1 See Resolution No. 93-10 IBRD, Resolution No. 93-6 IDA, The World Bank Inspection Panel, dated September 22,1993 [hereinafter Resolution establishing the Panel]. The text of the Resolution was published in 34 ILM 520 (1995) with an introductory note by Maurizio Ragazzi. It is also available on the Bank's website at <http://www.worldbank.org.html/ins-panel>. For a detailed account of the developments that led to the creation of the Inspection Panel, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel 5-13 (1994), and ibid.. The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 1-27 (2nd ed. 2000) (forthcoming).

2 Reference is made here to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).

3 The earlier case of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over decisions of the European Communities should not be counted here. The distinct supranational nature of the latter organization does not allow for the conclusion of seeing a comparable precedent in it. It may be noted that, following the example of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) established an inspection function in 1994, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) did the same in 1995. Their respective mechanisms have been patterned after the World Bank's Inspection Panel in most respects. They differ, however, in one important aspect. The IDB and ADB mechanisms do not consist of a standing panel with its separate secretariat. Rather, each has a roster of names from which in an actual case members of the Panel will be chosen to investigate the matter once a complaint is lodged.

4 For a more detailed discussion of the contribution to the development of international law in terms of accountability of an international organization for its own acts and omissions as well as procedural rights for non-state actors to trigger such accountability mechanism, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel 118-24 (1994). See also Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order, 54 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht (ZaoRV) (Heidelberg Journal of International Law) 392 (1994).

5 In the exercise of the first stage of its function, the Panel has to establish four elements of jurisdiction, the first of which does not apply in the exceptional case where a request is made by a member or members of the Bank's Board: (i) the Panel's competence relating to the person of the complainant (ratione personae); (ii) its competence regarding the subject matter of the complaint (ratione materiae); (iii) its competence relating to the timing of the complaint (ratione temporis); and (iv) the admissibility of the complaint in the absence of other grounds excluding it under the Resolution (e.g., when Management has already dealt with the subject matter or is taking adequate steps in that direction). For a comprehensive description of the Panel's role in the first stage, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Opinion of the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of January 3, 1995, The Role of the Inspection Panel in the Preliminary Assessment of Whether to Recommend Inspection, published in Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol. 2, Annex ffl (D) (1995), and also published in 34 ILM 525 (1995).

6 The Panel conducts the investigation by checking the pertinent Bank records, interviewing Bank staff and other persons and, if eeded, carrying out an investigation in the territory of the borrowing country with the borrowing country's consent.

7 For a more detailed account of the Panel's case work, see Sabine|Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's Experience with its Inspection Panel, Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht (ZaoRV) (Heidelberg Journal of International Law) 353 (1998), and Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 99-154 (2nd ed. 2000) (forthcoming). See also Bissell, Richard E., Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank, Am. J. of Int’ 1 L. 741 (1997)Google Scholar, and, from the perspective of the Inspection Panel, The Inspection Panel: The First Four Years (Alvaro Umafia Quesada, ed., 1998). See further Lori Udall, The World Bank Inspection Panel: A Three Year Review (1997).

8 For a more detailed discussion of the “case law” that is building up under the Resolution, see Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 7, at 379.

9 For a comprehensive analysis of the 1996 Clarifications, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 156-72 (2nd ed. 2000)(forthcoming).

10 For a detailed discussion of the 1996 Clarifications as an authoritative “commentary,” see Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 7, at 380- 386.

11 For a detailed account of the discussion on the occasion of the second review of the Inspection Panel and a detailed analysis of the 1999 Conclusions, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 173-203 (2nd ed. 2000)(forthcoming). See also Bradlow, Daniel D., Precedent Setting NGO Campaign Saves the World Bank Inspection Panel, Vol. 6, Issue 3, Human Rights Brief of the American University Washington College of Law 7 (1999).Google Scholar

12 See also Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 213 (2nd ed. 2000) (forthcoming)(noting that the Panel process was, until the second Board review addressed that issue, focusing on ascertaining the harm inflicted on affected parties while “downplaying” the Panel's main function of verifying the Bank's compliance or failure with respect to its policies).

13 See Para. 34 of the Operating Procedures on the Inspection Panel, as adopted by the Panel on August 19, 1994 (referring to a preliminary review by the Panel of conditions required by provisions of the Resolution). See further Para. 36 of the Operating Procedures (referring to a further preliminary study of the conditions by the Panel before submission of its recommendation).

14 See 1996 Clarifications of Certain Aspects of the Resolution Establishing the Panel, under the section “The Panel's Function.“

15 See 1999 Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel, at Para. 9(b).

16 See, for a more detailed discussion of issues of accountability and liability in connection with the Panel, Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel 106-13, and 115-17 (1994), and ibid., The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 237-40, and 241 - 53 (2nd ed. 2000)(forthcoming). For a detailed distinction between the Inspection Panel as accountability mechanism versus the remedies concepts of legal liability and international responsibility, see Schlemmer-Schulte, Sabine, The World Bank, its Operations and its Inspection Panel, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 175, 179-81 (No. 3, 1999).Google Scholar

17 See also Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 220-25 (2nd ed. 2000)(forthcoming) (identifying the trend of Management submitting borrowers’ remedial action plans and discussing the trend's distorting effects compared to the original intention of the Panel process under the Resolution).

18 In two further cases such action plans were submitted together with Management's response to the request.

19 See also Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice 176-81, and 220-25 (2nd ed. 2000)(forthcoming) (identifying the lack of distinction between Bank failures and borrower failures in Management's response and the Panel's recommendation, and discussing a solution to the problem which the author proposed in the Bank as the Bank's then-General Counsel, and which was later to a great part accepted by the Board as reflected in the 1999 Conclusions)