¹ Compare, Essad Bey, Mohammed, Reza Shah. Hutchinson and Co: London 1938;Google Scholar with, Asar Foruqi, Mohammed, The Silver Lion. Upper India Publishing House, Lucknow 1939;Google Scholar and the more comprehensive but by no means exhaustive, Wilber, N. Donald,Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran. Exposition Press. New York, 1975.Google Scholar

² Archival material relating to Teymourtash from the Iranian Ministry of Court, the Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still not available.

³ Essad-Bey, op. cit. p. 238. Sardar Mu'zzam Khorassani, as Teymourtash was also known, enrolled as a cadet in the Imperial Russian Nikolayevski Cavalry School.

⁴ von Blücher, Wipert, Zeitenwende in iran, Erlebnisse und Beobachtungen. Biberach an der Riss: Koehler und Voigtländer 1949, p. 149.Google Scholar

⁵ The Persian Parliament and Constitution of 1906 was the outcome of the impact on Persia of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the democratic ferment of the Persian middle class.

⁶ This information is based on interviews given to the writer by members of the Teymourtash family both in Iran and abroad.

⁷ The coup d'état which took place on February 1921 was led by Reza Khan and the pro-British journalist, Sayyid Zia-ed-Din; it is not without significance that the latter belonged to Teymourtash's circle of intellectuals. Essad-Bey actually points out that this “mission first had been discussed in Teymourtash's house,” op. cit. p. 239. Further proof that Reza Khan was not the sole author of the coup d'état is attested by the posted proclamation of 22 February 1921. Cited in Wilber, , op. cit., p. 6. Reza Shah, of course, later took full credit for the coup and his accession to power.Google Scholar

⁸ Wilber, , op. cit. p. 103. As Minister of Public Works in 1924 Teymourtash presented a bill in the Majlis which was intended to levy a tax on tea and sugar to pay for the construction of a Trans-Iranian railroad. The plan was eventually expedited and fulfilled under Reza Shah in 1937.Google Scholar

⁹ Essad-Bey, , op. cit. pp. 239–240.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Rouholla, Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500–1941. Charlottesville University of Virginia Press. 1966. p. 185.Google Scholar

¹¹ ibid. p. 186.

¹² Wilber, , op. cit. p. 113.Google Scholar

¹³ When Teymourtash became Court Minister, a powerful triumvirate emerged in support of the new Shah. It comprised of Teymourtash who, similar to a Grand Vizier, was responsible for much of domestic policy and the conduct of Persian foreign affairs; the Finance Minister, Firouz Mirza (subsequently accused and executed for accepting bribes); and Davar, the Minister of Justice who later committed suicide. Semyon L'vovitch Agaev, Iran: Vneshniaia Politika i problemy Nezavisimosti 1925–1941. Izdatel'stvo, “Nauka” Institut Vostokovedenia, Moskva. 1971. p. 153.Google Scholar The German Minister in Teheran at this time later wrote in his memoirs: “Teymourtash was not only the eyes, but the very ears and mouth of his Shah.” See, Blücher op. cit. p. 225. For an interesting discussion of the fundamental socio-economic transformations in Iran during the inter-war period, see: Banani, Amin, The Modernization of Iran: 1921–1941. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1961.Google Scholar See also: Toynbee, Arnold, Survey of International Affairs for 1928: Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1929.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Wilber, , op. cit. p. 122.Google Scholar

¹⁵ ibid.

¹⁶ FO 371/E 906/239/34 Nr. 279, January 1936. p. 7.

¹⁷ The person in charge of the Foreign Ministry was primarily responsible for all official correspondence with foreign representatives and was looked upon as the Court Minister's clerk. Agaev, , op. cit. p. 45.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The “Times,” 9 January 1933.

¹⁹ Essad-Bey, , op. cit. p.240.Google Scholar

²⁰ The Rise and Fall of Teymourtash, , Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol. 21, ch. I, 1934, p. 93.Google Scholar

²¹ Pal'gunov, N. G., Tristsat' let: Vospominania Zhurnalista i diplomata. Moskva 1964. p. 51–52.Google Scholar

²² Blücher, , op. cit. p. 199.Google Scholar

²³ Agabekov, George, For the English version see: OGPU. The Russian Secret Terror. Translated by Henry, W. BunnBrentano: New York 1931.Google Scholar

²⁴ The Bahrein Islands had once been occupied by Persians. Iran began to claim sovereignty over them by means of a series of notes addressed to the British government on 22 November 1927. The British had earlier entered into treaty arrangements with the Shaykh of Bahrein. For a full account of this problem see: Mesbah Zadeh, Mostafa. La Politique de L'Iran Dans La S.D.N. Pedone. Paris. 1936.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ministerstvo Innostranikh Del: Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki Sovietskogo Soyuza. 1927. vol.10, Nr. 1. Moskva 1965 p. 9.

²⁷ Confidential Report from Mr. Hoare to Sir Austin Chamberlain. FO 371/1 1494/E 6324/644/34.

²⁸ FO 371/11494/E4500/644/34.

²⁹ Nicolson to Sir Austin Chamberlain. 16 August 1926. FO 371/E4821/644/34.

³⁰ FO 371/E6324/644/34. 15 November 1926.

³¹ The 1927 treaties and agreements were eventually signed in Moscow and their conclusion marked the pinnacle of Teymourtash's career. For Chicherin's comment on this event and the full text of the agreements and exchange of letters, see: Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki, vol. 10, Nr. 228. pp. 434–435.

³² The capitulatory clauses were priviliges and extra-territorial rights extended to foreign powers and their nationals, among whom Britain had been the foremost. They were abolished by the Persian government on 10 May 1928. Documents on International Affairs. ed. John, W. Wheeler Bennett. Oxford Univ Press, London, 1929, p. 200–205.Google Scholar The Soviet leadership had unilaterally surrendered similar Russian capitulatory rights in Persia immediately after the October revolution. For the full text see: Childs, J. Reeves. Perso-Russian Treaties and Notes. Stanford: Hoover Library (microfilm) undated;Google Scholar cited by Kapur, Harish, Soviet Russia and Asia. Geneva 1965. p. 154.Google Scholar

³³ Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki. Sovetskogo Soyuza. Report from Davtyan, to Narkomindel, , of 30 05 1928: vol II, Nr. 192, p. 347.Google Scholar

³⁴ ibid.

³⁵ ibid. Nr. 167, pp. 317–318.

³⁶ The British airline in question was “imperial Airways.” Its route extended from London to Karachi, but as it traversed Persian territory its bases there enhanced Britain's strategic domination of the Persian Gulf, and it thereby heightened Soviet fears of an attack on its territory from southern Persia. For Persia's air transit agreement see Chamberlain's, speech of 14 05 1928, in: The Parliamentary Debates. The House of Commons. 1925–1941. vol. 217, London: p. 650–651.Google Scholar

³⁷ Deutsches Auswärtiges Amt, Nr. 3 Pol. 2. Orient vol. I. Nr. 5012 September 19, 1928.

³⁸ ibid.

³⁹ For the Russian account see: Agabekov, George, Zapiski Chekista, Izdatel'stvo “Strela,” Berlin 1930. pp. 120–121.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ ibid. p. 114. Soviet covert activity was aimed less against the Shah and the Persian government per se as it was against British interests and various White Russian and Dashnak (Armenian nationalist) anti-Soviet groupings in the country.

⁴¹ The fact that the British Foreign office requested Agabekov, who was of Armenian extraction, to make further revelations to be published in an Armenian (Dashnak) newspaper, the “Husaber” in Cairo, is revealing. See: F.O. 371/E6336/5842/34. While not detracting from the validity of Agabekov's statements regarding Soviet espionage in his formal publications as a whole, the printing of some of this material in newspapers and anti-Soviet journals abroad, with the active encouragement of the British government, appeared in certain instances to have rendered the information somewhat distorted.

⁴² National Archives. Legation of the U.S. Nr. 284 Doc. 891. OOB/37. Jan. 12, 1931.

⁴³ The minutes of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office recorded that Agabekov's revelations have a solid basis of truth.” FO. 371/E6336/5842/34. The memoirs created quite a stir in Persian official circles, too.

⁴⁴ Indeed, Reza Shah was seldom seen by Persians and foreigners alike. A prominent member of the Iranian military admitted this fact in his memoirs. See: General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs. Murray, John, Edinburgh 1964. p. 279.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Wilber, , op. cit. pp. 243–245.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Essad-Bey, , op. cit. p. 241.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Pal'gunov, , op. cit. p. 57.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ National Archives. Department of State. Legation of the U.S. Doc. 891. OOB/49. April 1931.

⁴⁹ Wilber, , op. cit. p. 142.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Arfa, , op. cit. p. 235.Google Scholar

⁵¹ It has rightly been argued that the Iranian trade monopoly was specifically instituted in response to the centralized Soviet trading system and its practices. Soviet journalists were told by Persian merchants that the Iranian monopoly, “Teymourtash's brain-child” was designed as an economic weapon to free Persian trade from the constraints of the Soviet market, implicitly suggesting that Teymourtash was seeking to draw Persia closer to Europe. Pal'gunov, , op. cit. pp. 47–48.Google Scholar

⁵² A detailed discussion of the points at issue during the dispute between Persia and Britain over the APOC is beyond the scope of this article. For detailed reference see: Shwadran, Benjamin, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. Frederick A. Praeger, New York 1955, pp. 41–56.Google Scholar or, Ellwel-Sutton, , Persian Oil. A Study in Power Politics. London 1955.Google Scholar

⁵³ Ellwel-Sutton, , op. cit. p. 70.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ The substance of this letter was later formally presented to the Majlis in 1949 at the time of the debate on APOC's supplemental agreement. ibid.

⁵⁵ ibid.

⁵⁶ League of Nations, Official Journal, 14th year 1933; Pleadings 191: cited by Shwadran, , op. cit.p. 42.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Toynbee, Arnold, Survey… 1934. London 1935. p. 237.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ League of Nations, Official Journal, 14th year 1933: 289–295. Pleadings 190–192.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ The British government held the major share of the stocks in the Company.

⁶⁰ See: Soyuza, D.V.P. Sovetskogo, vol. 15 Nr. 21 pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

⁶¹ ibid: Nr. 485 pp. 687–688.

⁶² General Arfa, op. cit. p. 236. There was talk, too, of the excessively friendly reception given to Teymourtash by the Soviet leaders.

⁶³ Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki vol. 15 p. 49 and 62. The protocol initialed by Teymourtash was subsequently neither signed nor ratified by the Iranian government.

⁶⁴ Mehdi Farrokh, Sayed. Katarat-i tiasi Farrokh. Mostaam Assuldaneh Shamil. Tari-e yan jah Salab Moasir. Teheran 1968. pp. 292–294.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Report on Seven Year Development Plan Nr. 4 p. 240. Cited in Shwadran, p. 95.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ FO: 371/E4498/535/34.

⁶⁷ ibid. Teymourtash and Reza Shah were also shareholders.

⁶⁸ Shwadran, , op. cit. p. 95.Google Scholar Specifically, the Soviets were more interested in the old Khostaria concession held in Tsarist times which the Soviet government had relinquished to the Persian government under the 1921 Treaty of Friendship.

⁶⁹ Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society. vol. 21, Nr. 1 1934, p. 93.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Mehdi Farrokh, Sayed, op. cit. p. 291.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Blücher, , op. cit. p. 255.Google Scholar See also: Ghoreichi, Ahmad, Soviet Foreign Policy in Iran 1917–1960. Unpublished PH.D. dissertation. University of Colorado 1965, p. 138.Google Scholar

⁷² These letters were concealed by his immediate family and only published during the period from 1943 to 1949 in a Teheran paper called Rastakhiz (Resurrection) by Madame Iran Teymourtash. The extract of the letter cited above was dated January 1933; moreover, Sardar As'ad (Bakhtiari), then Minister of War, to whom reference is made in this letter, had replaced Firuz Mirza in the short-lived governing triumvirate. He subsequently died in prison in March 1934. For an account of the circumstances of his death, see: Iskandari, Abbas, Kitab-i arzu, ya tarikh-i mufassal-i mashrutiyat-i Iran, Teheran, 1322, vol. 1, chapter 28. (The book of aspiration, or the detailed history of the Iranian Constitution 1943.)Google Scholar

⁷³ Shafaq-i Surkh, 19 03 1933.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Tajaddud-i Iran of 02 20, 21, 1933. and Iran of 02 1933.Google Scholar Teymourtash was suspected of making profits in foreign exchange with the assistance of Dr. Lindenblatt, the German Director of the National Bank.

⁷⁵ FO 371/E 879/47/34.

⁷⁶ FO 371/E 1358/47/34. February 1933.

⁷⁷ This alleged letter is dated 7 February 1933, and appeared in “Rastakhiz.”

⁷⁸ The Tajaddud, 25 02 1933.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Ambassador Hoare to the British Foreign Office. Nr. 128 FO 371/E 1877/47/34.

⁸⁰ ibid. See also: National Archives, Legation of the U.S. Despatch Nr. 1478. 30 June 1933.

⁸¹ Various forms of the system are manifest even today. See Zonis, Marvin, The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton University Press. 1971. pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

⁸² Wilber, , op. cit. p. 148.Google Scholar

⁸³ Second Cadman, Baron. Ambassador for Oil, The Life of John, First Baron Cadman. Herbert Jenkins, London 1960. p. 123. The relevant letter in this book has been reproduced in full by Sir John Cadman's son.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ John Cadman reported that the Shah had been satisfied with the British Company, but that his “only misgivings were on the financial terms offered.” ibid. p. 126.

⁸⁵ Elwell-Sutton, op. cit. p. 79.Google Scholar The author quotes from the speech of Sir Gladwin Jebb, delivered to the Security Council on 1 October 1951, that the concession had been negotiated personally with the Shah. ibid.

⁸⁶ National Archives of U.S. Department of State, Legation of the U.S. Nr. 1426, May 4, 1933.

⁸⁷ Elwell-Sutton, , op. cit. p. 73.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Evidence of an instance where a Persian monarch allowed himself to be bribed by British agents occured in 1919 in connection with the signing of the Anglo-Persian treaty, whereby the British persuaded Ahmad Qajar to dismiss Premier Ala es-Sultane Dowleh and to appoint Vossugh ed-Dowleh; it was achieved by paying the Shah a monthly subsidy of 15,000 tomans. See Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Woodward, E. L. and Rohan, Butler (eds.) 1st. series (IV) London 1952, pp. 1125–1126.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ FO 371/E6345/47/34. Mr. Mallet to Sir John Simon. 24 October 1933.

⁹⁰ Wilber, , op. cit. p. 156.Google Scholar

⁹¹ FO 371/E6345/47/34. 24 October 1933.

⁹² ibid.

⁹³ For the text of the discussions between Reza and Karakhan, see: Documenty Vneshnei Politiki Sovetskogo Soyuza. vol. 16, Nr. 308, September 30, 1933. There were great difficulties in SovietIranian trade along the frontier.

⁹⁴ Wilber, , op. cit. p. 16.Google Scholar