* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text appearing at the United Nations website (last visited May 18, 2007) >http://www.un.org/Docs/sc>

2 U.N. Charter art. 39.

3 Murphy, Sean D., The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 214, 216 (1994)Google Scholar[hereinafter Murphy, Legitimacy .

4 S.C. Res. 232, U, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16. 1966).

5 S.C. Res. 418,12, U.N. Doc. R/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).

6 Secretary-General Reviews Lessons Learned During “Sanctions Decade” in Remarks to International Peace Academy Seminar, Press Release, SG/SM/7360 http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/sgstatement.htm

7 Robin Geiss, Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Period Monitoring, and Follow-up Assessment of Long-Term Effects, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 167, 170 (2005).

8 S.C. Res. 864,120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993). The Security Council imposed Chapter VII sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independent of Angola “ UN-ITA ” a rebel group.

9 See Murphy, Legitimacy, supra note 2 at 286.

10 S.C. Res. 1696, fl, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (December 27, 2006), 46 ILM 1 (2007).

11 S.C. Res. 1747, fl, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (March 24,2007).

12 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 484, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 169 [hereinafter NPT]. See also G.A. Res. A/RES/1380 (XIV), Nov. 20,1959; G.A. Res. On the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons with text of treaty annexed, A/ RES/2373 (XXII), June 12, 1968.

13 The NPT distinguishes between two types of nations: those that possessed nuclear weapons at the time the treaty was negotiated, the “Nuclear Weapon States” (NWS) China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and nations not possessing nuclear weapons, the “Non Nuclear Weapon States.“

14 See supra note 9 NPT art. IV.

15 See supra note 9 NPT art. II.

16 Broad, William J. and Sanger, David E., Iranian Boast is Put to the Test, N.Y. TIMES, February 4, 2007, at Al.Google Scholar

17 Id.

18 See Sciolino, Elaine, Russia and West Split on Iran Nuclear Issue, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2006 Google Scholar.

19 U.N. Charter art. 40 states “[i]n order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.“

20 S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 10, 1

21 Id. at 12

22 S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 10,1 3.

23 Id. at 4.

24 S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 10, at 5.

25 Id. at 6,7.

26 S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 10, 8. U.N. Charter art. 41,permits the Security Council to impose measures that would interrupt economic relations, and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

27 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 10, 2.

28 Id. at 3.

29 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 10, 12.

30 Id at 13.

31 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 10, 17.

32 Id. at 18.

33 S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 11,1.

34 Id. at 2.

35 S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 11,5.

36 Id. at 7.

37 S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 11, 10.

38 S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 11, 8.

39 Id. at 12.

40 Id. at 13