¹ Polanyi, K., The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944);Google ScholarDumont, L., From Mandeville to Marx (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977);Google ScholarLight, I. and Karageorgis, G., “The Ethnic Economy,” in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, ed. Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 647–71.Google Scholar

² This particular methodological position amply draws on the recent literature on networks. See, for example, Granovetter, M., “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481–510;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPowell, W. M. and Smith-Doerr, L., “Networks and Economic Life,” in Handbook of Economic Sociology, 368–401;Google ScholarMelin, Leif, “The Field of Force Metaphor,” Advances in International Marketing 3 (1989): 161–79;Google ScholarEaston, G. and Araujo, L., “The Network Approach: An Articulation,” Advances in International Marketing 3 (1989): 97–119;Google ScholarEmirbayer, M. and Goodwin, J., “Network Analysis, Culture, and Problem of Agency,” American Journal of Sociology 99 (1994): 1411–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ See, especially, Piore, M. J. and Sabel, C., The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984).Google Scholar

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⁵ Ibid., 91.

⁶ See, for example, Biggart, N. Woolsey and Orru, M., “Societal Strategic Advantage: Institutional Structure and Path Dependency in the Automotive and Electronic Industries of East Asia,” in State, Market and Organizational Form, ed. Bugra, A. and Usdiken, B. (New York and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 201–40,Google Scholar and Biggart, N. Woolsey and Hamilton, G., “On the Limits of a Firm-Based Theory to Explain Business Networks: The Western Bias of Neo-Classical Economics,” in Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, Action, ed. Nohria, N. and Eccles, R. G. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 471–90.Google Scholar

⁷ Amsden, A., “Third World Industrialization: Global Fordism or a New Model?” New Left Review 182 (07/08 1990): 5–31;Google Scholaridem, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989);Google ScholarCumings, B., “The Abortive Abertura: South Korea in the Light of Latin American Experience,” New Left Review 173 (02 1989);Google Scholaridem, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,” in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialization, ed. Deyo, F. C. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987);Google ScholarJones, L. and Sakong, I., Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Council on East Asian Studies, 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁹ Buğra, A., “Political Sources of Uncertainty in Business Life,” in Strong State and Economic Interest Groups, ed. Heper, M. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 151–62;Google Scholaridem, State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994).Google Scholar

¹⁰ This economic-policy orientation against small business originated in the early years of the Republican era and remained effective until the 1990s. For early Republican attitudes, see, for example, ilkin, S. and Tekeli, I., Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye'de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Uni-versitesi Yayinlari, 1982), 24–25.Google Scholar A survey of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce on the problems of small and medium-size enterprises conducted in the beginning of the 1990s found that about 90 percent of the enterprises covered in the survey had never used any incentives. See Odasi, Istanbul Ticaret, Türkiye'de Küçük ve Orta Boy Işletmeler: Yapisal ve Finansal Sorunlar, Çözümler (Istanbul, 1991), 102–3.Google Scholar

¹⁰ TÜSIAD manifests many of the characteristics of those British and American elite associations that Useem discusses in his account of the emergence of “the inner circle”–that is, the network of class–as opposed to private–interest-conscious businessmen. According to Useem, starting in the 1970s, these businessmen have played a very significant socio-political role that has served to consolidate the social status of businessmen as a class, albeit through the sacrifice of some short-term interests of class members: Useem, M., The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

¹² See Piore and Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide.

¹³ Ibid.For a critical appraisal of the contemporary significance of Marshallian industrial districts, see Amin, Ash, “The Globalization of the Economy: An Erosion of Regional Networks?” in The Embedded Firm. On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks, ed. Grabher, G. (London: Routledge, 1995), 278–95.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Biggart and Orru, “Societal Strategic Advantage,” and Biggart and Hamilton, “On the Limits of a Firm-Based Theory.”

¹⁵ See, especially, the long series of articles on private–sector development in about 20 Anatolian towns published by the daily Milliyet, 3–23 June 1996.

¹⁶ In the 1990s, the historical injustice against smaller enterprises and its negative consequences for the economy were also recognized and often mentioned by politicians from both the Welfare Party and the True Path Party. Tansu Çiller, the leader of the latter, was especially active in her efforts to change that particular economic-policy orientation. It was even suggested that when she was the minister of foreign affairs during the Welfare Party-led coalition government, matters pertaining to small and medium-size enterprise development became the major concern of the ministry, and Turkish diplomats were constantly under pressure not to take steps to improve Turkey's foreign relations, but to raise foreign funds to support such enterprises. See Gürdilek, Nursel, “Dişişlerinin KOBİ İşleri,” Radikal, 17 March 1997.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ümit Cizre Sakalhoğlu interprets these developments as a new phase of the complex relationship between the Turkish state and Islam, which has never conformed to the basic tenets of secularism: Sakalhoglu, Ümit Cizre, “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 28 (1996): 231–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This interpretation does not contradict the observation that in the 1980s, Islam became a more significant factor in Turkish political scene.

¹⁸ An extensive discussion of this unequal partnership is presented in Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey, esp. chaps. 2 and 5.

¹⁹ SİAD, TÜ, Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri (Istanbul, 1997).Google Scholar

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 84–150.

²² See, for example, the references to the pathetic state of political development in Islamic countries highlighted in an interview with Abdullah GUI from the Welfare Party, published in Görüş 29 (January/February 1997): 34–39. GÜI was one of the ministers of state during Erbakan's coalition government, and he was, in many ways, more active than Foreign Minister Çiller in the area of foreign relations. In this interview, GUI, who underlines the necessity of diversifying the country's foreign relations in an approach that combines politics and economics, is challenged by questions that draw attention to the problems of such an approach given the authoritarian and undemocratic governments that rule Asian and African countries that the minister thinks should be included among Turkey's close political and economic allies.

²³ See, especially, TÜSİAD, Yasalanmiz, Haklanmiz (Istanbul, 1990).Google Scholar

²⁴ In the 1980s, older members often attacked TÜSİAD's outspoken president Cem Boyner, as well as other young presidents such as Omer Dinckok and Bulent Eczacibaji, and demanded that they speak for themselves and not for the association. See, for example, the reaction of the founding members Feyyaz Berker and Ali Kocman to the public criticism of the government by Boyner (Milliyet, 15 August 1989).

²⁵ In these criticisms, many references were made to the “irresponsible” attitude of the “youngsters” now controlling the administration of this previously very“respectable”organization founded by their fathers (Milliyet, 5 April and 13 April 1997).

²⁶ The intensity that this tension can reach is revealed by a particular incident where, during the rule of very private-sector-friendly Motherland Party government, Cem Boyner, president of TÜSİAD's, was called to the prosecutor's office for interrogation because of his so-called illegal political speeches (“The Report of the Experts to the Prosecutor's Office,” 2 August 1990). The recently expressed hostility of military authorities toward some members of MÜSİAD's constituency is another manifestation of the uneasy relationship between Turkish state and organized business.

²⁷ Biggart and Orru, “Societal Strategic Advantage.”

²⁸ Light and Karageorgis, “The Ethnic Economy,” 652, 660.

²⁹ See the series of articles on “Islamic capital” by Kemal Can, “Tekkeden Holdinge Yeşil Sermaye,” Milliyet, 11–18 March 1997, and idem, “Yeşil Sermaye Laik Sisteme Ne Yapti?” Birikim 99 (07 1997): 59–65.Google Scholar When I asked the general secretary of DEİK about the episode concerning the exclusion of MÜlSİAD members from the meeting organized in the former Soviet Union, she told me that the Muslim businessmen in question applied for participation so late that there was no way to include them officially in the group. According to her version of the story, their participation in the meetings was accepted, but they still created several scenes whenever it proved to be impossible to include them in pre–arranged activities such as formal dinners with statesmen.

³⁰ The MÜSİAD Bulletin of February 1997 lists, among new members of the association, eight companies located in the eastern town of Diyarbakir. This is not an insignificant achievement given the difficulties of organizational activity in this city, which is deeply affected by ongoing military conflict. In fact, the new membership in TÜSİAD of a Diyarbakir–based big enterprise employing 3,000 workers appeared in the front–page headlines of a daily newspaper (Radikal, 18 August 1997).

³¹ Yarar, Erol, A New Perspective of the World at the Threshold of the 21st Century (Istanbul: MÜSİAD, n.d.), 3.Google Scholar

³² Ibid., 8.

³³ Ibid., 50–51.

³⁴ Ibid., 39.

³⁵ Can, “Tekkeden Holdinge.”

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ See, for example, Akpinar, Ali, “Kur'an-i Kerim'in Emtia'ya Bakişi,” Çerçeve 4: 15 (08–10 1995); 120–24,Google Scholar and Zaim, Sabahattin, “Ekonomik Hayatta Müsülman İnsanin Tutum ve Davranişlari,” in MÜSİAD, İş Hayatinda Islam insam (Homo Islamicus) (Istanbul, 1994), 101–12.Google Scholar

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³⁹ It is the central motif, for example, in the multi–vision show staged for the Fourth International Fair organized by MUSIAD in Istanbul. See MÜSİAD, Bülten 5: 18 (1997): 15–18.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ References to Islamic brotherhood are frequently used, for example, in the attempts to get a share of the post–war reconstruction activity in Bosnia. See MÜSİAD, Başbakan Necmettin Erbakan'in Doğu Asya Gezisi ve MÜSİAD' in Bosna–Hersek Gezisi Raporu (Istanbul, 1996).Google Scholar

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⁴² The MÜSİAD report on the first tour of diplomatic visits that Erbakan, as prime minister, made to a group of Muslim countries clearly reflects the attempts to turn Islamic cooperation into an asset in an Asian strategy. See MÜSİAD, Başbakan Necmettin Erbakan'in Doğu Asya Gezisi ve MÜSİAD'in Bosna–Hersek Gezisi Raporu.

⁴³ Ibid., 50, 52, 64.

⁴⁴ Can, “Tekkeden Holdinge.”

⁴⁵ For a large survey on new Islamic consumption patterns, see Kivanç, Ümit, “İslamcilar & Para-pul: Bir Dönüşüm Hikayesi,” Birikim, no. 99 (July 1997), 39–58.Google Scholar

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⁴⁷ See the comments on this subject of the minister of finance of Erbakan's coalition government (Radikal, 7 June 1997).

⁴⁸ SeeRadikal, 6 June 1997, and ibid., 7 June 1997.

⁴⁹ Zaim, , “Ekonomik Hayatta Müsülman”; Yusuf Balci, “İslam'da Çalişma İlişkileri,” in MÜSİAD, İş Hayatinda İslam İnsant, 113–27.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Can, “Tekkeden Holdinge.”

⁵¹ Balci, “İslam'da Çalişma İlişkileri.”

⁵² Ibid., 124–25.

⁵³ Can, “Tekkeden Holdinge.”

⁵⁴ Such statements abound in the autobiographies written by Turkish businessmen. For a survey of three autobiographies (by Koç, Sabanci, and Eczacibaşi) from this point of view, see Buğra, Ayşe, “The Late–Coming Tycoons of Turkey,” Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies 1: 1 (Winter 1987): 143–55.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Can, “Tekkeden Holdinge,” and Akpinar, “Kur'an–i Kerim'in Emtia'ya Bakişi.”

⁵⁶ See Radikal, 7 June 1997.

⁵⁷ Yeni Yüzyil, 31 August 1997.

⁵⁸ This closeness between the government and MÜSİAD was clearly seen, especially in their cooperation in the attempts to change the traditional pro-Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy. In MÜSİAD's published accounts of these very explicit attempts, Prime Minister Erbakan's efforts to foster and enhance Turkey's economic and political relations with Islamic countries are discussed both in relation to their significance for the country and with regard to the opportunities they represent for MÜSİAD's members. See, for example, MÜSİAD, Başbakan Necmettin Erbakan'in Doğu Asya Gezisi ve MÜSİAD' in Bosna–Hersek Gezisi Raporu, and MÜSİAD, MÜSİADD'in Afrika ve ingiltere is Gezileri Raporu (Istanbul, 1997). Similarly, Erbakan's speeches at MÜSİAD–sponsored international meetings make explicit references to the opportunities his government will open to Islamic business networks: see, especially, Erbakan's speech at the Second International Business Forum organized by MÜSİAD (MÜSİAD, Bülten, 5:18 [1997],50–61).

⁵⁹ Hürriyet, 9 June 1997, and Radikal, 10 June 1997.

⁶⁰ Yeni Yüzyil, 31 August 1997; Radikal, 10 June 1997. See also Kivanç, “İslamcilar & Para-pul.”