1 The text of the award is published at 40 ILM 426 (2001).

2 Article 52(4) of the ICSID Convention provides: “The provisions of Articles 41-45, 48, 49, 53 and 54, and of Chapters VI and VII [of the Convention, dealing with arbitration proceedings] shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the Committee.“

3 Signed3 July 199 Centered into force 3 March 1993; United Nations Treaty Series,vol. 1728, p. 282 (French text). The BIT provisions quoted, in English, in the present decision are drawn from the official United Nations English translation: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1728, p. 298. Appendix 1 to the Tribunal's Award of 21 November 2001 is the source of the English translation of the provisions of the Concession Agreement referred to herein: 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 449-451.

4 Award, Part A., pp. 1-3; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 427-429 (footnotes omitted).

5 Award, Part B., paras. 1-23; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 429-433.

6 Award, Part C., paras. 24-39; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 433-435.

7 Award, Part D., paras. 40-55; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 435-439.

8 Award, Part E., paras. 56-92; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 439-446.

9 Award, Part G., p. 35; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 447. Part F. of the Award, paras. 93-96, contains the Tribunal's assessment and determination regarding the allocation of the costs and fees associated with the arbitration: 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 446-447.

10 Award, para. 50; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 438.

11 Award, para. 49; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 437.

12 Award, para. 51; in para. 52, the Tribunal supports this conclusion by reference to the travaux of Article 25; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 438.

13 Award, para. 53; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 438-439 (footnote omitted). This conclusion is supported inter alia by reference to the decision of the ICSID Tribunal in Lanco International Inc v. Argentine Republic (Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 December 1998), 40 ILM 457 (2001).

14 Referring to the analysis contained in paras. 53-54 of the Award (40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 438-439) and summarized at para. 14(d) of this decision.

15 Award, para. 55; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 439. Strictly speaking, this passage did not constitute part of the Tribunal's findings on jurisdiction, though it flowed from its analysis of the jurisdictional situation. We return to it later in this decision.

16 Award, para. 50; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 438.

17 Ibid. The terminology employed by the Tribunal in this regard is not entirely happy. All international claims against a state are based on attribution, whether the conduct in question is that of a central or provincial government or other subdivision. See ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annexed to GA Resolution 54/83, 12 December 2001 (hereafter “ILC Articles“), Articles 2(a), 4 and the Commission's commentary to Article 4, paras. (8)-(10). A similar remark may be made concerning the Tribunal's later reference to “a strict liability standard of attribution” (Award, para. 63; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 440). Attribution has nothing to do with the standard of liability or responsibility. The question whether a state's responsibility is “strict” or is based on due diligence or on some other standard is a separate issue from the question of attribution (cf. ILC Articles, Arts. 2, 12). It does not, however, appear that either of these terminological issues affected the reasoning of the Tribunal, and no more need be said of them.

18 Award, Part G., p. 35; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 447.

19 Award, para. 83; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 444.

20 Ibid.

21 Award, para. 84; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 444.

22 Award, para. 86; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 445.

23 Award, para. 87; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 445.

24 Ibid.

25 Award, para. 92; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 446.

26 Award, para. 62; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 440. Thus, as mentioned above (see note 17), the confusion inherent in the phrase “strict liability standard of attribution” seems to have no operative effect in the Award.

27 Award, para. 63; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 440.

28 Award, paras. 65-66; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 440-441.

29 Award, para. 65; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 440.

30 Award, para. 66; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 440-441.

31 Award, para. 67; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 441.

32 Ibid.

33 Award, paras. 68-69; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 441.

34 Award, para. 68. In para. 69, the Tribunal sidestepped a factual dispute as to whether “the ERSACT intervention” was a legitimate administrative intervention or was politically motivated, to the detriment of Claimants, noting again that “Claimants never brought any legal challenge in the courts of Tucuman [in respect] of the ERSACT intervention on the ground that such action violated the rights of CGE under the Concession Contract.” See 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 441.

35 Award, paras. 70-76; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 441-442.

36 Award, para. 73; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 442. This conclusion is repeated in para. 82 of the Award: 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 444.

37 Award, para. 74; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 442.

38 Award, para. 75; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 442. The Tribunal also referred summarily to the post-termination conduct of the parties. specifically Claimants’ allegations that they were forced to continue to provide services under the Concession Contract while the provincial authorities continued to obstruct their attempts to collect charges from their customers (para. 76). The Tribunal only summarised the arguments made by the parties in this regard.

39 Award, para. 77; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 443.

40 Ibid.

41 Award, para. 78; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 443.

42 Award, para. 79; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 443.

43 Ibid.

44 Award, para. 80; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 443.

45 Award, para. 81; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 444.

46 Award, para. 78, note 20; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 449.

47 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 438-439 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

48 Ibid., p. 444.

49 Ibid., p. 446.

50 Above, note 3.

51 BIT, Article l(l)(b).

52 BIT, Article l(2)(c).

53 Award, para. 24, note 6; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 447-448.

54 Although counsel for the Respondent contended otherwise before the Committee, the issue does not appear to have been the basis for the Tribunal's ruling on Article 8(2). See above, paras. 35-41, where the Committee summarises its understanding of the Tribunal's reasoning on this point.

55 Cf. Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico (No. 1), 40 ILM 56 (2001) at p. 68 (para. 28).

56 Cf. MINE v. Guinea, Decision on Annulment of 22 December 1989, (1989) 4 ICSID Rep 79 at p. 86 (paras. 4.09-4.12); and see also Schreuer, C., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary(Cambridge, Cambridge Unversity Press, 2001) (hereafter “Schreuer“), at pp. 902-3.Google Scholar

57 See Schreuer, pp. 984-1008.

58 See Schreuer, pp. 1018-1023, with references to the authorities, especially MINE at paras. 4.09-4.10.

59 Application, para. 3; see also para. 2 of the present decision.

60 With the possible exception of the matter concerning Dycasa's shares, referred to above, para. 48.

61 40 ILM 457 (2001), cited by the Tribunal in its Award, para. 53.

62 40 ILM 457 (2001), p. 466 (§26).

63 Ibid, §§39-40.

64 See also Salini Costruttori SpA v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID, jurisdictional decision, 23 July 2001, reported in [2001] Journal de droit international 196, with note by Gaillard, ibid., p. 209. This was a construction dispute focusing on the amount payable under a contract with a local jurisdiction clause. The Tribunal held that provisions in the BIT concerning measures of expropriation or nationalization “ne saurait etre interpretee dans le sens d'une exclusion de tout grief d'origine contractuelle du champ de l'application de cet article” (p. 209, para. 59), and further that, notwithstanding the local jurisdiction clause, “le Tribunal arbitral demeure competent pour les violations du contrat qui constituerait en meme temps, a la charge de l'Etat une violation de l'Accord bilateral” (p. 209, para. 62).

65 Schreuer, pp. 937-938.

66 Award, para. 87; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 445.

67 See above, paras. 16, 23-33, 43.

68 Commentary to Article 3, paras. (4), (7) (footnotes omitted). The passages from the ELSI case, quoted in para. (4) of the commentary, are to be found at ICJ Reports 1989 at p. 51, para. 73, and p. 74, para. 124.

69 That is, unless the treaty in question otherwise provides. See, e.g., Article 11(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration of 19 January 1981, 1 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports p. 9, which overrode exclusive jurisdiction clauses concerning United States courts but not Iranian courts: see the cases cited by Brower', C.N. Brueschke, J.D., The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) pp. 60–72.Google Scholar The Committee does not need to consider whether the effect of Article 8 of the BIT is to override exclusive jurisdiction clauses in contracts underlying investments to which the BIT applies.

70 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. IX, p. 213.

71 Ibid., p. 222.

72 Ibid., p. 223.

73 It is not necessary for the Committee to pronounce on the content of the standard laid down in the BIT, in particular Article 3. It may be that “mere” breaches of contract, unaccompanied by bad faith or other aggravating circumstances, will rarely amount to a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard set out in Article 3. The Tribunal did not, however, offer any interpretation of Article 3. nor seek to base itself on this consideration.

74 Award, para. 82; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 444.

75 Award, para. 91; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 446.

76 Award, para. 79; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 443.

77 See also the Tribunal's summary, cited in para. 11 above, where the Tribunal said it was “impossible … to distinguish or separate violations of the BIT from breaches of the Concession Contract without first interpreting and applying the detailed provisions of that agreement.“

78 See ILC Articles, commentary to Article 4, para. (6), commentary to Article 12, paras. (9)-(10). See also C. Amerasinghe, “State Breaches of Contracts with Aliens and International Law,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 58 (1964), p. 881, at pp. 910- 912: “The general proposition that, where a state performs an act which is prohibited by a treaty to which it is a party, it will be responsible for a breach of international law to the other party or parties to the treaty requires no substantiation. In accordance with the same principle, an act which constitutes a breach of contract would be a breach of international law, if it is an act which that state is under an obligation not to commit by virtue of a treaty to which it and the national state of the alien are parties;” R. Jennings' A. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (9th edn.) (Harlow, Longman, 1992), p. 927: “It is doubtful whether a breach by a state of its contractual obligations with aliens constitutes per se a breach of an international obligation, unless there is some such additionalelement as denial of justice, or expropriation, or breach of treaty, in which case it is that additional element which will constitute the basis for the state's international responsibility.“

79 Award, paras. 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81; 40 ILM 426 (2001), pp. 440-444.

80 Award, para. 95; 40 ILM 426 (2001), p. 447.