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⁴ During the period 1971–76, 601, 195 persons aged five years and above moved out of East-Azarbayjan to Tehran. For West Azarbayjan, Kermanshahan, Baluchestan and Kurdestan the figures are: 113,647; 14,795; 3,196; and 66,602 respectively. See Plan Organization, Statistical Center: Census of Population of Housing, Tehran Sharestan (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1979).Google Scholar

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⁹ Almost a total paralysis characterized the Iranian government by 1921 and most Iranians knew that their country needed a strong government. Hence there was no surprise when a coup d'etat brought into power a strong-minded leader, Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai. In order to carry out this coup d'etat, he had allied with an ambitious colonel of the Persian Gossacks, Reza Khan, who received as his reward the position of Commander in Chief of the Gossacks. Because of his conflict with the land-owning class and being unable to attract nationalist support, Sayyed Zia found himself totally dependent on Reza Khan's Gossacks. Reza Khan soon forced Sayyad Zia into exile and began to climb to absolute power. See Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 19.;Google ScholarAvery, Modern Iran, p. 215.Google Scholar

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¹³ A refinery was commissioned on the hand of Abadan around 1913 and this was a huge capital investment in Khuzistan. This was a starting point for absorbing non-Arabs and especially Persians of the Central plateau. During the war and later, when the 1901 concession was renewed, activities related to the oil industry expanded vastly and in-migration to Khuzistan accelerated. This continued in the 1960s. See Elwell-Sulton, L. P., Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics, (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1965).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Out of all the Khuzistan population, about 14 percent were born out of the province and about 60 thousands have arrived in Khuzistan during the period 1971–1976. See Plan Organization, Statistical Office, Census of Population and Housing, Khuzistan Province (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1979), p. 13.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid., footnote 10.

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