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The European Court of Human Rights: Nada v. Switzerland

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Miša Zgonec-Rožej
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Extract

On September 12, 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) ruled in Nada v. Switzerland that the implementation by Switzerland of the United Nations Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime violated the right to private and family life under Article 8, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Type
International Legal Documents
Information
International Legal Materials , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 268 - 322
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2013

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References

* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the European Court of Human Rights Web site (visited March 4, 2013) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra-press/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113118.

1 Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113118 [hereinafter Nada v. Switzerland].

2 Id. paras. 20, 194. The sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban was established by Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was expanded and modified by a number of subsequent resolutions.

3 Id. paras. 21-26, 38, 52.

4 Id. paras. 19, 28.

5 Id. paras. 41-52.

6 Id. paras. 1, 3, 149, 200, 215.

7 Id. para. 62.

8 Miša, Zgonec-Rožej, Kafka, Sisyphus, and Bin Laden: Challenging the Al Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Regime , 9 Essex Hum. Rts. Rev. 69 (2011)Google Scholar, available at http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Zgonec-Rozej.pdf.

9 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69564.

10 See, e.g., A and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91403; see also Iain Cameron, Council of Europe, Report on the European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, (2006), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Texts_&_Documents/Docs%202006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf.

11 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351.

12 UN Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Communication No. 1472/2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (Dec. 29, 2008).

13 In Al-Jedda, the Court found there was no conflict between the Security Council resolution and the ECHR in that case. In such cases, the Court endorsed the presumption against requiring member states to breach fundamental human rights. The Court held that where the terms of the Security Council resolution are ambiguous, the Court must apply the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the ECHR and which avoids any conflict of obligations. The Court acknowledged, however, that the Security Council could, by clear and explicit language, require States to take measures which would conflict with their obligations under ECHR but the Court failed to explain how this conflict would be resolved. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 50 ILM 950, para. 102 (2011); Miša, Zgonec-Rožej, Case Report: Al- Jedda v United Kingdom , 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 830, 835 (2012)Google Scholar.

14 Nada v. Switzerland, supra note 1, paras. 171-172.

15 Id. para. 170.

16 Id. para. 196.

17 Id. para. 197.

18 Id. paras. 198, 199.

19 Swiss Federal Court also held that ‘‘the sanctions (freezing of assets, and transit ban, arms embargo) are described in detail and afford member States no margin of appreciation in their implementation’’ and considered that ‘‘Switzerland would therefore be in breach of its obligations under the Charter were it to delete the names of the appellant and his organisations from the annex to the Taliban Ordinance.’’ Id. para. 50.

20 Id., Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudkivska, paras. 1, 5-8.

21 Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council & Comm’n, supra note 11, para. 299.

22 Nada v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 212.

23 Id. paras. 213-214.

24 Id. paras. 230-234.

1 Emphasis added

2 Emphasis added

3 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, § 42.

4 See paragraph 83 of the present judgment.

5 Emphasis added.

6 See Hanspeter, Mock and Alvaro, Borghi, ‘‘Vers une sortie du labyrinthe des listes antiterroristes de l’ONU’’, in Les droits de l’homme en évolution : mélanges en l’honneur du professeur Petros J. Pararas, Athens-Brussels, 2009, p. 406 Google Scholar.

7 See Josiane, Auvret-Finck, ‘‘Le contrôle des décisions du Conseil de sécurité par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme’’, in Sanctions ciblées et protections juridictionnelles des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne ; équilibres et déséquilibres de la balance, Constance Grewe et al. (eds.), Brussels, 2013, p. 214 Google Scholar.

8 See, to this effect, Luigi, Condorelli, ‘‘Conclusions’’, in Palmieri, G.M. (ed.), Les évolutions de la protection juridictionnelle des fonctionnaires internationaux et européens - développements récents, Brussels, 2012, p. 359 Google Scholar.

9 See De Sena, Pasquale, ‘‘Le Conseil de sécurité et le contrôle du juge’’, in Sanctions ciblées et protections juridictionnelles des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne (note 7, supra), p. 44 Google Scholar.

10 See, to this effect, Mock/Borghi (note 6, supra), p. 42.

11 Resolution 1597 (2008), United Nations Security Council and European Union blacklists.

12 See Josiane Auvret-Finck (note 7, supra), p. 235.

13 See the report by Dick Marty, Doc. 11454, United Nations Security Council and European Union blacklists.

14 Constance Grewe, ‘‘Les exigences de la protection des doits fondamentaux’’, in Sanctions ciblées et protections juridictionnelles des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne (note 7, supra)

15 See Josiane Auvret-Fink (note 7, supra), p. 241.

16 See Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-I. See also, to this effect, Luigi, Condorelli, ‘‘Conclusions’’, in La soumission des organisations internationales aux normes internationales relatives aux droits de l’homme, Paris, Pédone, 2009, p. 132 Google Scholar.

17 See Josiane Auvret-Finck (note 7, supra), p. 243.