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Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of Coup-Proofing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 July 2011
Extract
Oil and dynastic rule have led to an idiosyncratic pattern of state formation in the Gulf, and in few parts of the state are the idiosyncrasies more pronounced than in the security sector. Oil income has allowed the ruling families of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to engineer a relatively soft, rent- and patronage-based authoritarianism characterized by multiple centers of power and huge institutional redundancies. Having constructed their police and military forces along these lines, their monarchical rule has become more resilient, but their armed forces also more hapless.
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- The Arab Uprisings of 2011
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011
References
NOTES
1 Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Hertog, Steffen, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010)Google Scholar.
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