2006), ‘Protection of civilians in armed conflict’; and, S/RES/2071 (2012) (12 October 2012), ‘Mali’.

32 This should not be interpreted as meaning that States are bound by international and regional instruments that they have not ratified or acceded to, that do not constitute customary international law.

33 In para. 10, res. 20/16, the HRC states the aim of the basic principles and guidelines is to “assist [. . .] Member States in fulfilling their obligation to avoid arbitrary deprivation of liberty in compliance with international human rights law.” In para. 19 of its Deliberation no. 9, the WGAD stated: “The notion of arbitrary stricto sensu includes both the requirement that a particular form of deprivation of liberty is taken in accordance with the applicable law and procedure and that it is proportional to the aim sought, reasonable and necessary”. Further, the WGAD in its 2011 report to the HRC (A/HRC/19/57) stated, “the absence of a remedy of habeas corpus constitutes, per se, a human rights violation by depriving the individual [. . .] of the human right to protection from arbitrary detention.” Hence, if the Principles are restricted to a discussion of the lawfulness of the detention, not only will the aim of the HRC’s exercise be lost, but it would also severely limit the scope of protection this right could offer to persons deprived of their liberty. The International Court of Justice has stated that “wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgments, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 42, para. 91.

34 UDHR (Article 9).

35 The right to bring such proceedings before court is wellenshrined in treaty law and customary international law and constitutes a peremptory norm (jus cogens), as observed by the WGAD in its deliberation No. 9 (2013) concerning the definition and scope of arbitrary deprivation of liberty under customary international law (A/HRC/22/44). The current Basic Principles and Guidelines meet the criteria laid out by the International Court of Justice in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422 at p. 457 when confirming the status of the prohibition of torture as peremptory norm (jus cogens). The prohibition on arbitrary detention is grounded in a widespread international practice and on the opinio juris of States. It appears in numerous international instruments of universal application, and it has been introduced into the domestic law of almost all States; finally, arbitrary detention is regularly denounced within national and international fora. In the Court’s opinion, the prohibition of torture is part of customary international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens). That prohibition is grounded in a widespread international practice and on the opinio juris of States. It appears in numerous international instruments of universal application (in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; General Assembly resolution 3452/30 of 9 December 1975 on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), and it has been introduced into the domestic law of almost all States; finally, acts of torture are regularly denounced within national and international fora.” (Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422 p. 457). WGAD Background Paper, para. 15: A review of State practice demonstrates widespread acceptance to be bound by the obligation to ensure the right to court review of detention through its codification in national law. A majority of States has enshrined the protection in their respective Constitutions or Codes of Criminal Procedure, and often both. Half the responding States demonstrated the right to court review of detention also features in a diversity of other legislative acts, including human rights acts, administrative offence codes, and civil law procedural codes, among others. A very small number of States demonstrated the existence of the procedural safeguard in laws exclusively regulating the detention of particular vulnerable groups, including laws relating to child detainees, to detained migrants, including asylum seekers, and to persons detained involuntarily on health grounds. An equally small number of States have specialized laws uniquely dealing with the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before court. The right to court review is a peremptory (jus cogens) norm in its own right, and an additional reason that it cannot be derogated from under the Covenant is its importance in protecting explicitly enumerated non-derogable rights (see Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35 of the HRC. Document CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, paras. 14 and 67). Domestic authorities, including courts, have a clear and strong duty under international law to make the right effective. Erecting barriers to jurisdiction, extending immunities, and limiting the right or remedies under it in light of other rules, must not render the right ineffective. This is restated and clarified in the Working Group’s constant jurisprudence.

36 Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, adopted by the African Commission in 2003, section M, details the components necessary in order to ensure exercise of the procedural guarantee, including the necessity for States to enact legislation to ensure the right. Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT), Report on the Maldives, CAT/OP/MDV/1, paras. 96 to 98.

37 Committee against Torture (CAT): a “State party must also adopt the measures necessary to guarantee the right of any person who has been deprived of their liberty to have access to an immediate remedy to challenge the legality of their detention” (CAT/C/CUB/CO/2, para. 8). European Court of Human Rights: The right to court review of detention in domestic legislation must be effective and real, allowing for accessibility and certainty. Assandize v. Georgia (Application no. 71503/01) 8 April 2004; Aden Ahmed v. Malta (Application no. 55352/12) 23 July 2013.

38 WGAD: Where due process rights are denied, a State cannot rely on the excuse of lack of administrative capacity (opinion nos. 21/2004 and 46/2006).

39 The International Court of Justice in its 2010 Diallo judgment stated that article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the ICCPR applies in principle to any form of detention, “whatever its legal basis and the objective being pursued”. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 77. Body of Principles (Principle 4): “any form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting the human rights of a person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be ordered by, or be subject to the effective control of, a judicial or other authority”. WGAD (A/HRC/13/30/Add.2) and CAT (CAT/C/MRT/CO/1) have called on States parties to provide access to effective judicial remedies to challenge the legality of administrative decisions on detention. Special Rapporteur on Migrants and human rights: Governments must ensure that procedural safeguards and guarantees established by international human rights law and national law are applied to any form of detention (A/HRC/20/24, para. 72 (a)).

40 ICCPR (Article 9(4)): “anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful”. African Charter (Article 7(1)(a)): guarantees “the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force”. African Commission: “the writ of habeas corpus was developed as the response of common law to arbitrary detention, permitting detained persons and their representatives to challenge such detention and to demand that the authority either release or justify all imprisonment” (143/95-150/96: Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organization – Nigeria, para. 23). American Declaration (Article XXV): “every individual who has been deprived of his liberty has the right to have the legality of his detention ascertained without delay by a court, and the right to be tried without undue delay or, otherwise, to be released”. American Convention (Article 7(6)): “Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful.” Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2008) (Principle V) (Inter- American Principles): “all persons deprived of liberty shall have the right, exercised by themselves or by others, to present a simple, prompt, and effective recourse before the competent, independent, and impartial authorities, against acts or omissions that violate or threaten to violate their human rights”. Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004) (Article 14(6): “anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to petition a competent court in order that it may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful”. Article 5(4) of the European Convention (Article 5(4)): “everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful”. Oxford Pro Bono Publico study: In relation to all types of detention governed by civilian (as opposed to military) justice systems, there appears to be a very strong trend toward guaranteeing the right of a detainee to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a judicial body (p. 100). There is a very strong trend toward requiring that all members of the military detained as a disciplinary measure be guaranteed the right to challenge their detention, although the nature and scope of the right to court review differs (p. 97). HRC General Comment 31, para. 10; CAT General Comment 2, para. 7. See also Al- Saadoon & Others v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2015] EWHC 715 (Admin), [2015] WLR(D) 168.

41 This Principle is not limited to the legal concept of “the writ of habeas corpus” or similar concepts in common law countries. Such involvement includes the contractual relationship to private contractors or their subcontractors. See Opinion No.52/2014 (Australia and Papua New Guinea), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/52, and generally Opinion No.50/2014 (The United States and Cuba), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/50.

42 See: Introduction, paragraph 4, of this report. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (articles 27.2, 25, 8 IAConvention on Human Rights), OC 9/87 (1987), para. 41(1). [source: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_ 4i.htm]; Advisory Opinion 8/87 from January 30, 1987 entitled Habeas Corpus under suspension of guarantees (ARTS. 27.2, 25.1 Y 7.6) of the Interamerican Convention on Human Rights. [source: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ iachr/b_11_4h.htm] WGAD, Deliberation No. 9: “the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and the right of anyone deprived of his or her liberty to bring proceedings before court in order to challenge the lawfulness of the detention, are non-derogable, under both treaty law and customary international law” (A/HRC/22/44, para. 47) (UN Doc A/HRC/7/4 (2008), paras. 67, 82(a); WGAD 2011 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/16/47, 19 January 2011, para. 63: “The Working Group is of the view that, in their domestic legislation, States should ensure that the remedy of habeas corpus meets the following minimum requirements in order to comply with international human rights law . . . Non-derogability: even in cases provided for in article 4 of the Covenant, and in cases of armed conflict – whether between two or more States parties or within the same State party – in conformity with the Geneva Conventions. Provision to that effect has been made by all human rights bodies of the United Nations system (see Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/36, para. 16, and many others, including resolution 1994/32, which refers to habeas corpus as “a personal right not subject to derogation, including during states of emergency”).” Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C /21 /Rev.1 /Add.11 (2001), para. 11: The enumeration of nonderogable provisions in article 4 is related to, but not identical with, the question whether certain human rights obligations bear the nature of peremptory norms of international law. The proclamation of certain provisions of the Covenant as being of a non-derogable nature, in article 4, paragraph 2, is to be seen partly as recognition of the peremptory nature of some fundamental rights ensured in treaty form in the Covenant (e.g., articles 6 and 7). However, it is apparent that some other provisions of the Covenant were included in the list of non-derogable provisions because it can never become necessary to derogate from these rights during a state of emergency (e.g., articles 11 and 18). Furthermore, the category of peremptory norms extends beyond the list of non-derogable provisions as given in article 4, paragraph 2. States parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35 of the HRC. Document CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 14: “In order to protect nonderogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.” Footnote 9: “In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant.”

43 American Convention (Article 7(6): “. . . . In States Parties whose laws provide that anyone who believes himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may not be restricted or abolished.” Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (Section M(5)(e)).

44 Arab Charter (art. 4 (1 and 2)): The legal protections provided for in article 14 of the Charter cannot be derogated from, not even in in times of public emergency; Inter- American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (Article X); HRC General Comment No 29, para. 16; Commission on Human Rights resolution 1992/35, para. 2; Joint Study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, represented by its Vice-Chair Shaheen Sardar Ali; and The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, represented by its Chair Jeremy Sarkin (A/HRC/13/42), paras. 46-47; Report on the visit of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture to Honduras, UN Doc CAT/OP/HND/1 (2010), para. 282(a)-(b); Report of the WGAD, A/HRC/7/4, para. 64; E/CN.4/1995/31, para. 25 (d). Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture: recommends “the effectiveness and absolute non- derogability of habeas corpus be guaranteed in states of emergency” (CAT/OP/HND/1, para. 137). Committee on Enforced Disappearances: recommends the adoption of “the necessary measures to establish that the right to apply for habeas corpus may be neither suspended nor restricted under any circumstances, even when a state of emergency or siege has been declared, and to guarantee that any person with a legitimate interest may initiate the procedure” (CED/C/ESP/CO/1, para. 26).

45 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, January 30, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 8 (1987), para. 22.

46 IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, para. 39.

47 American Convention (Article 27(1)); European Court of Human Rights, Al-Jeddah v UK (2011) ECHR 1092.

48 American Charter s. 27(1).

49 See: para. 9 of this report regarding the definition of “anyone”. Also see: ICCPR, Articles 2(1), 4(1), 14, 16 and 26; 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 3.

50 ICCPR (Article 14(1)); African Commission, Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, No 153/96, 13th Activity Report (15 November 1999) paras 15-18. Body of Principles (Principle 11): “1. A person shall not be kept in detention without being given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or other authority. . . . 3. A judicial or other authority shall be empowered to review as appropriate the continuance of detention.” HRC Communications Nos. 1090/2002, Rameka v. New Zealand, para. 7.4 (discussing ability of Parole Board to act in judicial fashion as a court) and 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.2 (finding review by Minister of the Interior insufficient); and general comment No. 32 Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), paras 19- 24. “A “court” must be established by law, and must either be independent of the executive and legislative branches or must enjoy judicial independence in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in nature”; Vuolanne v Finland, UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987 (7 April 1989), paras 7.2 and 9.6 . Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, adopted by the African Commission in 2003, entrusts judicial bodies to, at all times, hear and act upon petitions for habeas corpus, amparo or similar procedures, and states that no circumstances whatever must be invoked as a justification for denying the right to habeas corpus, amparo or similar procedures. These are defined as “a legal procedure brought before a judicial body to compel the detaining authorities to provide accurate and detailed information regarding the whereabouts and conditions of detention of a person or to produce a detainee before the judicial body” (section S (m), Principles A(4) and A(5)). Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Chaparro A´ lvarez and Lapo I´n˜iguez v Ecuador, Series C No 170 (21 November 2007), paras 128-130. The authority which decides on the legality of an arrest or detention must be a judge or court; article 7(6) of the Convention is therefore ensuring judicial control over the deprivation of liberty”. Vélez Loor v. Ecuador, para. 126 [complete citation]: “The review by a judge or a court is a fundamental requirement to guarantee adequate control and scrutiny of the administrative acts which affect fundamental rights”. European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), D.N. v Switzerland, App No 27154/95 (29 March 2001), para 42. The procedure . . . requires a hearing of the detainee before the judicial organ, a body independent of the executive, with a guarantee of impartiality and the force to implement its decisions.

51 ICCPR (Article 9(2)). African Commission Guidelines on Conditions of Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in Africa (2014) (Article 5(h)): upon arrest, persons must be informed of the right to challenge their detention.

52 HRC General Comment no. 35, paras. 25 and 46; and, Concluding observations: Switzerland (1996), para. 111; and Benin (2004), para. 16.

53 HRC Communication No. 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.2 (seven days); Paul Kelly v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 (8 April 1991), para 5.6 (one month); HRC, Akhadov v. Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc CCPR/C/101/D/ 1503/2006 (25 March 2011), para. 7.4 (two weeks); Concluding observations: Suriname, UN Doc CCPR/CO/80/SUR (2004), para 14; Sri Lanka (A/50/40), (1995), para. 452 (one year).

54 In cases where, after the final judgment, the grounds justifying the person’s deprivation of liberty are susceptible to change with the passage of time, the right to challenge the arbitrariness and lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty shall be applicable upon service of the fixed portion of the sentence. (Kafkaris v. Cyprus, (no. 2) (dec.)). In particular, in Kafkaris v. Cyprus, the ECtHR found that “Article 5 §4 guaranteed prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment the right to a remedy to determine the lawfulness of their detention once they had served the “tariff” (the retributive and deterrent part of their sentence), since under English law, on expiry of that initial punitive period further detention depended solely on circumstances that were subject to change, such as how dangerous the individual was considered to be, or the risk of his reoffending” (Kafkaris v. Cyprus, para. 58) See also para. 40 of the HRC General Comment No 35: “When a prisoner is serving the minimum duration of a prison sentence as decided by a court of law after a conviction, either as a sentence for a fixed period of time or as the fixed portion of a potentially longer sentence, paragraph 4 does not require subsequent review of the detention.”

55 See para. 10 of this report regarding the term “deprivation of liberty”. Body of Principles (Principle 32): “1. A detained person or his counsel shall be entitled at any time to take proceedings according to domestic law before a judicial or other authority to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in order to obtain his release without delay, if it is unlawful.”

56 Body of Principles (Principle 11): “1. . . . . A detained person shall have the right to defend himself or to be assisted by counsel as prescribed by law.” HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 46; Communications; Umarova v Uzbekistan, UN Doc CCPR/C/100/D/1449/2006 (19 October 2010), para. 8.5; Bousroual v Algeria, UN Doc CCPR/C/86/992/2001 (30 March 2006), para 9.7. See also: Concluding Observations: Benin (2004), para. 16; Belgium, UN Doc CCPR/C/BEL/ CO/5 (2010), para 17; Portugal, UN Doc CCPR/C/PRT/CO/4 (2012); Turkey, CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1 (13 November 2012), para 17; Czech Republic, CCPR/CO/72/CZE (27 August 2001), para 17; The Netherlands, CCPR/C/NLD/CO/4 (25 August 2009), para 11; Spain, UN Doc CCPR/C/ESP/CO/5 (2008), para 14. UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 45/166 of 18 December 1990, Principle 7; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Veélez Loor v Ecuador, Series C No 218 (23 November 2010), para 139. Inter-American Principles, Principle V (4): The detainee must have an “opportunity to be represented by counsel or some other representative”. African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Liesbeth Zegveld and Messie Ephrem v Eritrea, No 250/2002, 17th Activity Report (November 2003), para 55; Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Principles M(2)(b), (e), and (f). European Court of Human Rights, Castravet v Moldova App No 23393/05 (13 March 2007) paras 47-50; Singh v the United Kingdom (App No 23389/94) ECHR1996-I (21 February 1996), para 68; Soysal v Turkey App No 50091/99 (3 May 2007) paras 77-81.

57 Body of Principles (Principle 32(2)).

58 ICCPR, article 14.3. (b) IACHR, article 8.2.c.

59 UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Principle 16.

60 UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Principles 8 and 22; UN Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid, para 43(d); UN Body of Principles (Principles 18(3) and (4)). HRC, Austria, UN Doc CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4 (2007), para 16. European Court of Human Rights, Castravet v Moldova App No 23393/05 (13 March 2007), paras 51-55, 58-60; Istratii and Others v Moldova App No 8721/05 (27 March 2007) paras 91-95, 98-100; Modarca v Moldova App No 14437/05 (10 May 2007) paras 89-93, 96-98; Musuc v Moldova App No 42440/06 (6 November 2007) para. 57; Rybacki v Poland, App no 52479/99 (13 January 2009), paras 56-62. Inter-American Principles, Principle V, fourth para; Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Principle I(c).

61 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Article 17 (2(f)): State parties must “guarantee that . . . any persons with a legitimate interest, such as relatives of the person deprived of liberty, their representatives or their counsel, shall, in all circumstances, be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty and order the person’s release if such deprivation of liberty is not lawful”; HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 46; Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, section M (Principle M(5)(b) and (e)): “anyone concerned or interested in the well-being, safety or security of a person deprived of his or her liberty has the right to a prompt and effective judicial remedy as a means of determining the whereabouts or state of health of such a person and/or identifying the authority ordering or carrying out the deprivation of liberty”. American Convention (Article 7(6)): “. . . The interested party or another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these remedies.” Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (Principle V, fifth paragraph, and Principle VII, first paragraph): “This right may be exercised by third parties or organizations, in accordance with the law”. Body of Principles (Principle 32(1)). WGAD Background paper, para. 44: The responses of States to the Working Group’s questionnaire show widespread practice in guaranteeing the detainee the right to initiate proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of detention, him or herself, or to be represented by counsel of choice. A number of States have empowered a wider group of individuals to initiate such proceedings, including a legal guardian, a state authority such as the prosecutor or state-appointed health professional, the ombudsman or national human rights institution, a nongovernmental organization, or the employer or co-workers.

62 Body of Principles (Principle 11): “1. A person shall not be kept in detention without being given an effective opportunity to be heard promptly by a judicial or other authority. “(Principle 32): “2. . . . The detaining authority shall produce without unreasonable delay the detained person before the reviewing authority.” HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 42; “The detainee has the right to appear in person before the court, and the court must have the power to order the detainee to be brought before it.” Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in advisory opinion OC-8/87 (30 January 1987) on habeas corpus in emergency situations, para. 33: the protection is “a judicial remedy designed to protect personal freedom or physical integrity against arbitrary detentions by means of a judicial decree ordering the appropriate authorities to bring the detained person before a judge so that the lawfulness of the detention may be determined and, if appropriate, the release of the detainee be ordered.”

63 Paragraph 8 of General Comment 32 of the HRC. EctHR, Wloch v Poland (2000) ECHR 504, paras. 125-131; A and Others v United Kingdom (2008) ECHR 113, paras. 202-204;

64 HRC, General Comment No 32, para 13.

65 EctHR, Hutchinson Reid v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 50272/99, Judgment (Third Section), 20 February 2003, para. 74; Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 33977/96, Judgment (Fourth Section), 26 July 2001, para. 87. UNHCR Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012) (para. 47 (v)). WGAD: Azharul Islam et al v. Bangladesh, Opinion No 66/2012, U.N. Doc.A/HRC/WGAD/ 2012/66 7 August 2013, paras. 52–58.

66 HRC Communication nos. A v Australia, Communication 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997) para. 9.5; 1255/2004 et al., Shams et al. v. Australia, para. 7.3; European Court of Human Rights, A and Others v United Kingdom (2008) ECHR 113, para. 202.

67 Article 8, UDHR; HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 52. Article 9.5 ICCPR (Spanish and French versions for reparations); UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly in resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, paras 18-23

68 ICCPR, Article 9(5). UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation, para 20. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers (Article 16(9)): Where it has been determined that migrant workers and members of their families have been victims of unlawful arrest or detention, the Convention guarantees an enforceable right to compensation. A claim for compensation may be made where the arrest or detention is found unlawful under national or international law and States parties must ensure that the right to compensation can be effectively enforced before the competent domestic authority (CMW/C/GC/2, para. 35). Arab Charter (art. 14 (7)): Any victim of unlawful arrest or detention is entitled to compensation. European Convention (Article 5(5)): Victims of unlawful arrest or detention have an enforceable right to compensation. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 85(1)). Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (1998), para 129; Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Principle M(1)(h)); African Commission, Embga Mekongo Louis v. Cameroon, Communication 59/91, decided 22 March 1995 at the 17th Ordinary Session. Permanent Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzów (Merits), Germany v Poland 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13), p.29. Oxford Pro Bono Publico study: There is a consistent trend toward guaranteeing the right of persons whose detention is found to have been unlawful to obtain monetary compensation (p. 100). There is a strong trend toward making compensation available to an individual found to be unlawfully held in preventive detention and a strong trend toward requiring that monetary compensation be available to persons whose administrative detention for counterterrorism, national security, or intelligence- gathering purposes is found to have been unlawful as well as to all members of the military whose detention under the military justice system is found to have been unlawful (p. 97-98). A weaker, but nonetheless significant, trend has been identified in the practice of States towards persons detained for migration-related reasons and persons detained for mental health reasons ensuring they be awarded compensation where their detention is found unlawful (p. 99).

69 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Juan Humberto Sa´nchez v Honduras, Series C No. 99 (7 June 2003), para. 121; Ba´maca Vela´squez v Guatemala, Series C No.

70 (25 November 2000), para 191; ICJ, The right to a remedy and to reparation for gross human rights violations – Practitioners Guide no. 2 (2006), Chapter 3, available at: http://www.icj.org/the-right-to-a-remedy-and-to-reparationfor-gross-human-rights-violations/. 70 See Principle 8, above, _any form of detention will constitute the effective control over the detention thereby making the detainee subject to the State’s jurisdiction_. See in general the UN Committee against Torture, General comment No. 3 (2012), Implementation of article 14 by States parties. The liability towards victims of arbitrary detention may also follow from the contractual relationship to private contractors or their servants or subcontractors.

71 See Opinion No.52/2014 (Australia and Papua New Guinea), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/52, Opinion No.50/2014 (The United States and Cuba), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/50 and Opinion No.8/2015 (Australia), A/HRC/WGAD/2015/8.

72 Human Rights Committee communication no. 473/1991, Barroso v. Panama, paras. 2.4, 8.2 (habeas corpus for bail from pretrial detention).

73 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 41; and, communications: A v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/ D/560/1993 (30 April 1997), at para 9.5; Shams et al. v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/90/D/1255/2004 (20 July 2007), para 7.3. WGAD Background paper, para. 34: The great majority of responding States to the Working Group’s questionnaire report the existence of specific legal provisions empowering the reviewing body to order the immediate release of the detainee upon a successful challenge to the lawfulness of detention.

74 ICCPR (Article 2(3)(c)); American Convention, article 25(2)(c); Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Principles C(c)(4) and M(2)(h). European Court of Human Rights, Assanidze v Georgia, App no 71503/01 (8 Apr 2004), paras 173 and 185- 187.

75 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/16/47: 46. Pursuant to article 72 of additional Protocol I, the provisions of Section III (Treatment of Persons in the Power of a Party to the Conflict) are additional to the rules concerning humanitarian protection of civilians in the power of a Party to the conflict, as well as to other applicable rules of international law relating to the protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict. In this regard, the ICRC refers to three instruments binding the States which are Parties to them: (a) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); (b) the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); (c) the American Convention on Human Rights (1969). 48. Paragraph 4 of article 75 of Protocol I reproduces most of the fair trial guarantees provided for in international human rights instruments (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14; European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 5-6; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8). Indeed, as is noted in the ICRC commentaries, in each of these treaties there is a clause permitting derogations from the articles in question in time of war (ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, para. 3092). However, article 75 is not subject to any possibility of derogation or suspension and consequently it is these provisions which will play a decisive role in the case of armed conflict. Besides, the provisions in all these instruments are more or less equivalent (Ibid ). 49. Similarly, it is emphasised in the preamble to Additional Protocol II that “international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person.” In this regard, the ICRC notes that this provision establishes the link between Protocol II and the international instruments on human rights. (ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, para. 4427). International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, Rule 99 ‘Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited’, pp. 349 –352, [https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarianlaw-i-icrc-eng.pdf]: (iii) Obligation to provide a person deprived of liberty with an opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of detention. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and European and American Conventions on Human Rights provide for the right to have the lawfulness of detention reviewed by a court and the release ordered in case it is not lawful (so-called writ of habeas corpus). This right is also provided for in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly without a vote. This rule is part of the domestic law of most, if not all, States in the world. It was included in the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Philippines. In its General Comment on Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (states of emergency), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that “in order to protect non- derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant”. In its advisory opinions in the Habeas Corpus case and the Judicial Guarantees case in 1987, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded that the writ of habeas corpus is among those judicial remedies that are “essential” for the protection of various rights whose derogation is prohibited under the American Convention on Human Rights and which is non- derogable in itself as a result. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has held that proceedings to decide on the lawfulness of detention must be brought before a court that is independent of the executive authority that ordered the detention, in particular in emergency-type situations where administrative detention is practiced. The European Court of Human Rights has similarly stressed the requirement that the review of the legality of detention be undertaken by a body which is independent of the executive. There is, in addition, extensive practice to the effect that persons deprived of their liberty must have access to a lawyer. The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly without a vote, also specifies that “a detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel”. In particular, the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention requires the assistance of a lawyer, in order to be effective. It should be noted, however, that all persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to a noninternational armed conflict must be given the opportunity to challenge the legality of the detention unless the government of the State affected by the non-international armed conflict claimed for itself belligerent rights, in which case captured enemy “combatants” should benefit from the same treatment as granted to prisoners of war in international armed conflicts and detained civilians should benefit from the same treatment as granted to civilian persons protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention in international armed conflicts.

76 WGAD: International human rights law, and the rights related to liberty and security of the person in particular, apply everywhere and at all times, both in peace and in armed conflict, at home and abroad. There is agreement that the norms of international human rights instruments and customary international law protecting individuals against arbitrary detention shall be complied with by Governments in situations of armed conflict (A/HRC/16/47, para. 51). ICRC commentaries to Protocol II, para. 4429, referring to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2675 (XXV), and resolution 2675 (XXV) as cited in A/HRC/16/47, para. 45. Every international court, tribunal or human rights body that has examined the application of human rights law extraterritorially confirm that a state’s human rights treaty obligations apply for detention in armed conflict. The approach or method here as in relation to the other questions in these Core Principles and Guidelines is that of public international law in general. In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep, §106, the International Court of Justice held that the protections offered by human rights conventions do no cease in military operations and applied the human rights obligation of states to the conduct of military operations; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep, §216); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, §25; In its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice affirmed the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights during armed conflicts, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of any kind to be found in article 4 of the Covenant. HRC General Comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 11); A/HRC/16/47, paras. 39 and 40. Mohammed v Ministry of Defence (2014) ECWH 1369 (QB), §§ 288-290. Mr. Justice Leggatt held that humanitarian law did not provide a legal basis for detention non-international armed conflicts and that absent some other legal basis there was a violation of human rights law. See also Al-Saadoon & Others v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2015] EWHC 715 (Admin), [2015] WLR(D) 168. Judgment of the ECtHR Grand Chamber in Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, 16 September 2014: “[I]n relation to detention taking place during an international armed conflict, Article 5 §§ 2 and 4 must also be interpreted in a manner which takes into account the context and the applicable rules of international humanitarian law . . . , if the Contracting State is to comply with its obligations under Article 5 § 4 in this context, the “competent body” should provide sufficient guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness.” The Court was careful to limits its judgment to international armed conflicts. An alternative approach, suggested by the dissenting judges, requires a derogation as a means of accommodating the humanitarian law principles in this situation. The Oslo Statement on Norms and Procedures in Times of Public Emergency or Internal Violence, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/31, is an authoritative and important source that has been referred to by the UN Human Rights Committee and international criminal tribunals. The so-called Copenhagen Principles and Guidelines on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations (2012) demonstrate a lack of agreement between states on how to proceed in the field within the framework of international law. Copenhagen Principles no. 12 clarify that: “A detainee whose liberty has been deprived for security reasons is to, in addition to a prompt initial review, have the decision to detain reconsidered periodically by an impartial and objective authority that is authorised to determine the lawfulness and appropriateness of continued detention.” The participants state that they are not seeking ‘to create new legal obligations’ and the Commentary that the text ‘should not be taken as evidence that States regard the practice as required out of a sense of legal obligation’. It is clear that this document cannot limit international law obligations in treaty or customary international law. One instance of state practice that runs counter to the general assertions in that document is stated in the UPR process. See Universal Periodic Review. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Germany A/HRC/11/15 (2009): II. CONCLUSIONS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS (to Germany): “6. Acknowledge the full applicability of ICCPR to persons subject to its jurisdiction both at home and abroad; comply fully with its obligations under the ICCPR and the recommendation of HR Committee”. Universal Periodic Review. Germany. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. Addendum Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review. A/HRC/11/15/Add.1 (2009): “6. Germany accepts the recommendation and already submitted the following declaration to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2004: “Pursuant to Article 2 (1), Germany ensures the rights recognized in the Covenant to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. “Wherever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular when participating in peace missions, Germany ensures to all persons that they will be granted the rights recognized in the Covenant, insofar as they are subject to its jurisdiction. “Germany’s international duties and obligations, in particular those assumed in fulfilment of obligations stemming from the Charter of the United Nations, remain unaffected. “The training it gives its security forces for international missions includes tailor-made instruction in the provisions of the Covenant.” Germany will continue to assume its ICCPR obligations in this area without restriction.” – See also about the German declaration in the Seventh Report by the Federal Government on its Human Rights Policy in the Context of Foreign Relations and in Other Policy Areas (BT-Drs. 15/5800 . . .) In the ICRCs Customary IHL database , https://www.icrc.org/ customary- ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_de_rule99_SectionA (accessed 26 April 2015), under “Germany. Practice Relating to Rule 99. Deprivation of Liberty. Section A. General.” it is stated that: “Since April 2007 German forces have detained no individuals in Afghanistan”.

77 Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism by a group of Special Procedures mandate holders (A/HRC/13/42, para. 292(b)).

78 Please refer to endnote 71.

79 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Part III, Section II: The detention of alien civilians in the territory of a party to the conflict may be ordered “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes [internment or placing in assigned residence of a civilian] absolutely necessary”, or if the civilian voluntarily demands this and his or her situation “renders this steps necessary” (article 42). In this case, Article 43 governs the procedure for review, entitling a civilian who has been interned or placed in assigned residence “to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose”. If the internment or assigned residence is maintained, “. . .the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit”. This reflects the rationale behind Rule 128(B) of the ICRC’s catalogue of rules of customary IHL, which provides that: “Civilian internees must be released as soon as the reasons which necessitated internment no longer exist, but at the latest as soon as possible after the close of active hostilities”.

80 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Part III, Section III: The Occupying Power may, at the most, subject civilians to internment or assigned residence within the frontiers of the occupied country “if the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons” (article 78). “Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. . .” If a decision to intern or place in assigned residence is upheld, this “. . .shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set up by the said Power”. Inter-American Commission, Coard et al v United States (Case 10.951 (1999)): “This delay, which is not attributable to a situation of active hostilities or explained by other information on the record, was incompatible with the terms of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as understood with reference to Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention” (para. 57).

81 WGAD: The treaty provisions relating to armed conflict that are applicable in such conflicts are minimal, and international human rights law provides important additional protections.

82 Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Articles: 4, 21, 109, 118. Additional Protocol I, Article 75(3); and Rule 128(A) of the ICRC’s catalogue of rules of customary IHL.

83 Rule 128(C) of the ICRC’s catalogue of rules of customary IHL: “Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a noninternational armed conflict must be released as soon as the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist”. HRC Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/ Add.93 (1998) paras. 11, 12. Report of the Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, Mission to Israel, UN Doc A/HRC/6/ 17/Add.4 (2007) para. 10.

84 WGAD: The treaty provisions relating to armed conflict that are applicable in such conflicts are minimal, and international human rights law provides important additional protections.

85 “Child” shall mean any person less than 18 years of age, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

86 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 37 (b)): “no child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time”. Article 37 (d) guarantees to every child deprived of his or her liberty “the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action”. United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (Rule 13): “juveniles deprived of their liberty shall not for any reason related to their status be denied the civil, economic, political, social or cultural rights to which they are entitled under national or international law, and which are compatible with the deprivation of liberty.” Rule 7.1 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) calls for the guarantee of basic procedural safeguards at all stages of the proceedings, including the right to appeal to a higher authority.

87 WGAD: all persons deprived of their liberty on health grounds must have judicial means of challenging their detention (E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 87). WGAD deliberation No. 7 on issues related to psychiatric detention: preventing mentally disabled persons from leaving may, in principle, amount to deprivation of liberty (E/CN.4/2005/6, para. 51). When assessing whether the measures taken are in compliance with international standards, the vulnerable position of persons affected by (alleged) illness has to be duly taken into consideration (E/CN.4/2005/6, para. 57). The Working Group applies the following criteria: ICCPR (Article 9(4)) shall be applied to anyone confined by a court order, administrative decision or otherwise in a psychiatric hospital or similar institution on account of his mental disorder. In addition, the necessity whether to hold the patient further in a psychiatric institution shall be reviewed regularly at reasonable intervals by a court or a competent independent and impartial organ, and the patient released if the grounds for his detention do not exist any longer. In the review proceedings, his vulnerable position and the need for appropriate representation must be taken into consideration (E/CN.4/2005/6, para. 58 (e)). HRC, General Comment no. 35, para. 19; Concluding observations Bulgaria 2011, para. 10, Germany 2012, para. 14.

88 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: CRPD/C/SLV/CO/1, paras. 31 and 32; CRPD/C/PER/CO/1, paras. 28 and 29. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities interchangeably uses “disability” both as social effect resulting from an interaction (Preamble, (e); also art. 1) and as impairment (see differentiation in preamble (e), biological). See A/HRC/28/37, paras 8, 20, 60. HRC, General Comment no. 35, para. 19.

89 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (article 14): States Parties must “ensure that persons with disabilities . . . are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law . . . If persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law”. Involuntary committal or institutionalization on the grounds of disability, or perceived disability, particularly on the basis of psychosocial or intellectual disability or perceived psychosocial or intellectual disability, is not in compliance with the Convention, and the Committee has called upon States to amend laws and to adopt measures to prohibit involuntary committal or internment, and to design and implement deinstitutionalization strategies (CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1/ para. 23; CRPD/C/CHN/CO/1 paras. 25 and 26).

90 WGAD deliberation no. 5 (1999) concerning the situation of immigrants and asylum seekers: In the case of absence, violation, circumvention or non-implementation of the following procedural guarantees, the WGAD may conclude that the custody is arbitrary: notification of the custodial measure in writing, in a language understood by the asylum seeker or immigrant, stating the grounds for the measure, and setting out the conditions under which the asylum seeker or immigrant must be able to apply for a remedy to a judicial authority, which shall decide promptly on the lawfulness of the measure and, where appropriate, order the release of the person concerned (E/CN.4/2000/4, principle 8).

91 The detention of migrants should not only be prescribed by law, but this detention should be necessary and proportional to the objectives to be achieved as has been noted in OHCHR’s study on the human rights of migrant children (A/HRC/20/24, para 9.) Also see Inter-American Court of Human Rights, case of Velez Loor v Panama, para 163-172 where the Court notes that preventive custody may be suitable to ensure the appearance at immigration proceedings or to guarantee the application of a deportation order.

92 Article 16 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers sets out the right to liberty and security of person for migrant workers and members of their families and the right not to be subjected individually or collectively to arbitrary arrest or detention (paras. 1 and 4). Migrant workers and members of their families who are deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention are entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of their detention and order their release if the detention is not lawful (para. 8). OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders (Guideline 8.4) : Establishing and strengthening procedural safeguards on detention including judicial authorisation and oversight, possibility to appeal and legal laid, to ensure the legality, proportionality and necessity of any deprivation of liberty and to periodically review the necessity and proportionality of continued detention. UNHCR Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (Guideline 7): respect for the detainee’s right, either personally or through a representative, to challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court of law at any time. HRC: the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party. General comments No. 35 (2014) on Article 9 : the right to liberty and security of persons, paras. 3, 7; No. 15 (1986) on the position of aliens under the Covenant, and No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant (HRI/ GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) p. 189, para. 2; and p. 245, para. 10).

93 Committee on Migrant Workers, General Comment no. 2 (2013) on the rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and members of their families: The migrant worker must have access to legal representation and advice, if necessary free of charge, to challenge the lawfulness of detention, and have timely access to effective legal remedies (para. 33); OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders (Guideline 8.14): providing migrants in detention with unconditional access to competent, free and independent legal aid, as well as any necessary interpretation services, for the purpose of exercising their right to habeas corpus, to judicial review of the lawfulness of their detention.

94 Guideline 7 of the UNHCR Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum- Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 2012 [available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html] Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (A/HRC/20/24): Migrants in detention shall be assisted, free of charge, by legal counsel and by an interpreter during administrative proceedings. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers (Article 16): In attending such proceedings, they are entitled to have cost-free assistance to an interpreter if they cannot understand or speak the language used (para. 8).

95 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (arts. 16 and 32 (2)): basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees, including free access to the courts of law on the territory of States parties and the ability to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specifically designated by the competent authority.

96 WGAD: Detention must be ordered or approved by a judge or a body affording equivalent guarantees of competence, independence and impartiality (E/CN.4/1999/63, para. 69).

97 WGAD: The procedural guarantee of article 9(4), ICCPR, requires that migrant detainees enjoy the right to challenge the legality of their detention before a court. There should be automatic, regular and judicial, not only administrative, review of detention in each individual case. Review should extend to the lawfulness of detention and not merely to its reasonableness or other lower standards of review. A maximum period of detention must be established by law, and upon expiry of that period, the detainee must be automatically released (A/HRC/13/30, para. 61). HRC: “every decision to keep a person in detention should be open to review periodically so that the grounds justifying the detention can be assessed” (CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, para. 9.4). Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, in his 2012 annual report on the detention of migrants in an irregular situation (A/HRC/20/24), recalled the statement of the WGAD that there should be automatic, regular and judicial, not only administrative, review of detention in each individual case, and that review should extend to the lawfulness of detention and not merely to its reasonableness or other lower standards of review (para. 23). Committee on Migrant Workers, General Comment no. 2 (2013) on the rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and members of their families: Further reviews of the continued necessity and lawfulness of the detention should be carried out at regular intervals by a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power (para. 32).

98 Committee on Migrant Workers: States parties must ensure that migrant workers and members of their families are not expelled while their claim is being considered (CMW/C/ GC/2, para. 35).

99 Article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention: ‘The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.’ IACHR: “147. [. . .] deprivation of liberty as a penalty or a punitive sanction in the area of immigration control is outside the scope of the question and, in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Court, must be regarded arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention and American Declaration; footnote 271: Cf. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 169. Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on the Human Rights of Migrants, Ms. Gabriela Rodrı´guez Pizarro: “[d]etention of migrants on the ground of their irregular status should under no circumstance be of punitive nature”. Commission onHuman Rights resolution 2002/62, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/85, 30 December 2002, para. 73. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: “criminalizing illegal entry into a country exceeds the legitimate interest of States to control and regulate illegal immigration and leads to unnecessary detention.” UN Doc. A/HRC/7/4, 10 January 2008, para. 53. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Jorge Bustamante, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/7, May 14, 2009, para. 65. Inter American Court on Human Rights. Rights and guarantees of children in the context of migration and/or in need of international protection. Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of August 19, 2014. Series A No.21]

100 Inter American Court on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of August 19, 2014. Series A No.21: “157. Based on the preceding considerations, the Court finds that, in light of international human rights law, deprivation of liberty is inappropriate when children are unaccompanied or separated from their family, because in this situation, the State is obliged to give priority to facilitating the measures of special protection based on the principle of the best interest of the child, assuming its position as guarantor with the greatest care and responsibility. See Article 20(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “[a] child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State.” Cf. Case of Furlan and family members v. Argentina, supra, para. 126. [see also para. 160] Committee on the Rights of the Child. General Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, supra, para. 61: “In application of article 37 of the Convention and the principle of the best interests of the child, unaccompanied or separated children should not, as a general rule, be detained. Detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied or separated, or on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof. [. . .] In consequence, all efforts, including acceleration of relevant processes, should be made to allow for the immediate release of unaccompanied or separated children from detention and their placement in other forms of appropriate accommodation. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Gabriela Rodrı´guez Pizarro, Specific Groups and Individuals: Migrant Workers, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/62, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/85, 30 December 2002, para. 75(a).

101 See, from the Working Group’s jurisprudence, in particular Opinion No.8/2015 (Australia), A/HRC/WGAD/2015/8. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion on the ‘Rights of all children in the context of international migration’, Recommendation on ‘Right to liberty and alternatives to detention’, paras. 32 and 78: “Children should not be criminalized or subject to punitive measures because of their or their parents’ migration status. The detention of a child because of their or their parent’s migration status constitutes a child rights violation and always contravenes the principle of the best interests of the child. In this light, States should expeditiously and completely cease the detention of children on the basis of their immigration status.” Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, A/HRC/28/68, para. 80: “Within the context of administrative immigration enforcement, it is now clear that the deprivation of liberty of children based on their or their parents’ migration status is never in the best interests of the child, exceeds the requirement of necessity, becomes grossly disproportionate and may constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of migrant children . . . The deprivation of liberty of children based exclusively on immigration-related reasons exceeds the requirement of necessity because the measure is not absolutely essential to ensure the appearance of children at immigration proceedings or to implement a deportation order. Deprivation of liberty in this context can never be construed as a measure that complies with the child’s best interests. Immigration detention practices across the globe, whether de jure or de facto, put children at risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. . . . Therefore, States should, expeditiously and completely, cease the detention of children, with or without their parents, on the basis of their immigration status. . .” Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion-21 (OC-21) (19 August 2014) concerning the Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and / or in Need International Protection, para. 160: “States may not resort to the deprivation of liberty of children who are with their parents, or those who are unaccompanied or separated”.

102 WGAD: all circumstances deprivation of liberty, including detention as a counter-terrorism measure, must remain consistent with the norms of international law (E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 84). The right of anyone deprived of his or her liberty to bring proceedings before a court in order to challenge the legality of the detention is a personal right, which must “in all circumstances be guaranteed by the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts” (ibid., para. 85). The Working Group has adopted a list of principles based on articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and on articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (A/HRC/10/ 21, para. 53). These principles guarantee that persons detained under charges of terrorist activities shall enjoy the effective right to habeas corpus following their detention. “Any person deprived of his or her liberty must enjoy continued and effective access to habeas corpus proceedings, and any limitations to this right should be viewed with utmost concern” (report on the situation of detainees at Guanta´namo Bay, E/CN.4/2006/ 120). WGAD Background paper, para. 19: A stakeholder submission comprising of a comparative study of relevant domestic law governing detention across 21 jurisdictions as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, has identified a very strong trend toward requiring that persons administratively detained for counter-terrorism, national security, or intelligence-gathering purposes be entitled to appeal their detention to, or have their detention reviewed by, a judicial body (Submission from Oxford Pro Bono Publico, University of Oxford, “Remedies and procedures on the right of anyone deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention to bring proceedings before a court: a comparative and analytical review of State practice” (April 2014), p. 96) Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism: “No jurisdiction should allow for individuals to be deprived of their liberty in secret for potentially indefinite periods, outside the reach of the law, without the possibility of resorting to legal procedures, including habeas corpus (A/HRC/13/42) cited in A/HRC/16/47, para. 54). “Effective habeas corpus reviews by independent judicial bodies” are central to ensuring respect for the right to personal liberty (para. 292 (b)). “Domestic legislative frameworks should not allow for any exceptions from habeas corpus, operating independently from the detaining authority and from the place and form of deprivation of liberty . . . The law should foresee penalties for officials who refuse to disclose relevant information during habeas corpus proceedings” (ibid.).

103 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 40; and, Communications Nos. 962/2001, Mulezi v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, para. 5.2 (military detention); 1051/2002, Ahani v. Canada, para. 10.2 (counter-terrorism); 1061/2002, Fijalkowska v. Poland, para 8.4 (involuntary committal to psychiatric institution); 560/1993, A. v. Australia, para. 9.5 (immigration detention); 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.4 (extradition); 414/1990, Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, para. 6.5 (presidential fiat) and 265/1987, Vuolanne v. Finland, para. 9.5 (solitary confinement). Concluding observations: India (1997), para. 438; Israel (1998), para. 317 (security detention); United Kingdom (2008), para. 17 (counter-terrorism); Rwanda (2009), para. 16 (recommending abolition of detention for vagrancy); Cameroon (1994), para. 204; Republic of Moldova (2002), para. 11; and Lithuania (2004), para. 13. No category of detainees may be denied taking such proceedings: Communications Nos. R.1/4, Torres Ramı´rez v. Uruguay, para. 18 (military); and 1449/2006, Umarov v. Uzbekistan, para. 8.6.

104 The requirement that detention not be left to the sole discretion of the State agents responsible for carrying it out is so fundamental that it cannot be overlooked in any context, and the procedural guarantee is not susceptible to abrogation.

105 WGAD: “The remedy of habeas corpus. . . must not be suspended or rendered impracticable in states of emergency” (A/HRC/7/4, para. 64; E/CN.4/1995/31, para. 25 (d)). WGAD adopted the legal analysis in the HRC’s general comment No. 29 (2001) on states of emergency (article 4), paras. 11 and 16. In addition to those rights enumerated in Article 4(2), ICCPR, certain other rights are non-derogable even during a state of emergency, including the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention. These nonderogable guarantees are customary international law binding on States that are not parties to the Covenant, and are also peremptory norms of international law. Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture: “the effectiveness and absolute nonderogability of habeas corpus be guaranteed in states of emergency” (CAT/OP/HND/1, para. 137). Committee on Enforced Disappearances: recommends the adoption of “the necessary measures to establish that the right to apply for habeas corpus may be neither suspended nor restricted under any circumstances, even when a state of emergency or siege has been declared, and to guarantee that any person with a legitimate interest may initiate the procedure” (CED/C/ESP/CO/1, para. 26). Joint report on the situation of detainees at Guanta´namo Bay: “procedural safeguards may never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the protection of nonderogable rights”, it determined that the main elements of article 9 of the Covenant, such as habeas corpus, must be fully respected even during states of emergency (E/CN.4/2006/120, para. 14).

106 Human Rights Committee General Comment 2, para. 16.

107 Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture: “judicial intervention during the period of confinement, by judges other than those who determined the criminal charges, goes hand in hand with due process” (CAT/OP/2, para. 14). Inter-American Commission: a judicial authority or a “quasi-judicial” board that decides petitions . . . must be impartial and different from the authority ordering and implementing the detention. [cite]

108 ICCPR (Article 9(4)); African Principles, Principle M(4). European Convention on Human Rights (Article 5(4)). American Convention (Article 7(6)); Inter-American Court has held nine days to be incompatible with the term “promptly” in article 7(6) of the American Convention: Chaparro A´ lvarez and Lapo I´n˜iguez v Ecuador, Series C No 170 (21 November 2007), para 135; see also Tibi v Ecuador, Series C No. 114 (7 September 2004), para 134 (21 days after filing of the application was “clearly an excessive time”). Body of Principles (Principle 32): “2. The proceedings . . . shall be simple and expeditious and at no cost for detained persons without adequate means.” HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 47; and, communication nos. 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.3. “The adjudication of the case should take place as expeditiously as possible.”; 1051/2002, Ahani v. Canada, para. 10.3;

109 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 47;

110 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 42;

111 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 41; Communication nos. 1324/2004, Shafiq v. Australia, para. 7.4; 1460/2006, Yklymova v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.4; 1751/2008, Aboussedra v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, para. 7.6.

112 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 41; communication no. 856/1999, Chambala v. Zambia, para. 7.2 (continued detention after release order amounted to arbitrary detention in violation of article 9, paragraph 1); Concluding observations India 1997.

113 International human rights law also requires that, in accordance with the principle of the open administration of justice, judicial decisions be made public, except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. Article 14(1) ICCPR; Touron v Uruguay, Human Rights Committee Communication 32/1978, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 61 (1984), para 12; Weisz v Uruguay, Human Rights Committee Communication 28/1978, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 57 (1984), para 16.

114 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 47; Communications Nos. 248/1987, Campbell v. Jamaica, para. 6.4;

115 Inter-American Commission, Principles and Best Practices for the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas (2008), Principle IV; European Court of Human Rights: Patsuria v Georgia (2007) ECHR 893, para. 62; and Aleksanyan v Russia (2008) ECHR 1903, para. 179.

116 HRC General Comments no. 35, para. 45, and No. 32, paras. 18-22; communication nos. 1090/2002, Rameka v. New Zealand, para. 7.4 (discussing ability of Parole Board to act in judicial fashion as a court); 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.2 (finding review by the Minister of the Interior insufficient); A tribunal managed entirely within the government department responsible for enforcing detention regulations and/or detention facilities fails to meet the abovementioned standards.

117 The determination of need for specific protection of a vulnerable group, for example, such as indigenous peoples and children, shall not be made without full consultation with the affected group and its representative organizations, and measures taken must be consistent with applicable standards of international law. Convention No. 169 International Labour Organization, articles 9-10; Vienna Declaration and Programme (Part I, para. 20); Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 40, para. 3); Beijing Rules; HRC General Comment No 17 (art. 24 of the ICCPR), paras. 1 and 2; CRC, General Comment No 10, par. 10; IAHRC, Advisory Opinion AO-17/2002, 28 august 2002, para. 109.

118 HRC communication No172/1984, Broeks vs The Netherlands, Communication No 182/1984, Zwaan- de-Vries vs. The Netherlands, Communication No 196/1985, Ibrahima Gueye and others vs. France; Communication N° 819/1998, Joseph Kavanagh vs. Ireland; Communication N° 516/1992, Alina Simunek vs. Check Republic.

119 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/27/48, 30 June 2014, para. 70(c ); “Category III: Military judges and military prosecutors often do not meet the fundamental requirements of independence and impartiality; military procedures applied by military courts often do not respect the basic guarantees for a fair trial;” Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Emmanuel Decaux, Issue of the administration of justice through military tribunals, E/CN.4/2006/58, paras 20-21: “Military courts should, in principle, have no jurisdiction to try civilians. In all circumstances, the State shall ensure that civilians accused of a criminal offence of any nature are tried by civilian courts”; Human Rights Committee, HRC General Comment No. 13 on Article 14, para. 4; “4. The provisions of article 14 of the ICCPR, para. 4: “apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialized. The Committee notes the existence, in many countries, of military or special tribunals or courts which try civilians. This could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned. Quite often the reason for the establishment of such courts is to enable exceptional procedures to be applied which do not comply with normal standards of justice. While the Covenant does not prohibit such categories of courts, nevertheless the conditions which it lays down clearly indicate that the trying of civilians by such courts should be very exceptional and take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14”. The Committee has noted a serious lack of information in this regard in the reports of some States parties whose judicial institutions include such courts for the trying of civilians. In some countries such military and special courts do not afford the strict guarantees of the proper administration of justice in accordance with the requirements of article 14 which are essential for the effective protection of human rights. If States parties decide in circumstances of a public emergency as contemplated by article 4 to derogate from normal procedures required under article 14, they should ensure that such derogations do not exceed those strictly required by the exigencies of the actual situation, and respect the other conditions in paragraph 1 of article 14.”.

120 UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Principle 21; European Court of Human Rights, Lamy v Belgium, App No 10444/83 (30 March 1989), para 29; (Grand Chamber), Nikolova v Bulgaria, App no 31195/96 (25 March 1999), para 63 and (Grand Chamber), Mooren v Germany, App no 11364/03 (9 July 2009), paras 121-125.

121 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006), Article 17(3). Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992), A/RES/47/133, Article 10. United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form or Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 16(1): ‘Promptly after arrest and after each transfer from one place of detention or imprisonment to another, a detained or imprisoned person shall be entitled to notify or to require the competent authority to notify members of his family or other appropriate persons of his choice of his arrest, detention or imprisonment or of the transfer and of the place where he is kept in custody.’ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook on Prisoner File Management (2007), page 21: ‘[t]ransfer details of prisoners should be duly recorded to ensure these rights are exercised and to ensure against disappearances. Accurate records should also contain parole eligibility and/or release dates.’

122 See Guideline 10(a) about the right to appear “promptly”.

123 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 43; and communication nos. 1090/2002, Rameka v. New Zealand, para 7.3 (annual review of post-conviction preventive detention); 754/1997, A. v. New Zealand, para. 7.3 (regular review of involuntary hospitalization); 291/1988, Torres v. Finland, para. 7.4 (review every two weeks of detention for extradition).

124 WGAD Opinion no. 34/2006, Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri v. USA, UN Doc A/HRC/7/4/Add. 1 (2008), paras. 36-37.

125 WGAD Background paper, para. 81: Although there is no obligation for States to provide for a right to appeal under international law, a quarter of responding States demonstrated legal provisions guaranteeing the right of appeal of an unsuccessful challenge to the lawfulness of the detention. Oxford Pro Bono Publico study: There is a very strong trend in the practice of States toward guaranteeing the right to appeal to a higher court against an order of preventive detention (p. 97). Appeal of a decision to release will normally not delay the release until the outcome of the appeal.

126 See Opinion No. 40/2012 (Morocco), A/HRC/WGAD/ 2012/40, and also Opinion No. 19/2013 (Morocco), A/HRC/ WGAD/2013/19 on the related issues of confession evidence and access to a lawyer.

127 United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, Resolution 67/187 adopted by the General Assembly on the report of the Third Committee (A/67/458), Principle 9 Remedies and Safeguards (para. 31): ‘States should establish effective remedies and safeguards that apply if access to legal aid is undermined, delayed or denied or if persons have not been adequately informed of their right to legal aid.’

128 Depending on the system in place this may include other legal advisors, legal assistants, paralegals and those running legal clinics that possess the requisite skills and training as required under national law for the provision of legal assistance and services.

129 WGAD Background paper, para. 44: The Working Group observes that the majority of States support an informal, cost-free and simplified process to bringing a claim challenging the legality of detention before court, offering even the ability to dispense with any requirement for the challenge to be submitted in writing.

130 Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture: “States parties should consider effective judicial review and due process during the detention of individuals in criminal proceedings as a prerequisite for the prevention of ill-treatment or torture of persons deprived of their liberty and as a means of conferring legitimacy on the exercise of criminal justice” (para. 19).

131 UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Principle 21;

132 European Court of Human Rights, Lamy v Belgium, App No 10444/83 (30 March 1989), para 29; (Grand Chamber), Nikolova v Bulgaria, App no 31195/96 (25 March 1999), para 63; (Grand Chamber), Mooren v Germany, App no 11364/03 (9 July 2009), paras 121-125. HRC, General Comment No 32, para 13, citing Jansen-Gielen v The Netherlands, UN Doc CCPR/C/71/D/846/1999 (3 April 2001), para 8.2 and Aär˘elä and Näkkäläjärvi v Finland, UN Doc CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (24 October 2001), para 7.4.

133 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 15. Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Article 15 is “likewise obligatory as applied to both torture and illtreatment” and that it must be observed in all circumstances (at para. 6). Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20 of 1992: “ the law must prohibit the use of admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through torture or other prohibited treatment” (para. 12); General Comment 32 of 2007, because article 7 is nonderogable in its entirety, “no statements or confessions or, in principle, other evidence obtained in violation of this provision may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered by article 14. . .” (paragraph 6). Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (United Nations General Assembly resolution 3452 (XXX)): “any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment may not be invoked as evidence . . . in any proceedings.” (Article 12). See from the Working Group’s jurisprudence, Opinion No. 40/2012 (Morocco), A/HRC/WGAD/2012/40.

134 Joint Study on global practices in relation to secret detention in the context of countering terrorism (A/HRC/13/42), para. 292(b); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Article 22).

135 ICCPR, article 19(3).

136 For example, such as providing redacted summaries of information, ex parte or in camera review of the information.

137 UNHCR Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012), Guideline 7 (v) Committee on Migrant Workers General Comment no. 2 (2013) on the rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and members of their families: The burden of proof rests on the detaining authorities to demonstrate that the presumption in favour of liberty should be displaced (para. 32).

138 IACHR Article 10. Right to Compensation. Every person has the right to be compensated in accordance with the law in the event he has been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice. See from the Working Group’s jurisprudence, Opinion No.52/2014 (Australia and Papua New Guinea), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/52 para 34: “National authorities, including courts, have a duty to comply with international law provide remedies to make international law effective. States are under a positive obligation to provide an effective remedy for violations of international law on human rights. The duty to provide redress is confirmed as customary international law in the constant jurisprudence of the Working Group. The Working Group points out that the arguments raised and doctrines offered in defence against remedies have so far been only too effective. In terms of actual outcomes, international courts and tribunals and domestic courts have not provided effective remedies. It is contrary to the rule of law and the requirements to an effective international legal order to accept new restrictions effectively barring remedies in domestic courts as under international law principles of subsidiarity and complementarity the domestic legal orders have the primary responsibility to provide remedies.” See also Opinion No.8/2015 (Australia), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/52, and Opinion No.50/2014 (The United States and Cuba), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/50.

139 UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation (Principle 20).

140 This should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and return of property. UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation (Principle 19). The growing jurisprudence of international and regional courts and human rights bodies provides increasing assistance to national courts about the minimum level that international law require, addressing arbitrary detention in particular. See the International Court of Justice, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Republic of Guinea), (2012) and the International Criminal Court Situation in The Democratic Republic of Congo, in the case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations (2012).

141 Including medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services; UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation (Principle. 21).

142 Including, where applicable, any or all of the following:

• (i)

  (i) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;

• (ii)

  (ii) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations;

• (iii)

  (iii) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or the cultural practices of the families and communities;

• (iv)

  (iv) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim;

• (v)

  (v) Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;

• (vi)

  (vi) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations;

• (vii)

  (vii) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;

• (viii)

  (viii) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in international human rights law and international humanitarian law training and in educational material at all levels. UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation (Principle. 22).

143 including, where applicable, any or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:

• (i)

  (i) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;

• (ii)

  (ii) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;

• (iii)

  (iii) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;

• (iv)

  (iv) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;

• (v)

  (v) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training for law enforcement officials as well as military and security forces;

• (vi)

  (vi) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular international standards, by public servants, including law enforcement, correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;

• (vii)

  (vii) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution;

• (viii)

  (viii) Reviewing and reforming laws mandating, contributing to or allowing detention that is arbitrary or unlawful under international law. UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation (Principle. 23) WGAD Opinion no. 25/2009 (para. 33); Opinion no. 42/2008 (para. 29); Opinion no. 22/2006 (para. 23).

144 WGAD Report, A/HRC/10/21, paras. 54 (d-g)

145 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Part III, Section II: The detention of alien civilians in the territory of a party to the conflict may be ordered “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes [internment or placing in assigned residence of a civilian] absolutely necessary”, or if the civilian voluntarily demands this and his or her situation “renders this steps necessary” (article 42). In this case, Article 43 governs the procedure for review, entitling a civilian who has been interned or placed in assigned residence “to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose”. If the internment or assigned residence is maintained, “. . . the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit”. This reflects the rationale behind Rule 128(B) of the ICRC’s catalogue of rules of customary IHL, which provides that: “Civilian internees must be released as soon as the reasons which necessitated internment no longer exist, but at the latest as soon as possible after the close of active hostilities”.

146 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Part III, Section III: The Occupying Power may, at the most, subject civilians to internment or assigned residence within the frontiers of the occupied country “if the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons” (article 78). “Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. . .” If a decision to intern or place in assigned residence is upheld, this “. . . shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set up by the said Power”. Inter-American Commission, Coard et al v United States (Case 10.951 (1999)): “This delay, which is not attributable to a situation of active hostilities or explained by other information on the record, was incompatible with the terms of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as understood with reference to Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention” (para. 57).

147 Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment. Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set up by the said Power. Protected persons made subject to assigned residence and thus required to leave their homes shall enjoy the full benefit of Article 39 of the present Convention.

148 Article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention

149 Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention

150 It is noted that the implications of this are very serious for the person concerned given that this can mean a very lengthy period of detention until the cessation of active hostilities. See: Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 4: Persons may be held as prisoners of war if they “have fallen into the power of the enemy” and if they fall within one of the categories specified in Article 4, including members of armed forces of a party to the IAC (4(1)), members of other armed forces who profess allegiance to a party to the IAC (4(3)), members of militias fulfilling certain conditions (4(2)), persons who accompany the armed forces, such as civilian contractors and war correspondents (4(4)). Article 5: ‘Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.’

151 Article 109 of the Third Geneva Convention: “Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to travel, in accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.” POWs may be subject to internment in a POW camp, or to close confinement if this is necessary to safeguard their health, and then only so long as the circumstances that make such confinement necessary continue (Article 21). Confinement to a cell or room may otherwise only be permitted in execution of penal or disciplinary sanctions (Part III, Section VI, Chapter III). According to articles 112 and 113, a Medical Commission should be established to decide such releases. [Right to challenge in this case would provide a complementary protection, in case these commissions do not function properly.]

152 Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention: “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” Additional Protocol I, Article 75(3); and Rule 128(A) of the ICRC’s catalogue of rules of customary IHL.

153 See: Principle 3: Scope of application of the right to bring proceedings before court and receive appropriate remedy.

154 Committee on the Rights of the Child regularly stresses the need for effective complaint procedures in general, and calls for the establishment of an “independent, child-sensitive and accessible complaint system for children” within the context of the administration of juvenile justice (CRC/C/15/Add.193, para. 62 (j); CRC/C/15/Add.198, paras. 51 and 53).

155 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007) (para. 51, 53, 62), on children’s rights in juvenile justice: the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of liberty includes not only the right to appeal, but also the right to access the court, or other competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body, in cases where the deprivation of liberty is an administrative decision.

156 Beijing Rules (Rule 10.2): The issue of release is to be considered by a judge or other competent official or body without delay. In the commentary to the Beijing Rules, “other competent official or body” is defined as any person or institution in the broadest sense of the term, including community boards or police authorities having the power to release an arrested person. Rule 20.1: “each case shall from the outset be handled expeditiously, without any unnecessary delay”. The commentary highlights as a paramount concern “the speedy conduct of formal proceedings in juvenile cases”.

157 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10: “The right to a prompt decision means that a decision must be rendered as soon as possible, within or not later than two weeks after the challenge is made” (para. 84).

158 United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules), Resolution 65/229 adopted by the General Assembly on the report of the Third Committee (A/65/457), Rule 2: ‘Adequate attention shall be paid to the admission procedures for women and children, due to their particular vulnerability at this time. Newly arrived women prisoners shall be provided with facilities to contact their relatives; access to legal advice [. . .]’; Rule 26: ‘Women prisoners’ contact with their families, including their children, their children’s guardians and legal representatives shall be encouraged and facilitated by all reasonable means. [. . .]’. United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, Principle 10: 32. ‘Special measures should be taken to ensure meaningful access to legal aid for women, [. . .]. 33. Such measures should address the special needs of those groups, including gender– sensitive and age-appropriate measures’; Guideline 9: ‘52. States should take applicable and appropriate measures to ensure the right of women to access legal aid, including: (a) Introducing an active policy of incorporating a gender perspective into all policies, laws, procedures, programmes and practices relating to legal aid to ensure gender equality and equal and fair access to justice; (b) Taking active steps to ensure that, where possible, female lawyers are available to represent female defendants, accused and victims; (c) Providing legal aid, advice and court support services in all legal proceedings to female victims of violence in order to ensure access to justice and avoid secondary victimization and other such services, which may include the translation of legal documents where requested or required.’

159 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/27/48, 30 June 2014, paras. 78-79, 91; Para. 78. ‘The present section addresses the practice of keeping girls and women in detention for the purpose of protecting them from risks of serious violence. The Working Group has previously addressed in its annual report protective custody of women and girls who may be detained for life. That form of deprivation of liberty is highly gendered in its reach, remit and application. In some countries, women and girls are placed in custody due to the risk of gender-based violence, such as honour crimes, and their release may be conditional upon the consent of a male relative and/or a guarantor (see A/HRC/20/16/Add.1). Para. 79. ‘There will typically be no legal basis for the detention, procedural guarantees will not be observed, and the detention will constitute discrimination. The Working Group recalls the views of the United Nations treaty bodies and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, that the practice of protective custody should be eliminated and replaced with alternative measures ensuring the protection of women without jeopardizing their liberty.’; Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 24 December 2012, A/HRC/22/44, recommendation in para 82(b): ‘Ensure that the guarantees available against arbitrary arrest and detention are extended to all forms of deprivation of liberty, including [. . .] protective custody;’; Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to the Commission on Human Rights, 16 December 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8, para. 65: The Working Group recalled its annual report in 2001 (E/CN.4/2002/77 and Add.1 and 2) and reiterated that ‘the Working Group had recommended, with regard to the detention of women who have been the victims of violence or trafficking, that recourse to deprivation of liberty in order to protect victims should be reconsidered and, in any event, must be supervised by a judicial authority, and that such a measure must be used only as a last resort and when the victims themselves desire it.’ Rule 59 of the Bangkok Rules: ‘. . .Temporary measures involving custody to protect a woman shall only be applied when necessary and expressly requested by the woman concerned and shall in all cases be supervised by judicial or other competent authorities. Such protective measures shall not be continued against the will of the woman concerned.’ Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Report to the Human Rights Council (13th session, A/HRC/4/33/Add.3): 39. “[The Special Rapporteur] is highly critical of the current policy of taking females under the provisions of the Crime Prevention Law into “protective” detention because they are at risk of becoming victims of an honour crime.” Para. 72 lit. (u): ‘in some countries, prolonged detention as such can become ill-treatment, as is the case for instance when women are detained for their ‘protection’ for up to 14 years because they are at risk of becoming victims of honour crimes.” The Special Rapporteur recommended in the context of his visit to Jordan in 2006 that “[f]emales (. . .) detained under the Crime Prevention Law for being at risk of becoming victims of honour crimes be housed in specific victim shelters where they are at liberty but still enjoy safe conditions.’ Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Commission on Human Rights, Integration of The Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective, Violence Against Women, 6 January 2003, E/CN.4/2003/75, paras. 90 and 91: ‘[p]rotective custody as a means of dealing with victims of VAW [violence against women] should be abolished. Any protection provided should be voluntary. Shelters should be opened and offer security, legal and psychological counselling and an effort to help women in the future. NGOs’ cooperation in this field should be sought.’ ‘States should establish, strengthen or facilitate support services to respond to the needs of actual and potential victims, including appropriate protection, safe shelter, counselling, legal aid, health-care services, rehabilitation and reintegration into society.’ Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo, ‘Pathways to, conditions and consequences of incarceration for women’ (21 August 2013, UN-Doc. A/68/340): ‘75. In some countries, women are unable to return home on release due to fear that violence may be committed against them. According to one report, female prisoners in Iraq have asked to remain in detention centres following their scheduled release due to fear of honourrelated violence.128 It is argued that in India “the interchangeability of punitive and protective or curative institutions has led to prison cells being regarded as places of safe custody”.129 In Australia, research has shown that women are left homeless, or forced to remain in secure custody, due to fear of payback and retaliation by the community.’ UN Committee against Torture, 2010 Report on visit to Jordan, UN-Doc. CAT/C/JOR/CO/2, para. 21. ‘The Committee notes with concern that the Suppression of Offences Act of 1954 authorizes “protective custody” for women at risk of violence, which according to reports is akin to administrative detention, and that some women are still retained in such custody (arts. 2, 11 and 16). The Committee urges the State party to replace the practice of “protective custody” with other measures that ensure the protection of women without jeopardizing their liberty, and to accordingly transfer all women currently held in “protective custody” to other safe and rehabilitative shelters. To this end, the Committee encourages the State party to adopt a national plan for the protection of women in danger.’ UNODC, Handbook for prison managers and policymakers on women and imprisonment, 2014, pp. 87, 88: ‘In other countries pretrial detention may be used as a form of protective custody for victims of rape, to protect the victim as well as to ensure that she will testify against her rapist at court. 89 Both of these practices are unacceptable, further victimizing women and putting them at risk of further abuse. Most importantly, such practices deter women from reporting rape and sexual abuse, thereby allowing perpetrators to escape justice.’ – ‘Pre-trial detention should not be used as “protective custody”. Other means of protection, for example, in shelters managed by independent bodies, NGOs or other community services, should be used.’

160 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: (a) “No one shall be detained against his or her will in any kind of a mental health facility.” [Concluding Observations on: Austria, para. 30; Australia, para. 34; Sweden, para. 36]; (b) “Criteria such as “danger to self or others” or “need for care and treatment” cannot legitimize a detention that is based on disability or perceived disability, in particular detention based on categorizations such as “mental disorder” or “mental illness”. [Statement on Article 14 of the CRPD and Concluding Observations on: El Salvador, para. 32; Austria, para. 29; Sweden, para. 35; Denmark, para. 36]; (c ) “No one shall be detained in a psychiatric hospital or similar institution as a security measure applied to persons with disabilities who are subject to criminal proceedings.” [Statement on Article 14; Concluding Observations on: Australia, para. 30; New Zealand, para. 33; Mexico, para. 30(a); Ecuador, para. 29(c); Denmark, para. 34; Belgium, paras. 27 and 34.] See also Opinion 17/2015 (New Zealand), A/HRC/WGAD/2015/17, clarifying international law of detention in relation to discrimination on grounds of disabilities.

161 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations on: Austria, para. 30; Sweden, para. 36; Azerbaijan, para. 29; New Zealand, para. 30; “Legislative provisions that authorize involuntary committal and involuntary treatment, including provisions found in mental health legislation and incapacity legislation, shall be repealed.” [CRPD Statement on Article 14; Concluding Observations on: Tunisia, para. 25; Spain, para. 36; Peru, para. 29; El Salvador, para. 32; Australia, para. 32(e) and 34; Mexico, para. 30(b); Republic of Korea, para. 26; Belgium, para. 26.]

162 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: States need to provide due process of law guarantees and appropriate judicial review to persons with disabilities deprived of their liberty as a result of a process in which they have been declared exempt from criminal responsibility (CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1, paras. 25 and 26).

163 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Negotiation Archives, Chair’s remarks on Article 14.1(b) concluding the discussion of Article 14, in UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities Ad Hoc Committee – Daily Summaries 8(4) (19 January 2006) http://www. un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7sum19jan.htm: “Persons with disabilities may only be lawfully deprived of their liberty on grounds that are applicable to the population as a whole, and subject to the same substantive and procedural guarantees. Detention that has the purpose or effect of discriminating based on disability is prohibited.”

164 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 on article 12 of the Convention regarding equal recognition before the law: respecting the right to legal capacity of persons with disabilities on an equal basis includes respecting their right to liberty and security of the person (paras. 40 and 41). The denial of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities and detention in institutions against their will, without their consent or with the consent of a substitute decision-maker, constitutes arbitrary deprivation of liberty, violating articles 12 and 14 of the Convention. States must refrain from such practices and establish a mechanism to review cases of placement in a residential setting without specific consent (CRPD/C/AUT/ CO/1, paras. 29–31). The standard of “best interpretation of will and preferences” rather than “best interests” applies in cases where, after significant efforts have been made, it has not been practicable to determine the will and preferences of the person (para. 19).

165 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations: Republic of Korea (2014), para. 26; Concluding observations: Tunisia (2011), para. 25.

166 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, article 13, para. 1.

167 The right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health includes the right to health care on the basis of free and informed consent. States have an obligation to require all health and medical professionals, including psychiatric professionals, to obtain the free and informed consent of persons with disabilities prior to any treatment, including in places of detention or arrest. In conjunction with the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others, States have an obligation not to permit substituted decision-makers to provide consent on behalf of persons with disabilities. All health and medical personnel should ensure appropriate consultation that directly engages the person with disability. They should also ensure, to the best of their ability, that assistants or support persons do not substitute or have undue influence over the decisions of persons with disabilities;

168 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 para. 46; Concluding Observations on: China, para. 32; Paraguay, para. 48; El Salvador, para. 42; Austria, para. 37; Australia, para. 42: Legislation, policies and programs shall be enacted to eliminate institutional care for persons with disabilities, and to ensure that living arrangements acceptable to persons with disabilities as well as desired supports are available in the community and respect the person’s autonomy, will and preferences; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Articles 3(c ), 14.2 and 19; and Concluding Observations on Australia, para. 30: Housing arrangements in places of detention shall afford the same opportunities to persons with disabilities as to others, and shall provide reasonable accommodation for disability. No one shall be transferred without his or her free and informed consent to a mental health facility or mental health unit in the place of detention. Diversion programs, probation and parole, and eligibility for programs and services within the detention setting, shall not require compliance with mental health services.

169 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 18: “The individuals must be assisted in obtaining access to effective remedies for the vindication of their rights, including initial and periodic judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention, and to prevent conditions of detention incompatible with the Covenant.” The Oxford Pro Bono Publico study: In regard to preventive detention proceedings, there is a very strong trend toward guaranteeing the right to be heard and to legal representation (p. 97). Further, there is a significant trend in the practice of States toward guaranteeing the right to information and to legal representation to a person with a mental illness during detention proceedings (p. 99).

170 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, para. 17: “Support” is a broad term that encompasses both informal and formal support arrangements, of varying types and intensity. For example, persons with disabilities may choose one or more trusted support persons to assist them in exercising their legal capacity for certain types of decisions, or may call on other forms of support, such as peer support, advocacy (including self-advocacy support), or assistance with communication. Support to persons with disabilities in the exercise of their legal capacity might include measures relating to universal design and accessibility. Support can also constitute the development and recognition of diverse, non-conventional methods of communication, especially for those who use non-verbal forms of communication to express their will and preferences.

171 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 2, para. 37.

172 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 2, para. 20.

173 HRC General Comment no. 35, para. 19: “States parties should make available adequate community- based or alternative social care services for persons with psychosocial disabilities, in order to provide less restrictive alternatives to confinement”.

174 This includes deprivation of liberty based on disability or perceived disability, particularly on the basis of psychosocial or intellectual disability or perceived psychosocial or intellectual disability.

175 OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders, Guideline 8.1: “Amending legislation to establish a presumption against detention in law, and legally prescribing human rightscompliant alternatives to detention, so that detention is a last resort imposed only where less restrictive alternatives have been considered and found inadequate to meet legitimate purposes.” HRC, General Comment no. 35, para. 65: “ The decision must consider relevant factors case-by-case, and not be based on a mandatory rule for a broad category; must take into account less invasive means of achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations, sureties, or other conditions to prevent absconding; and must be subject to periodic reevaluation and judicial review.”

176 Guideline 7 of UNHCR’s 2012 Detention Guidelines.

177 Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants: All migrants deprived of their liberty should be informed in a language they understand, if possible in writing, of the reasons for the detention and be entitled to bring proceedings before a court, so that the court can decide on the lawfulness of the detention (A/HRC/20/24, para?).

178 UNHCR’s specific mandate gives it the right to act in substitution of States for asylum-seekers, refugees and stateless persons who cannot obtain protection from their own governments. See: Guideline 7 paragraph 47 (vii) of the 2012 Detention Guidelines, as supported by UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX) (1998); Report of the WGAD, E/CN.4/2000/4, 28 December 1999, Annex II, Deliberation No. 5 on the Situation regarding immigrants and asylum-seekers; and Report of the WGAD, E/CN.4/1999/63, 18 December 1998, paragraphs 69 and 70, referring to principles 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10; Articles 2(3) and 8 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006).

179 OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders, Guideline 8.16. “Consular authorities should only be contacted if requested by or with the free, informed consent of the person concerned.”

180 HRC, General Comment no. 35, para. 18, and communication nos. 1324/2004, Shafiq v. Australia, para. 7.3;

181 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion on the ‘Rights of all children in the context of international migration’, Recommendation on ‘Right to liberty and alternatives to detention’, para. 78. HRC, General Comment no. 35, para. 65.

182 OHCHR’s Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders, Guideline 8 on Avoiding detention, para 11: “Ensuring that in the exceptional cases where children are detained, they are housed with their family members unless there are compelling reasons for separation; that unaccompanied children are not housed with unrelated adults; and that all children have access to adequate healthcare and education. Child protection agencies, rather than immigration agencies should take primary responsibility for children.”

183 Committee on Migrant Workers, General Comment no. 2 (2013): the scope of the judicial review cannot be confined to a formal assessment of whether the migrant worker concerned entered the State party without a valid entry permit, without the possibility of release if the detention is not established by law (para. 32).

184 Article 31(1), 1951 Refugee Convention.

185 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, article 13, paragraph 2.