page 285 note 1 See <http://www.un.org/law/ilc> (website of the International Law Commission). The U.N. General Assembly voted to establish the International Law Commission in 1947. Members were elected in 1948, and the International Law Commission held its first meeting until 1949.

page 285 note 2 De Los Santos Mora v. New York, No. 06-0341, slip op. at 7 (2d Cir. Apr. 24, 2008) (quoting Luke T. Lee, Vienna Convention Onnconsular Relations 16 (1966)).

page 285 note 3 Id.

page 285 note 4 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S 261, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (1970), also available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf>.

page 285 note 5 Id. art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 101-02.

page 285 note 6 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (1970).

page 285 note 7 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 24-25 (finding that the Optional Protocol to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provided a basis for jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the case brought by the United States against Iran).

page 285 note 8 The United States had also earlier withdrawn from the compul sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in 1985. See Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted at 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).

page 285 note 9 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is an autonomous judicial institution within the Organization of American States. See <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm> (website of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).

page 285 note 10 Mexico filed its request on December 9, 1997. In January 1998, the U.S. State Department published and distributed a new instruction manual to explain to state and local police departments the obligations of providing consular notice and access. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights gave its advisory opinion in 1999. The Right to Information on Con sular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (Oct. 1, 1999), reprinted at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_16_ing.pdf>.

page 285 note 11 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded that ’ ‘nonobservance of a detained foreign national's right to information, recognized in Article 36(1 )(b) of the Vienna Conven tion on Consular Relations, is prejudicial to the guarantees of the due process of law; in such circumstances, imposition of the death penalty is a violation of the right not to be “arbitrarily” deprived of one's life, in the terms of the relevant provisions of the human rights treaties (e.g. the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 4; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6) with the juridical consequences inherent in a violation of this nature, i.e., those pertaining to the international responsibility of the State and the duty to make reparations.” Id. at 63 (para. 137).

page 285 note 12 548 U.S. 331 (2006).

page 285 note 13 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).

page 285 note 14 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9), reprinted at 37 I.L.M. 810 (1998).

page 285 note 15 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).

page 285 note 16 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Order of Mar. 3), also available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/104/7726.pdf>.

page 285 note 17 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 506 (para. 110) (Judgment of June 27), also available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/104/7736.pdf>.

page 285 note 18 See id. at 497-98.

page 285 note 19 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/1913.pdf>.

page 285 note 20 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 77 (Preliminary Measures Order of Feb. 5).

page 285 note 21 See id. at 91-92 (para. 59).

page 285 note 22 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31).

page 285 note 23 Id. at 72 (para. 153(9)).

page 285 note 24 U.N. Charter art. 94.

page 285 note 25 President's Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html>.U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales later forwarded this Presidential memorandum to state Attorney Generals of the states where Mexican nationals named in Avena had been sentenced to death.

page 285 note 26 The United States gave notice of its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331(2006) (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State of the United States, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations).

page 285 note 27 548 U.S. 331 (2006).

page 285 note 28 Ex pane Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

page 285 note 29 548 U.S. 331 (2006).

page 285 note 30 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681 (2006).

page 285 note 31 No. 04-70047, 2008 WL 2170836 (5th Cir. May 27, 2008).

page 285 note 32 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007).

page 285 note 33 524 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2008).

page 285 note 34 Id. at 209.

page 285 note 35 2008 WL 2130577 (11th Cir. May 22, 2008).

page 285 note 36 See Cindy Buys&Mark E. Wojcik, U.S. Airport Arrests without Consular Notice May Violate Treaties, 37:2 International Law News 18 (Spring 2008) (newsletter of the American Bar Association Section of International Law); Cindy Buys&Mark E. Wojcik, If the U.S. Detains Foreign Visitors Arriving at the Airport, Is Consular Notice Required?, 45:8 The Globe 11 (May 2008) (newsletter of the Illinois State Bar Association Section on International and Immigration Law).

page 285 note 37 Cf. <http://galj.info/2008/03/01/#0301-consular-notification.txt>

page 319 note 1 The requirement of Article 36(1 )(b) of the Vienna Convention that the detaining state notify the detainee's consulate “without delay” is satisfied, according to the ICJ, where notice is provided within three working days. Avena, 2004 I. C. J. 12, 52, §97 (Judgment of Mar. 31). See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U. S. 331, 362 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment). Here, Medellin confessed within three hours of his arrest—before there could be a violation of his Vienna Convention right to consulate notification. App. to Brief for Respondent 32-36. In a second state habeas application, Medellin sought to expand his claim of prejudice by contending that the State's noncompliance with the Vienna Convention deprived him of assistance in developing mitigation evidence during the capital phase of his trial. This argument, however, was likely waived: Medellin had the assistance of consulate counsel during the preparation of his first application for state postconviction relief, yet failed to raise this argument at that time. See Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Ex parte Medellin, No. 675430-A (Tex. Crim. App.), pp. 25-31. In light of our disposition of this case, we need not consider whether Medellin was prejudiced in any way by the violation of his Vienna Convention rights.

page 319 note 2 The label “self-executing” has on occasion been used to 6 convey different meanings. What we mean by “self-executing” is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.

page 319 note 3 Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the background presumption is that “[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.” 2 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §907,Comment a, p. 395 (1986) (hereinafter Restatement). Accordingly, a number of the Courts of Appeals have presumed that treaties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F. 3d 377, 389 (CA6 2001); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F. 3d 192, 195 (CA5 2001); United States v. Li, 206 F. 3d 56, 60-61 (CA1 2000) (en bane); Goldstar (Panama) S. A. v. United States, 967 F. 2d 965, 968 (CA4 1992); Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1081, 1092 (CADC 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F. 2d 1287, 1298 (CA3 1979).

page 319 note 4 The question is whether the Avena judgment has binding effect in domestic courts under the Optional Protocol, ICJ Statute, and U. N. Charter. Consequently, it is unnecessary to resolve whether the Vienna Convention is itself “self-executing” or whether it grants Medellin individually enforceable rights. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5 (disclaiming reliance on the Vienna Convention). As in Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U. S., at 342-343, we thus assume, without deciding, that Article 36 grants foreign nationals “an individually enforceable right to request that their consular officers be notified of their detention, and an accompanying right to be informed by authorities of the availability of consular notification.”

page 319 note 5 We do not read “undertakes” to mean that “ ‘ “[t]he United States …shall be at liberty to make respecting th[e] matter, such laws as they think proper.” “ ’ Post, at 17-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Todok v. Union State Bank of Harvard, 281 U. S. 449, 453, 454 (1930) (holding that a treaty with Norway did not “operatfe] to override the law of [Nebraska] as to the disposition of homestead property”)). Whether or not the United States “undertakes” to comply with a treaty says nothing about what laws it may enact. The United States is always “at liberty to make … such laws as [it] think[s] proper.” Id., at 453. Indeed, a later-in-time federal statute supersedes inconsistent treaty provisions. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U. S. 102, 119-120 (1933). Rather, the “undertakes to comply” language confirms that further action to give effect to an ICJ judgment was contemplated, contrary to the dissent's position that such judgments constitute directly enforceable federal law, without more. See also post, at 1-3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

page 319 note 6 Article 94(2) provides in full: “If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.” 59 Stat. 1051.

page 319 note 7 Medellin alters this language in his brief to provide that the ICJ Statute makes the Avena judgment binding “in respect of [his] particular case.” Brief for Petitioner 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). Medellin does not and cannot have a case before the ICJ under the terms of the ICJ Statute.

page 319 note 8 The dissent concludes that the ICJ judgment is binding federal law based in large part on its belief that the Vienna Convention overrides contrary state procedural rules. See post, at 19-20, 20-21, 23. But not even Medellin relies on the Convention. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5 (disclaiming reliance). For good reason: Such reliance is foreclosed by the decision of this Court in Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U. S., at 351 (holding that the Convention does not preclude the application of state procedural bars); see also id., at 363 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment). There is no basis for relitigating the issue. Further, to rely on the Convention would elide the distinction between a treaty—negotiated by the President and signed by Congress—and a judgment rendered pursuant to those treaties.

page 319 note 9 In interpreting our treaty obligations, we also consider the views of the ICJ itself, “giv[ing] respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret [the treaty].” Breard v. Greene, 523 U. S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam); see Sanchez-Llamas, supra, at 355-356. It is not clear whether that principle would apply when the question is the binding force of ICJ judgments themselves, rather than the substantive scope of a treaty the ICJ must interpret in resolving disputes.Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 805 (1985) (“[A] court adjudicating a dispute may not be able to predetermine the res judicata effect of its own judgment”); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller,&E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4405, p. 82 (2d ed. 2002) (“The first court does not get to dictate to other courts the preclusion consequences of its own judgment”). In any event, nothing suggests that the ICJ views its judgments as automatically enforceable in the domestic courts of signatory nations. The A vena judgment itself directs the United States to provide review and reconsideration of the affected convictions and sentences “by means of its own choosing.” 2004 I. C. J., at 72 (emphasis added). This language, as well as the ICJ's mere suggestion that the “judicial process” is best suited to provide such review, id., at 65-66, confirm that domestic enforceability in court is not part and parcel of an ICJ judgment.

page 320 note 10 The best that the ICJ experts as amici curiae can come up with is the contention that local Moroccan courts have referred to ICJ judgments as “dispositive.” Brief for ICJ Experts as Amici Curiae 20, n. 31. Even the ICJ experts do not cite a case so holding, and Moroccan practice is at best inconsistent, for at least one local Moroccan court has held that ICJ judgments are not binding as a matter of municipal law. See, e.g., Mackay Radio&Tel. Co. v. Lal-La Fatma Bent si Mohamed el Khadar, [1954] 21 Int'l L. Rep. 136 (Tangier, Ct. App. Int'l Trib.) (holding that ICJ decisions are not binding on Morocco's domestic courts); see also “Socobel” v. Greek State, [1951] 18 Int'l L. Rep. 3 (Belg., Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles) (holding that judgments of the ICJ's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, were not domestically enforceable).

page 320 note 11 The other case Medellin cites for the proposition that the judgments of international courts are binding, La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 423 (1899), and the cases he cites for the proposition that this Court has routinely enforced treaties under which foreign nationals have asserted rights, similarly stand only for the principle that the terms of a treaty govern its enforcement. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, 5, n. 2. In each case, this Court first interpreted the treaty prior to finding it domestically enforceable. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 422-423 (1886) (holding that the treaty required extradition only for specified offenses); Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454, 458 (1806) (holding that the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States prevented the operation of a state statute of limitations on British debts).

page 320 note 12 That this Court has rarely had occasion to find a treaty nonself-executing is not all that surprising. See post, at 8 (Breyer, J., dissenting). To begin with, the Courts of Appeals have regularly done so. See, e.g., Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F. 3d 109, 119-120 (CA2 2007) (holding that the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is non-self-executing); Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F. 3d 396,404, n. 3 (CA6 2005) (same); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F. 3d 248, 267 (CA5 2001) (holding that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is non-self-executing). Further, as noted, Congress has not hesitated to pass implementing legislation for treaties that in its view require such legislation.

page 320 note 13 The dissent refrains from deciding the issue, but finds it’ ‘difficult to believe that in the exercise of his Article II powers pursuant to a ratified treaty, the President can never take action that would result in setting aside state law.” Post, at 29. We agree. The questions here are the far more limited ones of whether he may unilaterally create federal law by giving effect to the judgment of this international tribunal pursuant to this non-self-executing treaty, and, if not, whether he may rely on other authority under the Constitution to support the action taken in this particular case. Those are the only questions we decide.

page 320 note 14 Rather, in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I. C. J. 14 (Judgment of June 27), the President determined that the United States would not comply with the ICJ's conclusion that the United States owed reparations to Nicaragua. In the Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U. S.), 19841. C. J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), a federal agency—the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—issued a final rule which complied with the ICJ's boundary determination. The Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U. S.), 19521. C. J. 176 (Judgment of Aug. 27), concerned the legal status of United States citizens living in Morocco; it was not enforced in United States courts. The final two cases arose under the Vienna Convention. In the La-grand Case (F. R. G. v. U. S.), 2001 I. C. J. 466 (Judgment of June 27), the ICJ ordered the review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences of German nationals denied consular notification. In response, the State Department sent letters to the States “encouraging” them to consider the Vienna Convention in the clemency process. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20-21. Such encouragement did not give the ICJ judgment direct effect as domestic law; thus, it cannot serve as precedent for doing so in which Congress might be said to have acquiesced. In the Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U. S.), 1998 I. C. J. 248 (Judgment of Apr. 9), the ICJ issued a provisional order, directing the United States to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure that [Breard] is not executed pending the final decision in [the ICJ's] proceedings.” Breard, 523 U. S., at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted). In response, the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard's execution. Id., at 378. When Paraguay sought a stay of execution from this Court, the United States argued that it had taken every measure at its disposal: because “our federal system imposes limits on the federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the States,” those measures included “only persuasion,” not “legal compulsion.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1997, No. 97-8214, p. 51. This of course is precedent contrary to the proposition asserted by the Solicitor General in this case.

page 320 note 15 See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), Art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, [1966] 17 U. S. T. 1291, T. I. A. S. No. 6090 (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State”); 22 U. S. C. §1650a (“An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [ICSID Convention] shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States”).

page 320 note 16 Cf., e.g., U. S. Reservations, Declarations and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. 8071(1992) (“[T]he United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing”).

page 321 note 17 Congress’ implementation options are broader than the dissent suggests. In addition to legislating judgment-by-judgment, enforcing all judgments indiscriminately, and devising “legislative bright lines,” post, at 24, Congress could, for example, make ICJ judgments enforceable upon the expiration of a waiting period that gives the political branches an opportunity to intervene. Cf., e.g., 16 U. S. C. §1823 (imposing a 120day waiting period before international fishery agreements take effect).

page 321 note 18 In Avena, the ICJ expressed “great concern” that Oklahoma had set the date of execution for one of the Mexican nationals involved in the judgment, Osbaldo Torres, for May 18, 2004. 20041. C. J., at 28,¶21. Responding to Avena, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stayed Torres’ execution and ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether Torres had been prejudiced by the lack of consular notification. See Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (May 13, 2004), 43 I. L. M.1227. On the same day, the Governor of Oklahoma commuted Torres’ death sentence to life without the possibility of parole, stressing that (1) the United States signed the Vienna Convention, (2) that treaty is “important in protecting the rights of American citizens abroad,” (3) the ICJ ruled that Torres’ rights had been violated, and (4) the U. S. State Department urged his office to give careftil consideration to the United States’ treaty obligations. See Office of Governor Brad Henry, Press Release: Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), online at <http://www.ok.gov/governor/display_article.php?article_id=301&article_type=l> (as visited Mar. 20, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). After the evidentiary hearing, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that Torres had failed to establish prejudice with respect to the guilt phase of his trial, and that any prejudice with respect to the sentencing phase had been mooted by the commutation order. Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P. 3d 1184(2005).