¹ Safran, Nadav, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967 (New York, 1969).Google Scholar

² Burrowes, Robert and Muzzio, Douglas, “The Road to the Six Day War: Aspects of an Enumerative History of Four Arab States and Israel, 1965–1967,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (06 1972), 211–226;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Virginia Lee Lassier, and Dale Tahtinen, “Conflict Interactions in the Middle East, 1949–1967,” ibid., pp. 135–154.

³ Burrowes, Robert and Garriga-Pico, Jose, “The Road to the Six Day War: Relational Analysis of Conflict and Cooperation,” Papers, Peace Science Society (International), 22 (1974), 47–74;Google ScholarWilkenfeld, Jonathan, “Models for the Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior Between States,” in Russett, Bruce, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1972).Google Scholar Research in this milieu has been somewhat hampered by statistical problems of multicollinearity and dynamic change. While the foreign war/domestic unrest linkage is one of the very rewarding areas for further inquiry, it is also one of the comparatively few areas where the richness and complexity of the theoretical hypotheses are greater than the seeming availability of stastistical techniques to reliably test the insights.

⁴ Blechman, Barry M., “The Impact of Israel's Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (06 1972), 155–181;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Edward E. Azar, “Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez, 1956,” ibid., pp. 183–201.

⁵ Forecasting is of growing interest within the international relations field. See for instance Azar, Edward, Bennett, James P. and Sloan, Thomas J., “Steps toward Forecasting International Interactions”, The Papers of the Peace Science Society (International), 23 (1974), 27–67;Google ScholarRummel, R. J., “Forecasting International Relations: A Proposed Investigation of Three-mode Factor Analysis,” Technological Forecasting, (1969);CrossRefGoogle ScholarYoung, R. A., “Prediction and Forecasting in International Relations: Some Theoretical Issues,” World Event/Interaction Survey Report 5, University of Southern California, 1970;Google ScholarTanter, R., “Explanation, Prediction, and Forecasting in International Politics,” in Rosenau, J. N., Davis, V., and East, M. A., eds., The Analysis of International Politics (New York, 1972), PP. 41–57;Google ScholarSchon, D., “Forecasting and Technological Forecasting,” Daedalus, 96 (Summer 1967), pp. 759–769;Google ScholarChoucri, N., “Forecasting in International Relations: Problems and Prospects,” International Interactions, Vol. 1, 1974.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Burrowes, and Muzzio, , “The Road to the Six Day War,” pp. 211–226.Google Scholar

⁷ Doran, Charles F., Pendley, R. E., and Antunes, G. E., “A Test of Cross-National Event Reliability: Global Versus Regional Data Sources,” International Studies Quarterly, 17 (06 1973), 175–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ The Middle-East Instability and Cooperation Research Operation (MICRO) was conceived as an attempt to focus upon the dynamics of a single war, the June War of 1967, and to code its processes as intensively and completely as possible. Thus for a thirteen-week period, using regional data sources, the MICRO project encompasses a far larger variety of events and actions relating to a single war than do most macro-studies. Micro-analysis sacrifices temporal breadth for empirical depth, a trade-off with both negative and positive consequences.

In conception MICRO is indebted to a number of earlier data efforts. Middle East projects by Edward Azar (Conflict and Peace Data Bank [COPDAB]), Robert Burrowes (Middle East Cooperation and Conflict Analysis [MECCA]), and Jonathan Wilkenfeld were of particular assistance regarding the choice of coding categories and event-types. The older data collections by Russett, Bruce et al. (World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964]),Google Scholar C. A. McClelland (World Event/Interaction Survey [WEIS]), and Banks, A. S. and Textor, R. B. (A Cross-Polity Survey [Cambridge: MIT Press])Google Scholar were helpful guides to the design of the archive, as were the more specialized conflict data banks assembled by the Feierabends, Rudolph Rummel (Dimensionalities of Nations [DON]), Gurr, Ted, and Singer, and Small, . Taylor, C. L. and Hudson's, M. C.World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972),Google Scholar was especially useful regarding techniques of data handling. The Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project sponsored jointly by the National Science Foundation and the Mershon Center at Ohio State University provided insight into differences in verbal and nonverbal behavior among carefully delineated subgroups. Finally, personal experience in assembling and analyzing a 3,000-event conflict data bank for the Caribbean area eased the construction of MICRO.

⁹ Schleifer, Abdullah, The Fall of Jerusalem (New York and London, 1972), p. 105.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 101.

¹¹ Note, e.g., the precise but not overly fine delineation of the CREON verbal data into categories involving evaluation, desire, and intent (Hermann, Charles F., “Comparing the Foreign Policy Events of Nations,” in Kegley, Charles W. Jr., et al. , eds., International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy [Columbia, S.Ca., 1975], pp. 145–158.Google Scholar In practice a trade-off must exist at some point between increasingly fine code distinctions and increasingly large coder error because of inability on the part of the coder to make reliable judgments. Where this trade-off lies has not yet been determined, although rather simple experiments could and should be designed to identify its nature and dimensions.

¹² For a succinct analysis of selected Arab statements explaining the occurrence of border incidents, see Harkabi, Y., Arab Attitudes to Israel (New York, 1971), pp. 313–316.Google Scholar

¹³ The October 1973 War, for example, caught most of Israeli forces unprepared despite available intelligence information. Aware of the significance of troop movements as an indicator of war, the Egyptians camouflaged their invasion effort by scheduling numerous practice maneuvers well in advance of the canal crossing.

¹⁴ The art and science of indicator construction is most advanced in the field of economics. See Katona, George, Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior (New York, 1951);Google ScholarExpectations, Uncertainty, and Business Behavior, Bowman, Mary Jean, ed., (Chicago: Social Science Research Council, 1958)Google ScholarOkun, Arthur M., “The Value of Anticipations Data in Forecasting National Product,” in The Quality and Economic Significance of Anticipations Data, National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton, 1960), pp. 407–460.Google Scholar

Advocacy of indicator construction elsewhere, however, is not lacking. Bauer, R. A., ed., Social Indicators (Cambridge, 1966);Google ScholarSheldon, E. B. and Freeman, H. E., “Notes on Social Indicators: Promises and Potential,” Policy Sciences, 1 (1970), 97–111;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLand, Kenneth C., “On the Definition of Social indicators,” The American Sociologist, 6 (11 1971), 322–325;Google ScholarWilcox, Leslie D. et al. , Social Indicators and Societal Monitoring: An Annotated Bibliography (New York, 1972);Google Scholarde Neufville, Judith Innes, Social Indicators and Public Policy: Interactive Processes of Design and Application (New York, 1975).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Bar-Zohar, Michael, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues behind the Six-Day War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), p. 13.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Schleifer, , Fall of Jerusalem, p. 106;Google ScholarSharabi, Hisham, Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (New York, 1969), p. 108.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Kegley, Charles W. Jr., “The Generation and Use of Events Data,” in Kegley, et al. , International Events, pp. 91–105;Google ScholarMcGowan, P. J., ‘A Bayesian Approach to the Problem of Events Data Validity in Comparative and International Political Research,” in Rosenau, J. N., ed., Comparing Foreign Policies (New York, 1974);Google ScholarPhillips, W. R., “Theoretical Underpinnings of the Events Data Movement,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, 1973.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Laqueur, Walter, The Road to War: The Origin and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967/8 (London, 1970), p. 54.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Sharabi, , Palestine and Israel, p. 106;Google ScholarRouleau, Eric et al. , Israel et les Arabes: le 3e combat (Paris, 1967).Google Scholar

²⁰ Schleifer, , Fall of Jerusalem, pp. 104–105.Google Scholar

²¹ Much criticism has been leveled at Secretary General U. Thant for his precipitous withdrawal of UNEF troops. Described as a buffer that failed precisely when it met its first genuine test, UNEF should not have been dismantled so quickly according to suggestions by both some Israelis and some Egyptians, statements that imply that Nasser did not anticipate or necessarily desire an immediate withdrawal. That the United Nations was itself responsible for having created a turning point in the escalation is, however, challenged by Sohn, Louis B., The United Nations in Action (Mineola, N.Y., 1968), pp. 169–193,Google Scholar and by Draper, Theodore, Commentary, 44 (08 1967), 43.Google Scholar A similarly sympathetic interpretation of the Secretary General's role in the crisis is found in Anabtawi, Samir N., “The United Nations and the Middle East Conflict of 1967,” in Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, ed., The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective (Evanston, Ill., 1970), pp. 122–137.Google Scholar

²² Kamel S. Abu-Jaber, “United States Policy toward the June Conflict,” in ibid., pp. 155–168; Khouri, Fred J., The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse, N.Y., 1968), pp. 256–257.Google Scholar

²³ Whetten, Lawrence L., The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 42.Google Scholar

²⁴ Yost, Charles W., “How it Began,” Foreign Affairs 46 (01 1968), 304–320;CrossRefGoogle ScholarStoessinger, John G., Why Nations Go to War (New York, 1974), pp. 196–198.Google Scholar

²⁵ Blechman, , “Impact of Israel's Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel,” pp. 155–181.Google Scholar

²⁶ Azar, , “Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez, 1956,” pp. 183–201.Google Scholar

²⁷ See also North, R. C., “Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis,” Journal of International Affairs, 21 (1967), 16–39;Google ScholarMilburn, T., “The Management of Crises,” in Hermann, C., ed., Contemporary Research in International Crises (New York, 1971).Google Scholar

²⁸ Hurewitz, J. C., “Origins of the Rivalry,” in Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, Hurewitz, , ed. (New York, 1969), pp. l–20;Google ScholarBloomfield, Lincoln C. and Leiss, Amelia C., Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's (New York, 1960);Google ScholarZartman, I. William, “The Mediterranean: Bridge or Barrier?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 93 (02 1967), 63–71.Google Scholar

²⁹ For the most searching expression of the mind and personality of Israel's ruling elite, see Brecher, Michael, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (New Haven, Conn., 1972), pp. 211–369.Google Scholar

³⁰ Krebs, Charles J., Ecology: The Experimental Analysis of Distribution and Abundance (New York, 1972).Google Scholar

³¹ Wilkenfeld, et al. , “Conflict Interactions in the Middle East, 1949–1967,” pp. 135–154;Google ScholarHaas, Ernst B., “Multilateral Incentives for Limiting International Violence,” in The Future of the International Strategic System, Rosecrance, Richard, ed. (San Francisco, Calif., 1972), pp. 151–174;Google ScholarRosenau, James N., “Toward the Study of National-International Linkages,” The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York, 1971), pp. 307–338.Google Scholar

³² Zartman, I. William, “Military Elements in Regional Unrest,” in Hurewitz, , ed., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, p. 76.Google Scholar

³³ Lenczowski, George, “The Arab Cold War,” in The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy, Beling, Willard A., ed. (Albany, New York, 1973), p. 66.Google Scholar

³⁴ Kerr, Malcolm H., “Persistence of Regional Quarrels,” in Huerwitz, , ed., Soviet American Rivalry in the Middle East, p. 240.Google Scholar

³⁵ Wilkenfeld, et al. , “Conflict Interactions in the Middle East, 1949–1967,” pp. 135–154.Google Scholar

³⁶ Burrowes, and Garriga-Pico, , “The Road to the Six Day War: Relational Analysis of Conflict and Cooperation,” pp. 47–74.Google Scholar

³⁷ A further problem confounds judgments regarding the origins of the war, a problem that is inherent in the way dyadic relations are conceived and operationalized. Frequently challenges to one state are in fact indirect challenges to a second; indeed the primary motive for the challenge may be the effect on the second state. Egyptian diplomacy was particularly sensitive to this stratagem. But in coding dyadic relations, one in most cases must take such challenges at face value without unraveling deeper motivations. In so doing one may draw incorrect conclusions about the strength and even the directions of dyadic relations. For example, verbal attacks by Syria on the United States caused by support of Israel are just as informative as verbal attacks on Israel directly. Yet the dyadic approach often ignores the former type of behavior.

Brody, Richard, “Problems in the Measurement and Analysis of International Events” in Kegley, et al. , International Events, pp. 120–134,Google Scholar makes the interesting point that chains of dyadic interaction may be weighted in favor of the response of one partner to aggression and thus may not be symmetric. He notes Toch's findings in Violent Men (Chicago, 1969)Google Scholar that a citizen's response to a policeman's opening move decisively affected the policeman's second move. Hence the policeman's first act and the citizen's responses are considered a single unit of analysis, much as we in this study treat the acts of belligerents as a balanced “unit.” Since our data are also coded dyadically, however, we also have the subsequent option to explore directed relations at the disaggregated level.

The alternative is to explore the behavior of each state toward the undifferentiated system, an alternative which overcomes the problem of underreporting but which itself obscures conclusions regarding the precise target of each behavior.

³⁸ Burrowes, and Muzzio, , “The Road to the Six Day War: Aspects of an Enumerative History of Four Arab States and Israel, 1965–1967,” pp. 211–226.Google Scholar

³⁹ Charles F. Doran, “Origins of Middle East War: Cycles, Indicators, and Forecasts,” forthcoming. Also Doran, , Domestic Conflict in State Relations: The American Sphere of Influence, Sage International Relations Monograph Series (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1975).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Despite preference in the events data literature for ‘profile similarity” over “magnitude,” the latter measure is indispensable in research on the conflict cycle. The use of regional data sources makes the calculation of magnitudes more reliable. Not only the timing of the cycle (which correlation techniques would capture) but the severity of crisis indexed by the magnitude of cycle fluctuation are critical to good forecasts.

⁴¹ Alcock, Norman Z., “An Empirical Measure of Internation Threat: Some Preliminary Implications for the Middle East Conflict,” in Isard, Walter and Wolpert, Julian, eds., The Middle East: Some Basic Issues and Alternatives (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 51–72.Google Scholar

⁴² Laqueur, , The Road to War, p. 60.Google Scholar

⁴³ These are time series equations in which total conflict activity is aggregated across states at each weekly time point. Tests for multicollinearity among the independent variables conditioned the choice of these variables. (The Haitovsky Multicollinearity Test revealed a Chi-square of 9.24 with 10 degrees of freedom.) A Cochrane-Orcutt transformation was done to correct for a very small amount of serial correlation (Rho = .05) yielding a Durbin-Watson Statistic of 1.9, a value well within the acceptable range. In order to check for the presence of dominating variables, a further regression run was done using only the independent variables formal protests and formal warnings. The results were negative, thus adding confidence to the reliability of the general findings. See Wonnacott, Ronald J. and Wonnacott, Thomas H., Econometrics (New York, 1969);Google ScholarRao, Potluri and Miller, Roger Leroy, Applied Econometrics (Belmont, Calif., 1971).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ In this second time series equation multicollinearity was more a problem (Chi-square = 4.66 with 15 degrees of freedom for the Haitovsky Multicollinearity Test) but the determinant of the matrix at a value of .435 was still tolerable. Likewise serial correlation was initially present (Rho = .58) and was corrected by the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation yielding an acceptable value for the Durbin-Watson Statistic of 1.36. A second regression run tested for dominating variables and revealed no statistical complications.

⁴⁵ Azar, Edward E. et al. , “A Quantitative Comparison of Source Coverage for Event Data,” International Studies Quarterly, 16 (09 1972), 373–388;CrossRefGoogle ScholarDoran, et al. , “A Test of Cross-National Event Reliability,” pp. 175–203,Google ScholarBurrowes, Robert, Muzzio, D., and Spector, B., “A Source Comparison Study of Inter-Nation Event Data,” paper presented at the International Studies Association Meeting, San Juan, March 1971.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Samuelson, Paul A., Economics (5th ed.; New York, 1961), p. 285.Google Scholar