1 Appellate Body Report, United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R ¶133, (Apr. 30,2008) (“AB Report”). Zeroing is the practice, used in the calculation of margins of dumping in antidumping investigations, of disregarding sales in the investigating country market that are above “normal value.” In making antidumping determinations in original investigations, the preferred methodology is to compare the weighted average export price to the weighted normal value. When zeroing is used, sales of the imported product that are above normal value are counted as zero rather than treated as an offset to below normal value sales, with the result that the weighted average export price is lower than it would otherwise be. For a more detailed description of zeroing, see Id. ¶ 67.

2 Id. ¶ 66.

3 See Communication from the United States, “Laws, Regulations and Methodology for calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing),” WT/DS294/18 (June 19, 2006). The United States noted that the “Uruguay Round Negotiators actively discussed whether the use of ‘zeroing’ should be restricted in what would become the WTO agreements.” Id. at 12. However, “such proposals were never incorporated into any of the draft Agreement texts prepared during the Uruguay Round negotiations.” Letter to Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez and Ambassador Robert Portman from Eric Garfinkel and Allan M. Dunn, at 2 (June 20, 2005). Messrs. Garfinkel and Dunn served as U.S. negotiators in the Uruguay Round negotiations from 1989 through 1992.

4 AB Report at ¶ 66 and footnotes 151-154, which contain citations to all the decisions where the AB has found zeroing inconsistent with GATT-1994 and the AD Agreement.

5 Model zeroing in investigations refers to the practice of the U.S. Department of Commerce (“the Department”) where, during original investigations, the Department “makes a weighted-average-to-weighted average ('W-W’) comparison of export price and normal value for each ‘model’ of the product under investigation, and disregards the amount by which the weighted average export price exceeds the weighted average normal value for any model when aggregating the results of model-specific comparisons to calculate a weighted average margin of dumping for the exporter or foreign producer investigated.” Id. ¶ 67.

6 Simple zeroing in periodic reviews refers to the method under which the Department, when calculating the margin of dumping for duty assessment rates, “compares the prices of individual export transactions against monthly weighted average normal values, and disregards the amount by which the export price exceeds the monthly weighted average normal value … when aggregating the results of the comparisons …” Id.

7 Panel Report, United States-Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/R ¶ 7.50 (Dec.20, 2007)(“Panel Report”).

8 Id. ¶ 8.1(c).

9 AB Report ¶ 80.

10 Article 9.3 states that in the imposition and collection of antidumping duties, the “amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2.”

11 Panel Report ¶ 7.119.

12 AB Report ¶ 34 (citing the United States Appellee's Submission).

13 Id.

14 AB Report ¶ 111 (citing the United States Appellee's submission, ¶ 102).

15 United States Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, 9 January 2007, “U.S. - Zeroing (Japan).”

16 United States-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/R, 9 May 2006, as modified, WT/DS294/AB/R “US-Zeroing (EC).”

17 AB Report ¶ 68.

18 Id. ¶ 94.

19 Id. ¶ 98.

20 Id. ¶ 103.

21 Id. ¶113.

22 Id. As an example, the AB points to Article 9.4's direction to disregard de minimus margins.

23 Id. ¶ 107.

24 Id. ¶ 109.

25 Id. ¶ 111, citing the United States Appellee's Submission, para. 102.

26 Id. ¶ 112.

27 Id. ¶ 113.

28 Id.

29 Id. ¶ 95. In a footnote for this finding, the AB cited numerous academic sources for the proposition that “dumping” is “international price discrimination.” ¶ 95, Note 208.

30 Id. ¶ 145. Mexico argued that the Panel acted contrary to Article 11 of the DSU, which requires that a panel make “an objective assessment of the matter before it … and ”assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings ….”

31 This quotation, it should be recalled, opened the AB’ s discussion of the “errors” in the Panel's analysis. See Id. ¶ 68.

32 Id. ¶ 146.

33 WT/DS268/AB/R, 17 December 2004, DSR 2004.

34 Ab Report ¶ 159.

35 Id. ¶ 160.

36 Id. ¶ 161.

37 Id. ¶ 162.

38 Id. ¶ 129.

39 According to DSU Article 14, the DSB is obligated to adopt AB reports unless the DSB by consensus decides not to adopt such reports.

40 AB Report ¶ 128.

41 Id. ¶ 130. The AB also rejected the Panel's use of the “targeted dumping” provision of Article 2.4.2 to justify ignoring the AB's zeroing precedent. Id. ¶ 127. Briefly, the Panel found that an interpretation of US-Zeroing (Japan) that prohibits zeroing in all contexts renders the “targeted dumping” provision void. Id. ¶ 122. The AB finds that this provision is an exception and, as such, does not control the interpretation of the rest of Article 2.4.2 and that, in fact, zeroing in the context of targeted dumping has not been ruled on as yet. Id. ¶ 127.

* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text appearing at the WTO website (visited June 6, 2008)<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewerwindow.asp?><xhttp://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/344ABR.doc>

1 WT/DS344/R, 20 December 2007.

2 Panel Report, para. 2.1.

3 According to Mexico's description, “model zeroing in investigations” occurs when the investigating authorities compare the weighted average normal value and the weighted average export price for each model of the product under consideration and treat as zero the results of model-specific comparisons where the weighted average export price exceeds the weighted average normal value, when aggregating comparison results in order to calculate a margin of dumping for the product as a whole. (See ibid., paras. 2.1 and 7.7)

4 Ibid., para. 3.1(2).

5 USDOC, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Mexico, United States Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 109 (8 June 1999) 30790, subsequently amended as Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Anti-dumping Duty Order: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From Mexico, United States Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 143 (27 July 1999) 40560 (Exhibit MEX-5.A submitted by Mexico to the Panel). See also Panel Report, para. 2.2.

6 Panel Report, para. 3.1(1).

7 According to Mexico's description, “simple zeroing in periodic reviews” occurs when the authorities compare the prices of individual export transactions against monthly weighted average normal values and treat as zero the results of comparisons where the export price exceeds the monthly weighted average normal value, when aggregating comparison results in order to calculate a margin of dumping for the product as a whole. (See ibid., paras. 2.1 and 7.7. In our discussion, we use the term “periodic review” to describe the “periodic review of the amount of [anti-dumping] duty” as required by Section 751(a) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930 (the “Tariff Act”). That provision requires the USDOC to review and determine the amount of any antidumping duty at least once during each 12-month period beginning on the anniversary of the date of publication of an anti-dumping duty order if a request for such a review has been received. However, in the case of the first assessment proceeding following the issuance of the Notice of Anti-dumping Duty Order, the period of time may extend to a period of up to 18 months in order to cover all entries that may have been subject to provisional measures.

8 Panel Report, para. 3.1(3).

9 The five periodic reviews challenged by Mexico are listed in Exhibits MEX-5.B through MEX-5.F submitted by Mexico to the Panel; further details may be found in Panel Report, para. 2.2.

10 Panel Report, para. 3.1(4).

11 Panel Report, para. 8.1 (a). However, the Panel did not recommend to die Dispute Settlement Body that it request the United States to bring its model zeroing procedures into conformity with its WTO obligations under the covered agreements because of its earlier finding that the United States had abandoned that practice as from 22 February 2007. (Ibid., para. 7.45) The Panel explained that it’ “fail[ed] to see what purpose would be served by a recommendation relating to a measure that no longer exists.” (Ibid., para. 7.50) The Panel exercised judicial economy in relation to Mexico's claims under Articles VI: 1 and VI:2 of the GATT 1994, Articles 2.1, 2.4, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement regarding “model zeroing in investigations”. (Ibid., para. 8.2(a))

12 Ibid., para. 8.1(b).

13 Ibid., para. 8.1(c) and (d). The Panel exercised judicial economy in relation to Mexico's claims under Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement regarding “simple zeroing in periodic reviews”. (Ibid., para. 8.2(b))

14 WT/DS344/7 (attached as Annex I to this Report).

15 WT/AB/WP/5, 4 January 2005.

16 Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Working Procedures. Along with its appellant's submission, which it filed in Spanish, Mexico provided a courtesy English translation and an English executive summary of its appellant's submission. On 8 February 2008, Mexico provided an executive summary of its appellant's submission in Spanish to the Appellate Body and to the United States and the third participants. In view of the fact that Mexico filed the appellant's submission in Spanish and the executive summary in English on the due date, and that the Spanish executive summary was filed after the deadline for filing an appellant's submission, the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal informed the participants and the third participants that it considered the Spanish version of the executive summary to be a courtesy translation.

17 Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.

18 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) and (3) of the Working Procedures. On 29 February 2008, the participants and the third participants were provided a courtesy English translation, prepared by the WTO Language Services and Documentation Division, of Chile's third participant's submission originally filed in Spanish on 25 February 2008.

19 Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures.

20 Letter from the European Communities to the Appellate Body Secretariat, dated 3 March 2008, p.2.(emphasis omitted)

21 This issue is addressed at, infra, paras. 163 and 164.

22 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 31 (“el margen de dumping debe calcularse con respecto a los exportadores individuates y productores extranjeros sujetos a dichoprocedimiento y para elproducto objeto a consideration tornado en su conjunto”).

23 Ibid., para. 32 (“insumos que deben tomarse en cuenta en la determinación de margen de dumping para el producto considerado tornado en su conjunto para cada exportador o productor extranjero identificado”).

24 Ibid., para. 8 (“el razonamiento”).

25 See Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 47 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 111).

26 Ibid., para. 44 (“totalmente distintos”).

27 Ibid., para. 50 (“factualmente incorrecta”).

28 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 56 (“de valor normal prospectivo”; “los ‘derechos antidumping puede[n] realizarse sobre la base de transacciones especificas’ conforme a un sistema retrospectivo como tiene Estados Unidos”) (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.131).

29 See ibid., para. 60 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 162).

30 Ibid, (“es precisamente porque el monto de los derechos recaudados de los importadores conforme al sistema de valor normal prospectivo puede ser distinto del ‘margen de dumping’ real del exportador o productor, que el articulo 9.3.2 dispone una oportunidad para revisarlo”).

31 Ibid., para. 66 (“el argumento de equivalencia matemática se basa en una serie de suposiciones que pudieran no ser aplicables en todas las situaciones”) (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 133; and Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 - Canada), para. 99).

32 See ibid, (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 133; and Appellate Body Report, US-— Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 - Canada), para. 97).

33 See ibid., paras. 68 and 74.

34 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 75 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.146).

35 Ibid., para. 81 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.146).

36 Ibid., para. 83 (“si examina a un exportador, el USDOC examinará todas las ventas de exportaciones del exportador o productor”). (original emphasis)

37 Ibid., para. 76 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.146).

38 Ibid., para. 78 (“En la medida que las medidas antidumping impuestas pretenden crear incentivos para modificar el comportamiento en materia de precios …, la parte que lógicamente recibe este incentivo es el exportador o productor”).

39 Ibid., para. 87 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 128).

40 Ibid., para. 88 (“el requisito de trato consistente a un producto”) (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood. Lumber V, para. 99). See also ibid., para. 46.

41 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 90 (“intrinsecamente partial”).

42 Ibid, (“infla de manera artificial”).

43 Ibid., para. 92 (“distorsiona los precios de ciertas transacciones al reducir de manera artificial e inflar, sin justificación, la magnitud del dumping” “no es impartial, equitativa ni justa”).

44 See ibid., paras. 93 and 94.

45 See Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 97 (“idénticas”).

46 Ibid, (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para, 188).

47 See ibid., para. 95.

48 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 39.

49 Ibid., para. 40 (quoting Mexico's first written submission to the Panel, para. 171).

50 Ibid.

51 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 47.

52 See ibid., para. 53.

53 Ibid., para. 55.

54 TN.64/98, 20 June 1967.

55 BISD 26S/171, entered into force 1 January 1980.

56 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 56 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC-Chicken Cuts, paras. 175 and 176).

57 See United States’ appellee's submission, para. 57.

58 GATT Second Report of the Group of Experts, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, GATT Document L/l 141, adopted 27 May 1960, BISD 9S/194.

59 See United States’ appellee's submission, para. 64.

60 Ibid., para. 56.

61 Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679.

62 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 62.

63 See United States’ appellee's submission, para. 88.

64 Ibid., para. 90.

65 Ibid., para. 93.

66 See ibid., para. 94.

67 See ibid., paras. 94-97.

68 The “historical background” that the United States invokes as support for its position consists of pre-WTO panel reports and certain proposals submitted by various delegations in the context of the negotiations on the Anti-Dumping Agreement. For instance: Panel Report, EC-Audio Cassettes (unadopted); Panel Report, EEC-Cotton Yarn (adopted); Communications from Japan, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/11 and MTN.GNG/NG8/W/ 30; Proposals by Hong Kong, China, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/51/ Add. 1 and MTN.GNG/NG8/W/46; Proposal by Singapore, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/55; and Proposal by the Nordic Countries, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/76. (See United States’ appellee's submission, paras. 114-128)

69 See United States’ appellee's submission, paras. 114, 126, and 128.

70 Ibid., para. 128.

71 See ibid., para. 101.

72 Ibid., para. 102.

73 Ibid.

74 See ibid., para. 103.

75 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 69.

76 See ibid., para. 67.

77 See ibid., paras. 67 and 69.

78 See ibid., paras. 109-113.

79 See ibid., para. 129.

80 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 131 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 14, DSR 1996:1, 97, at 108).

81 Ibid., para. 131.

82 Ibid., footnote 9 to para. 11.

83 Ibid., para. 137.

84 Ibid., para. 140.

85 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 140.

86 Chile's third participant's submission, p. 2 (“apropiado”; “se espera” que asi lo hagan).

87 Ibid, (“que deben serponderadas en su debida dimensión pero no servirde justificación para que el [Órgano de Apelación] se abstenga de ejercer lasfunciones que le han sido encomendadas”).

88 European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 59. (emphasis omitted)

89 Ibid., para. 66. (emphasis omitted)

90 Ibid., para. 70.

91 European Communities’ third participant's submission, para.85.

92 Ibid., para.89.

93 Ibid., para.113.(emphasis omitted)

94 Ibid., para.120.(original emphasis)

95 Ibid., para.130.

96 Ibid., para.131.

97 European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 144.

98 Ibid., para.145.

99 Ibid., para.159.

100 Ibid., para.162.

101 Ibid., para.169.(emphasis omitted)

102 Ibid., para. 221.The “preparatory work” the European Communities refers to is set out in detail in ibid., paras. 222-228 and footnotes thereto.

103 See ibid., paras. 212-216.

104 European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 25. See also ibid., para. 239.

105 Ibid., para.243 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.146). See also ibid., para. 241.

106 Ibid., para.39.

107 Ibid., para.33 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 188).(emphasis added by the European Communities omitted)

108 Ibid., para. 35.

109 European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 42.

110 Ibid., para. 46.

111 Ibid., para. 50.

112 Ibid., para. 55.

113 Ibid., para. 56.(emphasis omitted)

114 Japan's third participant's submission, para. 26.

115 Ibid., para. 36 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), paras. 108-110, 115, and 189). (original emphasis)

116 See Japan's third participant's submission, para. 49. Japan finds contextual support for its arguments in Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

117 Ibid., para. 55 (quoting Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 42 (“la obligación depercibir derechos sólo si los importaciones que incurren en dumping causan o amenazan causar daño a la rama de producción national que produce el producto similar … tampoco puede cumplirse si las autoridades investigadoras pueden libremente ignorar algunas o la mayoria de las comparaciones de ventas para un exportador”)).

118 Ibid., para. 71.

119 See ibid., para. 74.

120 Japan's third participant's submission, para. 77 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), paras. 133- 135; and Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 - Canada), paras. 97-100).

121 Ibid., para. 90. (original emphasis)

122 Ibid.

123 See ibid., para. 85 and footnote 89 thereto. See also Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 83 and footnotes 64 and 65 thereto.

124 Japan's third participant's submission, para. 93 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.146).

125 Ibid., para. 94.

126 Ibid., para. 95 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.146).

127 Ibid., para. 98 (quoting Panel Report, para. 7.146).

128 Ibid., para. 99.

129 Japan's third participant's submission, paras. 108 and 109 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC-Bed Linen, para. 55; Appellate Body Report, US-Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 135; Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5-Canada), paras. 140-142; and Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 146).

130 Ibid., para. 13.

131 Ibid., para. 15 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp (Article 21.5- Malaysia), para. 108, in turn quoting Appellate Body Report, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 14, DSR 1996:1, 97, at 108). (emphasis added by Japan omitted)

132 Ibid., para. 18.

133 Ibid., para. 24.

134 Thailand's third participant's submission, para. 13 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 14, DSR 1996:1, 97, at 108).

135 Ibid, (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 188).

136 Ibid., para. 15. (original emphasis)

137 Ibid.

138 See ibid.

139 Ibid., para. 16.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid., para. 17.

142 Thailand's third participant's submission, para. 35.

143 Ibid., para. 36 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.146).

144 Ibid., para. 37 (referring to Panel Report, para. 7.147).

145 Ibid.

146 See ibid, (referring to Panel Report, EC - Bed Linen, paras. 6.135-6.142).

147 Ibid., para. 37.

148 The term “periodic review” applies to the “periodic review of amount of anti-dumping duty” under Section 75 l(a) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930 (the “Tariff Act”). That provision requires the USDOC to review and determine the final liability for anti-dumping duty at least once during each 12-month period beginning on the anniversary of the date of publication of an anti-dumping duty order, if a request for such a review has been received. However, in the case of the first assessment proceeding following the issuance of the Notice of Anti-dumping Duty Order, the period of time may extend up to 18 months in order to cover all entries that may have been subject to provisional measures.

149 The term “new shipper review” applies to the review to establish an individual weighted average dumping margin for the exporter or foreign producer under Section 751(a)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act. That provision requires the USDOC to review and determine the individual dumping margin for an exporter or foreign producer that did not export the product at issue during the original period of investigation.

150 The term “sunset review” applies to the review of an antidumping duty order at the end of five years, as required by Section 751(c) of the Tariff Act. That provision requires the USDOC to conduct a review, five years after the date of publication of an anti-dumping duty order, to determine whether revocation of the anti-dumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and of material injury.

151 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Bed Linen, para. 66; Appellate Body Report, US -Softwood Lumber V,para. 117; Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 -Canada), para. 124; Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 138; and Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), para. 222. In addition, we note that model zeroing in original investigations has been found to be inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by all panels that have examined that practice, including the panels in EC -Bed Linen, EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, US-Softwood Lumber V, US-Zeroing (EC), US-Zeroing (Japan), and US-Shrimp (Ecuador), as well as the Panel in this dispute. (See Panel Report, paras. 7.55, 7.61, and 8.1(a))

152 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), paras. 132- 135; and Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 166.

153 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), paras. 165 and 166.

154 See ibid., paras. 185 and 186. In US-Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, the Appellate Body stated that it saw “no obligation under Article 11.3 [of the Anti-Dumping Agreement] for investigating authorities to calculate or rely on dumping margins in determining the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping''. (Appellate Body Report, US -Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 127) However, if the investigating authorities choose to rely on dumping margins in making their likelihood determination in a sunset review, ”the calculation of these margins must conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4.” (Ibid.) The Appellate Body was, however, unable to complete the analysis and rule on the use of zeroing in that particular case because it did not have a sufficient factual basis to do so. (See Ibid., paras. 133-138) See also Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), paras. 165 and 166.

155 In our discussion, we hereinafter use the term “exporter(s)” to refer to exporter(s) and/or foreign producer(s).

156 See Panel Report, paras. 7.7-7.9.

157 See Panel Report, paras. 7.7-7.9 and 7.99.

158 Ibid., para. 8.1(a). However, the Panel did not recommend to the DSB that it request the United States to bring its model zeroing procedures into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 because of its earlier finding that the United States had abandoned that practice as from 22 February 2007. (Ibid., para. 7.45) The Panel explained that it “fail[ed] to see what purpose would be served by a recommendation relating to a measure that no longer exists.” (Ibid., para. 7.50)

159 Ibid., para. 8.1(b); USDOC, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Mexico, United States Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 109 (8 June 1999) 30790, subsequently amended as Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Anti-dumping Duty Order: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Mexico, United States Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 143 (27 July 1999) 40560 (Exhibit MEX-5.A submitted by Mexico to the Panel).

160 Panel Report, para. 8.1(c).

161 Ibid., para. 8.1(d). The five periodic reviews challenged by Mexico are listed in Exhibits MEX-5.B through MEX-5.F submitted by Mexico to the Panel; further details may be found in Panel Report, para. 2.2.

162 Notification of an Appeal by Mexico, WT/DS344/7 (attached as Annex I to this Report), para. 4 (“contradicen directamente”).

163 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 16.

164 Ibid., para. 17.

165 The United States stated at the oral hearing that, in investigations, it “almost universally” uses the W-W comparison methodology and that it rarely uses the transaction-to-transaction (“T-T”) comparison methodology, because the latter methodology is a “very burdensome procedure” and is appropriate only in limited circumstances.

166 See Panel Report, para. 7.50. This was also confirmed by the United States at the oral hearing.

167 United States’ response to questioning at the oral hearing.

168 See Panel Report, footnote 74 to para. 7.98. See also United States’ appellee's submission, para. 21; and USDOC Regulations, Section 351.213(b).

169 See supra, para. 67. See also USDOC Regulations, Section 351.414(c)(2); and USDOC Anti-dumping Manual, chapter 6, p. 7.

170 See Panel Report, para. 7.99.

171 See Tariff Act, Section 751(a)(2)(A)(ii).

172 See USDOC Regulations, Section 351.212(b)(l). See also Panel Report, para. 7.99: “The numerator for the importer-specific assessment rate reflects the results of comparisons where the normal value exceeds the export price within the universe of the imports made by that particular importer, and the denominator is the total value of all imports by the importer.”

173 See Appellate Body Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 62.

174 See ibid., para. 59; Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), para. 118; and Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V, para. 116.

175 Appellate Body Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 59.

176 Panel Report, paras. 7.143 and 8.1(c).

177 Ibid., para. 7.117.

178 Ibid., para. 7.119.

179 See ibid., para. 7.124.

180 Ibid., para. 7.126.

181 Ibid, (original underlining) The Anti-Dumping Agreement gives WTO Members the discretion to assess duties either retrospectively or prospectively.

182 Ibid.

183 Panel Report, para. 7.131.

184 Ibid., para. 7.146.

185 Ibid., para. 8.1(c).

186 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 31 (“o en relación con transacciones individuales de importación”), (emphasis added)

187 Ibid. (“el margen de dumping debe calcularse con respecto a los exportadores individuales y productores extranjeros sujetos a dicho procedimiento y para elproducto objeto a consideración tornado en su conjunto”) (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Timing (Japan), para. 156).

188 Ibid., para. 46 (“relación necesaria”).

189 Ibid., para. 77 (“Desde luego que los importadores pueden comprar productos cuyo precio es menor que el valor normal …. Sin embargo, en los Acuerdos de la OMC no existen conceptos tales como ‘los importadores con altos márgenes de dumping’ ”).

190 Chile's third participant's submission, p. 2; European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 69; Japan's third participant's submission, para 110; Thailand's third participant's submission, para. 38.

191 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 50.

192 United States’ response to questioning at the oral hearing.

193 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 85.

194 United States’ response to questioning at the oral hearing.

195 See United States’ appellee's submission, para. 52.

196 See ibid., para. 58.

197 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 109.

198 See ibid., para. 110.

199 Emphasis added.

200 We recall that, in accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation codified in Article 33(3) of the Vienna Convention, the terms of a treaty authenticated in more than one language “are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text”. It follows that the treaty interpreter should seek the meaning that gives effect, simultaneously, to the terms of the treaty as they are used in each authentic language. We find support for our reading in the French version of Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires the determination of “une marge de dumping individuelle”, that is, “one” single margin of dumping, for “each exporter” for “the product” under investigation. Similarly, the Spanish version requires the determination of a single margin (“el margen”) for each exporter, not multiple margins (“márgenes”).

201 Emphasis added.

202 Emphasis added.

203 Emphasis added.

204 Emphasis added.

205 Emphasis added.

206 In this regard, Article VI: 1 of the GATT 1994 itself states that dumping “is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a Member or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry”. Articles 5.2 and 5.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement also show that an anti-dumping investigation can be initiated or can proceed only if the investigating authorities have evidence of dumping, injury, and a causal link between the two.

207 This does not mean that anti-dumping duties are levied upon or collected from exporters. The duties may be levied upon or collected from the importers, but, under Article 9.3, the margin of dumping established for an exporter operates as the ceiling for such levy and collection of duties from the importers who import from that exporter.

208 It is well recognized in international economic and trade literature that “dumping” is “international price discrimination” reflecting the pricing practice of an exporting firm to charge a lower price for exported goods than it does for the same goods sold domestically. Some examples of the definition of “dumping” in international economic literature are as follows: “The most common form of price discrimination in international trade is dumping, a pricing practice in which a firm charges a lower price for exported goods than it does for the same goods sold domestically.” (Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 6th edn (Pearson Education, 2007), p. 174); “Dumping is international price discrimination in which an exporting firm sells at a lower price in a foreign market than it charges in other (usually its home-country) markets.” (Peter H. Lindert and Thomas A. Pugel, International Economics, 10th edn (Irwin, 1996), p. 174); “dumping: In international trade, the practice of selling a commodity at a lower price in the export market than in the domestic market for reasons unrelated to differences in costs of servicing the two markets” and “Dumping is a form of price discrimination studied in the theory of monopoly.” (Richard G. Lipsey, Paul N. Courant, and Christopher T.S. Ragan, Economics, 12th edn (Addison- Wesley, 1999), p. G-5 and p. 788); “Broadly defined, “dumping” is international price discrimination. Dumping occurs when an exporter sells merchandise in an importing country at a price below that at which it sells like merchandise in its home country …. A more restrictive definition of “dumping” is that it occurs when an exporter sells merchandise in an importing country at below the cost of production of that exporter.” (Raj Bhala, Modern GATT Law: A Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Trade Law Series (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 685) See also Martyn Taylor, International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO? (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 264 ff.

209 See Panel Report, para. 7.146.

210 As the Appellate Body has previously explained: “The concept of dumping relates to the pricing behaviour of exporters or foreign producers; it is the exporter, not the importer, that engages in practices that result in situations of dumping.” (Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 156 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), para. 129)) In this regard, we note that the United States’ Statement of Administrative Action (the “SAA”) states that, if foreign “companies continue to dump with the discipline of an order in place, it is reasonable to assume that dumping would continue if the discipline were removed”, and that, “[i]f imports cease after the order is issued, it is reasonable to assume that the exporters could not sell in the United States without dumping and that, to reenter the U.S. market, they would have to resume dumping.” (Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994), reprinted in 1994 USCAAN 3773, 4040 (Public Law No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), United States Code, Title 19, Section 3501, pp. 889-890) (emphasis added)) The SAA further provides that”declining import volumes accompanied by the continued existence of dumping margins after the issuance of an order may provide a strong indication that, absent an order, dumping would be likely to continue, because the evidence would indicate that the exporter needs to dump to sell at pre-order volumes.” (Ibid, (emphasis added)) In addition, the SAA states that “[d]eclining (or no) dumping margins accompanied by steady or increasing imports may indicate that foreign companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the United States”. (Ibid, (emphasis added)) These passages are quoted in Sections II.A.3 and II.A.4 of the US-DOC's Policies Regarding the Conduct of Five-Year (“Sunset”) Reviews of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders; Policy Bulletin, United States Federal Register, Vol. 63, No. 73 (16 April 1998) 18871 and 18872) As we see it, these and other similar passages in the SAA support the notion that “dumping” is an exporter-related concept, and that dumping reflects the pricing behaviour of exporters.

211 See United States’ appellee's submission, para. 99.

212 See Panel Report, para. 7.124; and United States’ appellee's submission, para. 99.

213 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 114.

214 See Panel Report, para. 7.117.

215 We note that the 1960 Group of Experts Report, to which the United States referred in its appellee's submission, suggests that, in order to fulfil the principles that imposition of antidumping duties is justified only where “a product was in fact found to be dumped” and where material injury is thereby caused to a domestic industry, “the ideal method … was to make a determination in respect of… each single importation of the product concerned”. (Supra, footnote 58, para. 8 (emphasis added)) Such a method would avoid the need of aggregation. The Group of Experts, itself, recognized that “[t]his however, was clearly impracticable, particularly as regards injury”. (Ibid, (emphasis added)) Such a method of antidumping determination is not before us in this appeal, nor has it been referred to by the participants or third participants in these appellate proceedings.

216 We are not dealing here with a hypothetical case where there may be just one large import transaction at a price below normal value, which, by itself, is causing injury to the domestic industry.

217 See also Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 126.

218 See supra, para. 80.

219 At the oral hearing, the United States argued that the definition of dumping applies at a transaction-specific level in a periodic review, and that the margin of dumping therefore relates to an individual transaction. Any transaction obviously is specific to both an exporter and an importer, and so, in that sense, dumping is importer-specific and also exporter-specific. (United States’ response to questioning at the oral hearing)

220 See also Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 114.

221 See Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V, para. 100.

222 Ibid., para. 97.

223 Ibid., para. 117.

224 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), paras. 125 and 135; and Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), paras. 166 and 176. The issue of zeroing also arose in US -Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, where the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that the use of zeroing in a sunset review was not inconsistent with Articles 2.4 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Appellate Body did not, however, complete the analysis because of insufficient factual panel findings and facts undisputed by the parties. (Appellate Body Report, US-Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 133-138)

225 Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 128.

226 Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V, para. 93.

227 Ibid. See also Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 115. See also Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), para. 127.

228 See also supra, para. 73.

229 At the oral hearing, the United States explained that the rationale for this approach is that the exporter's pricing behaviour is unpredictable.

230 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 102.

231 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 102.

232 Panel Report, para. 7.146.

233 The Appellate Body stated, in US-Zeroing (EC), that: … a reading of Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 does not suggest that final anti-dumping duty liability cannot be assessed on a transaction- or importer-specific basis, or that the investigating authorities may not use specific methodologies that reflect the distinct nature and purpose of proceedings governed by these provisions, … provided that the total amount of anti-dumping duties that are levied does not exceed the exporters’ or foreign producers’ margins of dumping. (Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), para. 131 (original emphasis; footnote omitted))

234 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 156.

235 See ibid., paras. 115 and 151; and Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), paras. 126 and 128.

236 Panel Report, para. 7.146. We reiterate our view that importers do not “dump” and do not have “dumping margins”.

237 The Appellate Body has previously stated that, if aggregation of the results of multiple comparisons yields a negative value for a particular importer,“this would not mean that the authorities would be required … to compensate an importer for the amount of that negative value (that is, when export prices exceed normal value).” (Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), footnote 363 to para. 155 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), footnote 234 to para. 131)) We further note, as stated in paragraph 110 of this Report, that, in the case of such an exporter, under the United States' system, cash deposits will continue to be collected at the going-forward cash deposit rate applicable to the exporter concerned.

238 Panel Report, para. 7.146.

239 Ibid.

240 See Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 83 and footnotes 64 and 65 thereto.

241 Supra, para. 74.

242 See Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 83 (referring to Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of Review in the 2001/2003 Administrative Review of Automative Replacement Glass (“ARG”) Windshield from the People's Republic of China, A-570-867, 69 FR 61790,21 October 2004 (Exhibit MEX-13.1 submitted by Mexico to the Panel), pp. 10-11: “The regulation limits an importer's ability to request an administrative review to its own producers or exporters. The purpose of this limitation is to allow only those companies with a stake in the outcome to request an administrative review of the producers relevant to them. Once the [USDOC] decides to conduct its review, however, any such review covers that producer's or exporter's sales to all importers”).

243 Article 9.4(ii) provides that an anti-dumping duty applied to imports from exporters not examined individually and not included in the examination shall not exceed “where the liability for payment of antidumping duties is calculated on the basis of a prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and the export prices of exporters or producers not individually examined”.

244 Panel Report, para. 7.131.

245 Ibid.

246 Ibid.

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid., para. 7.133.

249 Ibid.

250 Panel Report, para. 7.133.

251 Ibid.

252 See Mexico's appellant's submission, paras. 49-51; European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 68; and Japan's third participant's submission, para. 51.

253 Panel Report, para. 7.131.

254 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), paras. 162 and 163.

255 See Panel Report, para. 7.136. The United States generally supports the Panel's interpretation of Article 2.4.2. (See United States’ appellee's submission, paras. 87-93).

256 See Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 65.

257 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 67 (“obligan a usar el valor normal promedio mensual más contemporáneo en situaciones de ‘dumping dirigido', y obligar usar valores normales de periodos completos (normalmente un año) cuando se trata de comparaciones promedio-contra-pro- medio”).

258 See European Communities’ third participant's submission, paras. 239 and 240; Japan's third participant's submission, paras. 80-83; and Thailand's third participant's submission, paras. 32-35.

259 Panel Report, para. 7.140. (emphasis added)

260 Ibid., para. 7.142. (footnote omitted)

261 See ibid, and footnote 105 thereto (referring to United States' response to Question 5 posed by the Panel at the second panel meeting).

262 See also Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 - Canada), para. 99.

263 Ibid., para. 97.

264 Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 133 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5-Canada), para. 100 (original emphasis)).

265 Ibid., para. 135.

266 See Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 136. Accordingly, the inferences that the Panel seeks to draw as to the Appellate Body's interpretation of the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 are misguided. (See Panel Report, paras. 7.138 and 7.139)

267 Panel Report, EC-Audio Cassettes, circulated 28 April 1995, unadopted; Panel Report, EEC-Cotton Yarn, adopted 30 October 1995.

268 See United States’ appellee's submission, paras. 59-64.

269 See ibid., paras. 114, 126, and 128.

270 See ibid., paras. 126 and 127.

271 Ibid., para. 128 (referring to Communications from Japan, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/11 and MTN.GNG/NG8/W/30; Proposals by Hong Kong, China, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/5 I/Add. 1 and MTN.GNG/NG8/W/46; Proposal by Singapore, MTN.GNG/ NG8/W/55; and Proposal by the Nordic Countries, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/76). See also ibid., paras. 114-128.

272 European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 226. (emphasis omitted) In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the European Communities argued that the negotiating history of the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 suggests further that investigating authorities are permitted to select low-priced export transactions, in order to calculate a margin of dumping, only where a pattern of export prices for different purchasers, regions, or time periods exists.

273 See Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V, para. 108.

274 Supra, footnote 58, para. 8.

275 Mexico confirmed at the oral hearing that, in making its claim under Article VI: 1 of the GATT 1994, it does not rely on the last sentence of that Article dealing with price comparability.

276 See also Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 140.

277 Panel Report, paras. 7.149 and 8.1(d).

278 Ibid., para. 7.149.

279 See supra, para. 134.

280 See also Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), para. 133; and Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), paras. 174-176.

281 See Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 101.

282 See, supra, para. 133.

283 Panel Report, para. 7.144.

284 Ibid., para. 7.145.

285 See ibid, (referring to para. 7.123) and para. 7.149.

286 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 91.

287 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 92 (“argumentos independientes” “distorsiona los precios de ciertas transacciones al reducir de manera artificial e inflar … la magnitud del dumping” “cálculo de los márgenes de dumping [por la utilización de la reducción a cero] no es imparcial, equitativa ni justa”).

288 We recall that, in US-Zeroing (EC), the Appellate Body considered that, in the light of its earlier finding that zeroing as applied in the periodic reviews at issue was inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, additional findings under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were not necessary to resolve that dispute. (Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (EC), para. 147) In that same appeal, the Appellate Body was unable to complete the analysis and determine whether zeroing in periodic reviews was, as such, inconsistent with the “fair comparison” requirement in Article 2.4. (Ibid., para. 228) In US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5-Canada), the Appellate Body found that the use of zeroing in calculating the margins of dumping under the T-T comparison methodology in the original investigation at issue in that dispute was inconsistent with the “fair comparison” requirement in Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5-Canada), para. 146) In US-Zeroing (Japan), the Appellate Body found that zeroing in periodic reviews is, as such, inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (Appellate Body Report, US-Zeroing (Japan), para. 169)

289 Panel Report, para. 7.103 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 14, DSR 1996:1, 97, at 108.

290 Ibid., para. 7.104 (quoting Appellate Body Report, US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 188).

291 See ibid., para. 7.106.

292 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 97 (“to negativa de seguir los informes del Órgano de Apelación que abordaron las mismas cuestiones con respecto a la misma parte demandada”).

293 Mexico's appellant's submission, para. 98 (“interf[irió] con la solución pronta de esta controversia y, por ende, frustr[ó] el funcionamiento eficaz del mecanismo de solución de diferencias de la OMC”).

294 United States’ appellee's submission, para. 130.

295 Ibid., para. 131.

296 See European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 35; Japan's third participant's submission, para. 13; and Thailand's third participant's submission, paras. 14 and 15.

297 European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 53.

298 See ibid., para. 50; and European Communities’ first written submission to the Panel, paras. 141-144.

299 See European Communities’ third participant's submission, para. 51.

300 See Japan's third participant's submission, paras. 15 and 19.

301 Ibid., para. 18.

302 Ibid.

303 See Thailand's third participant's submission, para. 14.

304 See ibid., para. 15.

305 Chile's third participant's submission, p. 1 (“circulo vicioso”).

306 See ibid., p. 2.

307 The word “accordingly” is used in a similar way in Article 2 of the DSU. There, the first sentence establishes the DSB. In the second sentence, starting with the word “accordingly”, the DSB is provided with “the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements.”

308 See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, pp. 12-15, DSR 1996:1, 97, at 106-108. In that case, the Appellate Body stated: It is worth noting that the Statute of the International Court of Justice has an explicit provision, Article 59, to the same effect. This has not inhibited the development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in which considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible. (Ibid., p. 14, footnote 30, DSR 1996:1, 97, at 108) See also Appellate Body Report, US-Softwood Lumber V, paras. 109-112; Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp (Article 21.5 -Malaysia), para. 109. While Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB shall be accepted unconditionally by the parties to the dispute, it is the exclusive authority of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council to adopt, pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, interpretations that are binding upon the WTO membership.

309 We note that the mandate of an Article 21.5 panel includes the task of assessing whether the measures taken to comply with the rulings and recommendations adopted by the DSB in the original proceedings achieve compliance with those rulings. Therefore, panels established under that provision are bound to follow the legal interpretation contained in the original panel and Appellate Body reports that were adopted by the DSB.

310 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 14, DSR 1996:1, 97, at 108.

311 See Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp (Article 21.5 - Malaysia), para. 109.

312 Appellate Body Report, US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 188.

313 See H. Lauterpacht, “The so-called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought in International Law” (1931) 12 British Yearbook of International Law 53, who points out that adherence to legal decisions “is imperative if the law is to fulfil one of its primary functions, i.e. the maintenance of security and stability ”. Consistency of jurisprudence is valued also in dispute settlement in other international fora. In this respect we note the Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgement of 24 March 2000, para. 113, which states that “the right of appeal is … a component of the fair trial requirement, which is itself a rule of customary international law and gives rise to the right of the accused to have like cases treated alike. This will not be achieved if each Trial Chamber is free to disregard decisions of law made by the Appeals Chamber, and decide the law as it sees fit.” Furthermore, we note the Decision of 21 March 2007 of the ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) Arbitration Tribunal, Case No. ARB/05/07, Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID IIC 280 (2007), p. 20, para. 67, which states that “[t]he Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.”

314 Letter from the European Communities to the Appellate Body Secretariat, dated 3 March 2008, p. 2. (emphasis omitted)

315 See Appellate Body Report, India - Patents (US), para. 94.

1 See Panel Report, paragraphs 7.7 and 7.84-7.97.

2 See Panel Report, paragraphs 7.145, 7.149, and 8.1(c).

3 See, for example, Panel Report, paragraphs 7.117 to 7.123.

4 See, for example, Panel Report, paragraphs 7.124 to 7.128.

5 See Panel Report, paragraphs 7.129-7.143 and 7.146-7.148.

6 See Panel Report, paragraphs 7.145 and 8.1(c).

7 See Panel Report, paragraph 7.145.

8 See, for example, Panel Report, paragraphs 7.149 and 8.1(d).