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Escalation or Containment? Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Army, 1964–67

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Yezid Sayigh
Yezid Sayigh
Affiliation:
Assistant Director, Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, U.K.
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Extract

Three decades later, the circumstances that led to the Arab–Israeli war of June 1967 bare again the subject of scholarly attention as the end of the Cold War and the release of official documents in the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and Israel have allowed surviving participants to compare notes and made possible the detailed reconstruction of decision-making in those states. Much of this historiography has focused on the critical two months immediately preceding the start of hostilities, giving rise to broad agreement that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser “stumbled into the crisis rather than provoking it deliberately,” through miscalculation and ill-advised brinkmanship. However, there is still no consensus regarding the relationship between Nasser's decisions in spring 1967 and his policy toward Israel in the preceding three years, partly because the dearth of official documents from the Egyptian side has made it difficult to substantiate his real intentions and “historicize” his crisis behavior. Most recent studies tend to skim over the earlier period, if they cover it at all, or now accept the view that Egyptian strategy before 1967 was essentially defensive, based on deterrence and containment, and that Nasser ultimately shifted course due to perceptions of threat that steadily heightened in the course of the previous three years due to the revival of the Arab “cold war,” fear of Israeli nuclear power, and deteriorating relations with the United States, all set against a background of the debilitating military entanglement in Yemen and economic malaise at home

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Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 97 - 116
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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References

NOTES

Author's note: I was able to conduct the research for this article in Cairo thanks to a Small Personal Research Grant from the British Academy. I owe a special debt to General ʿAbd-al-Hay ʿAbd-al-Wahid, then commander of the ʿAyn Jalut Forces of the Palestine Liberation Army, for granting access to its archives, without which this article could not have been written. I also thank the following for their comments on various drafts of the article: the anonymous readers, Avner Cohen, Rex Brynen, Fawaz Gerges, Janice Gross-Stein, Ibrahim Karawan, Ahmad Khalifeh, Roger Owen, Richard Parker, Moshe Shemesh, and Avi Shlaim.

1 The best examples are Parker, Richard, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Parker, Richard, ed., The Six Day War: A Retrospective (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Middle East Journal, special issue on the 25th anniversary of the June 1967 War, 46, 2 (spring 1992)Google Scholar; and Cohen, Avner, “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War,” Middle East Journal 50, 2 (spring 1996): 190–210Google Scholar. Further examples of the continuing interest in why the 1967 war occurred are Janice Gross-Stein, “The Arab–Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War Through Miscalculated Escalation,” and Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, “The Arab–Israeli War of 1967,” in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, ed. George, Alexander (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Lieberman, Elli, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian–Israeli Rivalry,” Security Studies 4, 4 (summer 1995): 851–910CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the response from Gross-Stein, Janice, “Is War A Good Classroom? Deterrence in an Enduring Rivalry” (unpublished ms., 05 1996)Google Scholar.

2 Parker, Richard B., “The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored,” Middle East Journal 46, 2 (spring 1992): 178Google Scholar. Similarly, Gross-Stein, , “The Arab-Israeli War of 1967.”Google Scholar

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4 Besides personal memoirs, few Egyptian documents from this period have been published in any form, the best example being the somewhat eclectic selection in the twin volumes by Haykal, Muḥammad Ḥasanayn, Ḥarb al-Thatāthīn Sana: Sanawat al-Ghalayān (The Thirty-Year War: The Years of Upheaval), pt. 1 (Cairo: al-Ahram, 1988)Google Scholar; and idem, Ḥarb al-Thalāhtīn Sana: 1967 al-lnfijār (The Thirty-Year War: The Explosion of 1967), pt. 2 (Cairo: al-Ahram, 1990)Google Scholar.

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11 Al-mudhakkira al-ʿaskariyya li-munaẓẓamat al-taḥrīr al-filasṭīniyya (The Military Memorandum of the PLO), submitted by the PLO executive committee to the second Arab summit conference, n.d. (end 08 1964), 1–2Google Scholar.

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13 Ibid., 2.

14 Quote from Resolution QQ21/D2/, 11 September 1964, in Second Arab Summit Conference, art. 4, 36. The assumptions are confirmed in the Memorandum to the chiefs of staff of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria from UAC commander-in-chief ʿAmir, ʿAli, Organization and Mobilization Branch, UAC, 25 11 1964, no. 104/64/16/1216Google Scholar; and Al-taqrīr al-ʿām al-muqaddam ilā al-lajna al-tanfīẓiyya ʿan al-mudda min 24/8/1964–22/5/1965 (The General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965), the PLO Military Committee, 3. The summit approved a budget of £8.5 million for establishment costs and an annual budget of £2 million for recurrent expenses. Resolution QQ21/D2/, art. 4, items 5, 6, and 7, p. 37Google Scholar.

15 Shemesh, Moshe, The Palestinian Entity, 1959–1974: Arab Politics and the PLO (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 60Google Scholar.

16 Shuqayrī, , From Summit to Defeat, 155Google Scholar. Hafiz boasted that with 40 brigades, the Arabs could defeat Israel in four days. Haykal, , Years of Upheaval, 767Google Scholar.

17 al-ʿAbadla, Qusay, then head of the PLO military department and member of its military committee, interviewed by the author in 11 1992Google Scholar.

18 Mashrūʿ al-khiṭṭa al-ʿaskariyya li-taskīl jaysh al-taḥrīr al-filasṭīnī (Draft Plan for the Formation of the PLA), PLO Military Committee, 8 11 1964, art. 1, items 1 and 2.b, p. 1Google Scholar.

19 Ibid., 3.

20 Letter to Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian chiefs-of-staff from ʿAmir, ʿAli, 25 11 1964Google Scholar.

21 Draft Plan for the Formation of the PLA, app. A.

22 Military Memorandum of the PLO, 2Google Scholar.

23 Letter to the General Secretariat, from General ʿAmir, ʿAli, 4 09 1964, 4Google Scholar.

24 Resolution QQ21/D2/, art. 4, items 3 and 4, p. 37Google Scholar.

25 Taqrīr ʿan al-mubāḥathāt maʿ al-jumhūriyya al-ʿarabiyya al-muttaḥida (Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic), PLO Military Committee, n.d. (late 05 1964), 1Google Scholar.

26 Ibid., 1–2.

27 Ibid., 2, 5; letter from Madani to Fawzi, 18 February 1965, ref. B/9/65/80; letter from Madani to Fawzi, 24 April 1965, ref. B/659/172; and General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, section 3, art. 1, item a, p. 5Google Scholar.

28 Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic, 3Google Scholar.

29 Shuqayrī, , From Summit to Defeat, 150Google Scholar.

30 Ibid., 149–50.

31 Written note from Nasser, and Haykal's assessment. Haykal, , Years of Upheaval, 769Google Scholar, and doc. no. 53, app., 950.

32 lbid., 3.

33 Ibid.

34 Shuqayrī, , From Summit to Defeat, 151Google Scholar.

35 Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic, 4Google Scholar.

36 Shuqayrī, , From Summit to Defeat, 152Google Scholar.

37 Ibid.

38 General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, 1Google Scholar.

39 ʿAbadla interview. Shuqayri faced criticism and soon relinquished the post, and did not attend any further military talks with Egypt. Two other executive-committee members headed the military department in quick succession and also took no part in talks. Madani conducted the talks assisted by Fayiz al-Turk and other PLA officers.

40 Instructions on organization, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Egyptian General Staff, 23 02 1965, ref. Organization/4/General/lGoogle Scholar; and General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, 4Google Scholar.

41 Draft memorandum prepared by the PLA command, undated; and memorandum from Madani to Fawzi, 24 04 1964, ref. B/659/172Google Scholar.

42 Ibid., items 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, and 15.

43 Ibid., item 11.

44 Protocol of Agreement, Office of the Chief of War Staff of the Armed Forces [Egyptian], 29 04 1965, file 4296/, pp. 1–3Google Scholar.

45 General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, item lc, p. 4Google Scholar.

46 Ibid., item 2b, c, f, p. 6.

47 Undated, unapproved draft of Agreed Minutes prepared by PLO following the meeting of 27 April, with handwritten marks indicating agreement and disagreement on various items after follow-up meeting on 28 or 29 03 1965Google Scholar. Section titled General, item 6a, 6b, and 6c, p. 1.

48 General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, item 2k and ml, p. 7Google Scholar.

49 Ibid., item 2j, p. 7.

50 Taqrīr najāḥ al-marḥala al-ūlā min inshāʾ jaysh al-taḥrīr al-filasṭīnī ʿan al-fatra min 24/8/1964 ilā 15/8/1965 (Progress, Report on the First Stage of the Establishment of the PLO for the Period from 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965), submitted to the PLO Executive Committee, art. 1, item D.3, p. 2Google Scholar.

51 Taqrīr najāḥ al-marḥala al-ūlā wa al-marḥala al-thāniya min khiṭṭat inshdāʾ jaysh al-taḥrīr alfilasṭīnī ʿan al-fatra min 1/9/1965 ila 1/5/1966 (Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966), submitted by Madani to the Organization and Mobilization Branch, UAC, sec. 1, art. 2, p. 3Google Scholar.

52 Taqrīr najāḥ al-marḥala al-ūlā wa al-marḥala al-thāniya min khiṭṭat inshāʾ jaysh al-taḥrīr alfilasṭīnī ʿan al-fatra min 1/9/1965 ilā 1/5%1966 (Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 May 1966), submitted by Madani to the PLO Executive Committee, 30 04 1966, ref. 16/S/66/481, sec. 1, art. 2, p. 1Google Scholar. On earlier attainment level, art. 1, item H.I, p. 2.

53 Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic, 7Google Scholar.

54 Progress Report on the First Stage of the Establishment of the PLO for the Period from 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965, art. 8, item A.2, p. 7Google Scholar; Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966, sec. 2, art. 1, pp. 5–6Google Scholar; and Resolution QQ36/D3/, 17 09 1965, in Third Arab Summit Conference, art. 8, p. 46Google Scholar.

55 Ittifāqiyya bi-shaʾn tashkīl wa taslīḥ waḥdāt jaysh al-taḥrīr al-filasṭīnī (Agreement Regarding the Formation and Armament of the PLA), Office of the Chief-of-Staff of the [Egyptian] Armed Forces, 22 03 1966, file 4296/3764, General, item 7, p. 2Google Scholar.

56 Letters from the PLA command to the Egyptian Supreme Command, 1 May 1966, QʿA/1, and 4 05 1966, QʿA/2/lGoogle Scholar. Response on 3 05 1966, ref. 4266/5102Google Scholar. Complaint about continued lack of response in letter from Madani to Shuqayri, 4 02 1967, QʿA/9/l/209, art. 3, p. 3Google Scholar.

57 Resolution QQ 21/D2/, art. 4, item 1, p. 36.

58 AU details from Draft Plan for the Formation of the PLA, art. 3, items 2b–h, p.4Google Scholar.

59 Palestinian figures from interviews with Mansur al-Sharif, Fayiz al-Turk, ʿAbdul-Raziq al-Majayda, and Fakhri Shaqqura, all graduates from 1955–57 and serving officers. Egyptian figures based on personnel strength for the 107th Brigade, Report of the PLA Command to the VAC for the Period 18 September 1964 to 1 June 1965, art. 3, item D.5, p.4Google Scholar; and General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, sec. 3, art. 2, item B.3.a, p. 8Google Scholar.

60 Ibid., art. 2, item B.3.g, 8; and Report of the PLA Command to the VAC for the Period 18 September 1964 to 1 June 1965, art. 3, item D.6, p. 4Google Scholar. On earlier intakes, see Sharif interview.

61 This was certainly Madani's interpretation. Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966, sec. 1, art. 9.a, p. 4Google Scholar.

62 Letter from ʿAmir, Organization and Mobilization Branch, UAC, 15 11 1964, no. 99/64/16/1216, item 4Google Scholar.

63 Letters from the PLA command to the Egyptian general staff, 31 December 1964, ref. 2/D13/64; 9 January 1965, ref. D/2/65/6; and 11 01 1965, ref. D/2/65Google Scholar.

64 Draft memorandum prepared by the PLA command, undated; and memorandum from Madani to Fawzi, 24 04 1964, ref. B/659/172, item 2Google Scholar.

65 General Report Submitted to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, sec. 3, art. 2, item A.I, p. 6Google Scholar.

66 Report of the PLA Command to the UAC for the Period 18 September 1964 to 1 June 1965, art. 2, item A.5, p. 2Google Scholar; ʿAbadla, Turk, and Shaqqura interviews.

67 Request for ten officers noted in Report of the PLA Command to the UAC for the Period 18 September 1964 to 1 June 1965, art. 2, item A.6, p. 2Google Scholar. On appointment of Jabi, see Turk interview.

68 On Syria and Iraq, see Report of the PLA Command to the UAC for the Period 18 September 1964 to 1 June 1965, art. 4, items B.5, B.7, B.8, p. 6; and art. 5, item D, p. 6Google Scholar. Iraq requested that any officers surplus to PLA needs should serve in the Iraqi army. On Egypt, see Akhbār Filasṭīn, 18 10 1965Google Scholar. Cited in al-Kitāb al-sanawī li al-qaḍiyya al-filasṭīniyya (Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1965) (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies), 86Google Scholar.

69 Progress Report on the First Stage of the Establishment of the PLO for the Period from 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965, art. 10, item B, p. 8Google Scholar.

70 Ibid., art. 3, item B.6, p. 4.

71 Letter to Madani from the office of the chief of the general staff of the Egyptian armed forces, 18 01 1966, ref. 4296/766Google Scholar.

72 Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966, sec. 1, art. 1, art. 9, items B, C, pp. 4–5Google Scholar.

73 Tables in Ibid., art. 1, items A, B, p. 2.

74 Ibid., sec. 1, art. 10, items B, C, p. 5.

75 Turk and Sharif interviews; and Badran, Ramzi, PLA officer transferred from Syria, interviewed in 08 1990Google Scholar.

76 Percentage cited in Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 May 1966, sec. 1, art. 1,1. New request in letter from PLA command to Egyptian general staff, 20 08 1966, ref. D/10/637/114Google Scholar. Complaint about lack of answer in letter from Shuqayri to President Nasser, undated but sent soon after 4 02 1967, item 2, p. 3Google Scholar.

77 Higher figure offered in ʿAbadla and Shaqqura interviews. Lower figure offered in Sharif interview. Transfer also confirmed by al-Qaddumi, Kamal, PLA officer from Iraq, interviewed in 12 1987Google Scholar.

78 Sharif interview.

79 ʿAbdulla al-ʿAjrami, then PLA junior officer, interviewed in 08 1991Google Scholar.

80 Al-Khiṭṭa al-nihāʾiyya li-inshāʾ jaysh al-taḥrīr al-filasṭīnī (Final Plan for the Construction of the PLA), PLO Military Committee, app. 3, n.d. (11 1964), app. 1Google Scholar.

81 Reference by military committee to air and naval forces in comments on the draft conscription law. Memorandum (to the PLO executive committee), 21 11 1964, (app. 13), item 3, p. 1Google Scholar. On price inquiries, see ʿAbadla and Turk interviews.

82 ʿAbadla interview. Egyptian prices were as much as 50 percent higher in some cases, for instance for infantry firearms. Evident from a comparison of the relevant tables in the PLO–Egyptian accords of April 1965 and March 1966 and PLO–Syrian accords of 03 and 05 1965Google Scholar. Maḥḍar al-mubāḥathāt maʿ al-lijna al-ʿaskariyya li-munaẓẓamat al-taḥrīr al-filasṭīniyya maʿ al-jumhūriyya al-ʿarabiyya alsūriyya bi-taʿrīkh 6/12/1964 (Minutes of the Discussions between the PLO Military Committee and the SAR on 6 December 1964), app. 1, 2; and Contracts (prepared by Syrian side), no. 1/S (29 March), app. 1, 2/S (5 May), app. 1, and 4/S (16 May 1965), app. 1. Exemption from customs was made retroactive with effect from 1 January 1965, in a decree issued by the head of the presidential council, al-Hafiz, Amin, law no. 18, 2 01 1966Google Scholar.

83 Protocol of Agreement, app. C, 1, p. 5Google Scholar.

84 Ibid., art. 11, items a, b, p. 3. Total cost was calculated at £4,219,864. Ibid., art. 13, p. 4, and app. C, table.

85 In the document viewed by the author, T-34 was typed in the relevant table, but corrected to T-54 by hand. Madani later insisted that the agreement had been for T-54s, in a letter to Shuqayri, 4 02 1967, QʿA/9/1/209, art. 3, p. 3Google Scholar.

86 A first installment of £1.47 million was transferred to Egypt in April. Memorandum from UAC commander ʿAmir and Organization and Mobilization Branch head Wahid al-Jaburi to Madani, 14 05 1966, ref. 1201/h/66/66, item 4Google Scholar.

87 Noted in letter of thanks from Shuqayri to Chinese prime minister Enlai, Zhou, 7 10 1965, reference 9/65/15/Google Scholar.

88 Turk interview.

89 Letter from Madani to Shuqayri, 4 02 1967, QʿA/9/l/209, art. 3, 3Google Scholar. Confirmed by Abu-Marzuq, Mahmud, then PLA artillery company commander, interviewed in 03 1993Google Scholar; and Sharif interview. Comparison of numbers with tables in Agreement Regarding the Formation and Armament of the PLA, app. A, pp. 3, 11Google Scholar.

90 Letter from Shuqayri to President Nasser, undated but sent soon after 4 02 1967, item 2, p. 3Google Scholar.

91 Sharif interview.

92 Sahyun, Raji, director of VoP, and Yasin, Fuʾad, broadcaster, interviewed in 04and 06 1992Google Scholar.

93 Shemesh, , The Palestinian Entity, 60Google Scholar.

94 Ibid., 72–73.

95 Memorandum (to the PLO executive committee), 21 12 1964 (app. 13)Google Scholar; Comments by the PLO Military Committee on the Draft Palestinian Military Conscription Law, 21 December 1964; and National and Military Service Law Decreed by the Legislative Council and Ratified by the Governor-General.

96 Letter from Madani to Fawzi, 24 02 1965, ref. B/659/172, item 5, p. 1Google Scholar.

97 Undated, unapproved draft of Agreed Minutes prepared by PLO following the meeting of 27 04, item d, p. 6Google Scholar; and second undated, unapproved draft of Agreed Minutes after follow-up meeting on 28 or 29 04 1965, with relevant items crossed off, item 9, p. 2Google Scholar.

98 Agreement of 22 March 1966, art. 10, p. 2Google Scholar.

99 Ibid., item 10, p. 2.

100 Figure for 1965 from Progress Report on the First Stage of the Establishment of the PLO for the Period from 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965, art. 1, item B.3, p. 1Google Scholar. Shortfall calculated from a planned strength level of 6,701 given in the Draft Protocol, table of (projected) personnel costs for 1965, app. A. On annual intake target and slow implementation, see report of the Conference Held at the PLO, 18 February 1967 (attended by Shuqayri, Madani, and governor-general ʿAbdul-Munʿim Husni), item 2.g, p. 2Google Scholar. The number of conscripts required for the commando battalions is based on the PLA target that 75 percent of combat personnel would be provided by conscription. Progress Report on the First Stage of the Establishment of the PLO for the Period from 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965, art. 1, item A.3, p. 1Google Scholar.

101 Letter of complaint from PLO representative in Gaza and memorandum from Madani to Shuqayri, 29 07 1965, no refsGoogle Scholar.

102 Mobilization Branch, Organization and Administration Staff in the UAR, 19 04, 1965, ref. Mobilization/h/7/20/1/782Google Scholar.

103 Calculated from Study of the Popular Resistance Project in the Gaza Strip Submitted by the Organization and Administration Staff in the UAR, prepared by the PLO military committee, undated, item 3.2, p. 1Google Scholar. Figure and timetable confirmed in Progress Report for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, part 3, art. 2.B.4.b, p. 8Google Scholar.

104 Number of trainees from Ibid., part 3, art. 2.B.4.a, p. 8.

105 No mention was made of new conscription of militia intakes in PLA progress reports available up to mid-1966. A meeting in February 1967 noted that existing trained manpower was still sufficient only to form one brigade and three militia battalions, roughly equivalent to the number of trainees in 1965. Conference on the Popular Resistance Held at the PLA GHQ on 22 February 1967, item l.b, p. 1Google Scholar.

106 On pay, see Study of the Popular Resistance Project, item 2.2, p. 1Google Scholar.

107 Fawzi cited in Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic, 7Google Scholar.

108 Conference on the Popular Resistance Held at the PLA GHQ on 22 February 1967, items l.a, b, c.p. 1Google Scholar.

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111 Letter to the PLA command from the Egyptian Supreme Headquarters of the Armed Forces, 28 12 1966, ref. 4296/15662Google Scholar.

112 Memorandum to Madani from Major-General ʿAbdul-Khabir, ʿAli, director of staff at the supreme headquarters of the Egyptian armed forces, 30 03 1967, ref. 4296/3737Google Scholar.

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116 al-Sharif, Mansural-Turk, Fayiz, Shaqqura, Fakhri, and Tamraz, Muhammad, interviewed in 02 1989, April 1993, April 1993, and 05 1989Google Scholar, respectively.

117 On budget cut, see al-Ḥadīdī, Ṣalāḥ, Shahīd ʿalā ḥarb 67 (Witness to the 1967 War) (Cairo: Madbuli, 1974), 94Google Scholar. On military readiness, see Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970: mudhakkirāt al-farīq awwal Maḥmūd Fawzī (The Three-Years War, 1967–1970; Memoirs of Field Marshal Muhammad Fawzi) (Beirut: Dar al-Wahda, 1983), 66Google Scholar.

118 Hadidi devotes considerable space to the re-shuffle, which is confirmed by Fawzi, Ibid., 38.

119 Sayigh, Yezid, “Reconstructing the Paradox: the Arab Nationalist Movement, Armed Struggle, and Palestine, 1951–1967,” Middle East Journal 45:4 (autumn 1991): 626–27Google Scholar. Egyptian military intelligence firmly prevented similarly provocative acts from Gaza. al-Dakhkahna, Ibrahim, then military intelligence officer in Gaza, interviewed in 04 1992Google Scholar; and Huwaydi, Amin, subsequently Egyptian defense minister and head of general intelligence, interviewed in 06 1991Google Scholar.