In May 1896 Lord Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt and that country's de facto ruler, received a “very numerously signed petition” from the coalheavers of Port Said. These workers, most of them migrants from Upper Egypt, were employed through labor contractors by several English and other foreign-owned companies to carry coal onto ships transiting the Suez Canal. The coalheavers complained of ill-treatment by the contractors (shuyuūkh), who “buy and sell us like slaves”, stealing part of their wages and forcing them to buy all they needed at stores owned by the contractors. Cromer acknowledged receipt of the petition in a letter to the coaling companies, commenting that the workers “seem to have some real grievances, notably in connection with the truck system”. Suggesting that the employers seek to avoid a strike, he expressed the opinion that the government “should deal with a strike at Port Said on the same lines as a strike in England, that is to say, that they should preserve order and not interfere to any serious extent between employers and labourers.”

Social scientists have studied small-scale manufacturers both on a theoretical and on a regional basis relative to their occupational prestige, values, way of life, and political affiliations. Lately, this topic has also been of interest to international lending institutions that have adopted policies that promote small-scale firms in less-developed countries. Part of the reason for the change in policy stems from the inefficient production of large-scale firms and their disappointing performance in reducing unemployment. Some of the studies have found small- scale firms to be more efficient in inputs. Small-scale firms are viewed as generating needed employment opportunities in countries that face pressures of fast-growing labor force populations.

Until now, there has appeared no party in the Arab world that can compete with the SSNP for the quality of its propaganda, which addresses both reason and emotion, or for the strength of its organization, which is effective both overtly and covertly. By virtue of its organization, this party succeeded in creating a very powerful intellectual and political current in Syria and Lebanon.

Many Middle Eastern governments are seeking to liberalize their trade policies. There is a desire to abandon policies based on import substitution through protectionism, and instead concentrate on export promotion. Advisors from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) urge governments to be less interventionist, and to create an environment where the provate sector can have freer rein. It is hoped that private entrepreneurs can revitalize the economies, and play a major role in emport promotion. Egypt, for example, has had an open door policy since 1974 following the years of government intervention and control under Nasser. Syria has also liberalized its import regime, and would like to encourage private sector exports, and Ba'thist socialist ideology has been less emphasized in recent years.

A number of the basic works on Iranian history have attempted to characterize seventeenth-century Iran as a whole, usually from a non-Marxist perspective. Vladimir Minorsky, for example, employs the term “tribal feudalism” to describe the pre-'Abbas I system, and speaks of the “great transformation” in the period to 1630 from tribal feudalism to “patrimonial absolutism.” These leads have been followed by Nikki Keddie, with “tribal feudalism”; Alessandro Bausani, with “pastoral nomadic feudalism”; and Amin Banani, with “patrimonial absolutism.” James Reid offers the term “uymaq system” (tribal state), while Hafez Farmayan notes the transition from Isma'ils “theocratic-feudal form of government” to 'Abbass “military and bureaucratic” centralized state. Marshall Hodgson's panoptic view of Islamic history provides the general term “agrarlanate citied society” and specific characterizations of Safavid Iran as heir to “military patronage state,” as a “bureaucratic absolutism” and as an “agrarian absolutism.” Each of these conceptualizations has its merits, not the least being that their authors include some of the most perceptive and empirically well-informed twentieth-century historians of Iran, Islam and the Middle East. While it is impossible to discuss their theoretical approaches in detail here, it should noted that the terminology tends to disclose two basic (if somewhat overlapping) orientations: (1) these are largely political conceptualizations—patrimonial absolutism, agrarian absolutism, theocratic feudalism, tribal state, military patronage state, and (2) a number of them suggest hybrid economic entities—tribal pastoral nomadic feudalism, agrarianate citied society. Without denying the interest of the first, primarily political approach to characterizing seventeenth-century Iran as a total system, it is the second set of terms—those of Minorsky, Bausani, Keddie and Hodgson—that is of particular significance for the present analysis, since each hints at the mixed economic bases of the Iranian social formation, to which we shall return after a look at the standard Marxist approaches.

This article focuses on two major aspects of the Mahdist political economy, i.e., its fiscal and monetary systems. It attempts to integrate an analysis of their structure with that of the political behavior of the Mahdist rulers in order to show how the Mahdist rulers' political power and personal aspirations affected the development of both systems. In doing so, the article will be primarily concerned with the struggle of the successors of the Mahdi for resource control; it will examine the efforts of the ruling group to control and manipulate the fiscal and monetary systems in order to turn these—and indeed the economy as a whole—into a power base so as to preserve the established political order.