1 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1315 (1958 ed.).

2 The late William H. Davis of New York City.

3 The segments were as follows:

1. From Point Conception to Point Hueneme;

2. San Pedro Bay;

3. From the southern extremity of San Pedro Bay to the western headland at Newport Bay;

4. Crescent City Bay;

5. Monterey Bay;

6. San Luis Obispo Bay;

7. Santa Monica Bay.

We directed the Special Master to recommend answers to the following questions:

“Question 1.—What is the status (inland waters or open sea) of particular channels and other water areas between the mainland and offshore islands, and, if inland waters, then by what criteria are the inland water limits of any such channel or other water area to be determined ?

“Question 2.—Are particular segments in fact bays or harbors constituting inland waters and from what landmarks are the lines marking the seaward limits of bays, harbors, rivers, and other inland waters to be drawn?

“Question 3.—By what criteria is the ordinary low water mark on the coast of California to be ascertained?” 342 U. S. 891.

4 California's claim to the “overall unit area” runs from Point Conception to Richardson Rock (21 miles across water), to San Miguel Island, to Santa Rosa Island, to Gull Island; thence to Begg Rock (35.8 miles), to San Nicholas Island, to San Clemente Island (43 miles); thence back to the mainland at Point Loma (56.8 miles). San Nicholas and San Clemente Islands are over 50 miles from shore. See Map attached as Appendix C to the dissenting opinion, post, at —.

5 To determine whether a coastal indentation is of sufficient depth and shape to be inland water, the Boggs formula would (1) draw the closing line across the mouth of the indentation; (2) draw a belt around the shore of the indentation (similar to a small marginal belt) having a width equal to one-fourth the length of the closing line across the entrance; (3) compare the remaining area inside the closing line with the area of a semicircle having a diameter equal to one-half of the length of the closing line, and if the enclosed area is larger than the semicircle, the indentation is inland water. Boggs, Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 541, 548.

6 The Special Master recommended as follows:

“Question 1: The channels and other water areas between the mainland and the offshore islands, within the area referred to by California as the ‘over-all unit area’ are not inland waters. They lie seaward of the baseline of the marginal belt of territorial waters, which should be measured in each instance along the shore of the adjoining mainland or island, each island having its own marginal belt.

“Question 2: No one of the seven particular coastal segments now under consideration for precise determination and adjudication is a bay constituting inland waters. The landmarks from which the lines marking the seaward limits (the straight-line segments of the baseline of the marginal belt) of bays, harbors, rivers and other inland waters are to be drawn, are as follows:

“Bays

“The extreme seaward limit of inland waters of a bay is a line ten nautical miles long. For indentations having pronounced headlands not more than ten nautical miles apart, and having a depth as hereinafter defined, a straight line is to be drawn across the entrance. Where the headlands are more than ten nautical miles apart, the straight line is to be drawn across the indentation at the point nearest the entrance at which the width does not exceed ten nautical mile. In either case the requisite depth is to be determined by the following criterion: The envelope of all arcs of circles having a radius equal to one-fourth the length of the straight line shall be drawn from all points around the shore of the indentation; if the area enclosed by the straight line across the entrance and the envelope of the arcs of the circles is greater than that of a semicircle with a diameter equal to one-half the length of the line across the entrance, the waters of the indentation shall be regarded as inland waters; if otherwise, the waters of the indentation shall be regarded as open sea.

“Harbors (Ports)

“In front of harbors the outer limit of inland waters is to embrace an anchorage reasonably related to the physical surroundings and the service requirements of the port, and, absent contrary evidence, may be assumed to be the line of the outennost permanent harbor works.

“River Mouths

“Where rivers empty into the sea, the seaward limit of inland waters is a line following the general direction of the coast drawn across the mouth of the river whatever its width. If the river flows into an estuary, the rules applicable to bays apply to the estuary.

“Landmarks

“Where pronounced headlands exist at tributary waterways, the appropriate landmark is the point of intersection of the plane of ordinary low water with the outermost extension of the natural headland. Where there is no pronounced headland, the landmark is the point of intersection of the ordinary low-water mark with a line bisecting the angle between the general trend line of the ordinary lowwater mark along the open coast and the general trend line of the ordinary low-water mark along the shore of the tributary waterway.

“Question 3: The ‘ordinary low-water mark on the coast of California’ is the intersection with the shoreline (as it exists at the time of survey) of the plane of the mean of all low waters, to be established, subject to the approval of the Court, by the United States Coast & Geodetic Survey from observations made over a period of 18.6 years.” Report of Special Master 2-5 (footnotes omitted).

7 The Submerged Lands Act provides, in relevant part:

“An act

“To confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and waters, to provide for the use and control of said lands and resources, and to confirm the jurisdiction and control of the United States over the natural resources of the seabed of the Continental Shelf seaward of State boundaries.

“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the ‘Submerged Lands Act’.

“Title I

“Definition

“Sec. 2 [43 U. S. C. § 1301]. When used in this Act—

“(a) The term ‘lands beneath navigable waters’ means—

“(2) all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the coast line of each such State and to the boundary line of each such State where in any case such boundary as it existed at the time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress, extends seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three geographical miles, and

“(3) all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath navigable waters, as hereinabove defined;

“(b) The term ‘boundaries’ includes the seaward boundaries of a State or its boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico or any of the Great Lakes as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by the Congress, or as extended or confirmed pursuant to section 4 hereof but in no event shall the term ‘boundaries’ or the term lands beneath navigable waters’ be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico;

“(c) The term 'coast line' means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters;

“Title II

“Lands Beneath Navigable Waters Within State Boundaries

“Sec. 3 [43 U. S. C. § 1311]. Rights of the States—

“(a) It is hereby determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and naturalresourcesall in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are hereby, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States or the persons who were on June 5, 1950, entitled thereto under the law of the respective States in which the land is located, and the respective grantees, lessees, or successors in interest thereof;

“(b)(1) The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto said States and persons aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources;

“Sec. 4 [43 U. S. C. § 1312J. Seaward Boundaries.—The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is hereby approved and confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line or, in the case of the Great Lakes, to the international boundaryAny State admitted subsequent to the formation of the Union which has not already done so may extend its seaward boundaries to a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line, or to the international boundaries of the United States in the Great Lakes or any other body of water traversed by such boundaries. Any claim heretofore or hereafter asserted either by constitutional provision, statute,or otherwise, indicating the intent of a State so to extend its boundaries is hereby approved and confirmed; without prejudice to its claim, if any it has, that its boundaries extend beyond that line. Nothing in this section is to be construed as questioning or in any manner prejudicing the existence of any State's seaward boundary beyond three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State became a member of the Union, or if it has been heretofore approved by Congress.”

8 One English, statute, or land mile equals approximately .87 geographical, marine, or nautical mile. The conventional “3-mile limit” under international law refers to three geographical miles, or approximately 3.45 land miles.

9 S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Seas., 18.

10 99 Cong. Rec. 4116. Senator Anderson proposed a similar amendment while the bill was in committee. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S. J. Res. 13 and other bills, 1348 (hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings). After discussion the proposal was voted down, id., at 1416.

11 Closing Brief of California 14.

12 1953 Senate Hearings 312-315, 1064-1065, 1085, 1304, 1378.

13 See also Senate Hearings, 1285 (remarks of Senator Cordon).

14 Senate Hearings, 275-280.

15 Id., at 1052.

16 Id., at 1374-1380.

17 Id., at 1380-1385.

18 In the later debates, Senator Cordon answered an assertion that the committee had rejected the Boggs formula by saying, “The committee, as I recall, and I think I am correct, neither accepted nor rejected the Boggs formula or any other formula.” 99 Cong. Rec. 2633. And see the material quoted in n. 23, infra.

19 See Senate Hearings 1415 (remarks of Senator Cordon).

20 See, e. g., 89 Cong. Rec. 2881, 2916, 3038-3040, 3549-3564, 36553656, 3884-3886, 4085-4086, 4094-4099, 4109.

21 99 Cong. Rec. 3655 (remarks of Senator Kilgore).

22 99 Cong. Rec. 2695, 3039 (remarks of Senator Daniel), 2746 (remarks of Senator Holland), 2881 (remarks of Senator Anderson), 2916 (remarks of Senators Anderson and Douglas). Senate Hearings 957 (remarks of Senator Holland).

23 Several amendments were offered and defeated which would have limited the grant to the international three-mile limit or to three miles from the shoreline around the entire coastal perimeter of the United States, thus cutting off any claims to a three-league limit by the Gulf Coast States. See 99 Cong. Rec. 4157, 4203, 4473-4478. The reason for the unacceptability of these amendments to the leaders of the measure, largely composed of Senators from the Gulf Coast States, is obvious, and had nothing to do with any particular concept of inland waters.

Senator Douglas introduced amendments specifically designed to prevent States from claiming as inland waters those water areas between the mainland and remote islands. Section 2 (c), as amended, would have read: “The term ‘coast line’ means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast of the main continent which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and in the case of any island seaward of such coast, means the line of ordinary low water around such island” 99 Cong. Rec. 4240. (Amendments italicized.) The colloquy leading to the rejection of these amendments is extremely revealing in the total absence of hostility to the basic idea which Senator Douglas was pursuing and the absence of any understanding by the leaders of the measure that it embodied an historical definition of inland waters.

“Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, this amendment is designed to clear up an ambiguity in the pending joint resolution and to conform to what the distinguished Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] the author of the joint resolution, stated was its real intention.

“One of the problems connected with the joint resolution is the problem of where the base line is, from which the submerged lands seaward from the low-water mark are to be measured. Senate Joint Resolution 13 defines this location as the “coastline,” but it is not precisely certain in my mind or in the mind of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. CORDON] whose interpretation I requested, what is meant by the word “coastline.” In the main debate on the joint resolution, I pointed out that this definition might mean 1 of 2 things. First, it might mean, what I hoped it would mean; namely, the shoreline of the main continental land mass and the external limits of inland waters; and then, in the case of islands, the shorelines of each of those islands.

“But I pointed out that probably there would be a contrary claim, particularly in the case of California, and that an attempt would be made to define the term “coastline” as being a line drawn from the main continent out to and along the outer edge of the outer islands lying off the coast. This is a tremendously important subject. It involves very substantial areas, particularly in the case of California. If it is the latter definition which is to be used, then the water between the remote islands—however far out—and the main continental land mass would become inland waters, not external waters, and all the intervening submerged lands would become the property of the coastal State.

“Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I can understand the argument made by the Senator from Illinois, but I believe his amendment completely fails to reach the objective he is striving to achieve.

“If one examines the testimony of the representative of the Department of State, he will see that it is the position of the State Department of the present administration, as it was also the position of the previous administration, and, so far as I know, of all other administrations, that the marginal sea begins wherever the line of inland waters ends. That is a very simple position to take in the case of a straight coast line, as is the situation with regard to the State of Texas. There the shore line and the coast line are synonymous in almost all instances.

“However, the situation becomes more complicated when we consider a coast having many indentures, islands, sounds, coves, bays, and the like. At present there is a difference of opinion between the State governments and the Federal Government as to precisely where the line of inland waters is located. But it is well agreed, as it has always been agreed, that the marginal sea begins at the point where the line of inland waters ends.

“I should like to apply that definition to the State of Louisiana. I regret that I do not have here a map of Louisiana for the purpose of demonstrating my point, but all who have made a study of the question agree that a body of water known as Chandeleur Sound is inland water. In that area there is a large number of islands, each island close to another. It is agreed by both the Federal Government and the State government, and it has always been agreed, that Chandeleur Sound is inland water. The effect of the Douglas amendment would be to make Chandeleur Sound a part of the high seas, although the Federal Government has never contended that Chandeleur Sound was a part of the high seas, and the State government has always claimed it was inland water.

“Likewise, in the case of bays, it is the position of the State Department that bays not wider than 10 miles are inland waters. The distance of 10 miles between headlands across the mouth of a bay marks the place where the marginal Bea begins. The amendment offered by the Senator from Illinois would have the effect once again of declaring such a bay to be a part of the high seas, merely because it is wider than 6 miles between headlands.

“Obviously, the Senator from Illinois is submitting his own definition of inland waters. La effect, it is a definition of inland waters which does not have the support of a single State government in the United States; it does not have the support of the State Department; it is a definition that does not meet with the approval of the Department of Justice; it is a definition, in effect, that does not meet with or similar international obligations.” 332 U. S., at 35 (footnote omitted).

The opinion also established that landlocked waters not a part of the open sea are not part of the marginal belt, and belong to the States. The only problem remaining in the way of actually fixing the location of the marginal belt, and hence the dividing line of ownership between the State and the United States, was that of determining where the open sea ends and landlocked waters begin. The Court specifically left that question unresolved. It is precisely that problem of denning what constitutes open Bea and what constitutes inland waters which we must decide in the present case.

Resolution of that question will (1) determine for the present the location of the marginal belt which we claim against other nations, and (2) define the areas within which ships of foreign nations have no right of innocent passage. Unquestionably, the definitions of what constitutes open sea and inland waters is, to borrow the words of the 1947 opinion, “a subject upon which the nation may enter and assume treaty or similar international obligations.” Negotiations at the Hague beginning in 1930 were directed to just that end, and the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, to which we became a party in 1961, now establishes rules for separating the open sea from inland waters. See infra, pp. 23-37.

26 Letter from Acting Secretary of State Webb to Attorney General McGrath, November 13, 1961. Senate Hearings 460; letter from Secretary of State Acheson to Attorney General McGrath, February 12, 1952. Senate Hearings 462.

27 See n. 5, supra. Neither the Special Master nor the United States treated the Boggs formula as having been the “definitive” United States position. The Special Master recommended it as an “appropriate technical method” for measuring the sufficiency of the depth of bays. Report of Special Master 26.

28 See n. 34, infra.

29 Letter from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to Robert Kennedy, Attorney General, January 15, 1963, 2 International Legal Materials 527.

30 See discussion and legislative history, Part II, supra.

31 See 99 Cong. Rec. 2633 (remarks of Senators Long and Cordon).

32 The Convention was approved by the Senate May 26, 1960, 106 Cong. Rec. 11196, and was ratified by the President March 24, 1961, 44 State Dept. Bull. 609. See Treaties in Force—Ianuarv 1, 1965. 263.

33 In support of the position that we should ignore the developments in the law and practice of nations respecting the concept of inland waters which have transpired subsequent to the passage of the Submerged Lands Act—a position which the Solicitor General frankly recognized in his oral presentation was not an easy one for the Government to maintain—the United States cites a statement made by Senator Cordon during the hearings.

“Those who prepared the bill over the years took the view—and that is the way the bill is before us—that ‘coastline’ means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters. That is in the present tense. It is the coastline as of now. We have confirmed here 3 miles from the coastline as of now. . . .

“If we attempt now to discuss a coastline of 1783, or whenever the Revolutionary War was concluded and the treaty was signed— and I do not just now recall the date—if we attempt now to determine a coastline as of then, it would seem to me that we increase our difficulties beyond what, as I understand the bill, we envisioned in the first place, but which we left where they were.” Senate Hearings 1354-1355.

That statement was made in reply to a suggestion that a State should have the choice of extending its boundaries three miles from its present coastline or three miles from its coastline as of the time it entered the Union. Senator Cordon's reply expresses his opposition to that idea on the ground that the exact location of the ancient shoreline would be extremely difficult to determine. It reveals no intent to restrict the courts in framing the definitions to be used to determine the present coastline.

Article 4 of the Convention provides:

“1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

“2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.

“3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them.

“4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provisions of paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.

“5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State.

“6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines oncharts, to which due publicity must be given.” of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouthof that indentation.

“3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentationis that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of theindentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn ona line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across thedifferent mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be includedas if they were part of the water area of the indentation.”

“4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the naturalentrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closingline may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and thewaters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters.

“5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the naturalentrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the bay in such amanner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible witha line of that length.

“6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called ‘historic’bays, or in any case where the straight baseline system provided forin article 4 applied.”

37 The parties stated that Crescent City Bay is no longer an areain dispute.

38 The United States asserts that “international law recognizes noprinciple of ‘fictitious bays.’ Wefindit unnecessary to decide thatQuestion. The Government states:

“The expression seems to have originated in a proposal by theCommittee of Experts, made to the Fifth Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, suggesting a 10-mile rule for bays, a general 10mile limit for straight baselines, providing that baselines should not be drawn to islands more than 5 miles from shore, and limitingbaselines to 5 miles in groups of islands or between such groups andthe mainland, except that in such a group one opening could be 10miles. The latter situation was called a ‘fictitious bay.’ The SpecialRapporteur adopted this proposal in an Addendum to the SecondReport of the Regime of the Territorial Sea, International Law Commission, Fifth Session, 18 May 1953. English text, D. N. Doc.A/CN.4/61/Add.l, p. 7, and Annex, p. 4. The subject of groupsof islands was postponed by the Commission in 1954 (Article 11,Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Workof Its Sixth Session (U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/88), p. 42), and there isno special provision of the subject in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone as finally adopted. The Reportof the International Law Commission on the Work of Its EighthSession, p. 45, fn. 1 (U. N. Doc. A/C.6/L.378), makes clear thatthe original proposal on the subject was an attempt to formulatea rule and not an expression of a rule already in existence.” Brieffor the United States in answer to California's Exceptions, p. 149,n. 112.

The openings at the ends of the Santa Barbara Channel are 11miles and 21 miles.“

39 See Letter from Acting Secretary of State Webb to AttorneyGeneral McGrath, November 13, 1951, Senate Hearings 460. Seealso Senate Hearings 1084-1085 (remarks of Jack B. Tate).

40 The depth in general ranges between 6 and 12 feet accordingto Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart No. 1270, but there is no passageas much as 12 feet deep connecting the ends of the sounds. Thesounds are “navigable waters” in the legal sense even in the partstoo shallow for navigation. See United States v. Turner, 175 F. 2d644, 647, cert, denied, 338 U. S. 851.

41 Testimony before the Special Master indicated that the channelprovided a substantial amount of protection from the rough seasof the Pacific and was used as an alternate route of passage for ships“coming down from the Pacific Northwest.” (Tr. 595. See alsoTr. 608.) In its appendix, p. 67, California points to a statement inDavidson, Coast Pilot of California, Oregon and Washington (4thed. 1889), p. 53, “The islands break the force of the large westerlyswell of the Pacific along the coastline, and in winter afford good leefrom the full force of the southeast gales.”

42 See Art. 7, § 6, supra, n. 36.

43 “See generally, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, IncludingHistoric Bays, U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962).

44 Article XII of the California Constitution of 1849 described thesea boundary of the State of California as follows:

“. . . thence running west and along said boundary line to the PacificOcean, and extending therein three English miles; thence runningin a northwesterly direction and following the direction of the PacificCoast to the 42d degree of north latitude, thence on the line of said42d degree of north latitude to the place of beginning. Also all theislands, harbors, and bays, along and adjacent to the Pacific Coast.”

45 Ocean Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235, 252 P.722 (1927); Ocean Industries, Inc. v. Greene, 15 F. 2d 862 (D. C.N. D. Cal. 1926) (Monterey Bay). People v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617,96 P. 2d 941 (1939) (Santa Monica Bay). United States v. Carrillo,13 F. Supp. 121 (1935) (San Pedro Bay).

46 Historic Bays, U. N. Doc. A/CN.13/1 (1957), and Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Historic Bays, V. N. Doc.A/CN.4/143 (1962).

47 E.g, for San Diego County, see Cal. Stat. 1850, c. 15, § 2, p. 58;Cal. Stat. 1851, c. 14, §2, p. 172; Cal. Political Code 1872, §§3907,3944; Cal. Political Code § 3945; Cal. Stat. 1919, c. 470, § 38, p. 895;Cal Stat. 1923, c. 160, §38, p. 361; Cal. Govt. Code 1947, §23137,Cal. Stat. 1957, c. 424, p. 1069. For Los Angeles County, see Cal.Stat. I860, c. 15, §3, p. 69; Cal. Stat. 1851, c. 14, §3, p. 172; Cal.Stat. 1856, c. 46, § 1, p. 53; Cal. Political Code 1872, § 3945; Cal. Stat.1919, c. 470, p. 877; Cal. Political Code 1923, § 3927; Cal. Stat. 1923,c. 160, § 20, p. 343; Cal. Govt. Code § 23119; Cal. Stat. 1947, c. 424,p. 1055.

48 See generally, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, IncludingHistoric Bays, TJ. N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, §§80-108 (1962).

49 The United States Attorney for the Southern District of California participated as an amicus curiae in the Stralla case and supported the position of California. We do not consider this actionso significant as to foreclose the United States in the controversybefore us. Compare the discussion of actions taken by the Secretary” of the Interior in United States v. CaUjorma, 332 U. S. 19, 39-40.

1 See Appendix A.

2 See Appendix B, which shows Monterey Bay, one of the bays inquestion. California claims that all the submerged land and waterslandward of the line drawn across the headlands are inland waterswithin the historic coastline of the State, and that its historic boundary, the outer limit of its rights under the Submerged Lands Act,extends three miles seaward of that line. The United States claimsthat California owns only a belt of submerged lands within threemiles of the low-water mark of the mainland shore.

3 See Appendix C. California claims all the submerged land between the line drawn along the islands from the mainland, and a beltof marginal sea three miles to seaward of that line. The UnitedStates contends that California is entitled only to a belt within threemiles of the mainland shore and three miles around each of the islands.

4 One geographic (or marine or nautical) mile equals approximately 1.15 statute (or land or English) miles. One marine league equals three geographic miles or approximately 3.45 statute miles.

5 See S. Rep. No. 133,83d Cong., 1st Sess. (hereafter cited as Senate Report), 21.

6 The Master was asked also to consider what criteria were proper for measuring the ordinary low-water mark on the shore.

7 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §§1301-1315 (1958 ed.).

8 §3, 67 Stat. 29, 30, 43 U. S. C. §1311 (1958 ed.).

10 §2 (a)(2), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §1301 (a)(2) (1958 ed.).

11 §2 (c), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §1301 (c) (1958 ed.).“ §2 (a)(2).“ § 2 (b), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 (b) (1958 ed.). (Emphasis supplied.)

13 Ibid.

14 The constitutional power of Congress to enact the SubmergedLands Act was upheld in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272.

15 S. J. Res. 20, 82d Cong., 2d Seas. For a summary of earlierproposed legislation dealing with submerged lands, see United Statesv. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 6, n. 4.

16 Message from the President, May 29, 1952, S. Doc. No. 139,82d Cong., 2d Sess.“

17 Id., p . 2.

18 S. J. Res. 13, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. A substantially identical bill,H. R. 2948, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced in the House.

19 67 Stat. 29. (Emphasis supplied.) The latter clause, dealingwith the outer Continental Shelf, was added to the original bill incommittee.

20 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and InsularAffairs on S. J. Res. 13 and Other Bills, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (hereaftercited as Senate Hearings), 31-32. (Emphasis supplied.)

21 Senate Hearings 49.

22 Id., 34.

23 Id., 512. Unlike the Truman Administration, the EisenhowerAdministration supported legislation to grant mineral rights in submerged offshore lands to the adjacent States.

24 Brief of the State of Texas, United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S.1, p. 50.

25 See Senate Report 14.

26 Senate Hearings 1378 (Senator Cordon). Compare United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 33.

27 Id, 1053 (Deputy Legal Adviser Tate). Compare United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 30-32.

28 Id., 926. Attorney General Brownell suggested that a line bedrawn on a map as part, of the bill. He said that if the Committeetried “to describe in words bays or other characteristics of the coast,unnecessary litigation will almost surely result.” Ibid

29 Senate Hearings 1304.

30 Id., 1378.

31 Id., 1383.

32 Id., 1384.

33 Ibid.

34 Id., 1385.

35 99 Cong. Rec. 2746.

36 Ibid.

37 Id., 2634.

38 Id, 2744. (Emphasis supplied.)

39 Id., 2830.

40 Senate Report 2. (Emphasis supplied.)

41 Id, 18. (Emphasis supplied.)

42 Senate Hearings 1211-1229.

43 The Committee Report also reprinted the favorable report of aSenate Committee during a previous session of a bill which the Committee said was “identical in substance with Senate Joint Resolution13 as introduced.” Senate Report 49. That earlier report, S. Rep.No. 1592, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., as quoted, criticised the Californiadecision for creating great uncertainty as to what areas would be “inland waters” within the reasoning of the opinion. Under thefederal-external-sovereignty reasoning of the California case theCommittee saw no clear answer to such questions as

“At what precise point does a bay become a part of the open sea?Are waters landward of offshore islands inland waters? Are uplandsformed by nature subsequent to the date offixingthe low-water marksubject to ‘the paramount power’ of the United States as definedby the Court's opinion?” Senate Report 61.

The Committee sought in the legislation to avoid these “extreme complexities,” ibid., by enacting “a law consonant with what the Statesand the Supreme Court believed for more than a century was thelaw,” ibid., and restoring to the States all their historic propertyrights both to inland waters and to the marginal sea. The Reportsaid:

“Unless S. 1988 as reported, is enacted, confusion will exist as tothe ownership and taxability of, and powers over, bays and the 3mile belt . . . . We consider it against the public interest for theFederal Government to commence a series of vexatious lawsuitsagainst the sovereign States to recover submerged lands within theboundaries of the States, traditionally looked upon as the property ofthe States under a century of pronouncements by the Supreme Courtreflecting its belief that the States owned these lands.” Id , at 62.

44 Senate Report 18.

45 See infra, pp. 34-35. “[T]he sponsors understood this Court tohave established, prior to the California decision, a rule of stateownership itself denned intermsof stateterritorialboundaries . . . .” United Statu v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1,19-20.

46 Senate Hearings 1383 (Senator Cordon).

47 99 Cong. Rec. 2984.

48 Senate Report 18, tupra, n. 44.

49 99 Cong. Rec. 4115.

50 Id., at 4114.

51 Ibid.

52 § 2 (b), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. Q § 1301 (b) (19S8 ed.)

53 See, e. g., 99 Cong. Rec. 2917, 2975-2977, 3040, 3273, 3336-3337,3381, 3549, 3552-3553, 3655, 3885-3886, 4085.

54 Compare the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462,43 U. S. C. §§ 1331-1343 (1958 ed.), passed the same year, claimingfor the United States “jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition” of all submerged lands seaward of the area granted the Statesin the Submerged Lands Act.

55 99 Cong. Rec. 4115.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)

58 See, e. g., Senate Hearings 48-49.

59 99 Cong. Bee. 2746.

60 Id 3039.

61 Id., 3051.

2 Fart v. Gia Intercontinental de Naregaekm, 243 F . 2d 342 (C.A. 2 ) ; Orion S. & T. Co. v. Eastern, States Petro. Corp. of Panama, 284 F. 2d 419 (C.A. 2).

3 The court of appeals relied upon Eule 4(d) (3), incorporated by reference into Eule 4(d)(7), which authorizes service upon a foreign corporation or unincorporated association in the manner employed in the State courts. The court also invoked Rule 4(e), which, as of the date of the service in the instant case, authorized service upon parties outside of the State whenever “a statute of the United States or an order of court provides for [such] service * * * ” The court noted that the service in this case was effected pursuant to an order of the district ourt(Pet. App. 18a).

4 Although we agree with the courts below that petitioner was not entitled to prevail in this action, we do not at this stage express an opinion on the Second Circuit's particular formulation of a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity or even upon the distinction between governmental acts and commercial or private acts.

5 See, e.g., The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216; Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616; The Parlement Beige, [1879-1880] L.R., 5 P.D. 197.

6 A few years earlier, the Court of Appeal in England had also held that a vessel of a foreign sovereign used in ordinary commerce was entitled to immunity, The Porto Alexandre, [1920] P.D. 30.

7 In Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, while holding that courts should normally grant or withhold immunity to foreign sovereigns “in conformity to the principles accepted by the department of the government charged with the conduct of our foreign relations” (324 U.S. at 35), the Court nevertheless specifically pointed out that “we have no occasion to consider the questions presented in the Berizzi case” (324 U.S. 35, n. 1).

8 Sovereign immunity is not an available defense with respect to prize taken in violation of our neutrality. The Santiesima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 288, 353. Vessels owned by sovereigns but not possessed by them are not entitled to immunity. Compania Espanola v. Navemar, 803 U.S. 68; Mexico v. Hoffman, supra; Long v. The Tampieo, 16 Fed. 491 (S.D. N.Y.). Moreover, several courts in this country have held that agencies or in-strumentalities of a foreign sovereign which are separate corporate entities are not exempt from the jurisdiction of our courts. Ooale v. Société Co-op. Suisse Des Charbons, Basle, 21 F. 2d 180 (S.D. N.Y.); United States v. Deutchet Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F. 2d 199 (S.D. N.Y.); but of.,BaccuS v. Servioio Naoional Del Trigo, [1956] 3 All E.K. 715. In addition, it is well-settled that a foreign sovereign who voluntarily appears in an action without asserting sovereign immunity, has waived the defense. The Sao Vicente, 281 Fed. I l l (C.A.2); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel ciudad, 335 F. 2d 619 (C.A. 4).

9 A few state court decisions have apparently indorsed the so-called “restrictive theory.” Pacific Molasses Oo. v. Comite De Ventas De Mieles, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 1018; Three Stars Trading Oo. v. Republic of Cuba, 222 N.Y.S. 2d 675; Harris and Company Advertising, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla.).

10 This Court,s decisions dealing with foreign sovereign immunity have been actions against vessels. However, the lower courts have applied the same principles of sovereign immunity in in personam actions. Oliver American Trading Go. v. Government of the United States of Mexico, 5 F. 2d 659 (C.A. 2 ) ; United States eas ret Cardashian v. Snyder, 44 F . 2d 895; (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied, 283 U.S. 827; Puente v. Spanish Nat. State, 116 F. 2d 43 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 627; Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F. 2d 355 (C.A. 2 );

79 Id., 2567.

80 Id., 4897.

74 H. R. 2948, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. See H. R. Rep. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (hereafter cited as House Report), 3.

75 H. R. 4198, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.

76 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H. R. 2948 and Similar Bills, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 219-220.

77 House Report 14.

78 99 Cong. Rec. 2504.

81 Ibid.(Emphasis supplied.)

71 id.,1304(Benator Cordon).

72 99 Cong. Rec. 4115 (Senstor Holland).

73 id., 4361.

79 id., 2567.

80 id., 4897.

74 H. R. 2948, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. See H. R. Rep. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (hereafter cited as House Report), 3.

75 H. R. 4198, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.

76 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H. R. 2948 and Similar Bills, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 219-220.

77 House Report 14.

78 99 Cong. Rec. 2504.

81 Ibid.(Emphasis supplied.)

82 Article XII of the California Constitution of 1849, approved when the State was admitted to the Union (Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 452), provides:

“The Boundary of the State of California shall be as follows:

“Commencing at the point of intersection of forty-second degree of north latitude with the one hundred and twentieth degree of longitude west from Greenwich, and running south on the line of said one hundred and twentieth degree of west longitude until it intersects the thirty-ninth degree of north latitude; thence running in a straight line in a southeasterly direction to the river Colorado, at a point where it intersects the thirty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence down the middle of the channel of said river, to the boundary-line between the United States and Mexico, as established by the treaty of May 30, 1848; thence running west and along said boundary-line to the Pacific Ocean, and extending therein three English miles; thence running in a northwesterly direction and following the direction of the Pacific Coast to the forty-second degree of north latitude; thence on the line of said forty-second degree of north latitude to the place of beginning. Also all the island, harbors, and bays, along and adjacent to the Pacific coast.” (Emphasis supplied.)

California contends that the inclusion of the islands off the shore also includes within the boundaries all waters between the islands and the mainland.

88 Reproduced in part in Appendix D, infra.

84 The brief of the United States Attorney, field sub name. People v. Adamt, is reprinted as Appendix 3 to the Brief for the State of California in the Proceedings Before the Special Master, pp. 6-22.