¹ In Bryce, Viscount, The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–16, Miscellaneous No. 31 (London, 1916), p. 653. Contrary to repeated claims by Turkish authors, throughout his life Toynbee, who was commissioned by the British Foreign Office to complete the material, stuck to his central conclusion that this crime constituted genocide. In a letter to the author he wrote, “My feelings and judgment are the same as they have always been. The genocide of the Armenians was a capital crime” (December 6, 1973).Google Scholar

² The campaign was launched by the publication of a book in Turkish that summarily dismisses these documents as fraudulent. A subsequent tract in English, French, and German, edited by Türkkaya Ataöv, Chairman of the Department of International Relations at Ankara University, summarizes the conclusions of that book. See Orel, Şinasi and Yuca, Süreyya, Ermenilerce Talat Paşaya Atfedilen Telegraflarin Gerçek Yüzü (Ankara, 1983).Google ScholarA synopsis in English, French, and German of the same work is produced by Ataöv, Türkkaya, The Andonian Documents Attributed to Talat Pasha Are Forgeries, with corresponding French and German titles (Ankara, 1984);Google Scholar see also Gürün, Kamuran, Ermeni Dosyast (Ankara, 1982), p. 246. Since April 1984, universities, foreign offices, and, above all, key echelons of the media, have been inundated with copies of this synopsis. The campaign evidently did not fail to make an impression on some members of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights. As “experts” rather than as representatives of their respective countries, they had convened at Geneva in August 1985 to discuss “The Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” Some members raised the issue of forgery on the basis of the above-mentioned pamphlet, which was handed out to them for the purpose of quashing paragraph 24 of a report that defined “the Ottoman massacre of Armenians in 1915–1916” as a bona fide “case of genocide.” That report was prepared for the Sub-Commission by the latter's British member, Benjamin Whitaker. After rebutting the allegation of forgery and providing additional data and explanations on his findings, which he said involved 8 years of research, Whitaker finally prevailed. Thus ended a debate that had remained unresolved since 1971, when the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the parent body of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, had agreed to the preparation of a historical study on genocide. By a vote of 14 to 1, with 4 abstentions, the Sub-Commission on August 19, 1985, voted to “take note” of the Whitaker report. For what it is worth, an international body thus for the first time has registered its recognition of the historical fact of the Armenian genocide involving as victims “at least one million, and possibly well over half of the Armenian population” (“Revised and updated report on the question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide prepared by Mr. B. Whitaker,” United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 38th Session, Item 4, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 [2 July 1985], pp. 8–9). In a revised and updated report Whitaker made some corrections and additions at the end of the Sub-Commission's deliberations; in note 13, for example, he changed “I million” to “40%.” See E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6/Corr. I [29 August 1985]. Furthermore, şinasi Orel published a new article since this work was completed. It is more or less a synopsis of the original book in Turkish that has been reviewed here, without the detailed references and arguments.Google Scholar See “The Facts Behind the Telegrams Attributed to Talat Pasha by the Armenians,” Turkish Review Quarterly Digest (Winter 1985–1986), pp. 83–102.Google Scholar

³ Andonian, Aram, Medz Vojeeru [The Great Crime], (Boston, 1921), hereafter cited as AT (Armenian translation);Google ScholarAndonian, Aram, Documents officiels concernant les massacres arméniens, David-Beg, M. S., trans. (Paris, 1920),Google Scholar hereafter cited as FT; The Memoirs of Naim Bey, compiled by Andonian, Aram, no translator indicated (London, 1920), hereafter cited as ET. The English translation is but a compressed version, and the French is less extensive in scope than the original Armenian. More significantly, the original of all three versions was first prepared in Armenian sometime in the summer of 1919, and its publication was delayed nearly 2 years. The resulting confusion in the publication sequence of the three volumes provides the context within which the errors of dating in a key letter (No. I in Table 2) will be easily understood when reviewing that error.Google Scholar

⁴ AT & FT, p. 25, ET, p. 6. This penchant for eventually getting rid of the other nationalities, considered as obstructive to Turkish designs, is clearly indicated in the second of the two letters heading the list of the documents (No. 2).

⁵ The first to point out some of these flaws was Walter Rössler, the 1908–1918 veteran German Consul at Aleppo, who in a confidential letter in the spring of 1921 described these flaws “as simple errors.” He had read the French text, and the French translation of his comments are in Justicier du génocide arménien, le procès de Tehlirian (Paris, 1981), pp. 226–29.Google ScholarSimilar and other errors are reviewed in Krieger, “Keetch Mu Lurtchoutiun” [Let Us Be A Little Serious], Houssaper (Cairo Armenian daily), December 30 and 31, 1964, and January 2 and 4, 1965;Google Scholar and in Krieger, , “Aram Andonianee Huradaragadz Tourk Bashdonagan Vaverakrerou Vaveraganoutiunu,” [The Authenticity of the Turkish Official Documents Published by Aram Andonian] 1915–1965 Houshamadian Medz Yeghernee [Commemorative Compendium on the Great Holocaust, 1915–1965], (Beirut, 1965), pp. 229–30. Although not free from an array of errors, this study reflects the pioneering work of Krieger, who for decades singlehandedly and patiently canvassed the available archives here and abroad, especially the Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive, compiling a mass of documentary data. The author takes this opportunity to express his appreciation to Krieger, who helped him become initiated into this most neglected genre of scholarship combining Turkish and Armenian studies.Google Scholar

⁶ Not knowing English at all, Andonian could neither control typographical errors nor oversee the body of the translation. In a confidential letter to Terzian (a physician and apparently a friend of Andonian), the French translation of which is in Justicier du génocide arménien, pp. 230–37, he complained that his manuscript was treated “cavalierly,” and in the process “they went a little too far” [keetch mu shad asbedoqren]. Employing self-imposed secrecy, Andonian used double-digit ciphers to record his three November 1918 transactions with Naim, at the last one of which (November 14) he had induced Naim to deliver original telegrams. The Andonian-Naim file in Nubar Library at Paris starts with these coded messages. See Krieger, “Aram Andonianee,” p. 230.Google Scholar

⁷ The Ottoman calendar, otherwise called rumi, or Julian, or old style, in contradistinction to miladi, Gregorian, or new style, respectively, began on March 1, the start of the fiscal year, and ended on February 28 or 29 of the following year. The date one month after December 10, (1)330, for example, was January 10, (1)330 old style, because the Ottoman calendar year stretched through the months of January and February of the following year of the Western calendar. Only after March 1 old style, or March 14 new-style Western calendar, was the date switched to that of next year, i.e., (1)331. By applying the 13-day differential one gets thus February 16 old style as the cut-off date for the users of the Western calendar, even though Ottoman documents bore old-style dates to the end of February of a given year. This practice was discontinued on February 16, 1916 old style, i.e., February 16, 1332, so that it would coincide with March 1, 1917 new style, and became March 1, (1)333 Ottoman style. In other words, in 1917 the Ottoman Calendar shrunk by 13 days and 2 months as a result of eliminating the 13-day differential while retaining the old-style year, i.e., 1333; the following year January I, (1)334 coincided with January 1, 1918. This practice too was eliminated on January 1, 1926, when the old style was completely eradicated through Bill No. 698, enacted on December 26, 1925, in the Parliament of the nascent Turkish Republic (Deny, J., “L'adoption du calendrier grégorien en Turquie,” Revue du Monde Musulman, 18 [1921], 46–53;Google ScholarTemelkuran, Tevfik, “Türklerin Kullandiği Takvimler ye Bati [Miladi] Takvimin Kabulu,” Belgelerde Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 51 [12 1971], pp. 28–29). The tabulation on p. 360 shows selected old-style/new-style calendar conversions.Google Scholar

⁸ After the February 18 letter is introduced as February 28 in a prefatory remark, the error is repeated in the Armenian and French versions (AT 129; FT96).

⁹ Ramsaur, Ernest E. Jr, The Young Turks (Beirut, 1965), pp. 123–24.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The point may be illustrated with reference to Takvimi Vekayi, or TV, the Ottoman calendar of events, or the official gazette, to which frequent supplements were attached to cover the 1919–1921 court-martial proceedings. First, the trial of the two wartime cabinet ministers began on Monday, April 28, 1919 (new style). As a major event of immense public interest, the trial was covered with front-page headlines throughout the Turkish and non-Turkish press. Yet when recording the proceedings, the TV editors misprinted the date as “Sunday, April 27” on the front page of the supplement (see Table I). Second, the fifth sitting of the Court in that trial series took place on Monday, May 12, 1919, yet TV again misprinted the date as “Wednesday, May 14, 1919.” Third, when assigning a number to the particular issue covering that fifth sitting, the editors put one number on the front (3553), and another number inside it (3554), while maintaining uniform numbers for other issues. Other irregularities attend the practice of distorted chronology by which gaps are created between the date of a sitting and that of publication; later sittings are moved up, and earlier ones are delayed in the order of publication. See Table I for the display of these errors.

¹¹ Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya, Makedonyadan Ortaasyaya Enver Paşa, 3 vols. (Istanbul, 1971–1972), Vol. III, pp. 57–62.Google Scholar

¹² For item I, see Orel and Yuca, Ermenilerce, p. 60; item 2, p. 130; item 3, pp. 34–35, 40; item 4, pp. 66, 75–76; item 5, pp. 44–45, 46–47.Google Scholar

¹³ Sertel, M. Zekeriya, Hatirladiklarim, 1905–1950 (Istanbul, 1968), pp. 63–64. Before joining the staff of şükrü Kaya's Directorate-General to study the problem of tribes involving Alevi Kurds, Sertel's newspaper had become a casualty of newsprint shortage. Moreover, in order to fashion the three makeshift notebooks he supplied to Andonian in three installments (November 6, 10, and 14, 1918), Naim had to use what scraps of paper he could scrounge, which he then tied together with a string.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Reşit, Ahmed [Rey], Gördüklerim- Yaptiklarim (1890–1922) (Istanbul, 1945), p. 117.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Wrote the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph: “on account of the lightning advance of Lord Allenby's forces … time was lacking for so complete an obliteration of the tragic archives while subordinates, who remained behind, sometime retained possession of compromising documents…. A Turkish official employed in the local administration disclosed the series of telegrams, mostly in cipher” (Daily Telegraph, May 29, 1922. British files [Public Records Office at KEW, London] identify him as Mr. Gerstwohl, FO 371/7874/5516, folio 139).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Justicier, p. 228; a copy of the original report in German is in the possession of this author. Commenting on this condition, Andonian wrote to Terzian: “This Aleppo office was one of the worst in terms of orderliness; the disorganization was indescribable. The documents were piled pel mel in the drawers, without being registered, without any system of classification. This condition was typical of other offices with similar functions.” Justicier, p. 234.

¹⁷ For the first British author see Young, George, Corps de droit Ottoman (Oxford, 1906), Vol. 2, p. XVI; for the other,Google Scholar see Bucknill, John A. S. and Utidjian, H. A. S., The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code: A Translation from the Turkish Text (London, 1913), p. XVI. The presumption of Armenian authorship for “poor Turkish” is whimsical, if not frivolous, since many a literate Armenian surpassed many a Turk in the command of that language.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Mithat, Ahmed, “Münakaşai Lisaniye,” Tarik, 4624, 11 18, 1898;Google ScholarSami, Şemseddin, “şiir ve Edebiyattaki Teceddüdü Ahirimiz,” Sabah, 11 29, 1898.Google Scholar Both authors are quoted in Berkes, Niyazi, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), p. 320. Ahmed Mithat was not only a prolific author of novels and historical works, but was also Director of the Imperial Press [Matbaai Amire], editor of the governmental gazette Takvimi Vekayi, and founder of the Turkish newspaper Tercümani Hakikat. As an Ottoman delegate he participated in the International Congress of Orientalists held in Stockholm in 1888.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Thirteen authenticated cipher telegrams were introduced as evidence at that sitting on March 6, 1919, one of which, marked “secret,” was from the Boğazliyan Gendarmery Chief informing his superiors at Kayseri that Armenians from the area “were deported, namely destroyed” (sevkiyat, yani mahv manasina). Despite this paraphrasing at the trial, the court decided to retain the original version with the notation, “for the record, the very inept writing has been kept intact; it conforms to the original” [pek acemi yazisi aynen kaydedilmictir, aslina mutabzkdir] (Nor Giank, Renaissance, Vakit, Ikdam, March 7, 1919 issues;Google ScholarKrieger, , Yozgadee Hayasbanoutian Vaverakragan Badmoutiounu [The Documentary History of the Armenian Genocide at Yozgad], [New York, 1980], pp. 265–66).Google Scholar The Interior Minister's remark is in Reşit, Ahmet [Rey], Gördüklerim, p. 183 footnote.Google Scholar

²⁰ Danişmend, Ismail Hami, Izahli Osmanlt Tarihi Kronolojisi (Istanbul, 1961), Vol. 4, p. 452. In this volume of his encyclopedic work the author focuses not only on the quality of Talat's Turkish but on the contents of the letter as well to conclude that Talat, without being specific, “personally admitted that he deserved punishment and that he was willing to courageously submit to ‘the supreme punishment’” (‘cezayi kemali cesaretle çekmek isterim’ demek suretiyle cezaya layik olduğnu itiraf etmiştir).Google Scholar

²¹ Stoddard, Philip H., The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilâi-, Mahsusa, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1963 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1964), p. 230.Google Scholar

²² On doubting Naim's existence, see Orel and Yuca, Ermenilerce, pp. 23, 24; Ataöv, Andonian Documents, p. 9. On pp. 11 and 12, these two authors raise the question as to how a man dismissed early in 1916 (the Meskene appointment) could have procured and transmitted to others documents 21/2 years after his dismissal. Having relied on the French translation, it is conceivable that they gave a one-sided interpretation to the French word révoquer, which in addition to “dismiss,” has the meaning of “recall.” Naim discloses in his annotations that he not only returned to his post after the Meskene recall but was entrusted with a new mission for Sivas (AT 190, FT 135). See appropriate columns under AT, FT, and ET in Table 2.

²³ Krieger, Aram Andonianee, pp. 245–46.

²⁴ Orel and Yuca, Ermenilerce, p. 24.

²⁵ There are many other errors of counting, dating, and inaccurate referencing. Here are some examples: (1) The March 25 letter (No. 2) is not misprinted as February 8, as they assert, but rather is printed in the ET correctly. (2) Contradicting themselves, they then reproduce the March 25 date when quoting from the same ET on another page. See Orel and Yuca, pp. 33, 140. (3) Again on p. 33 they inaccurately report that the FT has omitted the year of the February 18 letter (No. I); it did not. (4) Of the Talat ciphers, only three have no date and registry number, only three have no date, and only twelve have no registry number, rather than five, five, and nine, respectively, as reported on p. 4 by Orel and Yuca. (5) On pages 124 and 330, a document by Third Army Commander Vehib Paşa is introduced in which the number 3,000 is raised to 30,000, presumably by mistake for another Ottoman document, dated 18 days later, specifically cites 2,127 casualties (Documents [Ankara, 1983], document No. 69, of April I, 1918). In his Kafkas Yollarinda Hatiralar ve Teşebbüsler, Turkish historian and Intelligence Officer Ahmed Refik (Altinay), who investigated the sites of the atrocities as a member of a joint Turko-German inspection team, states that there were no more than 10,000 people in Erzurum since “the residents had not returned from their flight to the interior of Anatolia by April 1915.”Google Scholar See Gazigiray, A. Alper, Ermeni Terrörunün Kaynakiari (Istanbul, 1982), pp. 495–96, 503.Google Scholar

²⁶ The Armenian National Union was convened under the aegis of Catholicos Sahag, the Supreme Armenian Patriarch of the Sea of Cilicia, who selected nine persons as members, the president being a Protestant physician, and the vice-president, a Catholic Armenian: FO 608/108, General Headquarters Intelligence summary of March 4, 1919, p. 4 of the report. These documents were validated “after many long tests” (Krieger, Aram Andonianee, p. 232; Justicier, p. 237).Google Scholar

²⁷ On Naim never having lied, on his relative “saintliness,” and on testing his reliability along with that of his documents, see Krieger, Aram Andonianee, p. 232. It should be pointed out that Krieger culled these revealing details mostly from the assemblage of Andonian‘s Unpublished Essays and Papers, deposited in Nubar Library at Paris, and subsumed under the file index “Haigagan Deghahanoutiantz yev Tcharterou Badmoutian Hamar” [Toward the History of the Armenian Deportations and Massacres], containing also Naim's notebooks. Series 672, Carton 5–2–6: For the nonavailability of this file and the documents thereof at the present time see Table 2, note e. For Andonian's avowedly faithful translations, see Orel and Yuca, Ermenilerce, pp. 30, 33, 42, 51, 53, 64, 65, 66, 73; for Naim's occasional tears in connection with his r'ecording coded telegrams that decreed the death of the Armenian nation see AT 22, 91; FT 23, 72; ET 3.

²⁸ Justicier, pp. 227, 228.

²⁹ During the June 2–3, 1921, Berlin-Moabit Criminal Court trial an attempt was made to introduce into evidence Talat's 5 ciphers in the original (Nos. 5, 11, 19, 25, and 36, with No. 5 misprinted in the Proceedings as September 15 instead of 16). Additionally, the photocopies of these 5, and those of 16 other ciphers, were distributed in the Court. Upon the suggestion of the presiding judge that such an introduction at that juncture of the trial might be premature, Gordon, one of the three defense lawyers, agreed to drop the idea, provided the Court would concur with his claim that “the defendant believed … not without good reason… that Talat was the author [Urheber] of the terrible atrocities against the Armenians for which he was responsible.” The Procuror-General concurred only with the point that the defendant really believed Talat to be guilty. Thus the documents never had a chance to be tested in a court of law, including the Turkisl Military Tribunal, since they were hastily taken to London for translation and submission to the Peace Conference. All that the Berlin Criminal Court did was to certify the accuracy of the translations (Der Prozeβ Talaat Pascha [stenographic account of the trial] [Berlin, 1921], pp. 69, 86, 132–36). Ataöv credits Gollnick, the Procuror-General at the trial, with a definitive statement declaring the documents as “false”; this attribution itself is false because Gollnick never made such a statement. The issue involved the 5 original Talat ciphers that were not introduced and therefore could not be tested; Gollinick merely raised the possibility of falseness out of a general skepticismGoogle Scholar (Ataüv, The Andonian Documents, p. 9). The same misrepresentation is indulged in by the two Turkish authors, who inserted the word “fake” (düzmece) when quoting the German Procuror-General: Orel and Yuca, Ermenilerce, p. 19. For the involvement of the German Foreign Office in the trial, and for defense attorney Gordon's efforts to secure the testimony of Rössler,Google Scholar see German Foreign Office Archives (Bonn), or Auswärtiges Amt, Politische Abteilung 3/Türkei, Po 11 No. 3, vol. 1, June 1 and 2, 1921. Andonian declared that, except for the February 18 Şakir letter and some other original ciphers, a few of which were sent back to the Armenian Patriarchate at Istanbul in connection with A. Nuri's moribund trial, he left the Naim documents with the Berlin Court that had compiled a Tehlirian file, and that for some years his subsequent efforts to reclaim them from Berlin proved unsuccessful (Justicier, p. 233). This author on May 10, 1979, wrote a letter to the Justice Ministry of the German Federal Republic inquiring about the possibility of locating the Tehlirian file from the archives of the Moabit Criminal Court and of retrieving the documents for purposes of examination. In a response on May 29, 1979, the Berlin plenipotentiary of Justice informed me that the matter was referred to Berlin District Attorney Krause, who in turn declared, in a letter of June 15, 1979, that the file and the documents “no longer exist; they have been destroyed.”Google Scholar

³⁰ Lepsius, Johannes, Deutschland und Armenien, 1914–1918 (Berlin, 1919).Google Scholar

³¹ In the annotative part of his material Naim cited two instances that the Court Martial subsequently specifically verified. They deserve to be introduced here because of their substantial value. One refers to Naim's exchange with his superior, A. Nuri, who confided that before Nuri's departing to his new post at Aleppo, Talat took him to a corner in Talat's office and told him, “You surely do know what you have to do. I am not going to put up with the continuous existence in Turkey of those accursed people anymore,” meaning of course the Armenians (AT 32; FT 31; ET 13). This lethal instruction was independently confirmed and substantiated before the Turkish Court Martial by lhsan, a former staff member in Talat's Interior Ministry Special Secretariat, who directly quoted A. Nuri as saying that he “personally received Talat's order of extermination” of the Armenian deportation survivors (imha emirlerini bizzat aldim) (TV, 3540, p. 5 of the Indictment; reference to investigative papers, p. 15). The other has reference to Naim's assertion that the frequently used phrase “the deportees have been sent to their destination” was a euphemism for “they were killed” (AT 174; FT 125; not cited in ET). At the ninth sitting of the Yozgad trial series (February 22, 1919) this assertion was documented. One of the 11 ciphers read into the record at that sitting was Boğazliyan Recruitment Bureau Chief Mustafa's wire informing the Deputy Commander of the Fifth Army Corps at Ankara that the deportees in question were “sent off to their destination' (müreueblerine sevk). When Commander Recayi asked for clarification, the answer came on the same day: “They were killed” (katledildikleri) (Nor Giank, Renaissance, Yeni Gün, Ikdam, February 23, 1919 issues).Google Scholar

³² The full text of Radi's deposition is in Krieger, Yozgadee, pp. 387–95; the quotation used is on p. 389.

³³ Nor Giank, March 6 and 7, 1919;Google ScholarRenaissance, March 6, 1919.Google Scholar

³⁴ el Ghusein, Faiz, Martyred Armenia, translation from the original Arabic, no translator indicated (New York, 1918), p. 40.Google Scholar A member of the Damascus Governor's staff and subsequently subdistrict commissioner in the province of Harput, el Ghusein had been imprisoned as an Arab nationalist following the Aliya Court Martial. During and after his imprisonment at Diyarbekir he gained, as a fellow Muslim, the confidence of some Turks who had played active roles in the massacres, and who opened up to him with all sorts of revelations. He learned, for example, that the Arab killed was Sabat el Sueidi, the subdistrict commissioner of El Beşiri, a county of Diyarbekir district, and that the other victim, the subgovernor of Lice, was an unnamed Albanian. (This was independently confirmed by an August 20, 1915, German report in Türkei 183, vol. 38, A24658, enclosure No. VI; and by a September 27, 1915, Rössler report in Türkei 183, vol. 39, A30049, p. 7.) The total number of Armenians, native and others, that constituted the large convoys passing through the city and were massacred in and around Diyarbekir (a hub of transit for convoys) was 570,000, as confided to el Ghusein by one of the organizers of these massacres (p. 41). When relating the narration of Shahin Bey, a Turkish military who had participated in the massacre of a large convoy, el Ghusein adds, “So after the gendarmes had killed a number of Armenian men they put on them turbans and brought Kurdish women to weep and lament over them. They also brought a photographer to photograph the bodies and the weeping women, so that at a future time they might be able to convince Europe that it was the Armenians who had attacked the Kurds and killed them, that the Kurdish Tribes had risen against them in revenge, and that the Turkish government had no part in the matter” (pp. 37 and 38). In his epilogue the author absolves “the faith of Islam and Muslims generally,” depicting Ittihad's “fanaticism and their jealousy of the Armenians” as responsible for the crimes; “the Faith of Islam is guiltless of their deeds” (p. 49). Commenting on the production of fake photographs, Andonian adds to the Diyarbekir case one involving Urfa; this picture was so carelessly composed as to allow native Armenians to identify in it certain local Armenians as the actual victims (AT 222; FT 152). Providing full details, another Armenian author identifies by name and position the leading executioners of that particular carnage at Diyarbekir, after also confirming the falsity of the photo (Agounie, M., Million Mu Hayerou Tchartee Badmoutiunee [The Story of the Massacre of One Million Armenians] [Istanbul, 1920], p. 67). The prewar Armenian Vice Consul at the British Consulate of Diyarbekir, where he had served for 19 years, asserts the fake nature of the photo, specifying the location of the atrocity, describing the printing process, and sketching the lines of governmental propaganda that followedGoogle Scholar (Mugurditchian, Tovmas, Dikranagerdee Nahankeen Tcharteru Yev Kürderou Kazanoutiunneru [The Massacres of Diyarbekir Province and The Ferocity of the Kurds] [Cairo, 1919], pp. 74–75). Such fraudulence was not limited to pictures purporting to be evidence of Armenian atrocities against Muslims. A Venezuelan officer attached to the Turkish army through German mediation, who had witnessed several scenes of massacres in the Van and Bitlis provinces, relates a similar pattern regarding caches of arms purporting to be evidence of plans of wartime Armenian insurgency in Diyarbekir. The two pictures showed “a stack of arms which [supposedly] had been found in the houses and even the churches of the Armenians. However, a close contemplation of those interesting photographs revealed plainly that the park therein represented was composed almost entirely of fowling-pieces easily disguised by a thin layer of army guns”Google Scholar (de Nogales, Rafael, Four Years Beneath the Crescent, Lee, Numa, trans. [New York, London, 1926], pp. 139–40; for a graphic description of a ghastly scene of massacre at Siirt, Bitlis province, see p. 124.Google ScholarThe German translation of these accounts is in Nogales, , Vier Jahre unter dem Halbmond, no translator indicated [Berlin, 1925], pp. 100 and 89. Countless passages and sentences portraying Ittihad leaders in atrocious behavior, particularly the warlord Enver, are deleted in this German edition).Google Scholar

³⁵ Türkei 183, vol. 37, A23232, July 17, 1915, report.Google Scholar

³⁶ Talat told Mordtmann, who was in charge of the German Embassy's Armenian desk, that he intended to get rid of Turkey's “internal foes” by “taking advantage of the war” (den Weltkrieg dazu benuizen… um mit ihren inneren Feinden … gründlich aufzuräumen) (Türkei 183, vol. 37, A19744, June 17, 1915, Wangenheim report). Some six weeks later Talat told Interim Ambassador Hohenlohe that the Armenian Question is finished, is no moreGoogle Scholar (La question arménienne n'éxiste plus) (Türkei 183, vol. 38, A24674, September 4, 1915, Hohenlohe report; see also in the same archive at Bonn Borschaft Konstantinopel 170, No. 549 [5118]). In a 22-page report Jäckh, a key promoter of friendship ties with Turkey, describes Talat's “unabashed sense of political relief over the destruction of the Armenian people” as he summarizes the findings gathered during his September-October 1915 trip to TurkeyGoogle Scholar (Türkei 158, vol. 14, folio 034, p. 18 of report).

³⁷ Correcting his earlier diagnosis, the German Ambassador concluded that “the deportations” were a stepping stone to the act of “destruction” (Türkei 183, vol. 37, A22 110; see also Botschaft Konstantinopel 169, folio 142–6, No. [4018], July 16, 1915, Wangenheim report). About a week before his sudden death through stroke, the same Ambassador, reacting to Talat's “denials” of massacres, advised Berlin to conclude from these denials that “massacres in fact did take place,” and that “the denial” (Dementi) was a cop-outGoogle Scholar (Türkei 183, vol. 39, A30634, October 15, 1915, Wangenheim report). Wangenheim's successor called Talat “unscrupulous,” and “a double-dealer” (ein Doppelgänger)Google Scholar (Türkei 159, No. 3, vol. 4, A24679, September 7, 1916, Metternich report). On December 7, 1915, Metternich reported to Berlin, “Protests are useless and Turkish denials … are worthless”Google Scholar (Türkei 183, vol. 40, A36184). The Austrian Ambassador complained to Vienna that Talat is “throwing dust in the eyes,” and five days later described him as a man “engaging in double-dealing” (ein Doppeispiel treiben) as Talat persisted in his denials (Austrian Foreign Affairs Ministry Archive at Vienna, i.e., Haus- und Hof-Archiv, PA 12, Karton 209, No. 72, September 3, 1915, and PA 12, Karton 209, No. 73, September 8, 1915, Pallavicini reports, respectively).

³⁸ The German Adana Consul branded Talat's denials as “brazen-faced deception” (dreisie Täuschung) (Tärkei 183, vol. 38, A27578, September 10, 1915, Buge report). The German Musul Consul on his part condemned the denials as “blatant lies” (krasse Lügen) (Botschaft Konstantinopel 170, No. 24 [4729], September 10, 1915, Holstein report). Finally, the German Aleppo Consul, responding to the same denials, exclaimed, “Indeed, I could not trust my eyes as I read this declaration of denial, and I find no expression to characterize this abysmal untruth”Google Scholar (Fürwahr ich habe meinen Augen nicht getraut….) (Türkei 183, vol. 38, A23991, July 27, 1915, Rössler report).

³⁹ Morgenthau, Henry, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden City, N.Y., 1918), pp. 140–45. On pp. 37, 181, 184, 239 the Ambassador reiterates the point that he kept a regular diary, indicating that most of his accounts were based on entries.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ FO 371/9158/E5523, folios 106–7, May 22, 1923, communication.

⁴¹ “In Turkey Behind the Scenes,” Morning Post, 12 5, 1918, p. 7; the quotation is repeated on p. 9 of the December 7, 1918, issue of the same paper.Google Scholar

⁴² The first quotation is in Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya, Ikinci Adam (Istanbul, 1973), p. 45;Google Scholar the second is in Aydemir, , Suyu Arayan Adam, 7th ed. (Istanbul, 1979), p. 273.Google Scholar

⁴³ FO 371/7869/E7840, folio 262, p. 2 of August 1, 1922, report.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ It developed that Şakir had kept copies of all or of some of his communications, and that the letter in question was among those found in the suitcase discovered during a December 12, 1918, search by the military police at the home of Ahmed Ramiz, a brother-in-law of Şakir (Turkish daily Akşam, December 12, 1918). After being impounded, some of those letters found their way to the press and were published either entirely or in part by a number of anti-Ittihad Turkish dailies in Istanbul. According to the Turkish daily Tasviri Efkâr (February 3, 1919), the documents and letters, which criminally implicated Ittihadist leaders, were secured and photographed subsequently. An Armenian Deputy of the Ottoman Parliament in his memoirs states that Şakir also kept a diaryGoogle Scholar (Papazian, Vahan, Eem Housheru [My Memoirs] [Beirut, 1952], Vol. II, p. 295).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ The February 18 letter contains the following passage: “Unable to forget the humiliations and the bitterness of the past, and filled with an urge for vengeance, the Cemiyet [Ittihad], full of hope for its future, has reached a decision. The Armenians, living in Turkey, will be destroyed to the last. The government has been given ample authority. As to the organization of the mass murder, the government will provide the necessary explanations to the governors, and to the army commanders. All the delegates of Ittihad ve Terakki in their own regions will be in charge of this task. No Armenian will be allowed to get any help and support.” (Türkiyede yaşayan bil umum Ermenileri, bir tanesi kalmayinca kadar, mahva karar, ve bu hususra hükümete salahiyeti vasiye ita ermişdir. Tertibati katliye hakkinda hükümet vali ye ordu komandanlarina izahati lazimei verecekdir. Ittihad ve Terakkinin bilumum murahhaslari bulundukiari yerlerde bu meselenin takibiile mesgul olacaklar. Hiç bir Ermeninin nayili müzaharet ve muavenet olmasina meydan verilmiyecekdir.) The March 25 letter has this passage: “As stated in the February 18, 1915 letter, the Cemiyet has decided to tear from its roots and destroy the various forces which for years have been hampering its efforts and clashing with it. The measures adopted for this purpose are unfortunately very bloody…. [esasdan kal' ve imhaya karar vermiş ve bu babda maatessüf pek kanli tedabir ittihazina mecbur kalmişdir] There is no point in dealing with the other [troublesome nationalities] before the measures adopted against the known persons [the Armenians] produce results.”

⁴⁶ As some other high officials had done, Harput governor Sabit had saved a few incriminating ciphers he had received, as a hedge against the liabilities- of a possible defeat, which might involve reckoning before the bar of justice. In order to shift the blame to higher authorities, he reportedly handed out this particular cipher to the Mazhar Inquiry Commission whose magistrates had taken him in custody, subjecting him to a pretrial interrogatory (Jamanag, December 12; Ariamard, December 13, 1918). Mehmed Namik, the police chief of Dersim (Harput province district), confirmed this rationale of compliance with higher authorities. He testified that working closely with Nazim, Ittihad's Responsible Secretary of that province, Sabit, adamantly enforced the radical measures against the entire Armenian population there. Following an investigation ordered by Sabit, the police chief had rounded up 29 Dashnaks, finding “but a very few bombs.” As he proposed “to punish these men only, Sabit Bey refused to listen, replying that orders had come from the Central Government, signed by Behaeddin Shakir, that the whole Armenian population had to be deported and annihilated” (FO 371/6500, 30/A/4, Appendix B, folio 370/ 103).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ In February 1916, Vehib had replaced Mahmud Kamil Paşa, under whose aegis the Armenian population of “the six provinces” in the East was all but wiped out, and whose order forbidding shelter to any Armenian deportee under pain of death is cited in the Indictment (TV 3540, p. 7, ref. series 13, doc. no. 1). As Commander of the Second Army at the Dardanelles Southwestern Front, Vehib had distinguished himself; his brother, Esad Paşa, was Commander of the Dardanelles Western Army Group, which included Mustafa Kemal's (Atatürk) famous nineteenth division. Promoted to Commander-in-Chief of Army Group East in the spring of 1918, Vehib soon advanced all the way to the pre-1877 borders of Caucasus. Before Turkish authorities decided to arrest him as a suspect for wartime black-marketeering (TV, 3571), he prepared a lengthy deposition at the request of the Mazhar Inquiry Commission that was conducting pre-Court Martial investigations on the massacres. While in prison, he was unexpectedly visited one day in September 1919 by Şakir's wife, who began attacking him with a whip, prompting the General to call out, “Help! [aman], take this woman out, I can't strike at a woman” (Djagadamard, Jhamanag, september 9, 1919).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ General Sabis in his memoirs complained about Şakir's key role in Turkey's entry into the war, the Sarikamiş battle disaster, and his Pan-Turanist, or Pan-Turkist, ideology, denouncing Şakir's lack of grasp and incompetence in military affairs (Sabis, Ali Ihsan, Harb Hatiralarim [Istanbul, 1943], Vol. 1, pp. 64–65;Google ScholarBaytin, Arif, Ilk Dünya Harbinde Kafkas Cephesi [Istanbul, 1946], pp. 49–51). Colonel Baytin, who was a Deputy from Ankara in the Turkish Republic when he published his book, was in charge of the twenty-ninth division of the Ninth Army Corps of the Third Army. He bitterly denounced Şakir's “optimum influence” (tesiri azami). That “undeniable” influence was brought to bear upon Enver who, yielding to Şakir's intervention, relieved the Commander of that Ninth Army Corps, replacing him with Şakir's choice, i.e., General Ihsan Giresonlu, then the commander of the thirty-fourth division of the Eleventh Army Corps. According to the Turkish daily Sabah, the Intelligence (Istihbarat) branch of the War Office (i.e., Department II) mapped the strategy for massacres carried out by the çeles that were organized by Ittihad's Central Committee and directed by ŞakirGoogle Scholar (Ariamard, December 13, 1918).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Galib Vardar, in Tansu, S. N., ed., Ittihat ve Terakki Içinde Dönenler (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 244, 276–77.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Türkei 198, vol. 8, A2616, and IA Orientalia Generalia 9, vol. 7, January 20, 1917.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Politische Abreilung 3/Türkei Po. 11 No. 3, vol. 1, submitted by Weismann on May 21, 1921, i.e., in the wake of Talat's assassination in Berlin (March 15, 1921). Some 13 months later (April 17, 1922), Şakir too was assassinated by an Armenian.Google Scholar

⁵² Borschaft Konstantinopel 170, No. 3841, August 23, 1915. For his guerrilla activities, which included the brief capture of Ardahan, see Groβes Hauptquartier 186, Türkei 18/2 report Nos. 2734, 2736; 18/3 and 4, report Nos. 39, 43, 59, and 170. The capture by the Special Organization units of Ardahan and Artvin following the start of the Russo-Turkish hostilities in the winter of 1914 was accompanied by large-scale massacres of the native Armenian populations of these two cities. Apart from many other reasons fueling the Turko-Armenian conflicit, these atrocities were the catalyst for a new cycle of violence, culminating in the wholesale destruction of the Armenians. This fact is conceded by a Turkish captain at the War Office's Intelligence Section, i.e., Department II. In his article series in a Turkish daily, and subsequently in a book, this captain refers to the criminal gangs who were “released from the prisons, and after a week's training at the War College's training grounds, were sent off to the east as the çetes of the Special Organization, perpetrating the worst crimes against the Armenians [Ermeni mezaliminde en büyük cinayetleri bu çeteler ika ettiler]. Upon my 1918 visit to the sites of the atrocities, I have confirmed these 1914–15 massacres, and the role in them as brigand chiefs of Çerkez Ahmed and Lieutenant Halil, the two murderers of Zohrab and Vartkes, the Armenian Deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, and of Erzurum Deputy Sudi. The aim of Ittihad was to destroy the Armenians, and thereby to do away with the Question of the Eastern Provinces [Ermenileri imha etmek ve bu suretle Vilayati Şarkiye meselesini de ortadan kaldirmak istediler]”Google Scholar (Refik, Ahmed [Altinay], Iki Komite-Iki Kital [Ottoman script] [Istanbul, 1919], p. 23; for the author's personal confirmation of the massacres in Ardahan and Artvin see pp. 36–38;Google ScholarIkdam, December 23–28, 1918 installments, quotation from the December 26 issue). Altinay subsequently became a prolific author of historical works.Google Scholar

⁵³ Admiral de Robeck's report is in FO 371/5089B/E949, February 18, 1920; the Intelligence report is in FO 371/5171/E12228, p. 7 of the 26-page report, August 29, 1920.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Avcioğlu, Doğan, Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi (Istanbul, 1974), Vol. III, p. 1,135.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Rössler's quotation in original French is in Justicier, p. 228; his report to Berlin is in Türkei 183, vol. 40, A468, December 20, 1915. Rössler was not sure whether it was Şükrü or his deputy, A. Nuri, who made that remark. Biographical details provided by Nuri's brother indicate that Nuri did not know French well enough to converse in that languageGoogle Scholar (Tengirşek, Yusuf Kemal, Vatan Hizmetinde [Ankara, 1981]). Şukrü, on the other hand, had graduated from Galatasaray College, where the French language was prevalent, and had gone to Paris for advanced studies following his graduation from Istanbul Law School. After returning from Malta, where he had been interned along with other Ittihad leaders by the British, he served for a long time (first installed in Fethi Okyar's 1924 Cabinet) as Interior Minister in the nascent Turkish Republic, as well as Secretary General of the People's Party (Halk Partisi) founded by Atatürk.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Türkei 158, vol. 24, A1373, January 3, 1916, report. Bastendorff's report is dated December 18, 1915. According to a British intelligence report Bastendorff was employed as an engineer at the No. 1 Section, 3rd Division of Baghdad Railway, at a location between Arada and Darbeesa. FO 608/244/6474.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Kölnische Zeitung, January 1, 1917.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Vakit, December 12, 1918.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ FO 371/6504/E10319.

⁶⁰ Der Zor was an independent district, mutasarriflik, embracing Sabka, an open-air concentration camp site, and Ras ul Ain, a gigantic slaughterhouse; the other sites at Meskene, Abu Hrera, Hammam, Rakka, and Zierat were part of the Aleppo province.Google Scholar

⁶¹ The details of this enclosure highlight the standard pattern of massacre in this part of the desert of altogether some 150,000 Armenians over a period of several weeks. After having been collected together at a spot—in this case, Marat—the victims were then marched off in convoys of 2.000–4,000 each to Şedadiye on the Çabur River, a tributary of the Euphrates and several days away from Marat. A squad of mounted brigands surrounded the convoy, robbing the victims of the last of their possessions, including their clothing. They were then driven, completely naked, to Karadağ, a 3-hour-distant plateau encircled with hills, where they were set upon by the brigands and butchered with “axes, swords, and daggers,” the whole slaughter being “watched by Salihzeki from a carriage from which he kept egging on the butchers with loud shouts” (Türkei 183, vol. 45, A31831, November 5, 1916, report to Chancellor Hollweg).Google Scholar

⁶² FO 608/244/8183.

⁶³ U.S. National Archives, Record Group 59.867.4016/373; Jackson's 25-page summary report of March 4, 1918, was compiled in Washington, D.C. Significantly, the Consul, who, like his German counterpart Rössler, lived in Aleppo for 10 years, also reveals that much documentation involving “details of massacres,” which was too risky to relay to Washington via regular channels, was burned in Aleppo following the U.S. entry into the war in April 1917 (p. 20). The Consul further states that in one week 60,000 Armenians were butchered outside Der Zor, and that the total toll of the successive mass murders was 300,000 (pp. 11, 13); he attributed all this to Salihzeki having replaced Ali Suad, whom Jackson describes as a “high class gentleman who had spent 15 years of his life in Egypt, spoke English and French, and was highly esteemed by many in Aleppo” (p. 11) an almost identical view is in Türkei 183, vol. 42, A1291 1, Rössler's April 27, 1916, report.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Enclosure to Consul Rössler's September 20, 1916, No. 93 report in Türkei 183, vol. 45, A28162; and in 183, vol. 44, A26116, September 5, 1916, report.Google ScholarFor similar details from other sources, see also Rössler's July 29, 1916 report in 183, vol. 44, A21969.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Türkei 183, vol. 44, A26116, September 5, 1916, report.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Meclisi Mebusan Zabt Ceridesi 1918, No. 14, pp. 110–14. In its November 19, 1918, issue Journal d'Orient carried excerpts from that speech.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Jhogovourt, December 21, 1918.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ AT 23, 24, 33, 41, 98, 102; FT 24, 25, 32, 37, 74, 77, 78; ET 4, 5, 14, 19, 41, 42.

⁶⁹ Botschaft Konsiantinopel 169, No. (3378) folio 13, June 3, 1915, report.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Törkei 183, vol. 41, A2889, Rössler's January 3, 1916, report containing, as enclosure, Alexandrette Consul Hoffmann's 25-page, November 8, 1915, BN944 report. Hoffmann was Acting Consul at Aleppo during October of 1915, when Rössler was temporarily absent. Of all the German consular reports emanating from Syria and Mesopotamia, Hoffmann's is the most comprehensive review of the destruction process in that part of the Ottoman Empire, with particular emphasis on methods, cover-ups, false charges, and denials, and on the fact of central direction of the extermination process. By focusing, for example, on four instances of “Armenian uprising,” he tries to debunk this major Turkish, and occasionally German, charge against the Armenians by underscoring the desperately defensive nature of the cases he investigated as falling within the purview of his consular jurisdiction. These involved the Zeitun (Suleymanli), Funducak, Urfa, and Musa Dağ episodes of resistance, with only the population of the last escaping ultimate destruction. Questioning the seriousness of the Turkish charges of Armenian sedition, he refers to the active opposition both of the Kurds of Bedirhan tribe and of certain important Arabic tribes from Iraq and Arabia as being the real sources of danger threatening the Turkish war effort. The extermination of the Armenians, he argues, is essentially economically motivated: He describes the Armenians as “economically superior” and goes on to maintain that “hundreds of thousands” of them are actually “diligent and dexterous artisans, and energetic and enterprising farmers, not to speak of their agriculturally active mountaineers.” He also notes the contempt of most Muslim Arabs against the Turkish overlords, whose atrocities against the Armenians, “especially against women and children they condemn as being against the injunctions of Islam.” In this connection Hoffmann relates the case of the liquidation of a Turkish commander by an Arab sheikh he had chastised for having protected an Armenian deportee convoy (p. 22).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Türkei 183, vol. 42, A12911, April 27, 1916, Rössler report.Google Scholar

⁷² As related by Mark Sykes, who interviewed them, “The Turkish officers of the battalion were horrified at the sights they saw, and the regimental chaplain, on coming across a number of bodies, dismounted his horse and publicly prayed that the divine punishment of these crimes should be averted from Muslims, and, by way of expiation, himself worked at digging graves for the dead bodies” (FO 371/2781/201201; Arab sergeant's statement is in FO 608/247, folio 77 (no. 4880), April 8, 1919).Google Scholar

⁷³ PA 38/70, No. l/P, Austrian Consul Kwatkiowski's March 16, 1917, report.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Atay, Falih Rifki, Zeyrindaği (Istanbul, 1981), p. 66.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Botschaft Konstantinopel 172, No. 384, Loytved Hardegg's May 30, 1916, report.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Memoirs of Halide Edib (New York, London, 1926), pp. 389, 391, 400. Edib grants that “besides the political argument there was a strong economic one… to end the economic supremacy of the Armenians, thereby claiming the markets for the Turks and the Germans” (p. 386). Her companion in the train taking her to Aleppo was Falih Rifki (Atay), a reserve lieutenant and Cemal's private secretary (see note 74). Coming from the eastern provinces, B. Şakir boarded the train at Adana and was introduced to Edib, who until then hadn't known about the nature of his work. Evidently, during the remainder of the trip Şakir had narrated the details of his extermination work in the eastern provinces, because Edib's reaction is recorded thus: “I am saddened that you [Rifki] got me to shake the hand of a murderer” (katil). In reflecting upon this reaction Rifki also deplores Şakir's obsession with the idea of “wiping out [yoketmek] the Armenians for the purpose of preventing the future formation of an Armenia.” While subscribing to the view that the Armenians were aiding and abetting the Russians, he condemns the enactment of “genocide” (his word) as a means of retaliation, adding that Sakir was after all “a committee man” (komitact). Falih Rifki admits nevertheless that without that “genocide” Turkey would have confronted today an Armenia in the eastern provinces (Dünya, December 17, 1967).Google ScholarHe later repeats this point in another work: “What a pity that without the Armenian tragedy Atatürk's National Pact movement wouldn't have been able to gain a foothold” (Çcankaya [Istanbul, 1980], p. 450).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Türkei 183, vol. 43, A18979, June 26, 1916, report. On his part, Austria's Saloniki Consul-General in a “secret” report of February 20, 1912, describes H. Kâzim as a top adviser to Ittihad's secret Saloniki branch (PA 38/415, Zl:35).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ The personal accounts of Hasan were published in three installments in the Itilafist Turkish daily Alemdar in the second half of June 1919. They reappeared in French translation in the July 8, 11, and 16, 1919, issues of Renaissance as well as in the Armenian dailies in abridged form. Hasan felt constrained to relate his own experiences when Süleyman Nazif (of whom more later) declared in an editorial that the government was not responsible for the fate befalling the Armenians: Hadisat, April 5, 1919. Hasan retorted, the following day, “Then who killed hundreds of thousands of Armenians? Forget the terms ‘deportations,'‘massacres,' and say ‘the decision to exterminate the Armenians” (Alemdar, April 6, 1919). Subjected to a barrage of insults and threats following the publication of Hasan's memoirs, Alemdar suspended the rest of the installments, with Hasan promising to publish the entire series in a separate book. He declared, “This country doesn't have the guts to face the truth”Google Scholar (Alemdar, July 5, 1919).Google ScholarHis statement about the forced mass conversion of Armenian orphans is verified by the writer Edib, Halide, who denounced it as “wrong” (The Turkish Ordeal [New York, London, 1928], p. 16).Google ScholarHasan placed the number of Armenians deported at 1 million, and those who ended up in the deserts, at 200,000–250,000 (Akşam, January 26, 1955, interview,Google Scholar cited in Necefzade, Yakub Kenan, 1908–1918 Sultan Ikinci Abdülhamid ve Ittihad-ü-Terakki [Istanbul, 1967], pp. 96–97. His deposition with the British is in FO 371/6501, folio 47 (547), Tahsin file, p. 11).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Nedim, Mustafa, Hai Yegernu. Eem Vugayouliounnerus [The Armenian Genocide. My testimony], trans. by Shaldjia, A. S. (Cairo, 1925), pp. 90, 100.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ FO 608/108/5749, March 4, 1919, General Headquarters Intelligence Summary, p. 2;Google Scholar Nazif “was forced to cover his nose against the smell of putrid corpses” (TV, 3540, p. 8, ref. to investigative loose papers, p. 6).

⁸¹ Türkei 183, vol. 38, A23991, enclosure to No. 81, July 27, 1915, report.Google Scholar

⁸² The officer was Armin Wegner, who served in the Dardanelles in 1915 and was later assigned to the Headquarters of the Sixth Army in Mesopotamia in October 1915, traversing the Istanbul- Baghdad stretch twice during 1915–1916. Upon his return to Berlin, he issued an open letter to President Wilson imploring him to take charge of the martyred Armenian nation. In narrating his experiences he provided graphic details of the atrocities, some of which were deleted in the publication of the English version on account of their most gruesome nature. His appeal, titled ‘Ein Vermächtnis in der Wüste” [A Desert Legacy], was first published in Berliner Tageblatt, No. 86, February 23, 1919;Google Scholar see also Türkei 183, vol. 55, A5773.

⁸³ FO 371/5091, E14130, folio 32, Malta, October 19, 1920.Google Scholar For a similar admission of massacres by Aintab Deputy Ali, from Malta, see FO 371/50908/E11188, folio 142.

⁸⁴ Paşa, Cemal, Hatiralar, Cemal, Behcet, ed. (Istanbul, 1977), p. 443.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Orel and Yuca, Ermenilerce, pp. 21, 84–86; Ataöv, The Andonian Documents, p. 13.

⁸⁶ A surviving Armenian physician, Dr. Nakashian, who was instrumental for Nuri's arrest and prosecution, describes A. Nuri as “trembling and sobbing before the judge”; 20 witnesses were at hand to testify against him, including Ihsan, the Governor of Kilis, to whom Nuri had confided that the real intent of deportations was “the destruction of the Armenians” (imha). Nuri was on the verge of being condemned to death on the gallows, but his brother, Yusuf Kemal Tengirşek (then Economics Minister in M. Kemal's Ankara government and eight months later Foreign Minister, replacing Bekir Sami) reportedly sent the Armenian Bishop of Kastamonu to Istanbul with an ultimatum: Should Nuri be convicted, the brother would see to it that the 2,000–3,000 Armenian survivors in his area were massacred in retaliation. Yusuf Kemal mentions in his memoirs receiving a letter from his brother, informing him of Nuri's arrest and pending charges. These details are provided in Krieger, Aram Andonianee, pp. 234–35; the Bishop's intervention is also briefly mentioned in the memoirs of the Armenian Patriarch, who was apprised of Ankara's initiative (Arkyepiscopos, Zaven, Badriarkagan Housherus. Vaverakirner yev Vugayoutiunner [My Patriarchal Memoirs. Documents and Testimonies] [Cairo, 1947], p. 102.Google Scholar A. Nuri's letter to his brother is mentioned in Tengirşek, Vatan Hizmerinde, p. 182).

⁸⁷ FO 371/6503, E631 1, folio 34, June 1, 1921.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ FO 371/6500, folio 119(386), July 26, 1920.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ FO 371/5090/E7334, folio 51, June 15, 1920, communication.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ FO 371/6501, p. 4, folio 540/40.Google Scholar

⁹¹ FO 371/6504, folios 136 and 146, and FO 371/6504/E10023, folio 97.

⁹² FO 371/6504/E10411.

⁹³ Türkei 183, vol. 41, A4215, February 9, 1916, report;Google Scholar see also Borschaft Konstanrinopel 172, No. 366, folio 148.

⁹⁴ Arkyepiscopos, Zaven, Badriarkagan, pp. 71–72, 92;Google ScholarFO 371/6500, folio 77/344; Orel, and Yuca, identify him as Mülkiye Müfeuisi Mihran Boyaciyan (Ermenilerce, pp. 93, 201).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ The nurse was Grisell McLaren; her account is in Grace Knapp, H., The Tragedy of Bitlis (New York, Chicago, London, Edinburgh, 1919), pp. 130–31. When Abdülhalik was transferred to Aleppo, Memduh, the governor of Erzincan, was assigned to Abdülhalik's post at Bitlis and was “proud of the fact that he [Abdülhalik] had cleaned out the Christian population of Erzincan”Google Scholar (Ibid, pp. 130–31). Upon his release from Malta, Abdülhalik, who was Talat's brother-in-law, blended himself in the Kemalist movement and was promptly appointed Governor of Izmir in the wake of the capture, sacking, and burning of that port city in 1922. In the course of the subsequent, formative years of the Turkish Republic he had a meteoric rise in the government, consecutively becoming Minister of Finance, Education, and War.

⁹⁶ See note 47. Armenian accounts of the atrocities in Bitlis province, particularly Muş City and Muş Plain, are numerous. One of them may be cited here as epitomizing the special treatment that was inflicted upon the Armenian population of that province—namely, its destruction on location. The victims, estimated at 70,000–80,000, were mostly burned alive in large haylofts and stables. This is how the Armenian Catholic Bishop of Trabzon describes one instance of burning. “Having gathered together 1000 little children, Governor Mustafa Abdülhalik led them to a place called Taşhod where he had them burnt to death in the presence of notables and Turkish crowds, at the same time shouting at the top of his voice, ‘It is necessary to erase once and for all the Armenian name in these provinces for the security of Turkey.' The children were afterwards thrown into ditches prepared beforehand for them especially; the moans of those not yet completely consumed could be heard for days” (Les mémoires de Msgr. Jean Naslian [Vienna, 1955], Vol. I, p. 146, note 62). Page 138 of this same work describes the burning alive in Noren, near Muş of the Catholic Primate of Muş Referring to the same procedure at Muş, the Swedish nurse Alma Johansson, who was running the German orphanage there, reported that the Armenian orphans, along with the staff of the orphanage, “were burnt alive” [lebendig verbrannt] (Türkei 183, vol. 48, A34435, October 1, 1917 report). De Nogales, the Venezuelan officer with the title Inspector General of the Turkish Forces in Armenia, operating in the Van and Bitlis provinces, mentions in his memoirs the holocaust of the Armenians in the Muş area where some of the victims, involving “women and children were penned up and burned alive…” (See note 34 for the reference; the citation is on p. 135). Third Army Commander General Vehib's testimony that “Armenian women and children were burnt alive in the village Tchurig, located 5 kilometres north of Muş” was described in the section dealing with Sakir and was covered in n. 47. In the provinces of Erzurum, Harput, Diyarbekir, and Aleppo—the latter being the final destination for those victims who survived the ordeals of the deportation trek—the practice of burning alive the victims was similarly applied, though less systematically. An illustration may be in order. In a memorandum to the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, dated January 31, 1921, Sahag Mesrob, an Armenian lawyer, informing the Patriarch of his lawsuit against the Police Chief of Der Zor, Mustafa Sidki, describes a microcosm of a holocaust in that infernal location where the final scenes of the Final Solution of the Armenian Question were mercilessly enacted: “On October 9, 1916, Mustafa Sidki ordered to pile great stacks of wood and split 200 cans of petroleum on the whole stack. He lighted it and then had 2,000 orphans, bound hands and feet, thrown into the pyre” (Jerusalem Armenian Parriarchate Archive, Series 13, File L, nos. 323–39; the incident is described on p. 5 of the Memo, i.e., No. L330). The noted scholar Bernard Lewis, presumably in recognition of this practice of burning alive, saw fit to describe the Armenian experience as “the terrible holocaust of 1916, when a million and a half Armenians perished”Google Scholar (The Emergence of Modern Turkey [London, Toronto, New York, 1961], p. 350). The testimony of Hasan Maruf, a lieutenant of the Ottoman army, is more graphic: “In August 1915, on my return from Zaart [Siirt], [I saw] in a village of the suburbs of Muş how 500 Armenians, mostly women and children, were herded up in a stable and locked in. The gendarmes threw flaming torches through an opening in the ceiling. They were all burnt alive. I did not go near, but I distinctly saw the flames and heard the screams of the poor victims”Google Scholar (FO 371/2781/264888, Appendix B, p. 6).

⁹⁷ FO 371/6500/E3375, folio 284/15 deals with the March 16 Agreement; on the “all for all” condition, see FO 371/6509, p. 2, folio 47.

⁹⁸ FO 371/6509, folios 122–23.

⁹⁹ FO 371/5091/E16080, folio 85. In announcing this escape the British Foreign Office noted that the first two “have broken parole”; on the occasion of the subsequent escape of the 16, the Office wondered out loud “how little Turkish sense of honor can be relied on” (FO 371/6509/E10662, folio 159).

¹⁰⁰ Şimşir, Bilal, Malta Sürgünleri (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 451–60.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ FO 371/7882/E4425, folio 182. This attitude is evident in the remark General Campbell inserted in his letter to Lloyd George, whom he was pressuring for the release from Turkish custody of his son Captain Campbell. The latter had written to his father the following remark, repeated to Lloyd George, “I am more valuable than any of these miserable Turks” (FO 371/6509/E8562, folio 13). It is equally significant that one of the Turkish internees gleefully stated after his release that the British were duped by “a sly trick” of the Ankara government whose “British prisoners” to be exchanged included “six Maltese laborers and their Greek wives and children” (Yalman, Ahmed E., Turkey in My Time [Norman, Okla., 1956], pp. 106–7).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Talat's November 18 cipher (No. 11 in Table 2) clearly outlines these procedures of camouflage and deflection intended for the benefit of the American Consuls. He is instructing the deportation officials to be careful about the real intent of the deportations, to avoid attracting attention when carrying out that intent through “the known measures” (tedabiri mâlüme), and to “create the conviction among foreigners” (kanaatinin tevlidi için) that the aim of “deportation” is nothing but “relocation” (tebdili mekân).

¹⁰³ See note 40. It is ironic that as British Ambassador to the Third Reich, the same Henderson on August 25, 1939, relayed to London without comment a summary version of Hitler's notorious speech of August 22, in which Hitler purportedly is exhorting his generals not to be concerned about the adverse consequences of his plans of extermination against Poland. In that speech, there is a reference to the Armenian massacres, and to Hitler's allowing that that episode of destruction had been consigned to oblivion (“Wer redet noch von der Vernichtung der Armenier?”) For a detailed examination of the reasons warranting the truth-value of this statement, and the circumstances of Henderson conveying the speech to London, see Baumgart, Winfried, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung,” Vierteljahreshefre für Zeirgeschichte, 16, 2 (1968), pp. 121–22, 138–39.Google ScholarFor a similar reference by Hitler to “the extermination” (“Ausrouung”) of the Armenians, see Calic, Edouard, Ohne Maske (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 101. For the primary source of Henderson's communication to London see the Henderson file in FO 800/270, No. 39/85, folios 288–91. A monograph, just published, examines in detail the circumstances surrounding Hitler's August 22, 1939, reference to the Armenians to verify its authenticity:Google ScholarBardakjian, K. B., Hitler and the Armenian Genocide, Zoryan Institute Special Report Number 3 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 3–24.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Writing in the wake of the Turkish Armistice, while Seeckt was proceeding home with his German complement of officers via Odessa on the Black Sea., Seeckt explains the gap between official Turkish postures and unofficially held secret positions. In his essay on “The Causes of the Turkish Collapse” (Die Gründe des Zusammenbruchs der Türkei, dated November 4, 1918) Seeckt injects “the unhappy Armenian Question” when discussing Turkish rabid nationalism and methods of Turkish command and control. “Openly conveyed orders upholding official Turkish policy were followed by secret instructions [geheime Weisungen], or by intimations [Andeutungen] that their execution was being discounted [auf ihre Ausführung nichi gerechnet wurde]” (Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv-Freiburg im Breisgau, N247/202c, Nachlaβ Seeckt.Google ScholarThe full text of the essay is reproduced in Wallach, Jehuda L., Anatomie einer Militärhilfe. Die preuβisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei, 1835–1919 [Düsseldorf, 1976 ], PP. 258–71, remark on Armenians, p. 260).Google Scholar Ambassador Metternich complained to German Chief of Staff Falkenhayn that War Minister Enver's order to suspend the deportation of Baghdad Railway Armenian work details was “countermanded” [Gegenbefehl]. The message was relayed through Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow on July 2, 1916 (Groβes Haupiquartier 194, Türkei 41/1 cipher No. 763, folio 141). U.S. Consul Jackson on August 19, 1915, informed Ambassador Morgenthau that the anti-Armenian measures amount to “a gigantic plundering scheme as well as a final blow to extinguish the race, notwithstanding the existence of a Commission appointed by the Government to safeguard the interests of the Armenians.” He then went on to state that, “On the 17th instant an order arrived from the Minister of the Interior to permit the Armenian Protestants to remain where they were, but on the 18 another order came that all Armenians without distinction should be deported” (Record Group 59, 807.4016/148, enclosure in Ambassador Morgenthau's August 30, 1915 report). German Consul Büge, reacting vehemently to Talat's assurances, informs Interim Ambassador Hohenlohe that Talat's order “was subsequently rescinded [nachher diese Verfügung aufgehoben]”Google Scholar (Türkei 183, vol. 38, A27578, September 14, 1915, report). Mehmed Ali, former District Commissioner of Üsküdar, testified at the fifteenth sitting of the Yozgad Court Martial series (March 27, 1919) that secret orders followed official orders of deportation, to the effect that the latter were to be disregarded, and that the deportees were to be exterminated. At the fourth sitting of the same trial series (February 11, 1919) Yozgad Deputy Şakir testified to “secret” orders decreeing the extermination of the Armenians, orders about which he personally had complained to Talat in Istanbul, only to be accused of “incompetence.”Google Scholar (These last two items were culled from local dailies covering the trials, in particular Jhamang, March 29; Renaissance February 12; and Le Courier de Turquie, February 14, 1919 issues.)Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Atay, Falih Rifki, Zeytindaği, pp. 24–25. Relating his experiences in Aleppo, Mustafa Nedim (see n. 79) wrote that Enver's and Talat's orders to the governors “were routinely countermanded through coded messages… I know this too well,” pp. 102–3.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Beside the transcripts of the Courts Martial, there was another official publication that summarized the hearings of the Fifth Committee of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies (Meclisi Mebusan Beşinci Şube Tahkikat Komisyonu). From November 5 to December 11, 1918, the Committee conducted 14 hearings, interrogating 15 ministers, including two şeyhülislams. In the course of its inquiries, the Committee secured a number of top-secret documents that eventually were transmitted to the Courts Martial. The Grand Vezir Said Halim three times in a single sentence conceded the fact of “the Armenian massacres,” without adding the twin term “deportation.” Referring to Talat's concealments and cover-ups, Said Halim also admitted to the practice of translating orders for “deportation” into orders for “killing.” Furthermore, alluding to the Special Organization, he declared that it was “an evil” outfit, and was created without the decision of the government (Meclisi Mebusan Zabitlari, Üçuncü Meclis, No. 521 [Istanbul, 1918];Google Scholarfor the abridged version see Harb Kabinelerinin Isticvabz [Istanbul, 1933], pp. 285, 287, 290, 293–94, 308).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ The issue of premeditation needs to be understood in the broader context of the history of the Ittihad party, which from its very inception secretly pursued Turkism while pretending to multiethnic Ottomanism. After alluding to the pivotal role of Nazim and Şakir in the pursuit of this ideology, Akşin discerns a connection between the violent nationalism that evolved and gripped Ittihad, and the Armenian deportations (Akşin, Sina, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ye luihat ve Terakki [Istanbul, 1980], pp. 54, 159). Speaking of the Special Organization, Stoddard likewise asserted that “it rested on the concepts of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism, although, like the governmental authorities responsible for.it, the organization's agents paid lip service to the traditional concept of Ottomanism”Google Scholar (Stoddard, Ottoman Government, pp. 54–55). In the pre-1908 negotiations between Ittihad and the Dashnag party, the issue of decentralization and local administrative autonomy, bitterly opposed by Ittihad, emerged and remained a discordant note, casting an abiding shadow over the relationship of the two parties. Neither their cooperation in the overthrow of Hamid nor their mutual assistance in the securing and defense of the Constitutional regime could overcome the ensuing tensions that separated the two parties. Aggravated by Ittihad's inability and/or unwillingness to carry out the promised reforms in the eastern provinces, the impasse seemed to defy remedy. The conflict that developed was abetted in no small measure by Nazim and Şakir's bad faith, if not outright deceptive gimmickry. Three letters produced by two Turkish historians demonstrate the secret intentions of these two pioneers of Ittihad. On September 22, 1906—i.e., a year before the 1907 joint Young Turk-Dashnak Congress of Paris—Nazim and Şakir, in a letter to “our Azerbaidjani brothers in the Caucasus,” together advised the addressees to join hands with the Armenians in opposing the Russian government, “your greatest enemy.” They then injected this counterpoint: “The Armenians can later be brought on to the right course in as much as the Muslims are in the majority.” In a January 3, 1908, letter Şakir told his cohorts in Çanakkale that one reason for Ittihad's cooperation with the Armenians was to profit (isifade etmek) from their resources. In yet another letter (December 8, 1907), Şakir informed the Saloniki branch of Ittihad that the agreements reached with the Armenians were meant “to benefit us [gemini menafi]. Once we are in power it will then be easy to teach a lesson to those seeking administrative autonomy” (Bayur, , Türk Inkilâbi, Tarihi, vol. 2, part 4 [Ankara, 1952], pp. 87, 126, 129–30).Google Scholar Similar letters are contained in Kuran, Ahmed Bedevi, Inkilâp Tarihimiz ye Inihad ye Terakki (Istanbul, 1948), pp. 209–29. In one of these letters dated June 11, 1907, Şakir is accusing the Armenian revolutionaries of wanting to establish an Armenian state to be carved out of the territory of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 228–29. Commenting on the December 8, 1907 letter, Bayur interprets it to mean that as far as Ittihad was concerned the agreements with the Armenians were worthless. Amazed at the foolishness of committing such thoughts to writing, he allows that Ittihad must have been sanguine about the letters' remaining secret. In an editorial written during the Armistice, the noted opposition paper Alemdar berated the Armenians for having supported Ittihad. “The Dashnaks and Ittihad were one political party. Vartkes [the Dashnak leader] and Talat drank from one cup. But the bandit clique later executed him and the Armenians … a terrible punishment for their mistake” (translated in Jhamanag, April 27, 1919). The destruction of the Armenians appears to be presaged in the last (Dec. 8, 1907) of these three letters, which constitute rarely available primary sources. Touching on the ingredient of premeditation, Bayur concedes that, exasperated with the tribulations of discord with the Armenians, Ittihad would eventually solve the problem by force of arms, i.e., using the Army [işi ordu ile görmek]Google Scholar (Bayur, Türk Inkilâbi, Tarihi, vol. 2, part 4, p. 13).

¹⁰⁸ A leader of the Special Organization, ostensibly one of Şakir's lieutenants, published his memoirs in installments in the Turkish daily Vakit over a period of some six months; in them he reveals details on the workings of that outfit that are not published anywhere else. His accounts include verbatim reproductions of some of Şakir's secret telegrams to Talat and even a reference to a December 5, 1914, personal letter to Şakir's wife. Two revelations deserve foremost attention: (1) Before setting out for Istanbul in February 1915 Şakir convened in Erzurum a meeting of his top aides in which it was decided to make the Special Organization East an autonomous body for the purpose of devising strategy and tactics, and for having ultimate control over the celes to be employed in the East (installment No. 88); and (2) he was subsequently able to persuade his cohorts in Istanbul that the Special Organization had to shift its operations from the external to the internal front, involving the Armenians (installment No. 83). A September 3, 1914 cipher exposes Şakir as ordering the ambush and destruction of the Dashnak delegates who were returning to their cities from their Eighth quadrennial Congress in Erzurum (installments 12 and 13). The evidence the author believes to be adducing for demonstrating Armenian sabotage against the Turkish war effort is patently false, however. “Combat Instructions” [Mardagan Hurahankner] spread over several installments of the series, as an example of such evidence, were actually printed at the turn of the century, and were used against the regime of Hamid, to overthrow which the Ittihad and Dashnak parties had joined hands. It is also revealed that General Vehib intended to imprison and prosecute Şakir (installment 69) (Bil, A., “Umimi Harpte Teşilati Mahsusa,” Vaki, November 2, 1933–February 7, 1934; the rest, dealing with operations in the Balkans, appears in the subsequent issues of that paper). The Armenian daily in Paris, Haraich, whose installments are used here as a source, published these memoirs day by day in Armenian, starting with November 19, 1933, and ending with the April 7, 1934, issue, V. Ishkhanian being the translator. It is likely that “A. Bil” is a pseudonym, and considering the autobiographical hints supplied in installments 2, 14, 38, 46, and 88, the real author must be Cemal Fend, nicknamed hamallar kehyasi, who was one of Istanbul's five Responsible Secretaries; he was cited in the indictment read out at the Court Martial in 1919, and was subsequently exiled to Malta as a prima facie suspect in the Armenian massacres. The British Blue Book describes him in that roleGoogle Scholar (Bryce [Toynbee], Treatmern. doc. No. 56, p. 233). One final reference may be in order. Although focusing on the Special Organization's role in some of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Stoddard also offered some general comments on the overall mission of that organization. He stated that combating “internal foes” was part of its scheme: It meant “to ride herd on all separatist and nationalist groups.” Fear of a future independent Armenia “carved out of Ottoman territory” was an important factor in strategy. The political Directorate of the organization included Nazim, Şakir, Public Security Chief Canbolat, and Midhat Şukrü, Ittihad's Secretary-General. Agreeing that it “was a secret, rather disreputable group,” Stoddard believes that the excesses of the organization were intended to be explained away by blaming “groups of brigands” too distant to be susceptible to any control by authorities (Stoddard, Ottoman Government, pp. 5–6, 49–50, 54–56.

¹⁰⁹ In No. 5 there is the exhortation to have no scruples in the application of destructive means; in Nos. 8 and 45 is contained the assurance that cruelties and atrocious behavior will not be subject to prosecution; in No. 25 is a categorical order to have the infants collectively exterminated “without arousing suspicion, and through the exercise of circumspection [tarflh olarak], using the reassuring excuse that they are being taken to a place where they can be fed by deportation officials”; and in No. 35 it is declared, “The only way you can assist in the attainment of the goal we are pursuing is the severity and swiftness with which the deportees are to be dispatched… The current weekly lists showing the number of the dead are not satisfactory.” Because of their extraordinary importance the texts of the remaining two ciphers are being offered below in their entirety. No. 29. “Following an investigation, it has been established that only 10% of the Armenians, subjected to general deportation, is reaching its destination, with the rest succumbing to such natural causes as hunger and sickness incurred on the roads during the trek. You are directed to apply severe measures towards these survivors in order to effect a similar result.” No. 4. “All rights of the Armenians to live and work in the territories of Turkey have been completely cancelled. Assuming full responsibility, the government has ordered to end even the lives of babes in the cradle. The results of this order have already been attained in a few provinces. Nevertheless, for reasons unknown to us, exceptions are being made for certain people who are being sent on to Aleppo instead of being deported straight to their places of destination. The government is thus coming face to face with an additional difficulty. Disregarding their excuses, remove them, be they women or children, or whatever they may be, even those who are incapable of moving. Prevent their being protected by the people who, out of ignorance, treat material interests as a higher priority than patriotic feelings, and are unable to appreciate the grand policy pursued by the government in this regard. Given the fact that the operations of indirect extermination—severity, speed, travel difficulties, misery—, that have been carried out in other places, can be implemented there directly, work heartily. General orders have been issued from the War Ministry to all Army Commanders to the effect that the military post commanders [nokta komandam] are not to interfere in the affairs of deportation. Inform the officials to be appointed for this end that they must work for the realization of our goal, without being afraid of responsibility. Please send weekly cipher reports on the results of your operations.” This pivotal order gave the Governor of Aleppo, Mustafa Abdülhalik, license in the treatment of the surviving deportees. Finally, reference may be made to an American-trained sociologist who served as a journalist during the war, was exiled to Malta by the British as a dangerous nationalist editor, and had there intimate exchanges with top Ittihadist leaders. Referring to “the policy of general extermination,” he described the Ittihadist rationale as follows: “A dense Armenian population in the Eastern Provinces has proved to be a danger to the very existence of Turkey… [T]he instruments to remove this danger… shall be universally despised and condemned. Only in a very distant future” would this sacrifice for the national cause be appreciated (Emin, Ahmed [Yalman], Turkey in the World War [New Haven, 1930], p. 220). For a similar comment by Falih Rifki Atay with special reference to Şakir see note 76.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ U.S. National Archives, Record Group 867.4016/299. Lansing articulated this position of the United States government in a November 1, 1916, cipher to Josef C. Grew, American Chargé in Berlin, instructing him to seek the support of the German Foreign Affairs Minister in interceding on behalf of the Armenians, with their ally, Imperial Turkey. On November 4, 1916, Grew complied, repeating word for word Lansing's decrial of the Turkish Government's measures of extermination to Jagow, the German Foreign Affairs Minister (Türkei 183, vol. 45, A3001 I).

¹¹¹ The statement was published in the March 13, 1919, issue of the French daily Le Moniteur Oriental, and the March 15, 1919, issue of Alemdar. Incensed that the Minister had dared to make such a revelation “to a non-Muslim journalist…, about the number of Armenians killed,” some editors inveighed against him, with Süleyman Nazif declaring, “This act is not worthy of a Muslim minister” (Hadisat, March 17, 1919). Others, however, praised him for clarifying an important point through his “authoritative” disclosure (Ikdam, Vakit, March 15, 1919). Under the heading “The Courage to Redress a Mistake” (Hatadan dönmek cesareti), Vakit wrote, “Cemal is anxious to cleanse the bloody past.” To mollify his critics, on March 16 Cemal hedged, stating that he was misunderstood: The actual figure was a total of 900,000, which included the dead and the survivors (Alemdar, March 18, 1919). The editors of the Moniteurs three days later retorted that they were sticking to the 800,000 figure for the accuracy of which they vouched, and that there was no misunderstanding at all. Memleket and the semiofficial Alemdar supported this reaffirmation by Moniteur, the latter adding that in releasing his original figure “the Minister had relied upon statistics compiled by appropriate authorities” (quoted in Jhogovourtee Tzain, March 19, 1919). Cemal's effort to soft-pedal the shock caused by his disclosure proved futile. Yielding to pressures including the Sultan's displeasure, he resigned on April 7, 1919 (Alemdar, Vakit, Le Courier de Turquie, April 8, 1919;Google ScholarMorning Post [London], April 14, 1919;Google ScholarTürkgeldi, Ali Fuad, Görüp Işittiklerim, 2nd ed. [Ankara, 1951, p. 197). Cemal had a long-standing career in Ottoman civil service. He was Sub- Governor at Yaffa, Governor of Izmit, Governor of Harput (where he was replaced by Sabit due to his resistance to Talat's anti-Armenian policy), and at the time of his appointment as Interior Minister he was Governor of Konya. Contemporary Turkish authors continue to berate him for what they consider to be his treachery.Google ScholarBayar, Celal, president of the Turkish republic 1950–1960, denounced Cemal's act as “the ugliest and most unnecessary disclosure” (Ben de Yazdim, vol. 7, [Istanbul, 1969], p. 2,114). The noted historian Bayur decried the former Minister for supplying “to our enemies proof and weapons [kanit ye silah]”Google Scholar (Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, Atatürk. Hayati ve Eseri [Ankara, 1963], p. 268). Not only do these vehement reactions attest to the significance of the disclosure made, but more importantly, they accent the substance of that disclosure, which the authors do not challenge and about which nothing is said. Referring to “the official reports of the Turkish Government,” to which government he had access as head of the American Military Mission, Major General James Harbord declared that 1.I million Armenians were deported, concluding that the count of “the dead from this wholesale attempt at the race … is about 800,000,” and that the episode represents “the most colossal crime of all the ages”Google Scholar (Harbord, James G., “Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia,” International Conciliation, 151 [06 1920], pp. 280–81). As recently as December 1979, “a representative of the Turkish Republic” at Paris was reported to have admitted that “we Turks have massacred I million Armenians” (from an article by Can Pulak in the December 30, 1979, issue of Günaydin, quoted in the Boston Armenian daily Baikar, January 16, 1980). The admission was made to the widow of Yilmaz Çopan, an official of the Turkish Embassy at Paris who was assassinated by an Armenian on December 22, 1979.Google Scholar

¹¹² Dadrian, Vahakn N., “A Typology of Genocide,” International Review of Modern Sociology, 5, 2 (Autumn 1975), pp. 201–12.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Memoirs of Count Bernstorff, trans. from the German by Sutton, Eric (New York, 1936), pp. 176, 180, 374. For another reference to solving the Armenian question see the discussion on Nazim, pp. 328–29 above. The Metternich description of Talat is in Türkei 183, vol. 40, A36184, December 7, 1915, report. It should be noted that in a rare, confessional mood Talat during the war had revealed his premonition of a violent death in an interview with the Turkish feminist writer Halide Edib by saying, “I am ready to die for what I have done, and 1 know that I shall die for it”Google Scholar (Memoirs of Halide Edib, p. 387). For a similar utterance of guilt see n. 20. Talat was indeed assassinated on March 15, 1921, in Berlin where he was living incognito and under the fictitious name Mehmed Sâi. Tehlirian, the Armenian student charged with the murder, was on June 3, 1921, acquitted by a Berlin-Moabit District Court jury, which, following a one-hour deliberation, found Tehlirian not guilty on grounds of temporary insanity as provided by Article 51 of the German Penal Code. For details of the trial see note 29. Finally, it is most significant that, while serving as German Ambassador to the United States (1908–1917), Bernstorff categorically denied the massacres when they had already run their course, describing them as “the alleged atrocities” and “pure invention” (September 28, 1915, issues of The Washington Post and The New York Times).