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Parameters and Strategies of Islam–State Interaction in Republican Turkey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu
Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu
Affiliation:
Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.
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Extract

Against a historical background marked by “the most radical secular revolution of any state in the Muslim world,” the Turkish state over the past decade has faced an Islamic fundamentalist challenge to its secular basis. The Turkish version of radical Islam, like that elsewhere in the Middle East, has asserted itself effectively in all aspects and at all levels of society, making a stark contrast between the sixty years of the republic and the period since 1980. It is not surprising, therefore, that the causes for the emergence of Islamic political radicalism, its nature, and its possible effects on the system have aroused scholarly interest.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , May 1996 , pp. 231 - 251
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

NOTES

1 Harris, George S., “Islam and the State in Modern Turkey,” Middle East Review 11 (Summer 1979): 21Google Scholar.

2 Some cross-sectional examples can be given. For a viewpoint from among the “Islamists” emphasizing the total failure and bankruptcy of Kemalist secularism, giving rise to the revival of Islam, see Yanardaǧ, A. Faruk, “Siyaset'te Din Faktörü, Kitap Dergisi (Mart-Nisan 1992): 3–10Google Scholar. A prominent writer in the “leftist” camp, Ömer Laçiner, and like-minded writers also argue that radical Islam owes its broadening appeal to the “bankruptcy” of Kemalist Westernization. See Laçiner, Ömer, “Dini Akimlarin Yükselişi ve Türkiye'de Islamic Hareket,” Birikim (Ekim 1989): 6–14Google Scholar. Similarly, most writers within the “liberal” camp believe that radical Islam is the revolt of the petite-bourgeoisie, and that the fundamental factors responsible for its growth are the republican principle of secularism and the process of modernization. For two representative articles, see Sunar, İlkay and Toprak, Binnaz, “Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey,” Government and Opposition 18 (1983): 421–41;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Toprak, Binnaz, “The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey,” in State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s ed. Heper, Metin and Evin, Ahmet (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1988), 119–36Google Scholar. Another writer, stretching this line of thinking to its conclusion, claims that in the years following the 1980 military intervention there was a tacit admission of the failure of Kemalism, which led to a “departure” from strict traditional secularism. See Tapper's, Richard introduction to Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, ed. Tapper, Richard (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 1–27Google Scholar.

3 Mardin, Şerif, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in Atatürk: The Founder of a Modern State, ed. Özbudun, Ergun and Kazancigil, Ali (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 193Google Scholar.

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9 Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştirma Merkezi, 1989), 225 (from a public speech Atatürk made in Kastamonu on 30 August 1925)Google Scholar.

10 Islamic dervish, sufi lodge, or convent.

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13 Ibid.

14 Atatürk'ün Söylev ve DemeÇleri II, 98 (from a speech Atatürk made in the Pasa mosque in Balikesir on 7 November 1923).

15 Ibid., 94 (from a public speech Atatürk made in İzmir on 31 January 1923).

16 Ibid., 90 (from the same speech).

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18 See Ahmad, Feroz, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy(London: C. Hurst, 1977), 8–11Google Scholar.

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24 The first pro-Islamic party to be formed was the National Order Party (NOP) in 1969, which was dissolved after the military intervention in 1971. It was followed by the National Salvation Party (NSP)in 1972, which became a key partner in three coalitions between 1974 and 1977, and was the third-largest party in the political system in terms of seats occupied in the National Assembly. Following the dissolution of the party in 1981, after the 1980 coup, the Welfare Party (WP) was formed in 1981.

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26 Ekim 1974 (Ankara: n.p., 1974), 107Google Scholar (speeches made by Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the JP).

27 AP'nin Dini ve Manevi Hizmetleri (Ankara: n.p., 1977), 15Google Scholar (from a speech made in Kayseri on 31 May 1965).

28 Ibid., 37.

29 Ahmad, , The Turkish Experiment, 376.Google Scholar

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33 Saribay, Ali Yaşar, Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikasi: MSP Örnek Olayi (Istanbul: Alan Yayincilik, 1983), 219.Google Scholar

34 Ibid.

35 The situation remained the same for the WP with, however, the composition of its constituency moving toward youth, women, and workers in the outskirts of big metropolises. This became even more manifest in the partial local elections in 1992, and the local elections of 1994 (for more on these two elections, see note 44). The NSP received 11.8 percent of the total votes in 1973 and sent fortyeight deputies to the assembly. This figure fell to 8.4 percent in the 1977 elections, with the number of deputies down to twenty-four. The WP first competed in local elections in 1984, receiving 4.4 percent of the votes. In the 1987 general election it scored 7.1 percent, and in the 1989 local elections it received 9.8 percent of the votes. The party participated in the 1991 general elections as part of a nationalist “alliance” with the other extreme-right-wing parties, and the alliance received 16.9 percent of the total votes.

36 Toprak, , “The Religious Right,” 229Google Scholar.

37 Sunar, and Toprak, , “Islam in Politics,” 438Google Scholar.

38 See the interview with the vice president of the WP, Zengin, Bahri, in Yeni Zemin 6 (06 1993): 41Google Scholar.

39 Interview with Tayyip Erdoǧan in ibid.

40 Çakir, Ruşen, “Refah Çalişti, Haketti, Kazandi,” Sabah, 12 04 1994, 16.Google Scholar

41 Özbudun, Ergun, “Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The Case of the National Salvation Party,” in The Islamic Impulse, ed. Stowasser, Barbara Freyer (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988), 146Google Scholar; Alkan, Türker, “The National Salvation Party in Turkey,” in Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, ed. Heper, Metin and Israeli, Raphael (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), 86Google Scholar, expresses the same view. On the WP, for the same discourse, see Göle, Nilüfer, “İslami Dokunulmazlar, Laikler ve Radikal Demokratlar,” Türkiye Günlüǧü 27 (Mart-Nisan 1994): 13Google Scholar; and Ali Yaşar Saribay, “Refah Partisi'nin Ardindaki Sosyo-Politik Dinamikler,” in ibid., 20.

42 Zubeida, Sami, “Is There a Muslim Society?” Economy and Society 24 (05 1995): 182Google Scholar.

43 Idem, Islam, the People and the State (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 159Google Scholar.

44 In the 1 November 1992 partial local elections, one wing of political Islam, the WP, made unexpected gains by increasing its votes in Istanbul (the projected average national increase being 9.41%) as a result of its conscious effort to expand its political constituency and of its making inroads into “liberal” and “social-democratic” segments. This was the first sign of the comprehensiveness of the WP's program of transforming itself along the lines of mass parties and thus diluting its radicalism. See Aktüel (5 and 11 11 1992): 166–70Google Scholar. Similarly, in the 27 March 1994 local elections, the WP increased the percentage of total votes it scored in the election of mayors for greater cities from 9 percent in 1989—there were eight greater cities then—to 22.4 percent in the existing fifteen greater cities. On the level of provincial local councils, it managed to double the 9.7-percent representation it received in 1989 to 19 percent in the 1994 elections.

45 For discussions from three of the most eminent Muslim intellectuals (Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören, and İsmet Özel), see Meeker, Michael, “The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey,” in Islam in Modern Turkey, 189–219Google Scholar.

46 On the growing role of Saudi capital, see Mumcu, Uǧur, Rabita (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1993)Google Scholar. For a discussion of how non-governmental international Muslim bodies take global measures to promote Islam, see Landau, Jacob M., The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 276–303Google Scholar.

47 Keyder, Çaǧlar, Ulusal Kalkinmaciliǧin İflasi (Istanbul: Metiş Yayinlari, 1993), 32–49Google Scholar.

48 Göle, , “İslami Dokunulmazlar,” 17Google Scholar. See also Çandar, Cengiz, “27 Mart: Demokratik Metamorfoz veya Yeni Türkiye'nin Doǧum Sancisi,” Türkiye Günlüǧü 27 (Mart-Nisan 1994): 28Google Scholar.

49 Birtek, Faruk and Toprak, Binnaz, “The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey,” Praxis International 13 (07 1993): 195Google Scholar.

50 Ibid., 196.

51 Cumhuriyet, 9 03 1990, 6 (interview with Şener Battal)Google Scholar.

52 Evren, Kenan, Kenan Evren'in Anilari, Cilt 4 (Milliyet Yayinlan, 1991), 301Google Scholar.

53 Ibid., 309.

54 “Evren'in Amlari Dizisi,” Milliyet, 23 12 1990Google Scholar.

55 Tekeli, İlhan, “Türk-İslam Sentezi Üzerine,” Bilim ve Sanat 77 (Mayis 1987): 5–8Google Scholar; Saylan, , İslamiyet ve Siyaset (Ankara: Verso Yayinlari, 1992), 68“69Google Scholar.

56 Hatemi, Hüseyin, “Açik Oturum: Din ve Siyaset,” Mülkiyeliler Birliǧi Dergisi 21 (Şubat 1987): 17–37Google Scholar.

57 Ahmad, , “Politics and Islam, 18Google Scholar.

58 Çakir, Ruşen, “Devlet İslami İstiyor,” Birikim 55 (Kasim 1993): 33, 38Google Scholar.

59 Saribay, , “Refah Partisi'nin Ardindaki Dinamikler,” 21Google Scholar.

60 Article 163 of the Penal Code until very recently militated against Islamists quite visibly. It prohibited the formation of and membership in associations engaging in propaganda directed at transforming the fundamental order of the state based on religious principles. Even now, despite the repeal of the article on 31 January 1991, there are other back-door provisions that have the same effect, such as the constitutional provisions Law for Struggle Against Terror passed in April 1991 and the present Law on Political Parties. For the historical evolution of the core ideas of the article see Özek, Çetin, Devlet ve Din (Istanbul: Ada Yayinlari, n.d.), 500–507Google Scholar; Tarhanli, İştar, Müslüman Toplum, “Laik” Devlet: Türkiye'de Diyanet İşleri Başkanliǧi (Istanbul: Afa Yayinlan, 1993), 52–166Google Scholar.