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Communiqués 1001(2021), 1030(2021), and 1062(2022) Regarding the Re-Emergence of Coups D'état in West Africa (Afr. Union)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2022

Eki Yemisi Omorogbe
Eki Yemisi Omorogbe*
Affiliation:
University of Leicester, United Kingdom; founder and co-chair of the International Law and Policy in Africa Network (ILPAN). The webpages referred to in this work were last accessed on May 22, 2022.
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Extract

The issue of how a government comes to power generally falls within the domestic domain and is not a concern of international law. However, the African Union (AU, established 2002), like its predecessor the Organisation for African Unity (OAU, 1963–2002), views coups as significant threats to the peace, security, stability, and development of African states. To shape change, the AU codified the anti-coup policy that the OAU had progressively adopted from 1997, and broadened it into a normative framework.

Type
International Legal Documents
Information
International Legal Materials , Volume 61 , Issue 6 , December 2022 , pp. 977 - 990
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The American Society of International Law

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References

ENDNOTES

1 See, e.g., art. 2(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance, Jan. 30, 2007 (Democracy Charter); OAU's Declaration on a Framework for Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000, the Lomé Declaration).

2 Only successful coups are considered here. These are defined as those in which the perpetrators hold on to power for seven or more days. Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L Thyne, Global Instances of Coups, 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset Codebook, ¶ 2(2), https://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/Codebook.pdf. These are: Burkina Faso 2014; Central African Republic 2003; Comoros 1999; Cote d'Ivoire 1999; Egypt 2011 and 2013; Guinea 2008; Guinea Bissau 2003 and 2012; Madagascar 2009; Mauritania 2005 and 2008; Niger 1999 and 2010; Sierra Leone 1997; Togo 2005; and Zimbabwe 2017. Except for Chad, these figures are extracted from, Global Instances of Coups, 1950-present, List of Coups by Country (Excel version), https://www.arresteddictatorship.com/global-instances-of-coups.html.

3 Id., Algeria 1992; Benin 1972; Burkina Faso 1974, 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1987; Burundi 1976, 1987 and 1996; CAR 1981; Chad 1975 and 1990; Comoros 1975, 1978 and 1989; Ethiopia 1974 and 1977; Equatorial Guinea (1979); Gambia 1994; Ghana 1972, 1978, 1979, 1981; Guinea 1979 and 1984; Guinea Bissau 1980 and 1990, Lesotho 1986, 1991 and 1994; Liberia 1980; Mali 1991; Mauritania 1978, 1980 and 1984; Niger 1974 and 1996; Nigeria 1975, 1983, 1985 and 1993; Seychelles 1977; Sierra Leone 1992 and 1996; Sudan 1985 and 1989; Swaziland 1983; Tunisia 1987; Uganda 1971, 1980 and 1985; and Rwanda 1994.

4 African Union Summit: Leaders complain about wave of coups, BBC News (Feb. 6, 2022), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60281271.

5 Mali Coup d'Etat: Military proposes three-year transition, Africa Report (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.theafricareport.com/38911/mali-coup-detat-military-proposes-three-year-transition.

6 For the agreement, see ECOWAS, Communique, Meeting of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government with the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) of Mali, ¶ 9 (Sept. 15, 2020); Bah N'Daw: the retired colonel chosen to return Mali to civilian rule, DW (Sept. 26, 2010), https://www.dw.com/en/bah-ndaw-the-retired-colonel-chosen-to-return-mali-to-civilian-rule/a-55016448; Former Mali Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane named as Transitional PM, Aljazeera (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/27/former-mali-fm-moctar-ouane-named-transitional-premier.

7 Baba Ahmed, Mali Junta agrees to 18-month transition government, Washington Post (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/mali-talks-on-post-coup-transition-government-wrapping-up/2020/09/12/f1714250-f4f6-11ea-8025-5d3489768ac8_story.html.

8 Mali's detained interim leaders ‘resign’ during mediation efforts as UN condemns their ouster, France 24 (May 26, 2021), https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210526-mali-interim-leaders-resign-before-mediator-after-ex-coup-leader-takes-power.

9 Hamza Mohamed, What next for Mali after second coup within a year?, Aljazeera (May 29, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/29/what-next-after-malis-coup.

10 Aurore Bonny, New prime minister appointed in Mali, Anadolu Agency (June 1, 2021), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/new-prime-minister-appointed-in-mali/2260971; A new coup derails Mali's transition, ISS (May 31, 2021), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-coup-derails-malis-transition.

11 The EU, France, Germany, and UK joined in the statement. UN MINUSMA, Joint Statement on the Situation in Mali (May 24, 2021), https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/joint-statement-situation-mali-may-24-2021.

12 AU, Communique, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(1001(2021)) (June 1, 2021), ¶¶ 3 and 6 respectively [hereinafter Mali Comm.].

13 Mamady Doumbouya: Guinea coup leader sworn in as president, BBC News (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58761621.

14 Saliou Samb, Elite Guinea army unit says it has toppled president, Reuters (Sept. 5, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/16/guinea-coup-leaders-meet-mining-execs-as-ecowas-talks-next-steps.

15 AU, Communique, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(1030(2021)) (Sept. 10, 2021) [hereinafter Guinea Comm.], ¶¶ 4 and 8 respectively .

16 Burkina Faso restores constitution, names coup leader president, Aljazeera (Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/31/burkina-faso-restores-constitution-names-coup-leader-president.

17 Id..

18 African Union suspends Burkina Faso after coup, DW (Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-after-coup/a-60608911.

19 Beverly Ochieng, Burkina Faso coup: Why soldiers have overthrown President Kabore, BBC News (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60112043.

20 AU, Communique, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.1/1062(2022) (Jan. 31, 2022) [hereinafter Burkina Faso Comm.], ¶¶ 1 and 5 respectively.

21 This is the common practice of the AU. See Namira Ngem, The Sanctions Regime of the African Union in Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, in Talking International Law: Legal Argument Outside the Courtroom 218, 222 and 234 (Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner eds., 2022).

22 Mali Comm., ¶ 3; Guinea Comm., ¶ 4; and Burkina Faso Comm., ¶ 2. See also the preamble of each communiqué.

23 Burkina Faso Comm., ¶ 5.

24 AU Doc. 9/7/2002.

25 The exceptions are Cape Verde, and South Sudan. See AU, Status List (Apr. 27, 2022), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37293-sl-PROTOCOL_RELATING_TO_THE_ESTABLISHMENT_OF_THE_PEACE_AND_SECURITY_COUNCIL_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION_1.pdf. The PSC Protocol is adopted in line with Art. 5(2) of the Constitutive Act.

26 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.

27 AU, Status List (June 15, 2017), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7758-sl-constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_2.pdf.

28 This is the latest information available to the author, see: AU, Status List (Mar. 25, 2022), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36384-sl-AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_DEMOCRACY_ELECTIONS_AND_GOVERNANCE.pdf.

29 Mali Comm., ¶ 2; Guinea Comm., ¶ 2; and Burkina Faso Comm., ¶ 2.

30 In line with Arts. 5(2) and 9 of the Constitutive Act; and Arts. 7(1)(e) and 7(1)(f).

31 Incorrectly identified in the PSC Protocol as Art. 7(g) in the preamble to the Burkina Faso Comm.

32 Lomé Declaration, supra note 1.

33 Id.

34 AU, Decision on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacity of the African Region to Manage Such Situations, AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.269(XIV) Rev.1, ¶ 5 (2010) (emphasis in original).

35 Mali Comm., ¶ 6; Guinea Comm., ¶ 6; Burkina Faso Comm., ¶ 4.

36 Lomé Declaration, supra note 1. Italics are authors own, for emphasis.

37 So far, the limit of the Assembly's use of Art. 23(2) powers is the threat of sanctions it made against member states which failed follow the AU non-compliance policy with the International Criminal Court arrest warrants against (then) President Al-Bashir of Sudan for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Konstantinos Magliveras, The Several Sanctioning Regimes in the AU: Analysis and Synthesis, in The Emergent African Union Law 361, 369, id.

38 See Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups d'Etat, 44VANDERBILT 2022] INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO COMMUNIQUÉS 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 143 and 146 respectively (2011), and The AU and Disputed Presidential Elections, in THE EMERGENT AFRICAN UNION LAW 189, 205 (Olufemi Amao, Michele Olivier and Konstantinos D Magliveras eds., 2021).

39 Erika de Wet, The role of democratic legitimacy in the recognition of governments in Africa since the end of the Cold War, I-CON 470, 478 (2019).

40 Omorogbe, A Club of Incumbents? supra note 36, p. 136.

41 AU, supra note 34, ¶ 6(iii)(a).

42 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, arts. 45(1), 45(2) and 45(4), (Dec. 21, 2001).

43 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, arts. 21, 22, 25-26 and definitions section (1999).

44 AU, Communique, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM. (DCLIV), ¶¶ 7–9 (2017), and ‘Communique’ AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM. (DCXLVII) ¶ 3 (2017).

45 A new coup derails Mali's transition, ISS (May 31, 2021), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-coup-derails-malis-transition.

46 ECOWAS, Communique Extraordinary Summit on the Political Situation in Mali (May 30, 2021), ¶ 8(I).

47 Mali Comm., ¶¶ 1 and 11.

48 ECOWAS, Final Communique, Extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, (Videoconference, Sept. 8, 2021) [11(a)–11(b)]. Endorsed in Guinea Comm., ¶ 3.

49 ECOWAS, Final Communique, Extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on the Political Situation in Burkina Faso, ¶ 7(d)–7(e) (Videoconference, Jan. 28, 2022). Endorsed in AU, Burkina Faso Comm., ¶ 3.

50 On the application of Art. 25(4) at local level, see Antonia Witt, Where Regional Norms Matter: Contestation and the Domestic Impact of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 54 Africa Spectrum 106.

51 Mali Comm., ¶ 6.

52 Guinea Comm., ¶ 6.

53 Burkina Faso Comm., ¶ 4.

54 ECOWAS, Communique, Extraordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, ¶¶ 9(c) and 15 (Sept. 16, 2021); AU PSC, Communique, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.1036(2021), ¶ 3 (Oct. 5, 2021); Guinea junta brushes off impact of ECOWAS sanction, Reuters (Sept. 18, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/guinea-junta-brushes-off-impact-ecowas-sanctions-2021-09-18/.

55 Guinea Comm., ¶ 13.

56 Burkina Faso Comm., ¶ 10.

57 Tunisia (2002, Ben Ali); Togo (2002 and 2019, Eyadema); Gabon (2003, Bongo); Uganda (2005 and 2017, Museveni); Chad (2005 and 2018, Deby); Cameroon (2008, Biya); Algeria (2008 and 2016, Bouteflika);Djibouti (2010, Guelleh); Zimbabwe (2013, Mugabe); Burundi (2015 and 2018, Nkurunziza); Rwanda (2015, Kagame); Congo (2015, Nguesso); South Sudan (2015 and 2018, Kiir); Guinea (2020, Conte); Democratic Republic of the Congo-DRC (2016, Kabila), Comoros (2018, Assoumani); Egypt (2019, Sisi); Cote d'Ivoire (2020, Ouattara). See Joseph Siegle and Candace Cook, Circumvention of Term Limits Weakens Governance in Africa, Africa Center For Strategic Studies (Sept. 14, 2020, updated May 17, 2021), https://africacenter.org/spotlight/circumvention-of-term-limits-weakens-governance-in-africa/.

58 See Omorogbe (2021), supra note 36, 205; and Kennedy Ochieng Opalo, African Elections: Two Divergent Trends, 2 J. Democracy 80, 80-86 (2012).

59 See James Thuo Gathii and Olabisi D Akinkugbe, Judicialization of Election Disputes in Africa's International Courts 84 L. & Contemp. Probs. 181, 181 (2021).

60 See Jean D'Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the age of Democracy, 38 NYU J. Int'l L. & Pol. 877 at 893 (2006).

61 Antonia Witt, Convergence on Whose Terms? Reacting to Coups d'Etat in Guinea and Madagascar) 6 African Security 257, 271 (2013).