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Appeasement and the Problem of Palestine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Gabriel Sheffer
Gabriel Sheffer
Affiliation:
Hebrew University Jerusalem
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Extract

Laymen, Zionist leaders, and both Jewish and gentile analysts have maintained that in the 1930S the British government's policies toward Palestine were strongly affected by Britain's general orientation toward appeasement. Both contemporaneously and ex post facto, critics have made three assumptions about these policies. First, the decision-making elite which launched Britain's policy of appeasement was also responsible for Middle Eastern policies in general and policies toward Palestine in particular. Second, British actions in Palestine were an integral part of the general trend in British foreign and defense policies. Third, out of selfish interests Britain sacrificed the weaker democratic Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv) to its more aggressive protagonist (the Palestinian Arab community) which was supported by the leaders of neighboring Arab countries.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , May 1980 , pp. 377 - 399
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980

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References

NOTES

1 See for instance Weizmann, C., Trial and Error (London, 1949);Google ScholarBen-Gurion, D., Memoirs, Vols. 3, IV (Tel Aviv, 1973 and 1974);Google ScholarSharett, M., Making of Policy: The Diaries of Moshe Sharett, Vols. 1, II, III, IV (Tel Aviv, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1975), passim.Google Scholar

2 Sykes, C., Crossroads to Israel (London, 1965), Chap. 9, Appeasement.Google Scholar

3 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1936, 1937;Google Scholar RIAA, Great Britain and Palestine (London, 1946).Google Scholar

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7 The Times and The Manchester Guardian consistently advocated swift suppression of the Rebellion (see for instance the leaders in The Times of 5, 19, and 26 May 1936). Beaverbrook's papers occasionally called for a withdrawal from Palestine, which had been their line since the early 1930s.Google Scholar

8 See, for example, Lee, J. M., Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford, 1967), pp. 9, 28.Google Scholar

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12 Vansittart's minute June 1936, F.O. 371.20035; see also Vansittart, The Mist Procession, p. 546;Google ScholarGilbert, M., The Roots of Appeasement (London, 1966), p. 149;Google Scholar see Watt, D. C., Personalities and Policies (London, 1965), pp. 102, 109,Google Scholar on Vansittart's anti-German attitudes and his progrssively dwindling influence; see also Avon, The Eden Memoirs, pp. 447–448.Google Scholar

13 See his minute 11 June 1936, C.O. 733.312.75528/9.Google Scholar

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15 On 17 June an unofficial Arab delegation arrived in London. This visit encouraged Wauchope and the Home Government to belie ve that the Palestinians were seeking peaceful means of ending the Rebellion (C.I.D. report 11/36, 23 June 1936, F.O. 371.20018; Sharett, Making of Policy, 21 June 1936, p. 171;Google ScholarThe Times, 18 June 1936).Google Scholar

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25 See Ormsby-Gore's private letter to Wauchope 30 July 1936, C.O. 733.297.75156. He wrote:“I have encouraged Eddy Winterton, Crossely and Co. to form a standing committee in the House of Commons to watch the Arab side, as a make weight to those who have numbers of Jewish voters in their constituencies”; see Jeffries, J. M. N., Palestine: The Reality (London, 1939), p. 8.Google Scholar

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30 Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope, 10 June 1936, C.O. 733.297.75156, Pt. III.Google Scholar

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32 Ibid.

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36 The memo'randum, thus temporarily withheld, was later to be circulated as C.P. 178(36).Google Scholar

37 Williams's minutes 24 June, 25 June 1936, C:O. 733.311. 75528/8. The gist of these discussions reached the press and Consular Corps in Palestine (Sharett, Making of Policy, 28 June 1936, p. 179).Google Scholar

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39 Minutes of a telephone conversation with Norton, 26 June 1936, F.O. 371.20021.Google Scholar

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41 C.P. 190(36). On 1 July the Cabinet agreed to postpone the discussion on the Foreign Office's memorandum until the Colonial Office rendered its own (Cab. Con. 48(36), 1 July 1936).Google Scholar

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43 See Oliphant's minute 8 July 1936 and Vansittart's minute of the same day, F.O. 371.20021. He wrote: “The Jews are trying to force us into a hundred percent policy, for which we shall have to pay the entire cost and it will be a heavy political one, with Europe as it is.”Google Scholar

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47 Cab. Con. 52(36) 15 July 1936. Ormsby-Gore informed the Cabinet that Wauchope, though in favour of a decision to suspend immigration, was against its immediate announcement.Google Scholar

48 Peel to Ormsby-Gore, 20 December 1936, annexed to C.P. 1(37).Google Scholar

49 See the Chiefs of Staff memo, “Strategical Aspects of the Partition of Palestine,” 14 February 1938, F.O. 371.21870; see also Wedgwood's question on 27 July 1937 in the House of Commons, and Hore Belisha's confirmation that the Commission consulted the Services, Hansard, Vol. 326, cols. 3839–40.Google Scholar

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65 See Rendel's memorandum “Palestine, Suggested Alternative Policy,” 3 November 1937, F.O. 371.20819.Google Scholar

66 See Cab. Con. 42(37) 17 November 1937.Google Scholar

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73 The Chiefs of Staff did not change their attitude about the strategic importance of Palestine. See their memorandum 462c, 14 Feb. 1938, F.O. 371.21870, in which they wrote that “the retention of the Jerusalem-Jaffa enclave under British Mandate for political and religious reasons would be sufficient for our permanent Imperial requirements” (my italics); this view was endorsed by the C.I.D., see minutes of the C.I.D. 318th meeting 7 April 1938, Cab. 2.7.Google Scholar

74 Cab. Con. 10(38) 2 March 1938.Google Scholar

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76 See minutes of the meeting held on 22 June 1938, F.O. 371.21878.Google Scholar

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95 MacDonald to O.A.G. 10 Oct. 1938, CO. 733.368.75156/16. It included a preliminary draft of a Statement of Policy beginning thus: “Policy of partition has been abandoned on strict merits of the case, following on Woodhead's careful expert enquiries.”Google Scholar

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98 See minutes of the first meeting, 7 Oct. Lord Gort emphasized this point again at the third meeting, 8 Oct. 1938, F.O. 731.12864. Its minutes ran: “He [Gort] made it clear, however, that the War Office could not accept a heavy committment in Palestine later than Spring 1939 [MacDonald explained that] by a joint political and military effort we hoped to achieve a settlement by then.”Google Scholar

99 Minutes of second meeting 7 Oct. 1938, F.O. 731.12864.Google Scholar

100 Ibid. The use of the terms “federation” and “confederation” was loose and interchangeable.

101 Minutes of eighth meeting 11 Oct. 1938, F.O. 731.12864.Google Scholar

102 The minutes ran: “Secretary of State — Possible Formula for five years (a) no land purchases of rural immigration (b) urban immigration to be permitted. Assure Arabs that existing Arab population should always have sufficient land for their subsistence” (F.O. 731.12864).Google Scholar

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107 Cf. Middelmas, K., Diplomacy of Illusion (London, 1972), chap. 14;Google ScholarWatt, Personalities;Google ScholarNorthedge, F. S., The Troubled Giant (London, 1966), p. 548.Google Scholar

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