¹ Eden, Anthony, Full Circle (Boston, 1960), pp. 248–290Google Scholar, and Nutting, Anthony, Nasser (New York, 1972), pp. 68–73Google Scholar, are two accounts of the negotiations by British officials participating in them, the former within the context of British attempts to gain Egyptian agreement for retention of military bases since 1951. Studies of the Egyptian Revolution of 23 July 1952 are al-Rāfi'ī, 'Abd al-Rahman, Thawrat 23 Yuliu 1952 (The Revolution of 23 July 1959) (Cairo, 1959);Google ScholarSadat, Anwar el, Revolt on the Nile (New York, 1957);Google Scholar and Vatikiotis, P. J., The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, Ind., 1961), pp. 44–68.Google Scholar Britain's post–World War II policy is discussed in Kirk, George, The Middle East 1945–1950, Survey of International Affairs (London, 1954), pp. 116–146;Google ScholarGupta, Partha Sarathi, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914–1964 (New York, 1975), pp. 286–287;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWindrich, Elaine, British Labour's Foreign Policy (Stanford, 1952), pp. 238–243;Google Scholar and Fitzsimons, M. A., The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945–1951 (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953), pp. 67–77, 173–177.Google Scholar

² See Nasser, Gamal Abdul, Egypt's Liberation (Washington, D.C., 1956), p. 25, and el Sadat, Revolt, pp. 43–47, for mention of their reactions to 4 February.Google Scholar

³ The most detailed study, though lacking summary analysis of the materials presented, is that of Ramadān, 'Abd al-'Azīm, Tatawwur al-Harakat al-Wataniyyafī Misr 1937–1948 (Development of the Nationalist Movement in Egypt 1937–1948), 3 vols. (Beirut, n.d.), II, 192–218.Google Scholar Other Egyptian accounts are Anīs, Muhammad, 4 Febrāyir 1942 (4 02 1942) (Beirut 1972)Google Scholar which is a justification of Nahhās's actions, and two attacks on Nahhās by Haykal, Muhammad Husayn, Mudhakkirāt fi al-Siyāsa al-Misriyya (Memoirs of Egyptian Politics), 2 vols. (Cairo, 1951–1953), II, 227–246Google Scholar, and al-Rāfi'ī, , Fī A'qāb al Thawrat al-Misriyya (In the Aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution), 3 vols. (Cairo, 1949–1951), III, 101–112. Haykal was acting president of the rival Liberal Constitutionalist Party in 1942 and was ousted from office by the Wafd's return to power.Google Scholar

⁴ Western accounts are Little, Tom, Modern Egypt (New York, 1968), pp. 91–92;Google ScholarColombe, Marcel, L'Évolution de l'Égypte 1924–1950 (Paris, 1951), pp. 91–98.Google ScholarVatikiotis, P. J., A Modern History of Egypt (New York, 1969), pp. 347–349;Google ScholarBerque, Jacques, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, trans. Stewart, Jean (New York, 1972), pp. 564–567, who relies heavily on Haykal;Google Scholar and Warburg, Gabriel, ‘Lampson's Ultimatum to Faruq, 4 February 1942,’ Middle Eastern Studies, 2:1 (01, 1975), 24–32, which seeks through a very selective use of Foreign Office documents to dissassociate Lampson from any desire to have Nahhās return to office.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom (London, 1939), pp. 184–185, 244–247, 267–268.Google Scholar

⁶ F. O 371/19073/881, 1 August 1935.Google Scholar

⁷ F.O. 371/19075/1058, 13 September 1935.Google Scholar

⁸ See the discussion of ‘Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1930–1936’ in Toynbee, Arnold J. and Boulter, V. M., Survey of International Affairs, 1936 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937), pp.662–701;Google ScholarStrategic Interests, pp. 120–122;Google Scholar and Platt, Lawrence R., East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936–1939 (London, 1975), who concludes, p. 123, that the treaty was ‘a highly unequal instrument in which British imperial interests transcended the concept of Egyptian sovereignty.’Google Scholar

⁹ The Killearn Diaries, 1934–1946, ed. Evans, Trefor (London, 1972), pp. 71–72. Lampson was elevated to the peerage as Lord Killearn on 1 January 1943.Google Scholar

¹⁰ F.O. 371/19073/881, 1 August 1935.Google Scholar

¹¹ Minute by Campbell, F.O. 371/20887/612, 3 November 1937. Discussions of these issues are found in Colombe, L'Égypte, parts 1 and 3; Berque, Egypt, pp. 417–554;Google ScholarJankowski, James, ‘The Egyptian Blue Shirts and the Egyptian Wafd,’ Middle Eastern Studies, 6 (1970), 77–95;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Ramatān, , Tatawwur, vol. 1, which deals with the period 1937–1940.Google Scholar

¹² F.O. 371/20887/1227, 28 October 1937.Google Scholar

¹³ Killearn Diaries, p. 92.Google Scholar See ibid., p. 89, where Lampson, having thought he spoke ‘gently’ to Fārūq in an interview, learns of the king's resentment at having been lectured to and London's criticism that he was ‘too mild.’

¹⁴ Dismay at the subordination of national goals to political infighting had been expressed by university students in 1935 when the politicians squabbled over the leadership of the negotiating team rather than over the terms to be discussed. Though the Wafd controlled the vast majority of votes in any election, new groups were emerging reflecting disaffection from Egyptian politics and growing secularism, most particularly the Muslim Brothers. See Mitchell, Richard P., The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London, 1969), esp. pp. 12–80, 209–232, for discussion of the history of the Brothers and their impression of Egyptian society.Google Scholar Other sources questioning the factionalism of Egyptian politics and social disaffection are Berque, Egypt, pp. 451–558, and the reminiscences of al-Qādir, Zakī'Abd, Mihnat al-Dustūr 1923–1952 (The Ordeal of the Constitution 1923–1952) (Cairo, n.d.).Google Scholar

¹⁵ F.O. 371/24625/468, 16 June 1940; 371/24625/536, 17 June 1940; Killearn Diaries, pp. 120–121.Google Scholar

¹⁶ F.O. 371/24625/433, 11 June 1940; 371/24625/514, 13 June 1940; Lampson's private letter to Halifax, 371/24622/J229, 1 January 1940.Google Scholar

¹⁷ F.O. 371/24624/67 Saving, 3 April 1940.Google Scholar

¹⁸ F.O. 371/24624/346, 4 April 1940.Google ScholarCf. Ramadān, , Tatawwur, 2, 41–54, who discusses the memorandum and Lampson's response in nationalistic terms without noting the internal aspects involved as did Lampson and Fārūq at the time, the latter thinking Nahhās had played into his hands.Google Scholar

¹⁹ F.O. 371/24625/525, 15 June 1940; 371/24625/574, 21 June 1940; Halifax's reply, 371/24625/493, 22 June 1940.Google Scholar

²⁰ F.O. 371/24625/590, 23 June 1940.Google Scholar

²¹ F.O. 371/24625/592, 23 June 1940; 371/24625/599, 24 June 1940.Google Scholar

²² F.O. 371/24625/613, 26 June 1940; 371/24625/615, 26 June 1940; 371/24625/623, 27 June 1940; 371/24625/632, 29 June 1940. The palace deception is discussed in al-Tābi'ī, Muhammad, Min Asrār, al-Sāsa wa al-Siyāsa (Some Secrets of Politics and Politicians) (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 182–186.Google Scholar This book is a valuable source for palace intrigues and Hassanayn's machinations despite occasional historical inaccuracies; much of the material is derived from Hassanayn. Anīs, 4 Febrāyir, pp. 27–28, mentions the visit of 'Abd al-Wahhāb Tala'at to Nahhās but accepts his offer of coalition as genuine despite his reliance on al-Tābi'ī elsewhere. Ramadān, , Tatawwur, 2, 86–89, initially argues that Fārūq's intercession with London stopped Lampson from demanding Nahhās and then contradicts himself by detailing Hassanayn's account of his deception of Lampson, pp. 94–97.Google Scholar

²³ F.O. 371/24625/632, 29 June 1940; 371/24626/656, 3 July 1940.Google Scholar

²⁴ Al-Tābi'ī, Asrār, pp. 187–188, and F.O. 371/24626/848, 2 August 1940.Google Scholar

²⁵ Al-Tābi'ī, pp. 185–186, 192–193.Google Scholar

²⁶ F.O. 371/24626/680, 6 July 1940.Google Scholar

²⁷ F.O. 371/24627/1549, 16 November 1940; also 371/24627/1517, 14 November 1940; 371/24627/1539, 15 November 1940. A1-Tābi'ā, pp. 188–191, 212;Google ScholarRamadān, , Tatawwur, 2, 96.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Lampson to Foreign Office, F.O. 371/24626/1393, 27 October 1940 and Halifax's reply, 371/24626/1249, 2 November 1940.Google Scholar

²⁹ Vansittart minute to F.O. 371/24729/971, 15 April 1941.Google Scholar

³⁰ F.O. 371/24634/1726, 13 December 1940.Google Scholar

³¹ F.O. 371/27383/1131, 1 January 1941.Google Scholar

³² F.O. 371/24730/1251, 5 May 1941; see also 371/27433/900, 23 September 1941. Ramadān, , Tatawwur, 2, 154–160, the only detailcd account of the period May–August, treats it as one of continual rapprochement between Nahhās and Fārūq, the former supposedly agreeing with the king that Lampson was keeping Sirrī in power against them both. In actuality Nahhās kept in contact with Lampson, determined to rely on British intervention if possible and aligning himself with the palace in August to remind Lampson of the potential of a Wafd–palace alliance.Google Scholar

³³ F.O. 371/27431/566, 20 June Cf. Warburg, ‘4 February,’ p. 27, who considers it ‘absolutely clear that the idea of British intervention in Egyptian politics emanated in June 1941 from the Wafd and not from the British embassy.’ This threat of anti-British action, noted by Lampson as an attempt to use ‘the present danger to facilitate their return to power,’ came at a critical point in the desert war. British efforts to evict Rommel from Egypt and relieve Tobruk had failed on 17 June, a days before ‘Uthmān visited the embassy. In addition, the British had recently lost Greece and Crete, had been faced with a hostile government in Iraq, and were in the process of taking over Vichy-controlled Syria, a campaign that lasted from May to July: see Playfair, I. S. O., The Mediterranean and the Middle East, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, 2 (London, 1956), pp. 163–222, for treatment of these issues.Google Scholar

³⁴ F.O. 371/27432/798, 16 August 1941. See also 371/27431/2465, 7 August 1941; 371/27432/2526, 12 August 1941. Cf. al-Tābi'ī, Asrār, p. 195, where Hassanayn omits mention of Nahhās's speech of 4 August, giving the impression that the initial and subsequent contacts were the results solely of palace policy.Google Scholar

³⁵ F.O. 371/24732/807, 28 August 1941.Google Scholar

³⁶ F.O. 371/27432/2653, 23 August 1941; 371/27432/2659, 23 August 1941; 371/27432/ 2861, 14 September 1941; 371/27432/2988, 24 September 1941.Google Scholar

³⁷ There are at least, six dispatches withheld for August–September 1941 including /2642 of the 371/27432 series, dated 22 August, from Lampson to the Foreign Office to which he refers in /2653, 23 August and /807, private to Eden, 28 August.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Bateman's minutes to 371/27432/2730, 1 September 1941 and 371/27432/2961, 22 September 1941 where he argues that Nahhās must be protected from his own extravagances and Lampson's comments on Nahhās's fury at being excluded from government, 371/27432/2884, 15 September 1941.Google Scholar

³⁹ A1-Tābi'ī, Asrār, p. 198.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 199.

⁴¹ As Lampson saw, F.O. 371/27434/3508, 9 November 1941. His summary in 371/27433/900, 23 September 1941, indicated the alarm felt in London and Cairo.Google Scholar

⁴² F.O. 371/27432/2961, 23 September 1941.Google Scholar

⁴³ F.O. 371/27432/3684, 24 October 1941.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ F.O. 371/27434/3418, 30 October 1941. The emphasis is Lampson's. Bateman minuted to the dispatch that while the ‘eternal question’ was when and how the Wafd should return, it being assumed they would ‘some day,’ it should be ‘not before (his italics) the Western Desert has been cleaned up,’ a very different emphasis from Lampson's that elections should not be held until then, not the Wafd denied entrance. There was clearly no definite agreement on the conditions to be imposed, Lampson and Cairo eager to use the Wafd in power to dampen public unrest in time of crisis, London fearful of Wafd demands after the war and not wishing to have them in until the critical point had passed.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ F.O. 371/27433/3119, 4 October 1941; 371/31566/292, 22 January 1942. Haykal, , Mudhakkirāt, 2, 220–222, recounts his surprise when Sirrī introduced the matter at the cabinet meeting on 5 January and insisted it be passed then although the matter had been postponed several times previously. It seems likely that Lampson pressured Sirrī at times, being much more concerned about Egyptian relations with Vichy France than the Foreign Office which sympathized with Fārūq's position while finding it necessary and advisable to back Lampson. See minutes to 371/31566/304, 23 January 1942.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ F.O. 371/31566/284 Secret, 21 January 1942; 371/31566/290, 21 January 1942.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ F.O. 371/31566/442, 1 February 1942; 371/31570/243, 9 April 1942 which summarizes events of the period in detail; 141/829/I/2a/429, 1 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ 'Haykal Bāshā Yatahadith ‘an al-Wahda wa al-'Itilāf’ (Haykal Pasha Talks on Unity and Coalition), Ākhir Sā'a, 25 January 1942. Cf. his Mudhakkirāt, II, 223 for his account of Nahhās's welcoming coalition when suggested by Hassanayn.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ F.O. 371/31566/451, 2 February 1942. According to Lyttleton, , The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (New York, 1963), p. 265, the military was reluctant to agree to such procedures, fearing that subsequent unrest in the Egyptian military would force diversion of British forces from the front.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Foreign Office to Lampson 371/31566/572, 2 February 1942; 371/31566/602, 3 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Killearn Diaries, p. 202, and F.O. 371/31566/449, 2 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁵² F.O. 141/1/9/429, 3 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁵³ Mudhakkirāt, II, 229.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ F.O. 371/31566/468, 3 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ F.O. 371/31566/461, 3 February 1942; and Killearn Diaries, pp. 203–204. Cf. Vatikiotis, Modern History, p. 349, who states ‘it would be ludicrous to suggest that Nahhas was not, on 2 February, aware of [Lampson's] intentions’ and Berque, Egypt, p. 565, who suggests that Lampson contacted Nahhās through Amīn ‘Uthmān who was seen meeting Nahhās at the train station the morning of 3 February; Berque is borrowing here from Haykal, Mudhakkirāt, 2:243 who thinks ‘Uthmān could have been bringing with him instructions from Lampson on how to respond to Fārūq's offer of a coalition. If ‘Uthmān did meet Nahhās, the decision was then taken for the former to go to Lampson as that meeting occurred at 11 A.M.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See F.O. 371/31566/461, 3 February 1942, and Killearn Diaries, p. 204. It seems likely though unprovable that Lampson assuaged Eden's fears by assuring him he had made Eden's conditions clear to ‘Uthmān, whereas in fact he was much less emphatic, wishing to keep Nahhās in line and not scare him off as his diary suggests.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ F.O. 371/31566/461, 3 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ F.O. 371/31566/462, 3 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ F.O. 371/31566/469, 3 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Killearn Diaries, pp. 207–208.Google Scholar

⁶¹ F.O. 371/31567/482, 4 February 1942. Haykal, , Mudhakkirāt, 2, 231–232, thought the meeting was to discuss Lampson's demand for Nahhās made the evening of 3 February.Google Scholar

⁶² Mudhakkirāt, II, 234–235. The opposition leaders, desperate to hold on to the results of the 1938 elections, were quite willing to accept the results of British pressure if they included their own continuance in office.Google Scholar

⁶³ See ibid., pp. 235–238, for a discussion of the meeting, accurate except for its convenient omission of Nahhās's attack on the opposition for clinging to palace-supported cabinets and refusing to allow free elections (Anīs, 4 Fabrāyir, pp. 22–23).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Killearn Diaries, pp. 210–214; F.O. 371/31567/491, 5 February 1942.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Warburg, ‘4 February,’ p. 31.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Killearn Diaries, p. 212, and Chandos, Memoirs, p. 267, both agree that this initiative came from Lyttleton, influenced in part by Nahhās's willingness to sign the letter protesting British intervention. Cf. Ramadan, Tatawwur, II, 213–216.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 209–212, discusses these questions as does Anīs, 4 Febrāyir, pp. 73–78, who concludes that the major factor motivating Fārūq to accept confrontation was fear that the Germans would replace him with his uncle, 'Abbās Hilmī, the former Khedive deposed in 1914. Cf. Kirk, George, The Middle East in the War, Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946 (London, 1953), p. 211 and al-Tābi'ī, Asrär, p. 213, who argues that the British themselves were interested briefly in 'Abbās Hilmī.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Ramadān, Tatawwur, II, 216–217. Nahhās had Lampson agree to exchange letters on 5 February acknowledging the independence of Egyptian political life from any British interference to try to stave off inferences of British support. On the other hand, Wafdists lifted Lampson on their shoulders in triumph when he visited Parliament.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Killearn Diaries, p. 218.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ F.O. 141/1/195/42, 3 June 1942. Cf. F.O. 371/31567/550, 10 February 1942, where Lampson informs Hassanayn of his dismay that such rumors were about and insists the forces had been used only to ensure Fārūq's abdication, now being kept a secret.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Al-Tābi'ī, Asrār, pp. 228–265Google Scholar, and Ramadān, , Tatawwur, 2, 257–274. Hassanayn's lasting bitterness at Nahhās and Lampson for having wrecked his plans and determination to undermine his power are noted in al-Tābi'ī, p. 225, and F.O. 371/45917/275, 7 February 1945.Google Scholar

⁷² F.O. 371/35536/574, 16 June 1943.Google Scholar

⁷³ See the ‘General Political Review, 1944,’ F.O. 371/45921/670, 4 May 1945, and 371/41328/940, 6 May 1944. Cf. Ramadān, , Tatawwur, 2, 292–297, who sees a British conspiracy developing with Fārūq to oust Nahhās because of his nationalist demands.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ F.O. 371/41329/765, 27 June 1944; 371/41331/1645, 22 August 1944.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ F.O. 371/41332/1839, 17 September 1944; F.O. 371/41332/1844, 19 September 1944.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ F.O. 371/41131/1617, Most Personal and Secret, Lampson to Eden, 17 August 1944. See also F.O. 371/41332/1844, 19 September 1944.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See F.O. 371/41332/1228, 20 September 1944; 371/41333/1248, 25 September 1944; 371/41333/1904, 27 September 1944.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ F.O. 371/41333/1968, 5 October 1944; 371/41333/1966, 8 October 1944.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Killearn Diaries, pp. 314–315; F.O. 371/41335/229 Saving, 14 November 1944.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ F.O. 371/45916/265 Saving, 29 December 1944.Google Scholar

⁸¹ F.O. Minute, R. V. Howe to A. C. Cadogan, 371/45925/J3216, 10 September 1945, and accompanying minutes approving the suggestions by Scrivener and opposing them by Lampson.Google Scholar

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ F.O. 371/45928/J3947, 10 November 1945.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ F.O. 371/45927/J3526, 24 October 1945.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Killearn Diaries, p. 372.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Berque, Egypt pp. 583–674, is an excellent summary of these issues.Google Scholar See also, Mitchell, Muslim Brothers, pp. 35–80, 209–260, and Makarius, Raoul, La Jeunesse intellectuelle D'Egypte au lendemain de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1960).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ F.O. 371/35530/16657, 7 September 1944.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ As Fārūq's ambassador in London, 'Amr Pasha, assured Howe, F.O. 371/45925/J3216, 10 September 1945.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Little, Modern Egypt, pp. 91–92.Google Scholar

⁹¹ As the Foreign Office informed Shone, F.O. 371/41332/1228, 20 September 1944. London had already rejected Lampson's suggestion that material aid be given to the Wafd so that supplies could be distributed to the populace to alleviate social tensions, Maurice Peterson arguing that ‘we have consistently backed the Wafd against the King in recent years and now … we are being asked to back them against the Communist bogey and their own incompetence.’ Eden agreed the case was not a good one but suggested Lampson be told London could not fulfill his requests because of demands for supplies elsewhere rather than for the real reasons: see minutes to F.O. 371/41331/162 Saving, 29 August 1944. As it was assumed the palace and the new prime minister would implement the 1936 treaty, no problems seemed pressing and Scrivener could not understand ‘this frantic desire for action in Cairo’ when Shone backtracked and sought approval to try and keep Nahhāas in office: minutes to F.O. 371/41333/1904, 27 September 1944.Google Scholar

⁹² Berque, Egypt, pp. 575–576.Google Scholar

⁹³ Cf. Eden's emphasis on legality, Full Circle, pp. 248–254 ff., and the comments of Sir Oliver Franks, British ambassador in Washington from 1948–1952: ‘… we assume that our future will be of one piece with our past and that we shall continue as a Great Power. What is noteworthy is the way we take this for granted. It is not a belief arrived at after reflection by a conscious decision. It is part of the habit and furniture of our minds: a principle so much one with our outlook and character that it determines the way we act without emerging itself into clear consciousness.’ ‘Britain and the Tide of World Affairs,’ The Listener (11 November 1954), p. 788Google Scholar, quoted in Darby, Philip, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London, 1973), p. 22 who states, p. 17, that neither the Colonial nor the Foreign Office was ‘equipped to examine long-term trends and the wider implications of day-to-day policy. In the Foreign Office in particular there was an inbuilt prejudice against forward planning and before 1949 there was no desk specifically responsible for carrying it out.’Google Scholar