¹ Cf. Gruzinov, V. P., The USSR'S Management of Foreign Trade (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1979).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² The construction of this schematic model has benefited from Goldman, Marshall I., Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967);Google Scholar Fourth Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, “Economic Aid to the Less Developed Countries: Rationale of Soviet Aid,” May 1968; Cooper, Orah, “Soviet Economic Aid to the Third World,” October 14, 1976, pp. 189–96; Gur Ofer, “Soviet Military Aid to theMiddle East–An Economic Balance Sheet,” October 14, 1976, pp. 216–34; Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, “Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less Developed Countries, 1954–78,” October 10, 1979, pp. 648–62;Google Scholar and Gruzinov, V. P., USSR's Management, and Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980).Google Scholar

³ The Russians' covetous attitude toward access to warm-water ports surrounding the Middle East goes back to the time of Peter the Great (1682–1725). There is a general consensus that this was a main factor also in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See, for example, Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power, p. 147.Google Scholar

⁴ Historical accounts of the period can be found in Adamec, Ludwig W., Afghanistan. 1900–1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967);Google ScholarAdamec, L. W., Afghanisan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974);Google Scholar and Dupree, L., Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 343–456.Google Scholar

⁵ Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs, p. 69.Google Scholar

⁶ The Parcham-Khalq communists in Kabul, presumably encouraged by the Russians, herald King Amanullah as a hero of good relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.It should be pointed out, however, that there is no evidence that King Amanullah wanted to foster communism or for that matter ignore Russian imperialism. The evidence points quite to the contrary. While King Amanullah's desire for economic reform and development in Afghanistan, in view of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, seemed to have necessitated in part the establishment of improved economic relations with the Soviet Union, Amanullah's desire to extend his influence over the Muslim regions north of Afghanistan, which were still semi-independent Khanates during his reign (1919–1928) brought him clearly in a position to oppose Russian imperialism. King Amanullah's government gave support to the Muslim Freedom Fighters (“Basmach”) when in 1922 Selim Pasha was chosen as one of their commanders in a conference held in KabulGoogle Scholar (see Rywkin, Michael, Moscow's Muslim Challenge [New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1983], p. 40). Furthermore, Afghanistan received more than 200,000 refugees from the Muslim regions affected by wars between the Russian Army and the Muslim Freedom Fighters during the period 1918–1933, which is termed the period of “Basmach” revolts by the Russians. It is instructive to draw the analogy with what has transpired in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion in 1979; i.e., in a similar pattern Afghanistan has lost close to 4.5 million of its population as refugees to the neighboring countries of Pakistan (with over 3 million) and Iran (with 1.5 million). Ironically the communists also refer to the Afghan Freedom Fighters as “counter-revolutionaries and bandits.” The analogy of what the Russians did in the Muslim regions north of Afghanistan and Iran (viz., Azerbaijan, Kazakhistan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) and what they are attempting to do in Afghanistan is discussed inGoogle ScholarNoorzoy, M. S., “Economic Transformation of Afghanistan Since the Soviet Invasion,” presented to the Middle East Economic Association/American Economic Association Meetings, San Francisco, 12 30, 1983.Google Scholar

⁷ Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge, p. 61.Google Scholar

⁸ Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge.Google Scholar

⁹ Kakar, Hasan, Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp. 207–15.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Gregorian, Vartan, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Politics of a Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 146, 196, 254.Google Scholar

¹¹ U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June, 1967.Google Scholar

¹² The Russian-cum-Soviet manipulative moves of this period are discussed in detail in Poullada, Leon B., Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 222–32.Google Scholar

¹³ The size distributions of the Muslim population in these regions are based on a demographic map of the Middle East and southern Soviet Union published by the National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C., 1977. See also Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge, p. 66. (Azerbaijan is excluded from both studies for unstated reasons. This exclusion is surprising since 82% of the population is Muslim and only 8% is Russian, although admittedly colonization began earlier and the industrial structure is different from the regions east of the Caspian Sea.)Google Scholar

¹⁴ Cf. Newton, Francis, “Soviet Central Asia: Economic Progress and Problems,” in Kedourie, Elie, ed., The Middle Eastern Economy (London: Frank Cass, 1976), pp. 87–104.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For in-depth studies of the dynamics of the period, see Ghubar, Mir Ghulam Mohammad, Afghanistan Dar Maseer-i-Tarikh (Kabul: Government Press, 1967);Google ScholarGregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, pp. 227–74; Poullada, Reform and Rebellion; and Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs, pp. 42–113.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs, p. 265.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 203.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 245.

¹⁹ The Afghan position on Pushtunistan is complex. The basis of this position lay on the Treaty of Gandomak of 1879, which ever since has been detested among the Afghans, between the then Afghan King Yagub and the British in India. This Treaty gave a free hand to the British over Afghan territories in the border areas including the Khyber Pass. This development was followed by the so-called Durand Line Agreement of 1893 which essentially demarcated the spheres of Afghan and British influences from Chitral to Baluchistan, rather than forming a formal international border. These developments left Pushtun tribal areas on either side of the artificial line. In 1947 when Pakistan was formed, its government claimed the Durand line as the official boundary between the two countries. But in 1949, a Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly, whose origins are traceable to a period before Alexander's invasion in 328–330 B.c.; cf. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 278) organized by the Afghan government rejected all treaties with the British dealing with the tribal areas dating back to the Durand agreement of 1893. The Loya Jirgah provided the national support for the establishment of Pushtunistan that the Afghan government was seeking. The Soviet backed support for Pushtunistan in view of the recent events has lost general credibility.Google Scholar See Benava, A. R., Pushtoonistan, Afghanistan, 5, No. I, 1950, pp. 10–24. See also, Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 485.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Noorzoy, M. S., “Planning and Growth in Afghanistan,” World Development, 4, No. 9 (1976) pp. 761–73. This paper sets up the framework, as viewed by government planners, for economic growth. It also shows the requirements for a given target rate of growth.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Noorzoy, M. S., “The First Afghan Seven Year Plan 1976/77–1982/83: A Review and some Comparisons of the Objectives and Means,” Afghanistan Journal, 6, No. 1 (04 1979), pp. 15–23. Daoud's economic objectives during his tenure as President (1973–1978) along with the role assigned to foreign assistance are discussed in this article.Google Scholar

²¹ See Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 510–11: “the Daoud government officially stated the Americans refused to give Afghanistan military aid because the Afghans would not sign the required Mutual Security Agreement or join the Baghdad Pact.” No official Afghan communique is cited by Dupree on this important issue, however.Google Scholar

²² Cf. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 493–94.Google Scholar

²³ Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress “Economic Aid to the Less Developed Countries,” Washington, D.C., May 1968, p. 127.Google Scholar

²⁴ Cooper, Orah, “Soviet Economic Aid,” p. 191.Google Scholar

²⁵ Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, “Soviet Economic and Military Aid,” p. 661.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Statistical Abstracts of the United States. U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1978, PP. 869–70.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Arnold, Afghanistan, p. 40.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 510–11.Google Scholar

²⁹ Cf. Smith, H. H. et al. , Area Handbook for Afghanistan, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies of the American University, 1973), pp. 395–97.Google Scholar

³⁰ Cf. Joint Economic Committee. Economic Aid, p. 223.Google Scholar

³¹ See Franck, Peter, Afghanistan Between East and West (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1960). Issues raised by Franck on the possible use of this highway and related points are cited in Arnold, Afghanistan, pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

³² Historical trends of Afghan total trade with the Soviet Union, given in Table 2, show that major diversion of both exports and imports has taken place from the free world markets in recent years. While the diversion of this trade shows the degree of economic integration of the Afghan economy with the Soviet economy, the volume of trade is not a measure of gain to the Soviet system, or loss to Afghanistan. However, theoretically the loss to Afghanistan from its total trade with the Soviet Union can be measured if it is assumed that the price differentials between what the Soviet Union pays for Afghan exports and what Afghanistan obtains for these exports in the free world markets, and the price differentials that the Soviet Union charges for its exports to Afghanistan in comparison with the prices that Afghanistan can purchase the same imports are, in essence, taxes (tariffs) that the Soviet Union imposes on Afghan exports and imports. Let P represent a uniform tax on each unit of Afghan exports and t stand for a uniform tax per unit of Afghan imports from the Soviet Union. It is also assumed that the exchange rate (i.e., the Afghani/ruble rate or the cross rate through the U.S. dollar, which often is used to measure Afghan trade values) remains at the same level after trade diversion takes place. Thus, the total loss to Afghanistan (gain to the Soviet Union) summed over all tradse with the Soviet Union can be measured by: Σ(ΣP_iQ_i + Σt_jQ_j) where i = 1,2 …, n Afghan exports j = 1, 2…, m Afghan imports. and Q_i and Q_j are changes in the export and import trade from the rest of the world to the Soviet Union for a given period. In cases such as natural gas exports, where trade is only carried with the Soviet Union, the Q_s represent the exports or imports (as the case may be) themselves rather than the diversion of trade. In such cases, P_j and t_j would be the differences in international (shadow) prices and prices paid and charged to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.Google Scholar

³³ See Noorzoy, M. S., “Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15, No. 1, 1983, pp. 25–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ See Oil and Gas Journal, April and June, 1984.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Afghanistan Forum (New York: Afghanistan Forum Inc., March 1984), p. 34.Google Scholar

³⁶ Table 2 provides historical values of Afghan exports and imports. Measuring the value of gas exports in column (3) of Table 1 as a proportion of total exports to the Soviet Union in column (3) of Table 2, gas exports rose rapidly from 26.63% of these exports in 1979/80 to 48.88% in 1980/81 and to 57.03% in 1981/82.Google Scholar

³⁷ Cf. Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1980 and 1982, Statistical Compendium, Moscow Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1981 and 1983. I would like to thank Professor Gregory Grossman, University of California, Berkeley, who provided me with a translated version of these trade data.Google Scholar

³⁸ The difficulty in this case is that even though for this category of exports both the value and quantity of exports are given in the Soviet trade statistics (op. cit.), for some of the products, principally fresh fruits, international prices are not generally available for comparisons. These products are oranges (code 83204), pomagranates (83215), fruits (833), apricots (83301), raisins (83302), walnuts (83502), almonds (83502), and marinated olives (83704). Measuring the value of these exports (given in the Soviet trade statistics in dollars, converted at $1.38 = 1 ruble for 1979/80–1980/81, and $1.36 = 1 ruble for 1981/82–1982/83) as a ratio of total exports of fruits and nuts (based on International Trade Statistics, IMF, June 1984, pp. 76–77) the following is obtained:Google Scholar

³⁹ See Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: U.N., 1980), p. 63.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For an attempt to provide a framework for these costs see “Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan,” pp. 41–42.Google Scholar

⁴¹ For a bibliography of what has appeared between the years 1979–82, see McLachlan, Keith and Whittaker, William, A Bibliography of Afghanistan (Cambridge, England: Menas Press, 1983). There are more recent works.Google Scholar Among these see Amin, Tahir, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983);Google ScholarBradsher, Henry S., Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Duke University Press, 1982);Google ScholarHammond, Thomas T., Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and Their Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).Google Scholar

⁴² See Noorzoy, “Alternative Economic Systems,” pp. 32–38.Google Scholar

⁴³ See Afghanistan Forum, p. 39. The problems that communist policies face in the agriculture sector are discussed in Noorzoy, “Alternative Economic Systems,” pp. 34–38.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ As of July 1983, the number of refugees in Pakistan was 2,820,485, whereas the numbers for Iran are estimates commonly cited. See Afghanistan Forum, p. 20.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Internal reports indicate that Kabul's population has doubled in the last 4 years, from 80,000 in 1978/79 to more than 1.5 million in 1982/83. See Afghanistan Forum, p. 15.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics (New York: U.N., 1981); also Key indicators ADB, Manila, Tables on Afghanistan, October 1981.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Foreign Trade of the USSR (note 37).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Azam Gul and Grant Farr, “Decline in Afghan Agricultural Production 1978 to 1982,” mimeograph. 1983.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Foreign Trade of the USSR (note 37).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ It has been reported that the Soviet Union is investing the equivalent of $1 billion in the development of the Afghan copper mine at Ainak. See “Quarterly Economic Review,” Annual Supplement, The Economist, Intelligence Unit, 2nd quarter 1980, p. 18. Afghan copper ore is estimated at 480 million tons. The production of some 95,000 tons of copper concentrates are to begin in 1988. If the report is correct, this investment by the Soviet government will be the largest of its kind in Afghanistan. The question that arises is whether the Soviet government expects to capitalize on investment of this magnitude in the near future under conditions of military stalemate.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Foreign Trade of the USSR (note 37).Google Scholar

⁵² Afghanistan Forum, p. 34.Google Scholar

⁵³ Only a small amount of exports—i.e., $3.6 million in road construction equipment (code 154)– was reported in the Soviet trade data to Afghanistan for 1981/82–1982/83 and none for 1979/80– 1980/81. However, if road construction is being carried out by the Russian Army, the cost of that may not be reported as exports to Afghanistan, just as other expenditures by the Russians in conjunction with the invasion and the current war against the Afghan people are not reported in Soviet trade data.Google Scholar