In Waqfs and Urban Structures, Richard van Leeuwen gives a clear and coherent thesis regarding the evolution of Damascene waqfs throughout the Ottoman period. Since the takeover in 1516 of Greater Syria by the Ottomans, “waqfs were an integral part of imperial policy and were used as a mechanism to foster the cohesion between the centre of authority and the conquered provinces” (p. 148). A number of phenomena point in that direction, all of which seem to confirm the thesis of the strengthening of ties between Damascus and Istanbul. A number of sultans, beginning with Selim, who entered Damascus in 1516, erected their own waqfs within the city. Ties were strengthened with local families either through iqtāע grants or prestigious appointments to religious positions. Positions of judges, muftis, and administrators to major public waqfs, were all intermittently infused with elements from outside the city—or, at least, with elements known for their loyalty to the “center.” These elements were not exclusively from within the hierarchy of aעyān and ulama, and the local would be mixed with loyal elements from other provinces. Above all, the local governors were for the most part—with the notable exception of the עĀzms—Turkish, or at least from non-Arab provinces. Van Leeuwen argues—and that is his main thesis—that such phenomena constituted a clear indication of “centralizing tendencies” (p. 114) whose aim was for the imperial state to interfere in and control some of the major local institutions, among them, of course, the waqfs. Even though van Leeuwen makes it plain that such practices of “interference” did not imply that “waqfs were appropriated by the central government” (p. 87), there was nevertheless a deliberate urban policy of spatial control (the way waqfs were distributed). Control was imposed either through resource management (how rents and leases were granted) and appointments to major religious and judicial positions or through a reframing of the law to buttress the imperial grip over the city. Van Leeuwen's main thesis is indeed far broader than a study of urban waqfs. It uses the example of waqfs to show that, contrary to many theses of “decentralization” in which the “center” is portrayed as losing its grip over the provinces (the so-called peripheries), the state did its best not to relinquish control over major urban institutions. In short, the “centralizing efforts” (p. 115) of the imperial state is the motto of this study.