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Does The Interpretation of Islamic Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2009
Extract
When discussing the Kuzari of Halevi, Leo Strauss comments in a footnote that “One cannot recall too often this remark of Goethe (in the Noten und Abhandlungen zum besseren Verständnis der West-östlichen Divans): ‘Das eigentliche, einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt — und Menschengeschichte, dem alle übrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der Konflikt des Unglaubens und Glaubens.’” It will be argued here that the influence of such a conflict on Islamic philosophy has been much exaggerated, especially by the highly influential approach that Strauss brings to such a mode of thought and its means of expression.
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I should like to thank Dr. E. I. J. Rosenthal for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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6 See Maimonides's description of the sort of person to whom the Guide for the Perplexed is direcled at the start of that work.
7 Fārābī quotes from a letter from Aristotle to Plato, in which Aristotle is supposed to defend his practice of committing his teaching to writing in unenigmatic writing in this way: “If I have written down these sciences and the wisdom contained in them, I have arranged them in such an order that only those qualified for them can attain them.” See his Jam'bayna ra' yay al-hakīmain Aflātūn al-ilāhī wa Aristūtālīs, ed. Nader, A. N. (Beirut, 1960), p. 85.Google Scholar
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16 Who in any case writes logic in an exciting style?
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