Author's Note: The writer wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Zakariyya al-Nahas, Nihal al-Naggar, and Alaa H. who participated in the New Wafd study project; the analysis and conclusions contained in this paper are, however, purely the responsibility of the writer.

¹ The best works on the social composition of the Wafd are Marius, Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and Its Rivals, 1919–1939 (London, 1979);Google Scholar and Louis, J. Cantori, “The Wafd Party and the Egyptian Pre-Independence Struggle, 1918–1924: The Social Basis,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 01, 1975.Google Scholar

² Cantori, “The Wafd Party.” Deeb's analysis of Wafd organization is similar and particularly good on the urban wing of the party.

³ When in power, however, Wafd leaders were not always above comprador-like deals with foreign companies.

⁴ Deeb, , Party Politics, pp. 40–46.Google Scholar

⁵ Deeb, , Party Politics, pp. 40–46.Google Scholar

⁶ This analysis of the Wafd's career relies chiefly on Deeb, , Party Politics; Berque, Egypt,Google Scholar and Vatikiotis, P. J., The Modern History of Egypt (New York, 1969).Google Scholar

⁷ “Why the New Party?” (in Arabic) (Cairo, 1977).

⁸ Data on New Wafd leaders was collected in interviews with members of the thirty-five man party executive committee, or High Board, in early 1978. Where possible, the data were cross-checked. The writer believes the data on occupation and education to be quite reliable. The information on economic interests must, however, be regarded with caution; given the disinclination of elites to reveal personal wealth for obvious reasons, it most likely understates the interests of the respondents, and can be taken as merely suggestive.

The sample of New Wafd activists was obtained by means of questionnaires distributed to activists in two meetings held at the party's Cairo headquarters in early 1978. The sample has certain defects: It is small because police warned the writer against further distribution of the questionnaire. Rigorous sampling was impossible and, as such, one cannot be sure how representative the activists surveyed are of the whole membership. The writer is convinced the sample probably gives a good glimpse of the party's hard-core activists, but since it was given at the party's Cairo headquarters, it may underrepresent the party's rural membership. The percentage breakdowns of the social composition and attitudes of the sample must, given its small size, be taken as nothing more than indicators of orders of magnitude.

⁹ Table 9 was arrived at by assigning respondents to a class category according to whether or not they reported economic interests or held top positions (e.g., banker, hospital director), and according to the relative status of their profession (doctor, lawyer, etc., being considered “large,” a teacher or journalist a “small” professional). Because of the room for error this method allows and, in some cases, incomplete data, the table represents merely a rough ‘guesstimate’.

The possibility must be noted that had the party not been repressed, it might, in time, have recruited more activists from lower social strata. It is also possible that had sampling in the provinces been possible, the overall composition of the sample might have been somewhat less high in social status; however, if the past is any indication, the typical rural New Wafdist was likely to be a prosperous local landowner or professional.

¹⁰ This analysis of ideology is based on three basic sources: (1) the party program, Birnamig Hizb al- Wafd al-Jadid (Cairo, n.d.); (2) interviews with top party leaders including Fuad Serag ad-Din (President), Hilmi Murad (Vice President), and Drs. Numan Gomaa and Muhammed Nasr (party Assistant Secretaries); and (3) attitudinal questions included in the survey of party activists.

¹¹ Minutes of Parliament, 4, 12, 14, and 19 October 1978.

¹² a1-Nizam al-Dakhili li-Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid (Internal Rules).Google Scholar

¹³ Interview, Fuad Serag ad-Din, March 1978.

¹⁴ Makram Muhammed Ahmad in al-Ahram, 5 02 1978.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Interviews with two secretary-generals and a member of the politburo of the ruling Arab Socialist Party of Egypt. For an independent analysis of the Wafd's threat which agrees with this assessment, see Ghali, Shukri, al-Thawra al-muḍāḍa fī Misr (Dār al-Talia, Beirut, 1978), p. 24.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Interview, Muhammed, Anis, 02 1978;Google Scholar see also al-Ahram, 22 03 1978.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See, for example, al-Ahram, 13 06 1978;Google ScholarJaridat Misr, 7 02, 14 02, and 4 04 1978.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Iinterview, Secretary of Arab Socialist Party of Egypt, April 1978.

¹⁹ “Bayan Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid,” 12 June 1978.

²⁰ See Sadat's speeches of 2 May 1978, 15 May 1978, and 23 May 1978.

²¹ The victory was apparent because the supposedly pro-government winner, Ahmad al-Khawaga, did little to prevent the Lawyers' Syndicate from turning into a center of anti-government, pro-Wafd sentiment.

²² In fact, Husni Mubarek, Sadat's successor, soon faced pressures to again legalized the Wafd.

²³ Deeb, , Parry Politics, “Conclusion.”.Google Scholar