¹ This line of approach has been effectively criticized by Abrahamian, Ervand, “The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10 (1979), 381–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I have argued to the same effect without having received the benefit of Abrahamian's article see Afshari, Mohammed Reza, “A Study of the Constitutional Revolution within the Framework of Iranian History,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1981.Google Scholar

² In recent years some studies have recognized the role played by the bazaaris, but in them the rich merchants dominate the stage, with the pīshivarān being relegated into the background as the faceless mob. See Gilbar, Gad O., “The Big Merchants (tujjār) and the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906,” Asian and African Studies, 3 (1977), pp. 275–303.Google Scholar

³ Tahvildar, Mirza Hussein Khan, Jughrāfiāyi Isfahan (The Geography of Isfahan) (Tehran, 1963) pp. 66–127.Google Scholar

⁴ Hulster, Ernest, Irān dar Yaksadaw Sīzdah Sal-i Pīsh (Iran 130 Years Ago), trans. 'Asamī, Muhammad (Tehran, 1976), p. 31.Google Scholar

⁵ Whereas textile production suffered earlier and the most, a few branches, notably coppersmithery, maintained themselves. One source reported on a new structure of a “royal” (mulaukānah) bazaar built by the coppersmiths of Kashan; see Zarābī, 'Abdulrahīm Kalāntar-i, Tarikh-i Kāshān (History of Kashan), (Tehran, 1962) p. 227.Google Scholar

⁶ For many interesting examples see Shahri, Jafar, Tehran-i Qadīm (Old Tehran) (Tehran, 1978).Google Scholar

⁷ For examples see Hāshim, Muhammad, Rustam al-Tavārīkh, ed. Mushirī, Muhammad (Tehran, 1969). p. 210.Google Scholar

⁸ “Spatial fluidity” is borrowed from Helfgott, Leonard M., “Tribalism as a Socioeconomic Formation in Iranian History,” Iranian Studies, 10 (Winter—Spring 1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Gulistānih, 'Abdul-Hasan, Mujmal al-Tavārīkh, ed. Razavī, M. (Tehran, 1965). This source provides the best detailed account of the period.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ravandī, Murtizā, Tārīkh-i Ijtirnā'ī-yi Iran (Social History of Iran), 2 vols. (Tehran, 1975) 2: 458–59.Google Scholar

¹¹ For example, in the famous Shiraz episode when Hajī Ibrahīm, the Lord Mayor (kalāntar) of the city, decided to oppose Lutf Ali Khān, the Zand, in favor of Āghā Muhammad Khān, the Qajar, and closed the gates of the city to the former, Lutf Ali Khan, upon hearing the Hajī's decision, is reported to have contemptuously laughed and said, “This traitorous man is only a shahrī and his followers are merchants and dealers from the bazaar (ahl-i bāzār) who can never withstand the victorious army which is used to handling musket and sword.” See Fasā'ī, Hasan, Tarīkh-i Fārsnāma-yi Nāsirā (Tehran, n.d.);Google Scholar trans. Busse, Herbert, History of Persia Under Qajar Rule (New York: Columbia University Press. 1972), p. 234.Google Scholar

¹² Hashim, Muhammad, Rustam al-Tavārikh, p. 452.Google Scholar

¹³ Contarini, Ambrosio M., “Safar nāmih-'i Ambroso Contarini,” in Safarnāmih ha-yi Vinīzīyan dar Iran, trans. Amīrī, M. (Tehran, 1970), p. 136.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Malcolm, John Sir, The History of Persia, From the Most Early Period to the Present Time, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1815) 2: 147–52.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Franklin, William, Observations Made on a Tour from Bengal to Persia in the Years 1786–1987 (London, 1790), p. 307.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hashim, Muhammad, Rustam al-Tavārīkh, pp. 344–46.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Franklin, Observations, pp. 301–02.Google Scholar

¹⁸ For a vivid description of Nader Shah's exactions see Kazim, Muhammad, Nāmih-i' Āra-i Nāderī, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1965), 3: 341–45.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Arunova, M. R. and Ashrafian, K. Z., Dūlat-i Nader Shah Afshar, trans. Mūmanī, H. (Tehran, 1977), p. 286.Google Scholar

²⁰ Hāshim, Muhammad, Rustam al-Tavārīkh, pp. 207–09.Google Scholar

²¹ Arunova and Ashrafian, Dūlat-i Nader, p. 287.Google Scholar

²² Layard, Austen Henry, “A Description of the Province of Khuzistan,” Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 16 (1846), p. 248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Bishop, lsabella Lucy, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1891) 1:103.Google Scholar

²⁴ Lambton, Ann K. S., “The Tribal Resurgence and the Decline of the Bureaucracy in Eighteenth Century Persia.” In Naff, Thomas and Owen, Roger. eds., Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 378.Google Scholar

²⁵ Busse, History of Persia, p. 142.Google Scholar

²⁶ For an interesting example see Sheil, Mary Lenora, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia (London: J. Burray, 1856) p. 326.Google Scholar One recent study on the Haydarī-Ni'mati conflicts concludes “that central rulers and local governors and magnates alike have consistently stoked the fires of this conflict, especially in periods of popular unrest and opposition to authority, in order to bolster their own positions by diverting the course of popular rage and fragmenting a potentially united front.” Mirjafari, Hossein, “The Haydarī-Ni'matī Conflicts in Iran,” Iranian Studies, XII (1979), 156.Google Scholar

²⁷ Busse, History of Persia, pp. 296–97.Google Scholar

²⁸ Petrushevsky, I. P., Nihzat-i Sarbidārān-i Khurāsān (Tehran, 1972);Google ScholarMinorsky, V. F., “Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom, and Revolt,” in von Grunebaum, G. E., ed., Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 193–94.Google Scholar

²⁹ For descriptions of these revolts see Petruskevsky et al., Iran as Dowran-i Bāstān, pp. 522–27;Google ScholarFūmanī, Abdul Fattāh, Tārīkh-i Gilan (History of Gilan) (Tehran, 1970), pp. 261–77.Google Scholar

³⁰ Minorsky, “Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom, and Revolt,” p. 198.Google Scholar

³¹ A valuable police document pertaining to the interrogation of twenty-five Babis in 1883 is available in an otherwise worthless book by an ex-Babi. The prisoners were asked a number of questions including their occupation. Two were mullas; one was a servant to notables; one was a darvish; the remaining nineteen were all from the rank of the pīshivarīn with or without small shops. See Āyatī, 'Abdul Hussein, Kashf al-Hīyal (Tehran, 1947), pp. 3–42.Google Scholar

³² Lockhart, Laurence, The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 195–96; 265.Google Scholar See also Arunova and Ashrafīan, Dula-i Nader, pp. 65–66.Google Scholar

³³ They argue that in the period of trade expansion and commercialization of agriculture the living conditions of some groups, including merchants, had improved.Google Scholar

³⁴ Nowhere is this shown better than in the records of the Association of Iran's Merchants' Representatives (Majlis-i Vukalā-ye Tujār-i Iran), which have been recently published from the archives of the Amīn al-Zarb; see Adamiyat, Feraydun and Nateq, Homa, Afkär-i 1jtimāī va Sīāsī va lqtisadī dar Āsār-i Muntashir Nashudih-ye Dūrān Qajar (Tehran: Agah, 1978), pp. 299–; the records consist of documents relating to the Association's rules and regulations and various correspondence between the leading merchants, between merchants and the Shah, and between the central government and governors-general.Google Scholar

³⁵ See, for example, Akhtar, No. 11 (4 September, 1895).Google Scholar

³⁶ Algar, Hamid, Religion and State in Iran, 1785–1906 the Role of the Uama in the Qajar Period, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 218.Google Scholar

³⁷ Two things helped them in making their resistance more successful (in the short run) than the traditional revolts. Improved means of communication (notably telegraph) made effective coordination among rebellious Cities possible. Thus, the struggle assumed, for the first time in history, a “national” scope. (See Abrahamian, “The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution.”) Secondly, an outside factor was present and ready to intervene, for its own interests, between the two sides of the struggle. The Powers were involved, and their rivalry worked, in a short period of time, to the benefit of the movement. Moreover, given the conflicting tactics of the Russians and the British, the Shah and his reactionary cohort could not systematically and consistently unleash their tribal forces—as the shahs usually did in previous times—on the pīshivarn and merchants with the aim of annihilating the core of the problem.Google Scholar

³⁹ Garthwaith, Gene R., “The Bakhtiari llkhani: An Illusion of Unity,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 8 (1977).Google Scholar